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Abstract
In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the
unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this
thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan
and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern no-
tions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors’ logics, making
use of a number of different formal techniques.
In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and
per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodic-
tic fragment of Aristotle’s modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to
hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic.
In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the
usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to
be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan’s treatment
of the expository syllogism.
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[Logic] is good for this at least, (wherever it is understood,) to make people talk less;
by showing them both what is, and what is not, to the point; and how extremely hard
it is to prove anything.
John Wesley, An Address To The Clergy
Crime is common. Logic is rare. Therefore it is upon the logic rather than upon the
crime that you should dwell. You have degraded what should have been a course of
lectures into a series of tales.
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure Of The Copper Beeches
For consider your calling, brothers [and sisters]: not many of you were wise according
to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth. But God
chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the
world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, even
things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are, so that no human being might
boast in the presence of God. And because of him you are in Christ Jesus, who became
to us wisdom from God, righteousness, and sanctification and redemption. . .
1 Corinthians 1:26-30, English Standard Version Anglicised.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The overarching goal of this dissertation is twofold. On the one hand, this work seeks
to better situate our understanding of two very different medieval approaches to the
treatment of modality. One tradition places the theory of modality within the study
of Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics. In this tradition, modality is grounded
within a broader theory of essences and natures. The other tradition treats modalities
as a primitive notion, where the logic is anchored and developed within a systematic
exposition of the theory of supposition and the theory of consequence. In both cases,
these approaches to modality have broader implications for the logical theories that
emerge from these authors. This thesis will look at two authors, one from each tradition.
The works of Robert Kilwardby fall within the first tradition and we will discuss his work
in the second and third chapters of this thesis. The writings of John Buridan are an
example of the second tradition and we will discuss his writings in the fourth and fifth
chapters. In both cases, we will situate them within their historical context, offering
sustained textual discussions of the theories of the modal syllogism developed by these
authors.
The other goal of this dissertation is to explore the connection between these me-
dieval conceptions of modality and modern writings on logic. As has been remarked
many times in the history of logic, the medieval period (in particular the 13th and 14th
century) was a time of fruitful, technical, thorough, and deep study on the topic of logic.
While not carried out within a symbolic language, medieval logicians developed a tech-
nical vocabulary and rigorous theories designed to handle inferences within the Lingua
Franca of the day, Latin. Our aim in this thesis is to contribute to the literature by
further exploring the relationship between the modal logics of Kilwardby and Buridan
and modern logical systems by illustrating the connections that exist between modern
and medieval logic. Our hope is that, historically, we may gain a deeper insight into the
medieval theories, and that as modern logicians we may find inspiration for the study of
new and interesting logical systems.
It is these two (sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting) desires that have
guided and shaped the present work. Before moving into an outline of the work itself,
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we need to introduce the historical figures on whose works we will be focusing.
Biography & Historical Situation
The two figures treated in this work are in many ways very different. One was a Picard
(French) secular cleric, who never advanced beyond his arts degree, but whose influence
left a lasting mark on medieval thought. The other, an English Dominican, after having
taught as an arts master, went on to a successful ecclesiastical career serving as both
Archbishop of Canterbury and as a Cardinal. It is to these two figures that we now turn.
Robert Kilwardby
The exact date and location of Robert Kilwardby’s birth are unknown, however, given
the dates that we do know about him, it seems unlikely that he was born much earlier
than 1200.1 Likewise, the location of Kilwardby’s birth is unclear. Kilwardby is clearly
English, however none of our historical sources further elaborate on where he is from.
The name ‘Kilwardby’ is a reference to his place of birth, though it appears with many
variations in spelling among the various sources. According to Sommer-Seckendorff, by
the 15th century, Kilwardby named at least two English villages, one in Leicestershire
and the other in Yorkshire, and it seems likely that Kilwardby was from one of these
places.[56, p.1]
The early dates of Kilwardby’s life are also unclear and rest on some conjecture. We
know for certain that Kilwardby was elected as provincial of the English Dominicans
in 1261. The exact dates and times of his education are unclear. We know that he
completed his Master of Arts degree at the University of Paris and later completed his
theology degree at Oxford, however, an exact chronology of this time is not well-known
or clear. One theory holds that Kilwardby completed his arts degree in the early 1220’s,
wrote the majority of his works on Aristotle2 and later took the Dominican habit some
time between 1240 and 1245. It is during this time that Kilwardby also completed his
theological studies at Oxford and stayed on to lecture there. With Kilwardby’s election
in 1261, his career as an academic came to an end, while his life as an ecclesiastical figure
began.3
While Kilwardby’s time as provincial of the Dominicans would have placed him in
contact with various important political and ecclesiastical figures of his day, it is unclear
1. One source gives his date of birth as 1204, but does not provide reference to the source. See[56, p.47
fn. 7]
2. Including the ones that we will be interested in throughout this dissertation.
3. For further exposition of this position and references see [56] and the references therein.
6
1.1 Motivation
what views Kilwardby held on many of the political issues of his day. For example, little
is known about his views on the Crusade that was initiated during his time as provincial
nor about how he sought to rectify the financial issues that faced his predecessor.4
Kilwardby went on to be elected Archbishop of Canterbury in 1272. His time as Arch-
bishop was marked by two noteworthy events, the coronation of Edward I on August
19th 1276 and Kilwardby’s issuing of a number of condemnations in 1277. A number
of important questions in the history of science revolve around Kilwardby’s role in issu-
ing these condemnations and how they related to the condemnations issued by Bishop
Stephen Tempier in Paris earlier that year. While the reasons why Kilwardby issued
these condemnations do not have any bearing on this work, their content does, as some
of Kilwardby’s condemnations are directly related to logic.5 Kilwardby was promoted
to Cardinal in 1279 and died later that year.
Our interest in Kilwardby is derived primarily from his writings on logic, in particular,
his commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, written during his time as an arts master.
This will be more fully discussed, along with the reception of the Prior Analytics in the
Latin West, in the next chapter.
John Buridan
John Buridan was born sometime around 1300 in the Diocese of Arras in Picardy. We
know that his early studies were conducted at the Colle`ge Lemoine in Paris and that he
was awarded a stipend for needy students. He went on to study for his Masters degree
at the University of Paris and was licensed to teach in the mid 1320’s. He remained at
the University of Paris for the rest of his career and did not go on to read for any higher
degrees. He also remained a secular cleric, choosing not to become a member of any of
the monastic orders.
Buridan was awarded a number of stipends and benefices over the course of his career.
Perhaps most noteworthy was the stipend he was awarded in 1348, where the committee
was composed of a theologian, two members of the law faculty, a proctor from each of
the four nations at the University of Paris, and the rector of the University.
As we have already remarked, Buridan remained an arts master his entire career. This
is unusual, as the usual course of studies for talented students (which Buridan clearly
was) was to first read for the arts degree, and then go on to read for a higher degree, often
in law or theology. Buridan’s reasons for not following this path are unknown, however
there have been a number of hypotheses put forward, none of which seem particularly
4. For further discussion of this see [56, pp.41-47].
5. See[63] for further discussions on the relationship between the condemnations and logic.
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conclusive.6 Because of Buridan’s career path, all of his writings focus on the Arts
corpus of his day. His logical works (on which we will focus our attention in this work)
are a mixture of commentaries, textbooks, questions, and specific treatises. Buridan’s
writings covered the entire Organon, Metaphysics and Physics, among other works.
Buridan’s decision to remain a secular cleric is also noteworthy. By this point in
the Middle Ages, the various mendicant orders had developed distinct and influential
positions that had shaped the study of theology at the University of Paris.7 By standing
outside of these orders, Buridan was free to develop his thoughts and ideas in a way
unhindered by commitments to particular figures within a particular order. For example,
while Buridan embraces parts of William of Ockham’s nominalism, he also was free
to criticise Ockham on a number of occasions and may even have contributed to the
suspension of the teaching of particular ‘Ockhamist’ doctrines during his time as Rector
at the University of Paris.
Beyond the information sketched above, we know very little about Buridan’s life and
about the influences that led to the development of his logical theorising. He is believed
to have died around 1360. More information about Buridan’s life can be found in [69]
and the references contained therein.
Buridan’s writings covered the traditional arts corpus. His magnum opus is his Sum-
mulae de Dialectica, a massive textbook based on Peter of Spain’s Summulae which has
been heavily redacted. Buridan provides two main accounts of the modal syllogism in
his writings. The first occurs in the final book of the Treatise on Consequences. The
second occurs in Book Five of his Summulae De Dialectica.8 The two accounts differ
on a few points, some of which are relevant for our purposes in this thesis. In par-
ticular, the Summulae provides counterexamples to QXM Disamis and QXM Baroco.9
The semantics that we will present agree with the Summulae that these are invalid.
The countermodels can be found in the appendix on pages 221 and 222 respectively.
Our focal point of discussion will be on the Treatise on Consequences as it contains a
more compact treatment of the material and because it is situated within a work which
discusses Buridan’s logic more generally. When it is helpful to understand Buridan’s
thoughts more generally (for example, his discussion of per se terms, see page 155 and
onward), we will draw on his material in the Summulae as well.
6. This point is discussed or alluded to in a few of the papers in [58].
7. See [69, p.xii]
8. English translations of the two works can be found in [51] and [5] respectively. There is an older
translation of the Treatise, [25], which will not be referenced. The English translations provided here
are due to a recently published translation of the text by Stephen Read. Most of the other translations
have been taken from the works that they are cited in.
9. We discuss this terminology on page 106.
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The Structure of the Thesis
Having introduced the two main historical figures on which this work is focused and
offered some comments explaining the motivation for this thesis, we will now discuss
its structure. The thesis is organised into seven chapters which are interspersed with
historical, formal and philosophical content. The first and seventh chapters are the
Introduction and Conclusion respectively. Chapter Two provides a historical analysis of
Kilwardby’s commentary on the Prior Analytics, and situates his remarks on modality
within the broader Medieval Aristotelian tradition. Particular attention will be paid to
the reception of the Prior Analytics in the Latin West, Kilwardby’s analysis of modal
terms, his discussion of the modal syllogistic, and his more general theory of inference.
This will in turn require that we explicate the distinction between per se and per accidens
modality, and the distinction between natural and accidental consequences. In Chapter
Three we will develop a formal model for Kilwardby’s theory of modality. The main
aim in this chapter will be to incorporate the essentialist theory that Kilwardby is using
within a general modal framework of concepts. The resulting theory will be used to
provide a formal reconstruction of Kilwardby’s analysis of Aristotle and to develop a
formal treatment of Kilwardby’s theory of natural and accidental consequences. In
Chapter Four we will discuss Buridan’s theory of the modal syllogism as presented in
his Treatise on Consequences. We will provide an exposition of Buridan’s theory of
consequence and the results of his analysis. Chapter Five provides a formalisation of
Buridan’s results within the framework of modal logic. Here we will develop two formal
theories, one based on the theory of supposition presented in Chapter Four and another
based on Buridan’s theory of the expository syllogism, which we will develop in Chapter
Five. With this in place we prove that Buridan’s treatment of the divided fragment of
his modal syllogistic is 1) consistent, and 2) prove that it is complete, relative to our
formalisition of Buridan’s theory of the expository syllogism. Finally, in Chapter Six,
we will bring together the results of chapters Two through Five and conclude with some
philosophical reflections on the theories of modality employed by both authors. Our
main aims will be to compare Kilwardby’s and Buridan’s analysis of modal logic. We
will pay particular attention to the role that essences play in Buridan’s theorising, and
to the role of the expository syllogism in Kilwardby. We will then explore some of the
ontological questions that Buridan’s analysis of modal logic raise. Finally, we will raise a
methodological question which will help to draw together the main results of this thesis.
Here we will discuss the use of modern formal logic as a tool with which to study such
historical theories.
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2 Kilwardby’s Commentary on the Prior
Analytics
The goal of this chapter is to outline Kilwardby’s theory of the modal syllogism and
situate it within its larger historical context. To that end, the structure of this chapter
will be tailored to show how the various elements of Kilwardby’s logic come together
to give rise to the modal syllogism. The chapter will be divided into three sections.
The first section will begin with some historical background and set the stage for the
reception of the Prior Analytics, discussing the form of the text that Kilwardby was
likely commenting from. The second section will discuss Kilwardby’s treatment of the
assertoric syllogism. In the final section, we will look at the key parts of Kilwardby’s
theory of modal propositions.
There are a number of important connections that we will need to focus on in this
chapter. In our discussion of the assertoric syllogism, we will focus on Kilwardby’s theory
of signification and how this can be used to give truth conditions for assertoric and tensed
categorical propositions. What we will see here is that Kilwardby distinguishes between
two ways of giving truth conditions to assertoric propositions, one based on conceptual
connections between terms and the other based on classes of objects that fall under
terms. After that, we will turn to Kilwardby’s analysis of consequence and discuss when
various propositions entail other propositions. Here particular attention will be paid
to Kilwardby’s distinction between natural and accidental consequences, which will be
important in our formal reconstruction of Kilwardby’s theory. The section will then
conclude with Kilwardby’s definition of a syllogism. Within the modal portion of this
chapter, our main focus will be on Kilwardby’s conception of necessity. We will not
discuss Kilwardby’s analysis of propositions of contingency. Our main focus will be on
Kilwardby’s distinction between per se and per accidens modalities. Our main goal will
be to clarify what they are, how they are to be understood, and the inferential properties
that they possess. We will then conclude by bringing all of these components together
and explore how Kilwardby conceives of the modal syllogism.
2.1 Historical Background
Kilwardby’s writings covered a wide range of topics including grammatical, philosophical,
biblical, and theological writings. In this chapter we will concern ourselves mostly with
Kilwardby’s commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. However we will draw from
papers dealing with Kilwardby’s comments on the Logica Vetus as well. The commentary
on the Prior Analytics is an exposition of Aristotle’s text together with Kilwardby’s
analysis, and, in some places, attempted defence of the various views Aristotle puts
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forward. While Kilwardby attempts to portray Aristotle in as positive a light as possible,
he also strives for an account of logic that is both systematic and consistent.
The reception of the Prior Analytics in the Latin West is an interesting story and a
brief summary of it helps illuminate the historical importance of Kilwardby’s commen-
tary. The Prior Analytics is one of six Aristotelian texts that made up the Organon.1
These texts were often ‘introduced’ by Porphyry’s Isagoge.[7, p.1] After the collapse of
the Roman Empire, only some of these texts were transmitted and closely studied in
the Latin West. The Prior Analytics was one of the texts that was not transmitted
directly. Before the 10th century, those working in the Latin West had to make do with
second-hand accounts. It was not until c.980 that a copy of Boethius’ De Syllogismo
Categorico was recovered [7, p.2] and it was not until the writings of Abelard that we
find explicit references to the Prior Analytics again.
However, during the 11th century the influence of the Prior Analytics was slight. It
was not until the 12th century that the Prior Analytics begins to exert some influence on
medieval thinkers. For example, Peter Abelard seems to have made some study of the
text and his pupil Otto Freisingen is said to have brought a copy of the text to Germany.
[12, p.97] The reception of the Prior Analytics seems to have been slowed by a number
of factors. For one, it seems that many 12th century scholars believed the views of the
book were better articulated in other works. For example, John of Salisbury remarks
that:
Although we need its doctrine, we do not need the book itself that much.
For whatever is contained there is presented in an easier and more reliable
manner elsewhere, though nowhere in a truer or more forceful manner.2[12,
p.97]
Very few commentaries on the Prior Analytics have survived from the 12th century
and those that have, only in fragments. [12, p.99] Thus it is Kilwardby’s Commentary
on the Prior Analytics that, so far as we are aware, is the first completely preserved
commentary on this work.[12, p.101] As such, it offers us insights into the role of this
text and its function in medieval academic practice.
Kilwardby’s treatment of Aristotle’s work, as we shall see, is sophisticated, interest-
ing, and exerted considerable influence on the logicians and philosophers that followed
Kilwardby. The work itself is massive, coming to almost 300,000 words, and does not
currently exist in a critical edition, although one is currently being undertaken by Paul
Thom. To better understand this work, we will attempt to collect various elements of
Kilwardby’s views.
1. The other five texts were the Categories, On Interpretation, the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and
the Sophistical Refutations.
2. According to Ebbesen the work to which John refers is probably Boethius’ On Categorical
Syllogisms.[12, p.97]
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In order to understand Kilwardby’s analysis of the modal syllogism, it may prove helpful
to look at the following parts of Kilwardby’s theory:
1. Kilwardby’s discussion of truth and signification.
2. Kilwardby’s analysis of logical consequence and syllogistic form.
3. Kilwardby’s analysis of modality.
We will treat these parts in succession in separate sections. With each of these pieces
of the theory in place, we will then look at how the modal syllogism emerges from these
different elements.
Kilwardby’s account of logical consequence differs from the modern ‘classical’ concep-
tions of logical consequence in a number of important ways. For example, Kilwardby
distinguishes two kinds of logical consequence, one that, we will argue, is connexive in
nature, and another that is not. Kilwardby’s theory counts syllogistic reasoning as valid
in connexive logic (and in classical logic as well). For our purposes in this chapter, the
term ‘connexive logic’ will refer to any logic where the principles: ‘If A implies B then
it is not the case that A implies not B’ and ‘It is not the case that A implies not A’
both hold. It should be observed that, depending on how we interpret the negation in
the second principle, there are two ways of conceiving of it. On one view, we would
understand these to be saying that for all formulae A ‘It is not a theorem of our logic
that A implies not A’. The stronger view would assert that, for all A, ‘It is not the case
that A implies not A’ is valid in our system. It should be observed that, regardless of
how the second principle is understood, it is not compatible with classical logic, since,
‘(B & not B) implies not (B & not B)’ is a theorem of classical logic.
We will have more to say about some of the formal properties of connexive logics in
the next chapter.3 The starting point for the contemporary discussion of connexive logic
is [42] and [41]. Following McCall, we will refer to the first principle as Boethius’ Thesis
and the second as Aristotle’s Thesis. Later in this chapter we will also touch on parallels
between Abelard and Kilwardby’s accounts of implication. In that context we will also
discuss something that Martin [40, p.191] calls Abelard’s first thesis, which states that
‘it is not the case that both A implies B and A implies not B’.
Kilwardby treats several kinds of modals in his work. In this thesis we are going to
only focus on those modals that are grounded in the essence of the terms which occur in
the syllogism. The other sort of modals, which are used to distinguish two senses of con-
tingency, are based on the disposition of objects to change. As such, for Kilwardby, there
are two kinds of contingencies. One kind of contingency is the usual modal definition of
contingency. The other kind of contingency is grounded in the tendencies of particular
objects to change or develop in particular ways. Both the essentialist modalities and the
dispositional modalities are underpinned by an Aristotelian ontology. When Kilwardby
discusses modalities of necessity, there are two kinds. Necessity can be divided into
3. See page 56
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necessity per se or necessity per accidens. This distinction turns on the idea that some
properties are held in virtue of the essence of a term, and other properties are held nec-
essarily but are not essential to the object. As we shall see, this is at the heart of much
of Kilwardby’s theory. However, before we turn to this, we need to unpack Kilwardby’s
treatment of assertoric propositions.
2.2.1 Truth and Signification
As is well-known, for most medieval thinkers the theory of signification served as the
backbone and foundation for medieval theories of truth and, by extension, theories of
inference.4 Kilwardby, like many medieval authors, grounds his discussion of signification
in Aristotle’s comments in the De Interpretatione 16a 3-8:
Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all
men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs
of—affections of the soul— are the same for all; and what these affections
are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same. These matters have been
discussed in the work on the soul and do not belong to the present subject.[1,
p.25]
According to Conti, Kilwardby starts his discussion of signification in his commen-
tary on De Interpretatione by explaining exactly what written and spoken terms sig-
nify. [10, p.70-72]5 Kilwardby’s view is that words primarily signify passiones animae
and the objects themselves. However, Kilwardby does not think that words signify a
multiplicity.[10, p.71]6 On Kilwardby’s account this is because “concepts imitate the
things by which they come to be, taking on their forms”[10, p.72].7 It is this similarity
between the concept and the thing picked out by the concept that ensures that words
do not signify a multiplicity. They signify the concepts, and then the concepts have this
similarity with the things in the world. Visually, we can represent this as follows:
4. Buridan being a noteworthy exception, preferring to use the theory of supposition. We will consider
Buridan’s views more fully in Chapter Three.
5. It should be noted that in medieval discussions of signification it is either assumed that one is working
with terms that do signify or a distinction is drawn between those terms that signify and those which
do not. This is to rule out cases where the propositions are grammatically well-formed, but one or
both of the terms is meaningless.
6. For Kilwardby, a word is an utterance (vox) together with the act of signifying. The utterance
functions as the matter, while the act of signifying gives the utterance form.[10, p.71]
7. Conti cites two passages from Kilwardby for this:
“Ex quo patet quod non dicemus ipsam vocem rem et intellectum significantem plura significare” and
“Intellectus est similitudo rerum; fit enim ad imitationem rei et ex ea generatur”.[10, p.83, f.20].
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Concepts
Words Objects
NaturalConventional
Mediately Signifies
For many of the medievals the signification of concepts by words was conventional. On
Kilwardby’s view there is no intrinsic relationship between, for example, the word ‘homo’
in Latin (or the word ‘man’ in English) and the concept that the word signifies (in both
cases the concept of humanity). However, the relationship between concepts and the
objects which fell under those concepts was not a conventional one, but natural. To use
the modern phraseology suggested by the diagram, there is a relation from concepts to
objects that, in some important sense, maps the structure of the concept onto structure in
the objects. Kilwardby’s view is a fairly standard medieval realist reading of signification.
On this view, written terms immediately signify mental terms. Mental terms, in turn
immediately and naturally signify things in the world. Hence for Kilwardby, there are
two ways of understanding the signification of terms. On the one hand we can think of
terms as the names that are given to various things.8 This corresponds to the mediate
sense of signification. On this account we can think of terms as composed of utterances
and which in turn can be combined with other utterances to form propositions. For
example, on this reading, the term ‘man’ can be used to signify the various men in the
world (if there are any). On the other hand we can think of the signification of terms as
expressing relationships between various kinds of concepts in a mental language. In this
case we are interested in the immediate signification of the words. On this view, terms
signify thoughts or concepts. Both of these are important for signification, because it
means that either a term can signify a class of objects, or it can refer to the concept the
term expresses. Both notions of signification will be important for our discussions about
logical consequence and for how we formalise Kilwardby’s modal logic.
With the theory of signification in place, we can then move on to discuss when propo-
sitions are true or false. Kilwardby follows the standard medieval formulation of truth,
which states that a proposition is true if and only if it signifies how things are in the
world.9 One of the concerns that Kilwardby focused on was how to use the theory of
signification to account for the truth of complex propositions, e.g. conjunctions, disjunc-
tions, etc.10 For Kilwardby, truth is to be understood as a kind of relationship between
8. i.e. ‘est sermo de termino ut est praedicabilis’
9. [10, p.70] It is worth observing that the signification here would be the mediate kind.
10. For now we will use the term ‘proposition’ in a loose and imprecise sense to range over both significative
utterances and the content expressed by such utterances. Kilwardby’s account has some difficulty in
separating these two ideas and at this point we will not attempt to disentangle the two either.
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concepts and things in the world. However, this does not tell us how we are to account
for the truth or falsity of complex expressions. Terms (like ‘Socrates’ or ‘man’) cannot
be true or false as they only signify things in the world. They do not signify how things
are. In contrast, complex expressions generally, and in particular subject–predicate
propositions, can be true or false.11 According to Kilwardby this is because complex
expressions signify the realities to which the sentence refers.[10, p.76] For example, the
expression ‘Socrates’ may signify the philosopher Socrates12, but it does not describe
or signify anything about how the world is, so it cannot be true or false. Whereas, if
we say ‘Socrates exists’ (and Socrates refers to the ancient Greek philosopher) then this
signifies that Socrates exists, which is currently false, because Socrates is dead.
An interesting complication of this analysis emerges when Kilwardby gives truth con-
ditions for past and future tensed propositions. As we just observed, ‘Socrates exists’ is
false (assuming we are referring to the ancient Greek philosopher) because he is dead,
and so the name ‘Socrates’ does not signify an object that exists. What is important here
is that the tense of the verb, in this case, ‘exists’ (Latin: ‘est’), determines the time at
which the proposition is evaluated. Now, Kilwardby wants the proposition ‘Socrates ex-
isted’ to come out true. But then, how are we to understand the signification of ‘Socrates
existed’? Kilwardby’s answer is that it signifies the present tense proposition referring
to the past.13 On Kilwardby’s reading, ‘Caesar fuit’ signifies ‘praeteritio Caesaris sive
memoria est’ ([10, p.76]) i.e. ‘Caesar existed’ signifies that ‘Caesar exists in the past or is
remembered.’ Kilwardby’s strategy is a natural one: he tries to paraphrase the difficulty
of past tense propositions away by using present tensed propositions that refer to those
times. This also brings out some of the subtlety of Kilwardby’s theory. First, when we
say that ‘Caesar exists in the past’ what exactly is the signification of this proposition?
The name Caesar still signifies the person. The term ‘exists in the past’ presumably
signifies the various things that existed in the past. What is interesting here is that,
given what we have already seen, there needs to be some sort of fact that grounds this
relationship. Unfortunately, Kilwardby does not tell us what kind of fact this might be.
The other disjunct is simpler, and might also be more helpful. According to Kilwardby
it is sufficient for the past-tense proposition to be true if there is an individual who is
thinking about Caesar. In this case, it is the fact that there is a person who currently
exists who remembers Caesar that grounds the truth of the proposition. Regardless,
either way the goal is to paraphrase past tense expressions in terms of present facts
about those past tense terms and phrases.
As we have already seen, Kilwardby analyses tensed terms disjunctively. For simple
propositions like ‘Socrates runs’, all that is required is that Socrates be running. How-
ever, when we turn to complex propositions things become more complicated. In this
11. At least in a loose way of speaking. Kilwardby would argue that, strictly speaking, truth is a property
that is held by things in the world, not by sentences or other linguistic expressions. See [10, p.75].
12. At this point it is helpful to simply bracket the discussion of how we assign names to the objects
that they pick out. In many cases, the medievals used names like Socrates, Aristotle, etc., in a way
that is similar to how modern philosophers use the names John, Alice, Bob, etc., not as referring to
particular historical figures, but as generic persons for making a particular point.
13. The follow follows Conti’s analysis. See [10, p.76].
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context, a complex proposition is one that contains conjunctions, disjunctions, or similar
constructions. These operations can occur in a number of places. For example ‘Socrates
or Plato is running’ and ‘John runs and Plato sleeps’ are both complex propositions. In
the case of complex propositions such as ‘Socrates runs or Plato swims’, it is not obvious
if there needs to be a single fact in the world that corresponds to this disjunction, i.e.
what we might now call a ‘disjunctive fact’ which exists over and above the disjuncts,
or if all that is required is that one of the disjuncts be true. Regardless, categorical
propositions can then be given truth conditions in terms of their signification in the
usual way. For example, ‘Every A is B’ is true just in case anything that is signified by
A is also signified by B. This can then be disambiguated according to Kilwardby’s notion
of signification to give two different sets of truth conditions, one based on the concepts
expressed by A and B and another for the objects which fall under the extension of A
and B. Kilwardby does not discuss when negative propositions are true or false. This
can easily be done by defining negative propositions as the contradictory of the affir-
mative propositions. It should be remarked, however, that this is not a very medieval
way handle this. Usually medieval authors treat affirmative and negative categorical
propositions equally and as primitive.14
This distinction between what we might call the ‘mediate’ and ‘immediate’ senses of
signification is extremely important for our formal treatment of Kilwardby’s theory and
will be required to make sense of a number of things that Kilwardby speaks of. This
distinction gives rise to two ways different ways proposition such as e.g. ‘Every A is
B’ can be true. For example, the proposition ‘Every man is an animal’ will always be
true on the conceptual reading, since the concept of ‘man’ contains or makes use of the
concept of ‘animal’. However, if we read ‘Every man is an animal’ based on the objects
that fall under the terms, then this will come out false in the cases where there are
no objects that fall under the term ‘man’. In [61, p.14] a number of distinctions that
Kilwardby desired to preserve are listed. Inspired by the last item in this list, let us
refer to the ‘conceptual’ reading as expressing ‘habitual predications’, and the ‘object’
reading’ as ‘actual predications’. In our formal treatment of Kilwardby, we will separate
out these two classes of semantic readings and explore the kinds of logical machinery
that can be used to represent them.15
Before turning to our analysis of other parts of Kilwardby’s theory, we need to take a
metaphysical detour and examine his theory of being and essence, as the theory plays an
important role in his logical theorising. As we have already remarked, the proposition
‘Every man is running’ can be considered in one of two ways. The crucial difference
hinges on what the terms ‘man’ and ‘running’ signify. They could signify one of two
things. They could signify men and things running respectively, or they could signify
the concepts of ‘man’ and ‘running’. In the first case the proposition would be true if
every man were indeed running. In the second case, the proposition would be true if
14. Alternatively, and equivalently, one could simply put a negation in front of the truth conditions that
Kilwardby gives. According to the usual semantics of negative categorical propositions, a universal
negative is true if everything that supposits for A does not supposit for B, and a particular negative
is true if there is some A that does not supposit for B or A does not supposit for anything.
15. See page 46.
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the concept ‘man’ contained or in some sense entailed the concept of ‘running’(which
presumably it does not). But what exactly is this notion of containment? Its use is
critical to Kilwardby’s analysis of natural and accidental consequences to which we now
turn.
2.3 Consequence & Modality
2.3.1 Consequence
Kilwardby’s analysis of logical consequence takes two notions of consequence as primitive.
The first kind of consequence is one of natural consequence. These are consequences that
follow because the consequent is understood in the antecedent (i.e. they follow because
there is an essential relationship between the consequent and the antecedent such that
the consequent follows in virtue of the essence of the antecedent). The second kind is an
accidental consequence and is illustrated by the general idea that the necessary follows
from everything.16
Kilwardby illustrates accidental inferences with the example: “You are an ass, so you
are not an ass”. Kilwardby tells us that, “in such consequences, when one opposite fol-
lows from the other, it is not because one opposite posits the other; but the consequent
posits itself on account of its own necessity and not on account of the antecedent. So,
in natural consequences the antecedent posits its consequent; but in accidental conse-
quences this is not necessary.”[60, pp.55-56]17
It is this distinction, the idea that in a natural consequence the antecedent posits
the consequent, whereas in accidental consequences this does not have to happen, that
differentiates the two classes of logical consequence. But this raises the question as to
how we should conceive of the sort ‘understanding’ that Kilwardby speaks of. How
exactly are we supposed to be able to tell if a consequence is natural or accidental?
When Kilwardby says that in natural consequences the consequent is understood in its
antecedent, this should not be taken in an epistemic way. The containment in question
is one of containment in virtue of meaning, or put differently, in virtue of the essence of
the thing signified by the term. What we see here is that if the consequent is part of the
definition of the antecedent, then the consequence is natural.
A consequence is said to be accidental (or said to be a material consequence) if there
is no situation in which the antecedent can be true and the consequent false. This is
the sense of logical consequence that is more familiar to most modern students of logic.
Having said how we can identify a natural consequence and an accidental consequence,
we should discuss how these two notions relate to one another. Are these two different
16. It is important to realise here that this principle is only illustrative. It would be possible to illustrate
the same idea by using Ex Impossibile Quodlibet or another logical principle that violates the impos-
sible containment relationship. What is important is that this kind of logical consequence is not fine
grained enough to distinguish between essential and non-essential implications.
17. Quod autem in talibus consequentiis unum oppositorum sequitur ad alterum non est quia unum oppos-
itorum ponit alterum, sed ipsum consequens propter necessitatem sui ponitur et non propter suum
antecedens. In consequentiis ergo naturalibus antecedens ponit suum consequens, in consequentiis
autem accidentalibus non est hoc necesse.
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but equally good notions of logical consequence or is one a subset of the other (in the
sense that, e.g., all natural consequences are accidental consequences but not vice versa)?
We shall see that these are in fact two different notions of logical consequence, where
we can think of natural consequences and accidental consequences as a subdivision of
the kinds of valid logical consequences. We will also see in our formal treatment of
Kilwardby that we can think of natural consequences as a finer grained notion of logical
consequence that does not accept all accidental consequences as valid. Likewise, we can
treat accidental consequences as the logical consequences that are valid, but are not
natural consequences.
It is interesting to observe that for Kilwardby, natural consequences give rise to a class
of what are now referred to as connexive logics. There are two principles that Kilwardby
takes to characterise natural consequences. The first is that a disjunction follows from
either of its disjuncts.18 The second is that no proposition follows from its own negation
in a natural consequence.
And it is to be said that there are two types of consequences: positive or
accidental (and here it is not unacceptable that one of a pair of opposites
follows from the other, as has been shown), and natural or essential conse-
quence (and here one of a pair of opposites does not follow from the other
and this is what Aristotle means here).19
What is important to notice about this passage is that it emerges within Kilwardby’s
discussion of Prior Analytics 2.4.2021
This is a very complicated passage of Aristotle and it is the place where Aristotle
endorses what has come to be known as Aristotle’s Thesis. The reconstruction of the
passage sketched below follows Smith’s notes in his translation of the Prior Analytics[2,
p.190-191]. In this passage, Aristotle starts his deduction with the assumptions:
1. If A is white, then B is large.
2. If A is not white, then B is large.
From these two pairs, with a bit of work, Aristotle deduces that ‘If B is not large then B
is large’, which Aristotle rejects as an impossibility. The general form of the contradictory
of ‘If B is not large then B is large’ has come to be known as Aristotle’s thesis, and can
be stated, somewhat convolutedly in English as saying that ‘It is impossible that if not
18. Adhuc disiunctiua sequitur ad utrumque sui partem, et hoc naturali consequentia. See [24, ad B4
59a]. It should be noted that the first part of the quoted passage occurs within the context of an
objection and the second part is Kilwardby’s response, where he accepts the principle.
19. Et dicendum quod consequentia duplex est, scilicet positiua sive accidentalis (et ibi non est inconue-
niens unum oppositorum sequi ex alio, sicut ostensum est), et consequentia naturalis sive essentialis
(et ibi non sequitur unum oppositorum ex alio, et hoc intendit hic Aristoteles) [24, p.ad B4 60a]
20. Much of what follows is inspired by an unpublished book that Professor Thom was very kind to allow
me look at.
21. ie. Prior Analytics 57A37-57B17. See [3, III, 104 18-19].
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A then A’.22 What is important for our purposes here is to note that Aristotle says the
proposition needs to be impossible, otherwise the reductio argument does not work. This
is a strong claim, and, when working in non-modal connexive propositional systems, the
formula ¬(¬A→ A) is taken either as an axiom or shown to follow from other axioms.23
It should also be observed that, in classical logic, ¬(¬A→ A) is equivalent to ¬A and is
not a theorem of classical logic. We include this digression here because it is important
to be clear that this principle, which Kilwardby affirms, is the same principle that some
modern commentators view as connexive, and in what follows we will take Kilwardby to
be defending the strong form of this thesis.
Further, a disjunction follows from either of its parts – and in a natural
consequence. Hence, it follows ‘If you are sitting then you are sitting or you
are not sitting; and if you are not sitting then you are sitting or you are not
sitting’. And so the same thing follows from the being and the not being of
the same thing in a natural consequence and thus of necessity. 24
We can also further strengthen the idea that Kilwardby is endorsing a kind of connexive
logic by drawing parallels to other medieval connexive logicians. Our focus here will be
on Peter Abelard. In the recent literature on Abelard, he has been seen as a defender
of connexive logic. As the connections made here should hopefully bring out, there are
a number of interesting parallels between Kilwardby’s thinking on natural consequences
and Abelard’s discussion of entailment. By pointing out these parallels we will strengthen
the case for Kilwardby as a defender of connexive implication as well. At this point,
our intention is to simply point out the parallels between these two thinkers’ approaches
to logic, not to discuss what kind of relationship might (or might not) exist between
Kilwardby and Abelard on logic (e.g. we will not explore the possibility that Kilwardby
may be aware of Abelard’s logic or the common texts that may have served as the basis
for both Kilwardby’s and Abelard’s views on logic).
Like Kilwardby, Abelard distinguishes between two different kinds of necessity. Martin
writes:
The explanation of Abelard’s reference to two kinds of necessity is to be found
in his theory of the relation of substances to their properties and accidents.
In the Isagoge Porphyry introduces a distinction between separable accidents
such as being seated for humans, and inseparable accidents such as being
black for crows, and gives as the general definition of an accident that it
is something which may be present or absent without the corruption of its
subject. [40, p.183]
22. In the first case by we are taking ‘B is not large’ to be not A, and B is large, to be A.
23. For example, see the treatments of connexive logic in [42], [41].
24. Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum 2.4 dub.1: Adhuc disiunctiua sequitur ad utrumque sui partem, et
hoc naturali consequentia. Quare sequitur si tu sedes, tu sedes vel tu non sedes; et si tu non sedes,
tu sedes vel non sedes. Et ita naturali consequentia sequitur idem ad idem esse et non esse et ita ex
necessitate. [24, ad B4 59a] starting on line 36.
20
2.3 Consequence & Modality
We have already seen a very similar form of this distinction in Kilwardby, namely the
distinction between per se and per accidens modalities. Also, like Kilwardby, Abelard
observes that there seem to be two kinds of necessity of consecution i.e. two kinds of
implications. Abelard writes:
There seem to be two kinds of necessity of consecution. A broader kind, which
is found where the antecedent cannot hold without the consequent. Another
narrower kind, where not only can the antecedent not be true without the
consequent but also of itself requires (exigit) the consequent. This latter
necessity is the proper sense of consecution and the guarantee of immutable
truth. As, for example, when it is said if something is human, then it is
an animal, human is properly antecedent to animal since it of itself requires
animal. Because animal is contained in the substance of human, animal is
always predicated with human. [40, p.182]
As in the case of Kilwardby, Abelard also distinguishes two kinds of implications, one
based on the idea that an implication holds just in case the antecedent cannot hold
without the consequent, and another more narrow account. As in the case of Kilwardby,
this more narrow account is based on a further criterion, namely that the essence of the
antecedent contains in it, as part of the essence, the consequent, as in the case of animal
being part of the essence of human.
We quoted Kilwardby earlier as denying that the same thing follows from a proposition
and its negation in natural consequences (see pg. 19). We find this principle in Abelard
as well. Martin writes:
Two of these principles stand at the center of Abelard’s logic and provide,
as it were, the rules of proof corresponding to the semantics of containment.
The first of them is Abelard’s version of Aristotle’s Principle, noted above,
that the same cannot follow both from something and its opposite. Abelard’s
version is propositional and properly represented as: “not {(p → q)&(¬p →
q)}” [40, p.191]
Martin reconstructs Abelard’s reasoning for why this form follows from Aristotle’s
Thesis by means of the following reductio argument:
(1) p→ q Hypothesis
(2) ¬p→ q Hypothesis
(3) ¬q → ¬p I1, Modus Tollens
(4) ¬q → q 3,2 Transitivity
A similar argument is given to show that p → ¬p would follow. Another point of
observation is that on line (3) what Martin cites as Modus Tollens is what we might also
refer to as contraposition.
That (4) is inconsistent on Abelard’s view, is supported by the following passage:
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No one doubts them to be embarrassing, or inconsistent, because the truth
of one of a pair of dividing propositions not only does not require the truth of
the other but rather entirely expels and extinguishes it. (Dial. 290.2527)[40,
p.191]
As we saw in our discussion of Aristotle, Abelard also endorses the stronger sense
of Aristotle’s Thesis.25 Given these considerations then, it seems plausable to take
Kilwardby as also committed to a strong kind of connexive implication. For reasons
for space we will not further explore the possible connections between Abelard and
Kilwardby, however, this will be briefly remarked on in the conclusion of this thesis as
possible future work.
2.3.2 Modality
The theory of modality has a long history going back to Aristotle. Within this work
we will limit our attention to Kilwardby’s treatment of the modal syllogism as it is
discussed in his Commentary on the Prior Analytics. The most natural place to start
is with Kilwardby’s understanding of modes and the kinds of modal terms that result
from them.
Kilwardby distinguishes between two kinds of necessary modal relationships that can
hold between terms. Two terms can be related so as to be necessary per se or be related
so as to be necessary per accidens. It should be noted that terms may fail to be related to
each other in either way. This distinction between per se and per accidens is not unique
to Kilwardby, but traces its origins to Aristotle. In Posterior Analytics I 4-6, Aristotle
introduces four different ways that the term per se can be taken to function. The passage
is known for being difficult in a number of ways. Thankfully, we only need to take away
two things from Kilwardby’s treatment of Aristotle, which are nicely summed up by the
following quotation from Henrik Lagerlund:
Aristotle discusses four different notions of per se predication but Kilwardby
. . . seems to only have the first two in mind when referring to per se. Aristotle
says that the first type of per se predication (per se primo modo) occurs when
the definition of the subject includes the predicate. The second type of per se
predication (per se secundo modo) occurs when the definition of the predicate
includes the subject. . . to complete the picture of per se predication, one
should discuss the concepts of genus, species, difference and proprium. This
is not done by Kilwardby. . . who only very briefly states what [he] means by
necessity per se. [35, p.30-31]
The first thing to take away is the unfortunate reality that, as far as I am aware,
Kilwardby does not provide a sustained discussion of the notions of genus, species,
25. Recall that this is of the form: The stronger view would assert that, for all A, ‘It is not the case that
A implies not A’ is valid in our system.
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etc., in the commentary on the Prior Analytics. As such, this means that some of our
reconstruction of Kilwardby’s logic will have to be somewhat speculative on these points.
The second thing to observe is the distinction between per se primo modo and per
se secundo modo. This distinction is very important and will be helpful to understand
exactly how Kilwardby understands per se modalities. As was stated above, A is said
to be per se primo modo B if the definition of A includes or makes use of the definition
of B, while A is per se secundo modo B if the definition of B includes or makes use of A.
For example, ‘Every man is an animal’ is true per se primo modo since the definition of
‘man’ makes use of the definition of ‘animal’. While ‘Every man is capable of laughter’
would be true per se secundo modo since ‘man’ is part of the definition of ‘capable of
laughter’ because, according to the medievals, this a property unique to man alone.
One of the questions that we will need to answer is, by per se, does Kilwardby mean
per se primo modo or per se secundo modo? From what we have already seen about
natural consequences it is clear that what Kilwardby has in mind for these kinds of
consequences are per se primo modo predications. To see this, recall that in a natural
consequence it is the antecedent that posits the consequence, i.e. it is in virtue of the
nature of the antecedent that the consequent is said to follow. In what follows when we
speak of one term being per se, we will mean per se primo modo unless otherwise stated.
The use of the distinction between being per se predicated of another term or per
accidens predicated was employed to attempt to dissolve some purported counterexam-
ples to conversion. In looking at these counterexamples, the relationship to essentialist
modalities comes through clearly. The counterexample to conversion normally ran as
follows: ‘Every man is necessarily literate’ therefore ‘Something literate is necessarily
a man’. There are two challenges here. The first challenge is to understand why this
inference may be problematic, and second, to explain how that problematic inference is
to be dissolved.26
To address the first point, observe that the proposition ‘Every man is necessarily
literate’ is true because every man has the potential to be literate.27 However, the
converted proposition ‘Something literate is necessarily a man’ is, according to many
authors of this time, not true. The exact reason for why this proposition is false is often
unclear, but given an essentialist reading of the modality, we can easily make sense of the
problem. It is part of the nature of being a man that they are able to be literate, since
they are rational, and being rational includes the capacity for being literate. However,
it is not part of the nature of being literate that one be a man.
Now, to explain why this inference does not work, the response by Kilwardby and
others is to observe that man is per se literate, but that literate is not per se man.
Again, it should be observed that this reading only makes sense if we read per se in the
sense of per se primo modo. Thus the solution adopted by Kilwardby was to distinguish
the two senses of necessity mentioned above.
Kilwardby sums this up by saying:
26. The first point is an important one here. On a normal reading of the modal operators, reading them
de dicto, the conversion is logically valid and unproblematic.
27. The term ‘literate’ here needs to be understood as, ‘has the ability or capacity to be literate’, not as
saying that the person necessarily is able to read.
23
2 Kilwardby’s Commentary on the Prior Analytics
For a per se necessity-proposition requires the subject to be per se some of
the predicate itself. But when it is said, “all who are literate are of necessity
men”, the subject is not per se some of the predicate itself; but it is granted
that it is necessary, because the literate are not separate from what is some
man. But this is a per accidens necessity.[60, p.20]28
It should be observed here that Kilwardby is speaking not only of the relationship
that exists between terms, but also of when a proposition (in this case ‘Every A is B’)
can be per se necessary. As the quote illustrates, for Kilwardby a proposition is said to
be per accidens necessary if a relationship of necessity per accidens holds between the
subject and the predicate. Again, we see here that it is whether the subject is per se the
predicate that determines if a given proposition is per se or not.
So, it seems that per se modalities do not always convert. This raises a very natural
problem for Kilwardby’s interpretation of Aristotle, since Aristotle makes use of the
conversion of modal propositions in various places in the Prior Analytics. What is
Kilwardby to do about this? The answer is that Kilwardby sees a kind of symmetry
within the terms that are essentially predicated.[60, p.21] This is very much in keeping
with modern treatments of Aristotle’s modal syllogism. For example, in his paper on
Aristotle’s syllogistic, Malink writes:
By analogy, the particular affirmative necessity Niab could be defined as
(13) ∃zΥbz ∧ Eˆaz
However, using this definition, Niab fails to convert to Niba; in order to avoid
this problem we follow Thom and Brenner in weakening (13) by disjunction
as follows:
(14) ∃z((Υbz ∧ Eˆaz) ∨ (Υaz ∧ Eˆbz))
[37, p.109][38, p.179]29
What is important here is that we will need to find a way to weaken the reading of
the particular necessary propositions to ensure that modal conversion remains valid for
Kilwardby as long as the inference does not confuse per se and per accidens modalities.
Up to this point, we have seen that the distinction between two kinds of necessity,
necessity per se and necessity per accidens, is essential for understanding Kilwardby’s
reading of the modal syllogism. This distinction presupposes a difference between the
essence of a thing and the properties that are necessarily true of a thing. We have also
seen that Kilwardby does not discuss how essences and some of the related notions (such
28. “Propositio enim per se de necessario exigit subiectum esse per se aliquid ipsius praedicati. Cum
autem dicitur ‘Omne grammaticum de necessitate est homo’, ipsum subiectum non est aliquid per se
ipsius praedicati, sed quia grammaticum non separatur ab eo quod est aliquid ipsius hominis, ideo
conceditur esse necessaria. Sed quae sic est de necessario, per accidens est de necessario.”
29. We will make considerable use of Malink’s reconstruction of Aristotle in our formal reconstruction of
Kilwardby in Chapter Three. As such, there will be a sustained discussion of his system there as well
as definitions for all of the logical symbols.
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as genus, species, etc.) function within his logical theorising. As such, it may be helpful
to look at other authors’ views about essences around the time of Kilwardby.
How does this distinction function within the 13th century metaphysics of Kilwardby’s
day? First, it is helpful to realise that there were two theories about how the term esse
functions in sentences.
According to the inherence theory, the copula is a sign of the fact that the
‘nature’ or ‘form’ signified by the predicate term is present in the individual
things (supposita) denoted by the subject term. The identity theory instead
claims that the terms should be taken as denoting classes and that the affir-
mative propositions state that all or some members of the subject class are
simultaneously members of the predicate class.[35, p.29]
What is important is to note that Kilwardby held to the inherence theory of the copula
and it is this theory that allows him to distinguish the per se and per accidens senses of
the necessary propositions. Given that there can be a distinction between the necessary
and the essential, this distinction makes sense within an inherence framework. But how
are we to make sense of this distinction? When is it true to say that ‘A is essentially B’,
and when is it false?
There were two main questions that drove the metaphysical debates around the con-
ception of an essence in Kilwardby’s time. First, the medievals wanted to develop a
theory of essence and existence that could account for the existence of non-physical en-
tities like angels and demons (i.e. creatures that were non-physical, but not simple and
whose existence was not necessary.)[68, p.662] Second, the medievals wanted a distinc-
tion that would help explain the difference between God, whose existence was necessary
and who depended on nothing, and everything, which depended on God for existence.[68,
p.662] The development of these positions drew from a number of ancient sources, the
most important authors being Aristotle, Boethius and Ibn Sina.
As we have already observed, so far as modern authors are aware, Kilwardby does
not provide a sustained discussion of essences. However, what is clear is the following:
First, the essence of a thing is to be separated from the existence of a thing, so that
one can posit a thing’s essence without positing the existence of the thing.30 Second,
when we are dealing with necessary per se propositions, the universal affirmative lacks
existential import. To claim that ‘Every man is essentially an animal’ does not require
that there be some man who instantiates the term. The reasons for this are, at least
to some degree, connected to the relationship between the interpretation of Aristotle
and Christian theology. According to Christian theology, humans, animals etc. did
not always exist and were created by God. Now, if the subject of a proposition of
necessity needs to necessarily exist in order for the proposition to be true, many of the
propositions that Aristotle says are necessary turn out to be false, such as the ‘Every
30. For the medievals there is one obvious counter-example to this, namely God, who due to His simplicity,
is the place where existence and essence are identical. Such considerations will not concern us at this
point.
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man is an animal’ example cited above. According to Christian theology, there was
some time when men did not exist, and so, it follows that men did not necessarily exist.
Hence, ‘Every man is an animal’ would come out false if the subject had to necessarily
exist. In fact, Kilwardby had this proposition, namely, that necessary truth depends on
persistence of the subject, condemned in 1277! According to Kilwardby, “That necessary
truth depends on persistence of the subject31” is to be condemned.32 As an interesting
corollary to this, we should note here that if, for Kilwardby, the truth of the universal
affirmative proposition requires the existence of the subject, then necessary universal
affirmative propositions do not entail the corresponding assertoric proposition. As we
shall see later on this is one way of providing an interpretation of Aristotle’s modal logic
that does not run afoul of theological issues, while also preserving the inferences Aristotle
takes to be valid. Another interpretation, consistent with Kilwardby’s condemnation, is
to widen the class of objects under consideration. This interpretation, which Buridan
uses, requires only that there be an object that can fall under the subject, regardless of
whether that object exists or not. This approach yields a different theory of the modal
syllogism that is weaker then Aristotle’s.33
Now, given the way that Kilwardby employs the term per se, it seems that it is best
to think of this as concerning essential relationships that hold between the various terms
under discussion. What we then need to develop is a logic that can relate the conceptual
grounds of various terms to the objects that they pick out, and is fine-grained enough to
be able to separate out per se from per accidens modalities.34 Before looking for such
a formal model, we need to discuss how Kilwardby brings these results together in his
treatment of the syllogism.
2.3.3 Syllogisms
Kilwardby’s discussion of the syllogism looks at three different readings of Aristotle’s
text. One view appears to be based on that of Boethius. Another one is broadly Aris-
totelian and based on comments Aristotle makes elsewhere in the Prior Analytics. The
third and final reading, according to Thom, is advanced in the Dialectica Monacensis.[60,
p.40]35 The differences between these views can be seen in a number of places, but is
perhaps clearest if we start with how the different views look at Aristotle’s opening def-
inition of a syllogism in the Prior Analytics. Kilwardby quotes Aristotle saying that “A
syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things being set out [positis] something else
comes about [contingit] of necessity from their being so.”36 [60, p.42] The three different
readings all try to address the following problem: why does Aristotle give discourse as
the genus of the syllogism?[60, p.42] The Boethian reading sees the use of the term ‘dis-
course’ as a way to preclude other classes of arguments such as induction, example, and
31. Item quod veritas cum necessitate tantum est cum constancia subjecti. [63, p.217]
32. See [63, p.217] and the reference to Lewry therein.
33. See Chapter Four, section 5 for Buridan’s ampliative account of modality.
34. Ideally, the logical system should also help us make sense of the distinction between natural and
accidental consequence and so give rise to a connexive logic.
35. Hereafter, the Boethian, the Aristotelian and the Munichian readings.
36. The quote from Aristotle is Prior Analytics 24b1820.
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enthymeme.37 On this view the syllogism is a kind of complex argument that is used
to create a belief in the soul of an individual.[60, pp.43-44] Kilwardby spends much less
time on the Aristotelian exposition. On this view, the genus is not intended to exclude
induction, enthymeme, or example since these can be reduced to syllogisms.[60, p.45]
Instead, the reading focuses on the ‘necessity of the conclusion’ excluding syllogism pairs
that do not produce a valid conclusion.38 This reading also excludes petito principii and
non causa ut causa on the same grounds.
On the Munichian reading, the definition of the syllogism is intended to preclude all
other kinds of reasoning. Accordingly, they state that:
The definition given can therefore make clear from what has been said that
all other species of argumentation are excluded (namely Induction, Example,
Enthymeme), and it also excludes the sophistical syllogism no matter what
its cause (and this includes fallacies).[60, p.46]39
The first part of this definition is similar to the Boethian account, however the Mu-
nichian account goes further, in that it also precludes so called ‘sophistical’ syllogisms.
Unfortunately, after mentioning these sophisms, the Munichian author moves onto a dis-
cussion of quid sit dici de omini and does not bother to tell us what the author means
by sophistical syllogisms. However, given Kilwardby’s rejection of this view, it seems
that Kilwardby took this to refer to arguments that have the form of a syllogism, but are
deficient in matter, where the form of the syllogism refers to how the propositions and
terms are arranged in the argument, while (at least part of) the matter of the syllogism
is whether the propositions are true or false. Thom connects this view with William of
Sherwood’s[60, p.47] [67, pp.57-58]. Kilwardby rejects the view because:
For Syllogism formally (as dealt with in this Book) is merely two propositions
and three terms. Form and Figure and Mood can be saved in a sophistical
syllogism, as is clear from this “Every dog runs, everything that barks is a
dog, therefore etc.” and in many others.40[60, p.47]
Kilwardby is dissatisfied with this reading because he thinks it excludes too much.
According to a view like the Munichian, it is only sound syllogistic arguments that
37. Thus the particular “certain things” excludes Enthymeme. By “set out” is understood arrangement in
Mood and Figure and this excludes the useless premise-pairs and Induction. “Of necessity” excludes
example, which possesses mere probability since it is a rhetorical argument. . . By “something other
comes about” petito principii is excluded, not as a sophistical ground but as a fault in syllogism
simpliciter. . . By “from their being so” non causa ut causa is excluded. [60, p.42]
38. Thom uses the term ‘useless premise pairs’ [60, p.45]
39. “Potest igitur manifestum esse ex predictis per diffinitionem datam, quod excluduntur omnes alie
species argumentationis, scilicet inductio, exemplum, entimema, et preterea excluditur sophisticus
sillogismus secundum omnes sui causas, et hoc quantum ad tredecim fallacias.” The quote is taken
from [11, p.490:12-15]
40. Syllogismus enim formaliter, de quo determinatur in hoc libro, tantum modo sunt duae propositiones
et tres termini. Forma autem et figura et modus potest salvari in syllogismo sophistico, sicut patet
hic: Omnis canis currit, omne latrabile est canis, ergo etc., et in multis aliis.
27
2 Kilwardby’s Commentary on the Prior Analytics
count as syllogisms. Phrased slightly differently, this view entails that a syllogism which
is faulty in its matter is not a syllogism.[60][p.47] This is a view that Kilwardby explicitly
condemns in the condemnation of 1277 and he objects to in his commentary. The
argument is of interest to us because it hinges on how the form and the matter of the
syllogism are to be understood.
It is to be said that the material principles of the syllogism without qualifi-
cation are two propositions (and if this is lacking there will be no syllogism);
but of the ostensive syllogism [the material principles are] two true proposi-
tions. So, even though a syllogism with false premises is lacking in matter,
it is not lacking in the matter of a syllogism without qualification, but in the
matter of an ostensive syllogism; and so, even though it has false premises,
it does not follow that it is not a syllogism without qualification, but that it
isn’t an ostensive syllogism.41[60][pp.47-48]
At the heart of Kilwardby’s point is that while a syllogism with false premises will fail
to be an ostensive syllogism, it does not outright fail to be a syllogism. For Kilwardby
an ostensive syllogism must have true premises, while a syllogism is only required to
have two propositions. It should also be observed that here we see what Kilwardby
thinks the matter of a syllogism is. Kilwardby takes the matter of a syllogism to be
the two propositions that are used to make up the syllogism. For him it is simply the
propositions. The truth value of the propositions is irrelevant, as long as they are not
ruled out by the previous kinds of considerations given in the other two readings. For
example, the propositions cannot be ambiguous.
Kilwardby goes on to analyse the syllogism in terms of its material, formal, and final
causes. Kilwardby tells us that:
And it is to be said that there is an order in materials. For some are re-
mote and unarranged, and some are proximate and arranged. And so it is
in forms. Some are material forms, which are in potentiality to an ulterior
form, and some are ultimate and completing forms. Thus we find an order in
a syllogism’s materials and forms. For, in materials, the term is its remote
and unarranged material, and the proposition is its proximate and arranged
materials; and in forms, Figure is the incomplete form which is in poten-
tiality to an ulterior form, and Mood is the ultimate form completing the
syllogism.42[60][p.57]
41. Dicendum quod syllogismo simpliciter sunt principia materialia, quae sunt duae propositiones, et si
in hoc sit defectus non erit syllogismus, syllogismi autem ostensivi sunt duae propositiones verae.
Quamvis ergo syllogismus ex falsis deficiat in materia, non deficit in materia syllogismi simpliciter
sed in materia syllogismi ostensivi, et ideo, quamvis ex falsis sit, non tamen sequitur quod non sit
syllogismus sed quod non ostensivus simpliciter.
42. Et dicendum quod sicut ordo est in materiis, quaedam enim est remota et indisposita, quaedam autem
propinqua et disposita, sic est in formis. Quaedam est forma materialis et in potentia ad formam
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The above passage is one of the clearest summaries of Kilwardby’s view of the form
and matter of the syllogism. The distinction between proximate and remote matter
is a standard medieval distinction and is fairly straightforward. The idea is that the
proximate matter is the matter that is closest to what the particular thing is made up
of, while the remote matter is conceptually further away. Using modern biology as an
example, the remote matter in a human would be the basic atomic components that
make them up, while the proximate matter could be their various body parts (heart,
arms, legs etc). In the case of the syllogism, the terms are the remote and most ‘basic’
part of it. The propositions that make up the syllogism are its proximate matter. As is
standard, two of the necessary conditions for being a syllogism are that the argument
be composed of a pair of propositions, composed of three terms from which a conclusion
can be drawn. Since propositions are made up of terms together with the copula, they
serve as the remote matter of the syllogism. Then the propositions themselves form the
proximate matter of the syllogism.
2.3.4 The Syllogism Emerges
When discussing the validity of the syllogism, Kilwardby discusses two necessary condi-
tions common to all syllogistic arguments that entail a valid conclusion. This is what
we mean when we speak of valid syllogisms. The first property is that every valid syl-
logism must have at least one universal premise. The second property is that every
valid syllogism must have one affirmative premise.[60][p.114] In fact, Kilwardby, follow-
ing Aristotle, takes syllogisms to be valid by definition, i.e. only productive pairs of
propositions can form syllogisms. One does not have invalid syllogisms.
Kilwardby is quick to point out that: “And it is to be said that Aristotle does not
mean that without a universal there is no sort of syllogism- for a necessary conclusion
is drawn from singulars in the Third Figure- but that no syllogism competently related
and arranged according to mood is produced without universals”.43[60][p.114] It seems
likely that Kilwardby is here referring to expository syllogisms, as he is referring to the
use of singular terms that occur in third figure syllogisms.44 The expository syllogism
was often discussed in the context of the third figure, as in this figure the validity of
expository syllogisms is particularly clear. Here Kilwardby points out that Aristotle is
not ruling out arguments using singular terms with these claims, since inferences like:
‘Socrates is mortal’ and ‘Socrates is running’ therefore ‘Some mortal is running’ are
ulteriorem, quaedam autem est ultima et completiva. Et sic invenimus in syllogismo ordinem in
materia et in formis. In materiis quia terminus. . . est materia eius remota et indisposita, propositio
vero est materia propinqua et disposita; in formis etiam quia. . . figura est forma incompleta et in
potentia ad ulteriorem formam. Modus autem est forma ultima syllogismi completiva.
43. Et dicendum est quod non est intentio Aristotelis quod sine universali nullo modo sit syllogismus quia
ex singularibus in tertia figura concluditur necessario sed quod syllogismus competenter se habens et
secundum modum dispositus non fiat sine universalibus.
44. An expository syllogism is an argument where the middle term is a singular term, instead of a general
term. For example, ‘Socrates is mortal’ and ‘Socrates is a human’ therefore ‘Some mortal is human’.
In this case the term ‘Socrates’ picks out an individual. For more on the Expository syllogism see our
discussion of it on page 116.
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valid. Instead, Kilwardby is pointing out that while such arguments may be valid, on
Kilwardby’s reading they are not syllogisms since they are not properly arranged.
The point is that this property holds when the terms are categorical propositions. It
should be observed that Kilwardby does not consider such ‘syllogisms’ to be syllogisms
proper. According to him such syllogisms have figure, but lack a determinate mood.45
[60][p.114] When discussing the second property, Kilwardby starts by explaining why
Aristotle does not explicitly mention it in the Prior Analytics. Kilwardby offers three
arguments for this. One is based on the definition of the syllogism. The other uses the
first property (in a valid syllogism one premise must be universal) to infer the second.
The first argument goes as follows:
For when it is said in the definition of syllogism that something follows from
their being so, it is signified that the premises are the cause of the conclusion.
But no negation is a cause. So there has to be an affirmative.46[60][p.115]
The first thing to be aware of is that ‘cause’ here should be understood in a fairly broad
way, in terms similar to Aristotle’s use of the four causes.47 In contemporary thought
we would normally only consider an efficient cause to be a ‘cause’ proper. It may be
better to think of all four causes here as expressing the reasons why something happens
or why a particular inference holds. Kilwardby’s second argument goes as follows:
Or, it can be said that Aristotle, in showing that some universal is in a
syllogism, shows that something in the syllogism stands to something else
in it as whole to part. But taking a part under its whole cannot be with a
negation, but with an affirmation. Hence in showing that something in the
syllogism is universal he has thereby shown that something is affirmative.
And I am speaking of perfect syllogisms in the First Figure, from which all
others come and to which they reduce.48[60][p.115]
At the heart of this argument is an assumption that Kilwardby frequently uses. He
assumes that the subject stands to the predicate as the part stands to the whole. Hence,
this argument turns on a natural sense of the word ‘part’. Let X and Y be terms. Then
45. . . . duae propositiones factae in tribus terminis per situm terminorum ex necessitate determinant
figuram, sed non de necessitate determinant modum.
46. Quia cum dicitur in definitione syllogismi quod aliquid sequitur eo quod haec sunt, significatur quod
praemissae sint causa conclusionis. Sed negatio nullius est causa. Quare oportet aliquam esse affir-
mativam.
47. Recall that the ‘four causes’ are Material, Formal, Efficient, and Final. Aristotle discusses them in
Metaphysics V, 2 among other places.
48. Vel dici potest quod per hoc quod Aristoteles hic ostendit aliquam esse universalem in syllogismo
ostensum. . . est quod aliquid in syllogismo se habet ad aliud in. . . ipso sicut totum se habet ad partem.
Sed acceptio partis sub suo toto non potest esse cum negatione, sed cum affirmatione. Quare per hoc
quod hic ostendit aliquam esse universalem in syllogismo relinquitur ostensum esse aliquam esse
affirmativam. Et loquor de syllogismo perfecto, scilicet primae figurae, a quo omnes alii extrahuntur
et in quem omnes reducuntur.
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there will be cases where X is a part of Y and Y is a part of X. These cases occur when
the proposition in question can be converted simply. The third argument proceeds as
follows:
It is to be said that every syllogism aims to deny something of something or
to affirm something of something. Now, one thing can be denied of another
only through some difference between them; and this difference is necessarily
some of one of them that does not agree with the other. So, since this
difference has to be a Middle, it will necessarily be affirmed of one though it
is denied of the other. And so if the aim is to deny something of something it
is necessary for one at least of the propositions to be affirmative. [60][p.116]
According to this argument, the aim of the syllogism is to end up with a proposition
which is either affirmative or negative. This is fairly obvious, as categorical propositions
are always equivalent to one that is either affirmative or negative. If the conclusion
is a negative proposition, then one of the premises must have described some kind of
difference between the subject and predicate term in the conclusion. For this to be the
case, one of the premises needs to be negative (otherwise, they would both be affirmative,
and it is easy to check that no positive propositions ever yield a negative syllogism.)49
Now, because of this, it should be clear that the only way to get this difference to
connect the two propositions is that they share a term that expresses this difference.
That difference is expressed by the middle terms of the syllogism, and it is exactly this
difference which is the middle term of a valid syllogism.
2.3.5 Modal Syllogisms
Kilwardby’s discussion of the modal syllogism is divided according to the kinds of propo-
sitions that occur within the syllogism. The LLL50 syllogisms are treated in P8, the
mixed necessary/assertoric proposition in A9-11 respectively. Contingency syllogisms
are treated in P14, P17, and P20. The mixed contingency/assertoric propositions are
treated in P15, P18, and P21. Finally, the contingency/necessity propositions are treated
in P16, P19, and P22. [60][p.147, p.180]
As has already been mentioned, necessary propositions must be per se necessary.
When considering LL pairs, Kilwardby says that the valid syllogisms in the first figure
are the same as the ones that are valid in the assertoric case (i.e. aa, ea, ai, ei all
yield valid syllogisms). This uniformity continues in his treatment of the second and
third figures.[60][p.150] Kilwardby then goes on to show how the second and third figure
can be reduced to the first figure. The reductions are quite straightforward. The only
cases worth commenting on are the proofs of LLL Baroco and Bocardo. In both cases,
49. Strictly speaking this needs to be sharpened to rule out cases where one of the terms is implicitly
negative or entails a negative proposition.
50. In what follows we use the letter L to denote a premise of necessity, M to denote a premise of one
way contingency/possibility, X to denote an assertoric premise and Q to denote a premise of two way
contingency.
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Kilwardby makes use of expository syllogisms.51 The use of an expository syllogism
here could be because Kilwardby is following Aristotle’s exposition of the text, and
when Aristotle proves that these syllogisms are valid, he makes use of an expository
syllogism, because he has not yet treated syllogisms with possibilities.
In the LX case, Kilwardby adds an additional principle to describe the valid syllogisms
in this mood. He gives us the following principle:
P8 In First Figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity-proposition must be
the major.
From this, together with the principles P1-P4 Kilwardby is able to derive the same
syllogistic validities as Aristotle, namely LXL Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio. In
interpreting this, what is important is to look at Kilwardby’s justification for P8. P8 can
be used (with a bit of extra work) to rule out the XLL syllogisms that have traditionally
been seen as problematic.52 Kilwardby justifies P8 as follows:
The conclusion is part of the Major, and mostly in regard to the predicate,
which they share. With regard to the subject, it is part of the Minor. And
so it follows the Minor in features affecting the subject (such as universality
and particularity) and the major in features affecting the predicate (such as
affirmative and negative, assertoric and modal). 53[60][p.154]
Kilwardby’s point pertains to the question of what sorts of properties are transmitted
by which parts of the syllogism. Here, Kilwardby claims that it is the major premise
that conveys the mode and the quality of the syllogistic conclusion, whereas the minor
term determines if the conclusion is universal or particular. Kilwardby then proceeds
to sketch how useless premise pairs can be excluded using these principles. Kilwardby’s
justification for P8, in some sense, seems a little thin. The feature that he points to is
clearly true of the LXL syllogisms that Aristotle takes to be valid. However, what is
missing is an explanation of why exactly this is the case.
In Thom’s presentation of Kilwardby it does not seem that Kilwardby has a principled
reason for requiring that P8 be true. Thom says “As I read him, Kilwardby holds that
since the assertoric Major in the first Figure XLL moods may be true merely as-of-now,
those moods are invalid.”[60][p.161] This would be sufficient to generate counterexamples
to the various XLL syllogisms, however it is unclear how this could be justified in a
way that is not ad hoc. This is particularly problematic given that Kilwardby takes
51. We will discuss the expository syllogism in more detail when we talk about Buridan’s theory of the
syllogism. At this point it suffices to know that an expository syllogism is a syllogism where the two
premises are linked by a common singular term, i.e. a term that refers to an individual. We will
discuss how Kilwardby uses the expository syllogism in Chapter Six, pg. 158.
52. The most famous of these being XLL Barbara, but any first figure XLL syllogism will do.
53. Et dicendum quod conclusion est pars maioris et maxime secundum praedicatum in quo communicat
cum ipsa et quantum ad subiectum pars minoris. Et ideo sequitur minorem in dispositionibus ac-
cidentibus subiecto eius quae sunt universalitas et particularitas, maiorem autem in dispositionibus
accidentibus praedicato eius quae sunt affirmativum et negativum de inesse et de modo.
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the assertoric propositions in such syllogisms to be unrestricted.54 This leads to one
natural question: If Kilwardby wants to try and preserve Aristotle’s reading of the
modal syllogism, how is he going to be able to justify the rejection of various XLL
syllogisms (most importantly XLL Barbara)?
First, observe that if we require that the assertoric premise in an XLL syllogism be
unrestricted, then we can generate a counterexample to P8. For example, consider the
syllogism:
Every animal is a substance. (true and necessary in Aristotelian ontology.)
Every man is necessarily an animal.
Every man is necessarily a substance.
Kilwardby gives additional principles that explain the validity of the syllogisms in the
other figures. As these principles hold if a syllogism is to produce a valid conclusion and
as we will be making use of them in the next chapter, we restate them here:
P1 In every syllogism, at least one premise must be universal.
P2 In every syllogism, at least one premise must be affirmative.55
P3 In first figure syllogisms, the major must be universal.56
P4 In first figure syllogisms, the minor must be affirmative.57
P5 In second figure syllogisms, the major must be universal.58
P6 In second figure syllogisms, at least one of the premises must be negative.
54. “He[Kilwardby] holds that the Minor in the LXL moods must be an unrestricted assertoric which is
the same in reality as a necessary proposition, even if it is not the same in mode and he deals with
the issue by stating that despite the syntactic differences, there is no difference ‘in reality’ between
the minor premises in the LLL and the LXL case”[60][p.158]
55. See [24, p.ad A4 Part 2 Dub. 8 10vb].
56. Kilwardby writes: “Alternatively, it can also be said that if the Major were particular, the Middle
could be more common than the Major Extreme. For, an inferior is predicated of a superior in part,
affirmatively and negatively. And if this were so, it could happen similarly that the Major was negative
and the Extremes convertible, or exceeding and exceeded. And a negative conclusion couldnt follow
unless it was false as it clear from the terms man, animal, ass.”[60, p.120], [24, ad A4 Part 2 dub.11
(IIra)]
57. Kilwardby writes: Now, of the remaining principle, namely that the Minor is affirmative, it is to be
said that if the Minor were negative, either the Major would be negative (and then a syllogism would
not be produced– for the stated reason), or the Major would be affirmative (and then there would
be a fallacy of the consequent), because from the negation of a things inferior there doesnt follow the
negation of the same things superior.[60, pp.119-120], [24, ad A4 Part 2 dub.11 (IIra)].
58. Kilwardby affirms P5 and P6 is given in the following passage: “Next, someone will enquire concerning
the sufficiency of the moods in this Figure, why when there are premise-pairs, only are useful. This
is to be solved by supposing the common principles we had before, and two that are proper to this
Figure, of which one is that the Major is universal, and the second is that one of the propositions is
negative.”[60, p.131]. [24, ad A5 dub.2 12ra-b]
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P7 In third figure syllogisms, the minor must be affirmative.59
P8 In first figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity-proposition must be
major.60
P9 In second figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, one premise must be a universal
negative necessity proposition.61
P10 In affirmative third figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity premise
must be a universal affirmative.62
P11 In negative third figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity premise must
be a universal negative.63
In his book, Thom does not always provide quotations for each of these propositions. In
cases where he does, where he provides additional arguments that Kilwardby offers for
these propositions, or references to the Renaissance edition, they can be found in the
footnotes.
For a full summary of these principles and the citations to the references see [60,
pp.145,176—177,238].
2.4 Conclusion
Our main aim in this chapter has been to sketch the important details about Kilwardby’s
theory of the modal syllogism that are necessary to formalise his logic. To that end we
have explored Kilwardby’s use of the per se/per accidens distinction in modal logic and
shown that Kilwardby believes that modal syllogisms are only valid if they contain per
se terms. We have also explored the kind of essential relationship that was envisioned in
per se terms by the medievals. With these details in place, we can now develop a formal
reconstruction of Kilwardby’s logic, connecting his ideas with modern notions from the
literature on essences.
59. Kilwardby writes: “And it is to be said that the two common principles are to be supposed, and one
principle proper to this Figure, namely that the Minor is affirmative.”[60, p.136].[24, ad A6 dub.2
(13vb)]
60. See [24, ad A9 dub.5 (16vb)].
61. [24, ad A10 dub.1 (17va)].
62. See [60, p.170].
63. [24, ad A11 dub.5 (19ra)]
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3.1 Introduction
Our goal in this chapter is to provide a formal analysis of Kilwardby’s modal logic that is
expressive enough to capture Kilwardby’s ideas about per se and per accidens necessity,
and to capture the distinction between natural and accidental consequences.
As we saw in the last chapter, there are a number of challenges that face such a
construction. Kilwardby’s distinction between per se and per accidens modalities is a
fine-grained notion and it looks as though this would be difficult to faithfully represent
with a standard possible world semantics. On Kilwardby’s own analysis, ‘Every person
is literate’ and ‘Someone literate is a person’ are both necessary truths, but only the
first is necessary per se while the second is only necessary per accidens. As we already
observed, the reason for this is that per se necessities preserve essential connections
between concepts or objects (depending on the kind of signification), while per accidens
necessities need not do so.
Our goal in this chapter is to develop a formal theory of Kilwardby’s modal syllo-
gism, and his more general theory of inference revolving around accidental and natural
consequences. As we shall show, Kilwardby’s theory of the syllogism, together with the
distinction between per se and per accidens modality, naturally generalise to a connexive
theory of inference.
The distinction between per se and per accidens is not unlike some contemporary
debates about the relationship between essence and modality. In [15], Kit Fine makes
a number of observations that, he thinks, tell against various contemporary views that
attempt to reduce essences and essential predication to modal predications. Fine argues
that such approaches are, in some sense, treating the problem back to front. On his view,
essences should be the primitive notion, and it is then through the notion of essences
that we can obtain other kinds of necessity.[14] We will argue here that this analysis is
not unlike Kilwardby’s, and that we can draw inspiration from the logical machinery
that has been developed to treat Fine’s semantics also when we treat Kilwardby’s. In
doing this, we will show that Kilwardby’s interpretation of the modal syllogism succeeds
in validating all of the apodictic syllogisms that Aristotle claimed were valid and refuting
all of the apodictic ‘syllogisms’ that are invalid.
In this chapter, we will sketch the necessary formal and philosophical background to
connect Kilwardby’s discussion of per se terms to modern debates, both philosophical
and logical. After a brief exposition of Fine’s views on essence, we will highlight some of
the logical features of Marko Malink’s recent treatment of Aristotle’s modal logic. These
features will be helpful in our treatment of Kilwardby. With that in place, we will then
do two things. First, we will formalise Kilwardby’s distinction between per se and per
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accidens necessity in a framework that allows us to see the connections with both modern
modal logic and Fine’s analysis of essence. Second, we will show that our reconstruction
of Kilwardby’s logic can be extended to account for Kilwardby’s distinction between
natural and accidental consequences. In doing so, we will show how this gives rise to a
connexive implication relationship.
3.2 Essences, Modality and the Question of Reduction
In [14] and [16], Kit Fine articulates some of the reasons for rejecting the equivalence
between essences and modality [14][p. 3]. There are a number of important philosophical
ideas that underpin Fine’s theory. First and most importantly, for Fine, essences are
not to be analysed by means of modal properties. Fine points to three kinds of coun-
terexamples that seem to tell against any possible modal reduction[14][pp.4-5]. In each
case, the counterexample picks a particular necessary property or relation that holds of
an object or between objects, but does not seem to be essential to the object or objects.1
Fine’s response to these counterexamples is to argue that what has gone wrong in the
modal account is that it is not ‘fine grained’ enough to account for the differences in
essences that exist between objects. Instead, he argues that essences need to be treated
as the logically primitive notion and that other kinds of modal properties should then be
defined in terms of those[15][p.241]. Second, Fine suggests that the relationship between
essence and modality is similar to the relationship between meaning and analyticity. On
this view, the notion of essence is a very fine-grained relationship that can then be used
to express the more coarse-grained notion of necessity. Fine writes:
The concept of metaphysical necessity, on the other hand, is insensitive to
source: all objects are treated equally as possible grounds of necessary truth;
they are all grist to the necessitarian mill. [14, p. 8]
On Fine’s view, an adequate treatment of essences needs to be able to track exactly
this distinction. On Fine’s view, not all statements that are necessarily true about an
object are part of that object’s essence, as the quote about Socrates illustrates. This
idea, namely that an object’s essence is not all of the properties that are necessarily
true of the object, is not foreign to Kilwardby. In fact, the distinction between per se
and per accidens modalities seems to require a distinction that is in a similar spirit to
this one. Consider again the problematic inference: ‘Every man is necessarily literate’
1. To cite one example:
Consider, then, Socrates and the set whose sole member is Socrates. It is then necessary,
according to standard views within modal set theory, that Socrates belongs to singleton
Socrates if he exists; for, necessarily, the singleton exists if Socrates exists and, necessarily,
Socrates belongs to singleton Socrates if both Socrates and the singleton exist. It there-
fore follows according to the modal criterion that Socrates essentially belongs to singleton
Socrates. [14][p. 4]
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therefore ‘Something literate is necessarily a man’. Substituting the term ‘essentially’
for ‘necessarily’ makes the issue clearer. For ‘Every man is essentially literate’ is true if
we see being literate as something that follows from the rational nature of a man (i.e.
because you have a rational nature, it follows that you have the capacity to be literate).
However, ‘Something literate is essentially a man’ is false, since there is nothing in the
nature of being literate that connects with being a man. One natural way to understand
why conversion fails in this case, is in the essentialist terms that Fine suggests.
The failure of conversion leaves us with the challenge of thinking about Kilwardby’s
distinction between natural and accidental consequences. Characterising accidental con-
sequences is straightforward,2 as they appear to be a classical consequence relation.
However, natural consequences are not, and since Fine’s logic is thoroughly classical,
they will prove to be ill-suited as a starting point. As such, our challenge in modelling
Kilwardby’s logic, then, is to develop a formal system that, unlike the modern literature
on the logics of essence, allows for a connexive implication.
It should be recalled that connexive logics are a family of contra-classical logics. Fol-
lowing [21, p.1], a logic is said to be contra-classical (in the deep sense) if not everything
provable in the logic is provable in classical logic. Contra-classical logics, then, are un-
usual families of non-classical logics. Nearly all of the non-classical logics are commonly
discussed (e.g. relevance and para-consistent logics, intuitionistic logic, and many multi-
value logics ) are not contra-classical. They reject particular tautologies and/or theorems
that classical logic claims are valid. However, they do not include any validities that
are not valid in classical logic. They are proper sub-logics of classical logic. This is not
the case for connexive logics. First, they accept as valid some theorems that are invalid
in classical logic. Second, for such logics to be non-trivial they also need to reject some
theorems of classical logic. The easiest way to see this is to recall that classical logic is
Post-complete, i.e. that there are no logical systems that can consistently extend clas-
sical logic. Because of this, if we were to add any of the distinctive theorems (i.e. any
of the theorems of connexive logic that are not theorems of classical logic) of connexive
logic to classical logic, the logic would become trivial.
What are some of the theorems that are taken to characterise connexive systems? The
hallmark of connexive logic systems is that:
The definition of connexive implication is transmitted to us by Sextus Em-
piricus:
And those who introduce the notion of connexion say that a condi-
tional is sound when the contradictory of its consequent is incom-
patible with its antecedents.
2. To deal with the simplicity of the models, we will choose to represent Kilwardby’s accidental modals
in terms of the usual possible worlds semantics. This is just to make more transparent what is going
on in the models. If it turns out that Kilwardby’s accidental modals are better thought of in terms
of temporal operations (e.g. that φ is possible just means either φ is, was, or will be the case), the
models can be easily changed to reflect this. We will have more to say about the legitimacy of this in
5.6.2.
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It is characteristic of this variety of implication that no proposition connex-
ively implies or is implied by its own negation, since it is never incompatible
with its own double negation, nor is its own negation incompatible with
itself.[41][p. 415]
Using → as the symbol for implication, this approach to logic is often seen to give rise
to the following theses:
Aristotle’s Thesis: ¬(¬A→ A)
Boethius’ Thesis: (A→ B)→ ¬(A→ ¬B)
It can easily be checked that neither of these formulae is valid in classical logic. Like-
wise, one can also check that they are not valid in any of the logics of essence presented
by Fine[16]. Part of our goal in this chapter, then, is to show how we can obtain a con-
nexive implication from the logic of essence. While other semantics for connexive logics
have been given in e.g.[54],[48], our semantics will turn out to provide a fairly natural
understanding of the operations, and are (comparatively) simpler than semantics found
in other literature.
3.3 Essences, Syllogisms, and Previous Work
3.3.1 Reconstructing the Modal Syllogistic
At this point, it will be helpful to look at a reconstruction of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic
that gives a number of the features which we will want to make use in our formal
treatment of Kilwardby and which have been used in previous approaches to Kilwardby’s
logic. A longstanding problem in the interpretation of the Prior Analytics has been to
find a consistent interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. This challenge has been
met with varying degrees of success over the past two millennia. One answer, which
succeeds in a number of ways in which other interpretations of Aristotle have failed, is
given by Malink in [37] and further developed in [38]. The aim of [37] is:
to provide a single formal model that exactly captures Aristotle’s claims
on (in)validity and inconclusiveness in the whole modal syllogistic. This
model is intended to be not without a certain explanatory value for our
understanding of why Aristotle’s modal syllogistic looks the way it does; but
in the following we shall focus on the logical reconstruction and sketch the
explanatory background only in a cursory manner. [37][p.96]
Our main focus here will be to discuss the logical reconstruction offered by Malink,
with only some attention paid to the historical interpretation. Malink starts by intro-
ducing the following three primitive relations Υ, E and E˜, where Υ stands for accidental
predication, E for substantial essential predication and E˜ for non-substantial essential
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predication. The symbol aEˆb is a shorthand used by Malink for the disjunction aEb or
aE˜b.
Malink’s system is governed by the following five axioms:
ax. 1 ∀aΥaa
ax. 2 ∀a, b, c((aΥb ∧ bΥc)→ aΥc)
ax. 3 ∀a, b(aEˆb→ aΥb)
ax. 4 ∀a, b, c((aEb ∧ bΥc)→ aEc)
ax. 5 ∀a, b, c((aE˜b ∧ bΥc)→ aE˜c)
Slightly less formally, Υ is a reflexive and transitive relation. E and E˜ are transitive
subrelations of Υ that are downwardly closed under Υ.
This also gives us an easy way of thinking about the class of models that this gives
rise to. Let A be a non-empty set (of terms), and Υ,E and E˜ be subsets of A2. Then,A = ⟨A,Υ⟩ is a preorder on A with E and E˜ as designated down-sets of A.3
Malink is able to show that axioms 1-5 are sufficient to prove all of the validities that
Aristotle claims are valid in the Prior Analytics and that the class of models satisfying
1-5 are sufficient to prove counterexamples for all of the syllogisms that Aristotle says
are invalid.
What is important for our purposes is the idea that at the heart of Aristotle’s modal
logic are the various relationships that obtain between terms. Of particular interest in
the case of the modal syllogistic are the relationships of being essentially predicated and
of being accidentally predicated. It is these two notions that form the basis of how we
should understand the predication relationships.
Second, the modal logic that Malink proposes for Aristotle rests on a very close con-
nection between the truth of necessary propositions and the predicate being essentially
predicated of the subject if the proposition is affirmative and the predicate being essen-
tially incompatible with the subject, if the proposition is negative. Malink writes:
We have seen that the universal affirmative necessity Naab is not obtained
from the corresponding assertoric proposition Xaab by adding modal senten-
tial operators, but by replacing the Υ-copula of accidental predication by
the Eˆ-copula of essential predication.[37][p.106]
We may suspect Kilwardby would wholeheartedly agree with this. The basic idea
of thinking of per se necessities in terms of the essential predication of one term for
another, or the incompatibility of one term for another, is very much within the spirit
of Kilwardby’s project. What we will draw on is the underlying idea that the terms of
the modal logic are, in some sense ‘ordered’ by relationships of accidental containment
and essential containment.
3. Recall that, given an order ≤ on S and an element y ∈ S the down-set of y is {x ∶ x ∈ S and x ≤ y}.
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3.4 Semantics for Kilwardby
At the heart of our approach to Kilwardby’s logic will be an augmentation of the usual
possible worlds semantics with additional lattice-theoretic machinery that then imposes
constraints on how objects are assigned to predicates. This is in keeping with recent
literature on the logics of essence [16],[17]. In particular, given what we have seen in
Malink’s work [37], we will approach the construction as one that is based on ordering the
terms in a given language using a lattice-like construction. What we also saw in Malink’s
paper is that the order conditions turn out to be fairly weak. The order relations are only
preorders on the set of terms. If we help ourselves to the usual meta-logical resources,
we only need our essential predications to be preorders on the set of terms, downwardly
closed under accidental predication. Unlike Malink, as we shall see below, we will add
an additional relationship that captures the idea of an essential incompatibility between
terms.
3.4.1 Semantic Reconstructions
As we saw in our discussion of Kilwardby’s logic (see page 15) there are two ways that we
can think about the signification relationship. One of these corresponds to the mediate
sense of signification pertaining to objects in the world, while the other corresponds
to the immediate sense of signification, and is concerned with the relationships that
exist between various sorts of concepts. The challenge will be to bring these two senses
together, since in some cases they yield different truth conditions for some propositions.
First, let us define the language that we will be working in for this section. We define
LK in the following way:
A Language for Kilwardby Models 1. Let LK = ⟨TERMS,a, e, i, o, p.s., p.a., ⟩ where:
TERMS is a countable set of terms.
a, e, i, and o are operators used to form the usual categorical propositions ‘Every
A is B’, ‘No A is B’, ‘Some A is B’, and ‘Not every A is B’, as the formation
sequence will make clear.
p.s. and p.a. are the modal operations corresponding to per se necessity and per
accidens necessity.
The set of well-formed formulae, WFFLK is the least set closed under the following
conditions: For any A,B ∈ TERMS:
1. AaB, AeB, AiB, and AoB are in WFFLK .
2. if A ×B ∈WFFLK where × is either a, e, i, or o, then A p.s.× B ∈WFFLK
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3. if A ×B ∈WFFLK where × is either a, e, i, or o, then A p.a.× B ∈WFFLK
At the heart of our semantics are the following two ideas. The first is the usual idea
from modal logic that, at various points, objects may fall under different predicates. This
will be used to capture the idea of accidental necessity and possibility. The second idea is
that the relationships between terms determine the essential and accidental relationships
that hold between objects. As we explained in Chapter One (see page 22), the idea here
is that we interpret ‘Every A is per se B’ as per se primo modo and so is true if the
definition of A is part of the definition of B.
To that end, we will start by introducing the algebraic machinery we will be using.
Let T = ⟨T,⊴,≤, ∣ ⟩
where:
T is a non-empty set and ⊴, ≤, and ∣ are binary relations on T .
We require that ≤ be a preorder, ⊴ be a transitive relation on T , and that ∣ is irreflexive
and symmetric. We further require that:
1. ∀x, y if x ⊴ y then x ≤ y.
2. ∀x, y, z if x ≤ y and y ⊴ z then x ⊴ z.
3. ∀x, y if x ≤ y then not x∣y
4. ∀x, y, z if x ≤ y and y∣z then x∣z.
In what follows we shall refer to these as order properties 1-4. The basic idea behind these
structures is that we use the relations ≤, ⊴, and ∣ to represent the principles of accidental
predication, essential predication, and (definitional) incompatibility respectively. The
set T corresponds to the set of concepts that we are evaluating.
In this context, each of our conditions makes good sense. Every concept is contained
in itself accidentally, however a term does not need to be defined in terms of itself (and
so the relation does not need to be reflexive). Similarly for essential containment. In
the case of incompatibility, we require that no concept is incompatible with itself (in
essence, a consistency requirement) and that incompatibility is symmetric, (i.e. if A is
incompatible with B, then B is also incompatible with A).
The remaining conditions are used to explain how the various operations interact with
one another. Our first condition tells us that if x is essentially y, then x is also acci-
dentally y. It should be observed that when we speak of x being accidentally y, this is
taken in a broad sense to include those cases where x is also essentially y i.e. we can
think of ≤ as accidentally or essentially.
The second condition tells us that if x is accidentally y and y is essentially z then x is
essentially z as well. This is similar to the principle used by Malink in his reconstruction
of Aristotle. The rational for this principle comes from the idea of treating essences
as real definitions. What this principle tells us is that, if x happens to be y, and it is
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part of the definition of y is that it is z, then x also has that property as part of its essence.
The third condition is a further consistency requirement, and tells us that if x is ac-
cidentally predicated of y then x cannot be incompatible with y.
The fourth condition is similar. If x is accidentally y and y is incompatible with z,
then x cannot be compatible with z either, for otherwise, we would have something that
is both compatible and incompatible with itself.
With these conditions in place, we can give truth conditions for the various assertoric
and modal propositions that Kilwardby treats as follows:
Let T = ⟨T , c⟩ where T was as before, and c is a function from terms to elements of T .
Then we can give truth conditions for the immediate sense of signification as follows:
Semantics for Assertoric and Per Se Immediate Signification.T ⊧ AaB if and only if c(A) ≤ c(B)T ⊧ AeB if and only if ¬∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B)T ⊧ AiB if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B)T ⊧ AoB if and only if c(A) ≰ c(B)T ⊧ A p.s.a B if and only if c(A) ⊴ c(B)T ⊧ A p.s.e B if and only if c(A)∣c(B)T ⊧ A p.s.i B if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ⊴ c(A) and D ⊴ c(B)T ⊧ A p.s.o B if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ∣c(A) and D∣c(B)
What this account does not provide for us is a natural way to separate per se necessity
from per accidens necessity. For that, we will make use of the normal possible worlds
semantics. We will also give semantics for the mediate sense of signification, i.e. the
case where the word signifies the objects that fall under a given concept. To do that we
will make use of constant domain modal logic:
Let T ′ = ⟨D,W,R, v⟩ where:
D and W are non-empty sets.
R is a reflexive binary relation on W .
v ∶W × TERM → P(D).
We can then give semantic definitions for mediate signification as follows:
Semantics for Assertoric and Per Accidens Necessity in the case of Mediate
Signification 1.
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T ′,w ⊧ AaB if and only if v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B) and v(w,A) ≠ ∅T ′,w ⊧ AeB if and only if v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) = ∅T ′,w ⊧ AiB if and only if v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) ≠ ∅T ′,w ⊧ AoB if and only if v(w,A) ⊈ v(w,B) or v(w,A) = ∅T ′,w ⊧ A p.a.a B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then T ′, x ⊧ AaB.T ′,w ⊧ A p.a.e B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then T ′, x ⊧ AeB.T ′,w ⊧ A p.a.i B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then T ′, x ⊧ AiB.T ′,w ⊧ A p.a.o B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then T ′, x ⊧ AoB.
Now, in order to bring per se and per accidens modalities together into a common
system, there are a number of tensions between these two formalisations that need to
be resolved. What we will see in the next few paragraphs is that, given how things are
currently set up, our system does not correctly capture some key insights that we should
have.
First, it should be observed that the definition of AaB using the semantics based on T
and T ′ do not always agree with each other. To see this consider the following structure:
D = {a} W = {w} T = {A,B}
R = {(w,w)} ≤=⊴= {(A,A), (A,B), (B,B)} ∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
v(w,A) = ∅ v(w,B) = {a}
Since A ≤ B we have T ,w ⊧ AaB. However, since v(w,A) = ∅ it follows thatT ′,w ⊭ AaB.
There is a similar problem in the other direction:
D = {a} W = {w} T = {A,B}
R = {(w,w)} ≤=⊴= {(A,A), (B,B)} ∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
v(w,A) = {a} v(w,B) = {a}
In this case we have T ′,w ⊧ AaB, since v(w,A) ≠ ∅ and v(w,A) = v(w,B), which entails
v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B). However, T ,w ⊭ AaB since, A ≰ B.
In one sense, this difference shows us that we have got something correct. This dif-
ference captures Kilwardby’s idea that while ‘Every man is an animal’ is true (and
necessarily true) of the concepts ‘man’ and ‘animal’, it is not always true when we are
referring to the classes of objects that fall under this concept. On the other hand, it tells
us that there is somewhat of a mismatch between how ≤ encodes accidental predication
and how objects are assigned to terms.
However, this is not our only problem. Consider the following situation:
D = {a} W = {w} T = {A,B}
R = {(w,w)} ≤=⊴= {(A,A), (A,B), (B,B)} ∣ = ∅
c(A)=A c(B)=B
v(w,A) = {a} v(w,B) = ∅
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Observe that on this structure we have T ⊧ A p.s.a B since A ⊴ B. However, we also
have that T ′,w ⊭ AaB and T ′,w ⊭ A p.a.a B. Informally, this would mean that A is
essentially B, but that A is not B nor is it accidentally B, even where there is something
that is A. Again, this shows that there is a mismatch, but in this case it is between
how ⊴ relates terms and how v assigns the extensions of those terms to objects in the
domain. This will need to be fixed.
There is a third problem, which is itself more complicated. With what we have
sketched above, it appears that per se modalities do not entail per accidens modalities.
The question is, is this correct? There are some remarks that Kilwardby makes later in
life that suggest this may not be so. As we have already seen, in the condemnation of
1277, Kilwardby condemns the proposition “that necessary truth depends on persistence
of the subject”.4 Now, does Kilwardby here mean to include both per se and per accidens
necessity? The condemnation is not clear on this, but this can easily be done in our
semantics, especially if we are working with the immediate sense of signification. If we are
working with the mediate sense of signification, things will become more complicated.5
If we follow this idea, then we can give semantics for the entire modal logic which will
rectify these issues. In what follows, we will refer to these as KMM for Kilwardby Models
for Mediate Signification and KMI for Kilwardby Models for Immediate Signification.
We will start with KMI .
Kilwardby Models for Immediate Signification 1. Let KI = {D,W,T,R,≤,⊴, ∣, c, v}
where
D,W, and T are non-empty sets. (Informally, D is our Domain, W is a set of
worlds, and T is a set of interpretations for terms or predicates).
R ⊆W 2.
≤,⊴, and ∣ are subsets of T 2 and satisfy the conditions previously given for them.
c ∶ Terms→ T .
v ∶W × T → PD.
In order to bring these two families of structures together we need the following prin-
ciples:
1. For all terms, A,B c(A) ≤ c(B)if and only if for some w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
2. For all terms, A,B if c(A) ⊴ c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
3. For all terms, A,B if c(A)∣c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) = ∅
4. Item quod veritas cum necessitate tantum est cum constancia subjecti.[63, p.217]
5. As we shall see later, the ampliative approach that Buridan takes leads him to a different understand-
ing of modal propositions.
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The first principle ensures that accidental predication is respected by our valuation
relation in some world and that our ordering relation tracks each instance of an accidental
containment holding.
The second principle tells us that essential properties are preserved by objects across
all worlds (i.e. if A is essentially B then in every world if something is A, it is also B).
Likewise, incompatibility is preserved in the same manner.
The reason why 2. and 3. are not biconditionals has to do with the distinction
between per se and per accidens modalities. As the semantics below will make clear, it
will follow from both per se and per accidens modalities that ∀w ∈Wv(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
However, the distinction between the two is that, in the case of per se modalities, we
have the further relationship holding that c(A) ⊴ c(B) while in the case of per accidens
modalities, this does not need to hold. This is in keeping with Kilwardby’s own use of
the distinction, where he uses it to distinguish between essential and non-essential, but
still necessary properties (someone literate is a man).
It should be observed that most of the interpretive work in this logic is done by the
order-theoretic relationships. As such, our logic is much more term focused than modern
modal logic, where formulae are usually unstructured and not constrained in such a
way. In some sense, we can think of the function v as determining the supposition of
a particular term at a particular world, while the relation ≤ describes how the various
terms relate to each other.
With this in place, we can give our first attempt to treat all of Kilwardby’s modal
operations together:
KI,w ⊧ AaB if and only if c(A) ≤ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ AeB if and only if ¬∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ AiB if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ AoB if and only if c(A) ≰ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.a B if and only if c(A) ⊴ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.e B if and only if c(A)∣c(B)
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.i B if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D ⊴ c(B) or D ≤ c(B)
and D ⊴ c(A)
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.o B if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D∣c(A) and D∣c(B)
KI,w ⊧ A p.a.a B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then v(x,A) ⊆ v(x,B).
KI,w ⊧ A p.a.e B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then v(x,A) ∩ v(x,B) = ∅.
KI,w ⊧ A p.a.i B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then v(x,A) ∩ v(x,B) ≠ ∅.
KI,w ⊧ A p.a.o B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then v(x,A) ⊈ v(x,B).
With this in place, we can define logical consequence for these models as follows:
Let Γ be a set of well-formed formulae and φ a well-formed formula. We say that φ is a
logical consequence of Γ and write Γ ⊧ φ if:
For all models KI and for all w ∈ W (where W ∈ KI) if KI,w ⊧ γ (for all γ ∈ Γ) then
KI,w ⊧ φ.
This provides a semantic reconstruction of immediate signification. Here, we should
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observe that in all cases per se necessary propositions imply per accidens necessary ones,
in virtue of our three principles. Likewise, both per se and per accidens necessities entail
assertoric propositions. However, it should be observed that on this account, propositions
such as ‘Every animal is an animal’ and ‘Some animal is an animal’ come out true, even
if their extensions are empty. As we have already seen, this is unacceptable when we
are concerned with objects. In order to rectify this, let us now consider how to account
for such things by giving models for mediate signification and respecting Kilwardby’s
remarks in the condemnation of 1277.
Kilwardby Models for Immediate Signification 2. Let KM = {D,W,T,R,≤,⊴
, ∣, c, v} where
D,W, and T are non-empty sets. (Informally, D is our Domain, W is a set of
worlds, and T is a set of interpretations of terms or predicates)
R ⊆W 2.
⊏,⊴, and ∣ are subsets of T 2 and satisfy the conditions previously given for them.
c ∶ Terms→ T .
v ∶W × T → PD.
As before, we impose the following conditions:
1. For all terms, A,B c(A) ≤ c(B) iff for some w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
2. For all terms, A,B if c(A) ⊴ c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
3. For all terms, A,B if c(A)∣c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) = ∅
Truth conditions are given as follows:
KM,w ⊧ AaB if and only if v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B) and v(w,A) ≠ ∅
KM,w ⊧ AeB if and only if v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) = ∅
KM,w ⊧ AiB if and only if v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) ≠ ∅
KM,w ⊧ AoB if and only if v(w,A) ⊈ v(w,B) or v(w,A) = ∅
KM,w ⊧ A p.s.a B if and only if c(A) ⊴ c(B)
KM,w ⊧ A p.s.e B if and only if c(A)∣c(B)
KM,w ⊧ A p.s.i B if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. (D ≤ c(A) and D ⊴ c(B)) or (D ≤ c(B)
and D ⊴ C(A))
KM,w ⊧ A p.s.o B if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D∣C(B)
KM,w ⊧ A p.a.a B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then v(x,A) ⊆ v(x,B)
KM,w ⊧ A p.a.e B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then KM, x ⊧ AeB
KM,w ⊧ A p.a.i B if and only if ∀v ∈W if wRx then KM, x ⊧ AiB
KM,w ⊧ A p.a.o B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then KM, x ⊧ v(x,A) ⊈ v(x,B)
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As in the case of immediate signification, we require that 2. and 3. are not bicondi-
tionals on pain of collapsing the distinction between per se and per accidens modalities.
There is, of course, one glaring issue with the semantics given here. The problem is
that, given the way we have defined A
p.a.
a B, which is in accordance with Kilwardby’s
comments in the condemnation of 1277, the condemnation does not tell us what we
should do with particular necessity statements. Is it true to say that ‘Some man is
necessarily an animal’ even if no animals exist? The semantics presented here presuppose
that this is in fact not the case (i.e. A
p.a.
a B does not entail A
p.a.
i B). This is a problem
for our semantic presentation, and at this point, it is not clear how we might be able to
reformulate this so as to avoid this problem. Because of these problems, when we move
on to discuss Kilwardby’s theory of the syllogism and its relationship to Aristotle, we
will make use of KI models.
Logical Consequence
We have already defined a fairly standard notion of logical consequence for KI models.
However, as we have already observed, Kilwardby further distinguishes two notions of
logical consequence: natural consequences and accidental consequences. How shall we
capture these two notions of necessity? We propose to do this as follows:
As before let Γ be a set of well-formed formulae and let A
∇× B be a well-formed
formula where ∇ is either blank (corresponding to an assertoric proposition), p.s. or p.a.
and × is one of a,e,i, or o.
We say that Γ naturally entails A
∇× B and write Γ ⊧N A ∇× B if:
1) Γ ⊧ A ∇× B.
and
1. c(A) ⊴ c(B) if A ×B is an affirmative proposition.
2. c(A)∣c(B) if A ×B is a negative proposition.
Likewise, we say that Γ accidentally entails A
∇× B and write Γ ⊧A A ∇× B if:
Γ ⊧ A ∇× B and Γ ⊭N∇× B.
At this point we are in a position to formulate and demonstrate some of the claims
Kilwardby makes about the difference between accidental and natural consequences. As
we have already seen for Kilwardby ‘ex falso’ type arguments are accidentally valid, but
not naturally/essentially valid. At this point, there is, however, an interpretive point
that we need to make. When Kilwardby rejects ‘ex falso’ style arguments, it seems that
what he is objecting to is the lack of an essential connection between the premises and
the conclusion. By these sorts of examples, we do not take Kilwardby to mean that all
‘ex falso’ type arguments will fail to have the requisite connections, but only that some
arguments do. Read this way, all we need to do is provide a recipe for constructing a
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counterexample to an ‘ex falso’ style argument. We do not need to show that there is
no arrangement of premises and conclusion that results in an essentially valid ‘ex falso’
style argument.6
We can now prove this easily. Let Γ = {AeA,AiA}.7
To see that {AeA,AiA} ⊭N BiB, one can simply construct a countermodel.8 We
construct the model as follows:
D = {a} W = {w} R = {(w,w)}
T = {A,B} ≤=⊴= {(A,A), (B,B)} ∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = {a}
Since c(A) ⋬ c(B) , the second condition of natural consequence fails, and the argu-
ment is not naturally valid. However, such an argument is clearly accidentally valid as
there are no KI models of {AeA,AiA}.
3.4.2 Adequacy of Our Model
As we saw on 34 of the previous chapter, Kilwardby listed a number of principles that he
gives as rules for understanding when a syllogism is valid. According to Kilwardby the
following rules given necessary conditions for validities in the apodictic and assertoric
syllogisms, where the apodictic necessities are restricted to per se necessities. This is
important to note, as we will only focus on per se necessary propositions here.:
P1 In every syllogism, one premise must be universal.
P2 In every syllogism, one premise must be affirmative.
P3 In first figure syllogisms, the major must be universal
P4 In first figure syllogisms, the minor must be affirmative
P5 In second figure syllogisms, the major must be universal.
P6 In second figure syllogisms, one of the premises must be negative.
P7 In third figure syllogisms, the minor must be affirmative.
P8 In first figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity-proposition must be
major.
P9 In second figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, one premise must be a universal
negative necessity proposition.
6. In fact, this latter constraint is not possible in our logic.
7. Since we do not have access to a conjunction operation in this language, we need to use both of these
formulae to express a contradiction.
8. It could also be observed that such an argument would not be counted by Kilwardby as a valid
syllogism since a valid syllogism with a negative premise must have a negative conclusion.
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P10 In affirmative third figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity premise
must be a universal affirmative.
P11 In negative third figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity premise must
be a universal negative.
Can our models correctly model these conditions for syllogisms? We contend that they
can, when we restrict our attention to per se necessary propositions, as Kilwardby does
(see page 31). Properties P1-P7 are standard features of assertoric syllogisms and we
will prove these in the appendix, starting on page 191. We will focus here on the modal
claims. Before we move on to the proof of this, we will often appeal to the following
lemma:
Let × range over the categorical operations a,e,i or o and let ∇ range over p.s., p.a.,
and −. Then:
1. A
p.s.× B ⊧ A p.a.× B
2. A
p.a.× B ⊧ A × B
3. A
p.s.
a B ⊧ A ∇i B
4. A
p.s.
e B ⊧ A ∇o B
5. A
p.a.
a B ⊧ A p.a.i B
6. A
p.a.
e B ⊧ A p.a.o B
7. A
p.a.
a B ⊧ A i B
8. A
p.a.
e B ⊧ A o B
9. A a B ⊧ A i B
10. A e B ⊧ A o B
11. A
p.s
e B ⊧ A ∇e B
12. A
∇
i B ⊧ A ∇i B
The proof of these claims is routine and follow from what we show on page 194 of the
Appendix on Kilwardby’s logic.
A triple, S, is a pair of premises, ⟨M,m⟩ from which a conclusion C can be drawn. We
require that M , m, and C are well-formed formulae and satisfy the following conditions:
1. M ,m, and C are all categorical propositions;
2. M ,m, and C have exactly three terms;
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3. The predicate of C occurs in M ;
4. The subject of C occurs in m;
5. M and m share a common term that does not occur in C.9
It should be observed that the definition of S given here is entirely syntactic. In what
follows, a triple will count as a syllogism even if one or both of the premises in the
syllogism are false.
Syllogistic Validity. A triple S is valid when the following obtains:
if KI,w ⊧M and KI,w ⊧m then KI,w ⊧ C.
We will denote this by ⊧ S. A valid triple is called a syllogism.
We prove P8-P11 as follows:
P8: If S is a valid assertoric/necessity syllogism in the first figure, then the necessity-
proposition must be major.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive of this claim and restrict ourselves to the cases
where the syllogism’s assertoric counterparts are valid. For XLL syllogisms, we need to
verify that the following are not valid:
B a C B e C B a C B e C
A
p.s.
a B A
p.s.
a B A
p.s.
i B A
p.s.
i B
A
p.s.
a C A
p.s.
e C A
p.s.
i C A
p.s.
o C
Consider the following countermodels:
For XLL Barbara
D = {a, b} W = {w} T = {A,B,C}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), ⊴= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B)}(A,B), (B,C), (A,C)}∣ = ∅ v(w,A) = {a, b} v(w,B) = {a}
v(w,C) = {a}
Call this model O. Now, since B ≤ C it follows that O,w ⊧ BaC and since A ⊴ B it
follows that O,w ⊧ A p.s.a B. However, O,w ⊭ A p.s.a C since A ⋬ C, thus showing XLL
Barbara to be invalid.
9. This definition is based on the one found in [65].
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For XLL Darii:
D = {a, b} W = {w} T = {A,B,C,D}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C, c(D) =D ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (D,D), ⊴= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C),(D,A), (D,B), (D,C), (B,C)} (D,D), (D,B)}∣ = ∅ v(w,A) = {a, b} v(w,B) = {a}
v(w,C) = {a}
Call this model O. Again, observe that O,w ⊧ BaC since B ≤ C. Since D ⊴ B and
D ≤ A, it follows that O,w ⊧ A p.s.i B. To see that O,w ⊭ A p.s.i C, need to show that
there is no D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ A and D ⊴ C or D ≤ C and D ⊴ A. For the left disjunct,
observe that only C ⊴ C, and C ≰ A. For the right disjunct, observe that only A ⊴ A
and that A ≰ C. Hence O,w ⊭ A p.s.i C.
For XLL Celarent and Ferio:
D = {a} W = {w} T = {A,B,C}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B)} ⊴= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B)}∣ = ∅ v(w,A) = {a} v(w,B) = {a}
v(w,C) = {b}
Call this model O. For XLL Celarent observe that v(w,B) ∩ v(w,C) = ∅ and so,
O,w ⊧ BeC. Likewise, since A ⊴ B, it follows that O,w ⊧ A p.s.a B. However, we do not
have A∣C, and so, O,w ⊭ A p.s.e C.
For XLL Ferio, again, we have O,w ⊧ BeC. Likewise, since A ⊴ A and A ⊴ B we
have O,w ⊧ A p.s.i B. However, since only A ≤ A and we do not have A∣C it follows that
O,w ⊭ A p.s.o C.
That no XXL syllogism is valid in the first figure is fairly obvious. Observe that in
each case simply let ∣ = ∅ and ⊴= (A,A), (B,B), (C,C) and ensure that the model ver-
ifies the assertoric propositions. Then the ⊴ condition of per se propositions will fail in
each case.
Conversely, we show that the following syllogisms are valid:
LXL Barbara, LXL Celarent, LXL Darii, and LXL Ferio.
Proof of LXL Barbara:
Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ B p.s.a C
and that KI,w ⊧ A a B. From this it follows that c(B) ⊴ c(C) and that c(A) ≤ c(B).
From order property 2 it follows that c(A) ⊴ c(C) and hence KI,w ⊧ A p.s.a C as required.
Proof of LXL Celarent:
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Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ B p.s.e C and
that KI,w ⊧ A a B. Hence, c(B)∣c(C) and c(A) ≤ c(B) by order property 3 from which
it follows that c(A)∣c(C), and so KI,w ⊧ A p.s.e C as desired.
Proof of LXL Darii:
Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ B p.s.a C and
that KI,w ⊧ A i B. From this it follows that c(B) ⊴ c(C) and that ∃D ∈ T D ≤ c(A)
and D ≤ c(B). From this it follows by order property 2 that c(D) ⊴ c(C) and it follows
by basic logic that KI,w ⊧ A p.s.i C as required.
Proof of LXL Ferio:
Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ B p.s.e C and
that KI,w ⊧ A i B. Hence, c(B)∣c(C) and there is some D ∈ T such that D ≤ c(A) and
D ≤ c(B). Hence by order property 3 it follows that D∣c(C), and so KI,w ⊧ A p.s.o C as
desired.
P9 In second figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, one premise must be a universal
negative necessity proposition.
Based on this we need to check that the following second figure syllogisms are valid:
LXL Cesare:
Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ C p.s.e B and
that KI,w ⊧ A p.s.a B. Then it follows that c(C)∣c(B) and that c(A) ⊴ c(B). Since∣ is symmetric, it follows that c(B)∣c(C). Likewise, by order property 1 c(A) ⊴ c(B)
entails that c(A) ≤ c(B). Hence by order property 4 it follows that c(A)∣c(C). Hence
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.e C as desired.
XLL Camestres:
Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ C p.s.a B and
that KI,w ⊧ A p.s.e B. From this it follows that c(C) ⊴ c(B) and that c(A)∣c(B). Since∣ is symmetric, it follows that c(B)∣c(A). By order property 1, c(C) ⊴ c(B) entails
c(C) ≤ c(B). By order property 4, it follows that c(C)∣c(A), which entails, c(A)∣c(C).
Hence KI,w ⊧ A p.s.e C as desired.
LXL Festino:
Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ C p.s.e B and that
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.i B. Then it follows that c(C)∣c(B) and that for some D either D ≤ c(A)
and D ⊴ c(B) or D ≤ c(B) and D ⊴ c(A). We need to show that there is some D such
that D ≤ c(A) and D∣C. For the left disjunct, assume that D ≤ c(A) and D ⊴ c(B). By
order property 1, it follows that D ≤ c(B). By symmetry, c(C)∣c(B) entails c(B)∣c(C).
By order property 4 it follows that D∣c(C) as desired.
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For the right disjunct, assume that D ≤ c(B) and D ⊴ c(A). D ≤ c(B) together with
c(B)∣c(C) entails that D∣(C). By order property 1, it follows that D ≤ c(A) as desired.
Hence, in both cases we have shown that there is some D such that D ≤ c(A) and that
D∣c(C) and so KI,w ⊧ A p.s.o C.
To see that these are the only valid syllogisms in the second figure, we need to show that
the following syllogisms are invalid:
LXL Camestres, LXL Baroco, XLL Cesare, and XLL Festino.
Countermodel for LXL Camestres and LXL Baroco:
D = {a, b, c} W = {w} T = {A,B,C}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (C,B), (C,A)} ⊴= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (C,B)}∣ = ∅ v(w,A) = {a} v(w,B) = {b, c}
v(w,C) = {b}
Call this model O. In this model, observe that C ⊴ B. Hence O,w ⊧ C p.s.a B.
Likewise, observe that for no D ∈ T do we have D ≤ A and D ≤ B, since A ≰ B, B ≰ A,
and C ≰ A. Hence M,w ⊧ A e B. However, since ∣ is empty, we have M,w ⊭ A p.s.e C
and M,w ⊭ A p.s.o C.
For LXL Baroco, observe that A ≰ B and so M,w ⊧ C o B. We have already shown
that the conclusion does not follow.
Countermodel for XLL Cesare and XLL Festino:
D = {a, b, c} W = {w} T = {A,B,C}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B)} ⊴= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B)}∣ = ∅ v(w,A) = {a} v(w,B) = {a, b}
v(w,C) = {c}
In this model observe that for no D ∈ T is D ≤ B and D ≤ C, since A ≰ C, B ≰ C and
C ≰ B. Hence M,w ⊧ C e B. Likewise, observe that A ⊴ B . Hence M,w ⊧ A p.s.a B.
However, M,w ⊭ A p.s.e C and M,w ⊭ A p.s.o C since ∣ is empty.
For XLL Festino, observe that A ⊴ B and that A ⊴ A. Hence M,w ⊧ C p.s.i B. Like-
wise, since ∣ is empty, it follows that M,w ⊭ C p.s.o B. We have already shown that the
conclusion does not follow in this model.
Moving to syllogisms in the third figure, we need to prove P10 and P11. Recall that
P10 states:
P10 In affirmative third figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity premise
must be a universal affirmative.
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Based on this we need to show that LXL Datisi and XLL Disamis are valid.
For LXL Datisi: Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that
KI,w ⊧ B p.s.a C and KI,w ⊧ B i A. Then we have c(B) ⊴ c(C) and there is some D such
that D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(A) or D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B). We will show that there is
some D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ⊴ c(C). The first conjunct follows from our second
assumption. The second conjunct follows from D ≤ c(B) and c(B) ⊴ c(C) by the order
property 2. Hence some D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ⊴ c(C) and it follows by basic
logic that KI,w ⊧ A p.s.i C.
For XLL Disamis:
Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ B i C and
KI,w ⊧ B p.s.a A. Hence 1) there is some D such that either D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(A)
or D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(A) and 2) c(B) ⊴ c(A). By order property 2 D ≤ c(B) and
c(B) ⊴ c(A) entail that D ⊴ c(C). This, together with D ≤ c(A) and some basic logic
entails that KI,w ⊧ A p.s.i C.
We will also show that LXL Disamis and XLL Datisi are invalid.
For LXL Disamis :
D = {a, b, c} W = {w} T = {A,B,C}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (B,A), (C,B), (C,A)} ⊴= {(B,C)}∣ = ∅ v(w,A) = {a, b, c} v(w,B) = {b, c}
v(w,C) = {c}
In this model, observe that B ≤ B and B ⊴ C. Hence KI,w ⊧ B p.s.i C. Likewise, since
B ≤ A it follows that KI,w ⊧ B a A. In order to show that KI,w ⊭ A p.s.i C it suffices to
observe that: A ≰ C, B ⋬ A, C ⋬ A, A ⋬ C, B ⋬ C, and C ⋬ C.
For XLL Datisi:
D = {a, b, c} W = {w} T = {A,B,C}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (B,C), (A,B), (A,C)} ⊴= {(A,B)}∣ = ∅ v(w,A) = {a, b} v(w,B) = {b}
v(w,C) = {b, c}
In this model, observe that B ≤ C. Hence KI,w ⊧ B a C. Likewise, since B ≤ B and
B ⊴ A it follows that KI,w ⊧ B p.s.i A. However, in order to show that KI,w ⊭ A p.s.i C it
suffices to observe that: A ⋬ C, B ⋬ C, C ⋬ C, A ⋬ A, B ⋬ A, and C ⋬ A.
P11 In negative third figure assertoric/necessity syllogisms, the necessity premise must
be a universal negative.
Based on this we need to show that LXL Ferison is valid.
LXL Ferison:
Let KI be an arbitrary model and w a point in W. Assume that KI,w ⊧ B p.s.e C and
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KI,w ⊧ B i A. Based on this we have 1) c(B)∣c(C) and 2) there is some D such that
D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(A). We will show that there is some D such that D ≤ c(A) and
that D∣c(C). The first conjunct follows from 2). For the second conjunct, observe that
D ≤ c(B) and c(B)∣c(C) entails D∣c(C) by order property 4. Hence, KI,w ⊧ B p.s.o C.
We will also show that LXL Bocardo, XLL Bocardo, XLL Felapton and XLL Ferison
are invalid.
For the three XLL syllogisms, consider the following countermodel:
D = {a, b, c} W = {w} T = {A,B,C}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,C), (B,A),} ⊴= {(B,A)}∣ = ∅ v(w,A) = {a, b} v(w,B) = {b}
v(w,C) = {b, c}
First, observe that in this model, M,w ⊭ A p.s.o C since ∣ is empty.
For XLL Felapton, observe that there is no D such that D ≤ B and D ≤ C, since
A ≰ B, B ≰ C and C ≰ B. For this it follows that M,w ⊧ BeC. Likewise, since B ⊴ A it
follows that M,w ⊭ B p.s.a A.
For XLL Ferison, first observe that M,w ⊧ BeC, as we proved in the case of XLL
Felapton. Likewise, since B ⊴ A and B ≤ B, it follows that there is some D such that
D ≤ B and D ≤ A. From this it follows that M,w ⊭ B p.s.i A.
For XLL Bocardo first observe that M,w ⊧ B p.s.a A, as we proved in the case of XLL
Felapton. Likewise, observe that B ≰ C and so, M,w ⊧ BoC.
For LXL Bocardo consider the following countermodel:
D = {a, b, c} W = {w} T = {A,B,C}
R =W 2 c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C ≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (B,A),} ⊴= {(B,A)}∣ = {(B,C), (C,B)}∅ v(w,A) = {a, b} v(w,B) = {b}
v(w,C) = {c}
In this model, observe that since B ≤ A, it follows that M,w ⊧ B p.s.a A. Likewise,
since B∣C and B ≤ B, it follows that M,w ⊧ B p.s.o C. To show that M,w ⊭ A p.s.o C, it
suffices to observe that B ≰ C, not A∣C and not C ∣A.
This completes our treatment of the modal syllogisms that Kilwardby outlines in his
treatment of Aristotle’s modal logic. There is an interesting implication of our analysis
that we should mention at this point. In [37, p.117] Malink provides a standard table
that tracks all of the LXL, LLL, XLL, and XXX syllogisms that Aristotle claims are
valid as well as references to where those validities are affirmed in the Prior Analytics.
We reproduce a modified version of the table in Figure 2.1, omitting the numbers in
square brackets (which are references to theorems in Malink’s paper), stating the syllo-
gisms using their medieval mnemonic names, and using L where Malink uses N. Valid
syllogisms are in bold font while invalid syllogisms are in italics. If the square is blank,
55
3 Reconstructing Kilwardby’s Logic
1st figure XXX LLL LXL XLL
Barbara 25b37 29b36 30a17 30a23
Celarent 25b40 29b36 30a17 30a23
Darii 26a23 29b36 30a17 30b2
Ferio 26a25 29b36 30b1 30b5
2nd Figure
Cesare 27a5 29b36 30b9 30b18
Camestres 27a9 29b36 30b20 30b14
Festino 27a32 29b36 31a5
Baroco 27a36 30a6 30a10 31a15
3rd Figure
Darapti 28a17 29b36 31a24 31a31
Felapton 28a26 29b36 31a33 31a37
Disamis 28b7 29b36 31b31 31b12
Datisi 28b11 29b36 31b19 31b20
Bocardo 28b15 30a7 32a4 31b40
Ferison 28b31 29b36 31b33 32a1
Figure 3.1: Apodictic Syllogisms in Aristotle
Aristotle does not say if the syllogism is valid or not.
As the reader can verify from what we have shown above, our reconstruction of Kil-
wardby correctly tracks the validities in Aristotle’s modal logic. In some sense this is
not surprising, as there are a number of close connections between the formalisation of
Kilwardby developed here, and the formalisation that Malink uses for Aristotle’s modal
logic. The main difference, which we will not dwell on here, is that we make explicit
use of an operation to define definitional incomparability, while Malink prefers to handle
this in the semantic definitions of his formulae.
3.5 Connexive Implication and Natural Consequence
There is one final question that we will discuss and it also emerges from Kilwardby’s dis-
cussion of logical consequence. As we saw in the previous chapter10, Kilwardby provides
a characterisation of natural inferences that makes use of logical connectives other than
the categorical operations a, e, i and o. In particular, Kilwardby discusses implication
and disjunction. The main results of Kilwardby’s theory can be summarised as follows:
1. The natural implication relationship validates Aristotle’s Thesis and Abelard’s
Thesis.
2. Disjunction introduction is a natural inference.
3. The natural implication relationship does not validate ex impossibile quodlibet.
10. See chapter 1, section 3, subsection 1
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We treat each of the first two claims in some detail.
In Chapter One, we argued that Kilwardby is committed to Aristotle’s Thesis based
on textual analysis of Kilwardby’s commentary, the passage of the Prior Analytics and
some analogies between Kilwardby’s views and Abelard’s. We also gave explicit textual
references showing Kilwardby’s commitment to Abelard’s Thesis.11
In the case of the principle that “Disjunction introduction is a natural inference”, the
following passage in Kilwardby can be cited:
Moreover, a disjunction follows from each of its parts in a natural conse-
quence. Hence it follows that: ‘if you are sitting, then you are sitting or
you are not sitting’; and ‘if you are not sitting, then you are sitting or not
sitting’. And in the same way, in a natural consequence, the same follows
from its being and not being and similarly of necessity.[29, p.760]12
Given what we have seen in our model, we can motivate this sort of implication
as a generalisation of the notion of meaning containment. Just as per se necessary
propositions capture the idea that the meaning of one term is contained in the other,
the more generalised idea is that the meaning of the consequent should be contained in
the antecedent. Based on this, the failure of ex falso should generalise from the usual
syllogistic case. Inferences like disjunction introduction (and dually, as we shall see,
conjunction elimination) preserve this notion of meaning containment, since in each case
the antecedent ‘contains in it’ the meaning relationship necessary to ground the truth
of the consequent.
This leaves the connexive nature of this implication to be discussed. At the heart
of this is the idea that no true proposition contains in its definitions anything that is
inconsistent with it. In the framework we are working with here, this idea becomes the
notion that the definition of any term does not contain the negation of that term, or
taken from the object side, for no term, if an object satisfies the definition of that term,
does it then fail to satisfy the definition of that term.13
Formally, there are some interesting challenges present. Given the framework that
Kilwardby is working in, it is natural to think of his logic as term-based logic augmented
with the operations of ∧ (and), ∨(or), ¬(not) and →(implies), generalised to allow the
modal operations of per se necessity and per accidens necessity (which we will here
denote as ⊞ and ◻ respectively) to range over any of these propositions. In some sense,
we could think of this as a propositional modal logic, where the atomic terms just happen
to be categorical propositions. There are some technical challenges with this approach.
Instead, we will settle for a more modest proposal. We will have to require that our
11. See 21 and 19.
12. Adhuc disiunctiua sequitur ad utrumque sui partem, et hoc naturali consequentia. Quare sequitur
si tu sedes, tu sedes vel tu non sedes; et si tu non sedes, tu sedes vel non sedes. Et ita naturali
consequentia sequitur idem ad idem esse et non esse et ita ex necessitate. [24, ad B2 Dub 4 60ra].
13. It should be noted that one very natural class of terms that do seem to violate this condition are
liar-like properties, e.g., the membership condition of the Russell set.
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well-formed formulae be restricted in particular ways to make this idea precise. As such,
we will call this a quasi first-order logic.
The other interesting challenge is to figure out exactly how we should think about
meaning containment in some of the propositional connectives. For example, when is⊞(φ∧ψ) true? One very natural way forward involves treating ∧ in terms similar to how
particular affirmative propositions function. Then we would say that a conjunction is
per se just in case the truth of each of the conjuncts is guaranteed by a per se connection
(i.e. we would want to say that either φ ⊴ ψ or ψ ⊴ φ, and further require that both
propositions be true.) As we shall see, → will be similar to the notion of conceptual
containment and mirror the truth conditions for ⊞AaB.
The interesting challenge here concerns the notion of negation that we want to work
with. What we want to do is use the relation ∣ to define a notion of negation that captures
the idea of a proposition being per se impossible. This is not a notion that Kilwardby
treats, but we can think of it as saying that a concept or idea is per se impossible if there
is something incompatible about the way that the concept expressed by the proposition
has been defined.
Quasi First-Order Logic 1.
Let LQFOL = {Term,a, e, i, o,◻,⊞,∧,∨,→,¬,⇒}
The definition of well-formed formulae of LFOL is a natural generalisation of what we
have already seen:
Let A,B ∈ Term, and φ,ψ be well-formed formulae.
A ×B is well-formed, when × is one of a,e,i, or o.
¬φ,φ ∧ ψ,φ ∨ ψ,φ→ ψ,◻φ, and ⊞φ are well-formed formulae.
Nothing else is a well-formed formula.
We shall denote the well-formed formulae of a language, L as WFF (L). If φ is of the
form A ×B, ◻A ×B, or ⊞A ×B, then we say that φ is atomic.
Our Kilwardby Models for this language will be similar to the previous models we
considered. The only thing that will need to change is how we assign truth conditions
to newly added operations.
Kilwardby Models for FOL. Let L = {D,W,T,R,⊏, ∣, c, v} where
D,W, and R are non-empty sets. (Informally, D is our Domain, W is a set of
worlds, and T is a set of interpretations of terms or predicates)
R ⊆W 2.
⊴⊆ T 2, ∣ ⊆ T 2, ≤⊆ T 2.
c ∶ Terms→ T .14
14. For clarity, it should be observed that c is not the contradictory operator, but an operation that
assigns to each term in Terms its interpretation in T .
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v ∶ T ×W → PD.
Again, we require that the following properties hold:
1. ∀x, y if x ⊴ y then x ≤ y.
2. ∀x, y, z if x ≤ y and y ⊴ z then x ⊴ z.
3. ∀x, y if x ≤ y then not x∣y
4. ∀x, y, z if x ≤ y and y∣z then x∣z.
We also require that our domains be related in the following way: In order to bring
these two families of structures together we need the following principles:
1. For all terms, A,B c(A) ≤ c(B) if and only if for some w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
2. For all terms, A,B if c(A) ⊴ c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
3. For all terms, A,B if c(A)∣c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) = ∅
With the exception of per se necessity, truth conditions for the logical operations are
defined as usual:
L,w ⊧ A ×B if and only if as in our treatment of the modal syllogism.
L,w ⊧ A p.a.× B if and only if as in our treatment of the modal syllogism.
L,w ⊧ A p.s.× B if and only if as in our treatment of the modal syllogism.
L,w ⊧ ¬φ if and only if if L,w ⊭ φ
L,w ⊧ φ ∧ ψ if and only if L,w ⊧ φ and L,w ⊧ ψ
L,w ⊧ φ ∨ ψ if and only if L,w ⊧ φ or L,w ⊧ ψ
L,w ⊧ φ→ ψ if and only if if L,w ⊧ φ then L,w ⊧ ψ
L,w ⊧ ◻φ if and only if for all v if wRv then L, v ⊧ φ
In order to define how the per se operations work, we will make use of the following:
Let Ref ∶WFFLK → P(T ) governed by the following conditions:
1. Ref(A ∇× B) = {A,B}
2. Ref(φ ∨ ψ) = Ref(φ) ∪Ref(ψ)
3. Ref(φ ∧ ψ) = Ref(φ) ∩Ref(ψ)
4. Ref(φ→ ψ) = {A ∈ Ref(φ) ∶ ∃B ∈ Ref(ψ) A ⊴ B}
5. Ref(¬φ) = {A ∈ T ∶ A∣Ref(φ)}
6. Ref(⊞(φ)) = Ref(◻φ) = Ref(φ)
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Informally, we can think of Ref as the operation that collects the various terms that
occur in formulae.
Finally, we generalise ⊴ and ∣ as follows:
φ ⊴ ψ if and only if ∀A ∈ Ref(φ) ∃B ∈ Ref(ψ) such that A ⊴ B.
φ∣ψ if and only if ∀A ∈ Ref(φ) ∀B ∈ Ref(ψ) A∣B.
The concept of φ is contained in ψ just in case the content of φ jointly expresses the
content of ψ. Likewise, φ and ψ are incompatible (we might say strongly incompatible)
if none of their content is consistent.
The idea in each case, will then be to use the operation ⊞ to change the truth conditions
under which the main connective of the formula is evaluated. In the cases with categorical
formulae, it transforms them into per se formulae if they are not, and leaves them
unchanged if they are already per se. In the case of the new operations, we use the Ref
clauses to give the relevant truth conditions.
L,w ⊧ ⊞A p.s.× B if and only if L,w ⊧ A p.s.× B
L,w ⊧ ⊞A p.a.× B if and only if L,w ⊧ A p.s.× B
L,w ⊧ ⊞A × B if and only if L,w ⊧ A p.s.× B
L,w ⊧ ⊞¬φ if and only if ¬∃A ∈ Ref(φ).
L,w ⊧ ⊞(φ→ ψ) if and only if Ref(φ) ⊴ Ref(ψ)
L,w ⊧ ⊞(φ ∧ ψ) if and only if L,w ⊧ ⊞φ and L,w ⊧ ⊞ψ
L,w ⊧ ⊞(φ ∨ ψ) if and only if L,w ⊧ ⊞φ or L,w ⊧ ⊞ψ
The only clause that should require some comment is our definition of ⊞¬φ. Here,
the idea is that ⊞¬ tells us that the formula that follows it is ‘per se false’. The key
idea to observe is that Ref will be empty just in case there is some formula φ such that
A ∈ Ref(φ) and A ∈ Ref(¬φ), i.e. the term A occurs in both φ and its negation. This
leads to a per se impossibility, because A∣A is always false.
With these in place, we now need to explain how we formalise natural and accidental
consequences. As before, we start with the standard account of logical consequence. We
say that:
Γ ⊧ φ if for all models, L and all w ∈W , if L,w ⊧ Γ then L,w ⊧ φ.
φ is a natural consequence of Γ (denoted by Γ ⊧N φ) if whenever L,w ⊧ ⊞γi for all
γi ∈ Γ, L,w ⊧ ⊞φ.
φ is an accidental consequence of Γ (denoted by Γ ⊧A φ) if Γ ⊧ φ but Γ ⊭N φ.
The following lemma will be helpful:
Incompatibility Lemma For no A ∈ T do we have A ∈ Ref(φ) and A ∈ Ref(¬φ)
Proof: Assume not for a contradiction, so that for some A, A ∈ Ref(φ) and A ∈ Ref(¬φ).
This holds if and only if A ∈ Ref(φ) and A∣Ref(φ). Then A∣A, by the requirement of
strong incompatibility. But this is impossible as ∣ is irreflexive.
We claim that our account of natural consequences can prove the main features of
Kilwardby’s connexive logic. It can also prove the following:
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Aristotle’s Thesis We claim that ⊧N ¬(¬φ→ φ): this holds, if and only if ⊧ ⊞¬(¬φ→
φ). We will show that ¬∃A ∈ Ref(¬φ → φ). We will show that Ref(¬φ → φ) = ∅. To
see this, observe that Ref(¬φ → φ) = {A ∈ Ref(¬φ) ∶ ∃B ∈ Ref(φ), and A ⊴ B}. Now,
assume for a contradiction that {A ∈ Ref(¬φ) ∶ ∃B ∈ Ref(φ), and A ⊴ B} is non-empty
and call the witness of this C. Then C ∈ Ref(¬φ), and there is some B (which will
call D) such that D ∈ Ref(φ) and C ⊴ D. It then follows by the definition of Ref that
C ∣Ref(φ) and so C ∣D. However, since C ⊴ D, it follows that C ≤ D and so not C ∣D
which is a contradiction. Hence Ref(¬φ→ φ) = ∅ and so ¬∃A ∈ Ref(¬φ→ φ).
Abelard’s Thesis We claim that ⊧N ¬((φ → ¬ψ) ∧ (φ → ψ)). It suffices to show
that Ref(φ → ¬ψ) ∩ Ref(φ → ψ) = ∅. Assume not. Then ∃B s.t. B ∈ Ref(φ →¬ψ) ∩Ref(φ→ ψ) i.e. the following both hold:
1. B ∈ Ref(φ) and ∃C such that B ⊴ C and C ∈ Ref(ψ)
2. B ∈ Ref(φ) and ∃C such that B ⊴ C and C ∈ Ref(¬ψ)
Let D be a witness to 1 and E be a witness to 2. Then by 1. we have B ⊴ D and
D ∈ Ref(ψ). By 2. we have B ⊴ E and E ∈ Ref(¬ψ). By the definition of Ref(¬ψ) it
follows that E∣Ref(ψ) and so E∣D by the definition of ∣. Since we have B ⊴ E we also
have B ≤ E by order property 1. and so B∣D by order property 4. However, B ⊴ D,
and so B ≤ D by order property 4. and so not B∣D by order property 3. This is a
contradiction. Hence Ref(φ→ ¬ψ) ∩Ref(φ→ ψ) = ∅.
Boethius’ Thesis We claim that ⊧N ((φ→ ψ)→ ¬(φ→ ¬ψ)). This holds if and only
if For all A, if A ∈ Ref(φ→ ψ) then ∃ B such that B ∈ Ref(¬(φ→ ¬ψ)) and A ⊴ B.
Take an arbitrary term, C and assume that C ∈ Ref(φ → ψ). Then C ∈ Ref(φ) and∃D such that D ∈ Ref(ψ) and C ⊴ D. Now, we claim that D ∈ Ref(¬(φ → ¬ψ)). It
suffices to show that D∣Ref(φ → ¬ψ). So, take an arbitrary E such that E ∈ Ref(φ →¬ψ). It then follows that ∃B such that E ⊴ B and B∣Ref(ψ). Call this F . Then E ⊴ F
and F ∣Ref(ψ). From the second conjunct it follows by the definition of ∣ that F ∣D.
Hence by order properties 1. and 4. it follows that D∣E. As E was arbitrary, this
holds for all E ∈ Ref(φ → ¬ψ). Hence by the definition of ∣ we have D∣Ref(φ → ¬ψ) as
claimed.
It is also easy to see that disjunction introduction is a natural relationship. To see
this, observe that Ref(φ) ⊴ Ref(φ ∨ ψ), since for any A ∈ Ref(φ) it follows that A ∈
Ref(φ) ∪Ref(ψ) (for any ψ), and hence A ∈ Ref(φ ∨ ψ).
3.5.1 Connexive Logic, Substantivity and Interpretation
Over the years there have been a number of attempts, both formally and historically, to
understand and offer motivation for the connexive account of implication. One sort of
motivation, discussed by Graham Priest, comes from a particular reading of negation:
The connexivist principles appear rather odd to the modern eye, and it is not
clear what might justify them. The answer is, in fact, simple. They are all
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justified by the null account of negation. . . The connection is also explained
by Routley and Routley (1985), p. 205, as follows:
Entailment is inclusion of logical content. So if A were to entail¬A, it would include as part of its content what neutralizes it, ¬A,
in which event it would entail nothing, having no content.
So it is not the case that A entails ¬A, that is, Aristotle’s thesis,¬(A→ ¬A), holds. [48][p. 144] who cites [53][p.205].
This is one possible interpretation of the connexivist principles generally and one
way to justify Aristotle’s thesis in particular. On this interpretation, the connexivist
principles are to be justified by appealing to a non-classical notion of negation. In [48],
Priest refers to this view as a ‘null account’ of negation. It is null because the idea is
that, in a contradiction, the two propositions, in some sense ‘destroy’ or ‘extinguish’
each other. [48, p.142] In both cases the use of the terms ‘destroy’ and ‘extinguish’ are
taken from historical works, one due to Abelard and the other due to Berkeley.
The main idea that Priest tries to capture in his system is the idea that, in a connex-
ive framework, contradictions do not have any logical content, and as such, should not
imply anything. Priest writes:
The main problem in formulating a null account of negation, as should be
clear, is how to make sense of the idea that a contradiction has no content.
We will enforce this in the most simple-minded way. Let us say that: Σ ⊧ α
iff Σ is consistent and Σ ⊢ α [48, p.142]
In his semantics, Priest uses ⊧ for his consequence relation and ⊢ for classical con-
sequence. To avoid confusion in what follows, we will use ⊩ for Priest’s ⊧ and always
subscript our account to make clear we are talking about ⊧N .
There are a few interesting technical details worth noting about Priest’s system. First,
it is helpful to make the following observation about connexive implication:
As with the semantics of section 1.3, these semantics are not monotonic
or closed under uniform substitution, and for exactly the same reason. In
particular, none of the inferential principles (i.e., those with something to
the left of the turnstile) just cited is valid for arbitrary substitutions (though
the logical truths are).[48][p. 146]
The issue in each of these cases is that while inferences such as: {p→ q, q → r} ⊩ p→ r
hold, instances like the following entailments do not hold with Priest’s semantics.
1. {p ∧ ¬p, p→ q, q → r} ⊩ p→ r
2. {(p ∧ ¬p)→ q, q → r} ⊩ p→ r
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The reason for this is straightforward. In his logic, Priest requires that Σ be consistent,
and clearly both 1. and 2. are not. Priest then goes on to observe that it is possible to
generalise this idea. If one were to move into a modal framework then we can use the◇ operator15 to make this requirement explicit in the object language. Priest observes
that:
We may define a connexivist conditional, α → β as ◇α∧(α⇒ β)[∧◇¬β]. For
example, ⇒ can be any strict conditional or the conditional of many relevant
logics. [48, p.146]
The idea that we have taken from Kilwardby is, in some sense different from the
account of Priest, although there is clearly some overlap. Our idea is to think of ⊧N as
capturing a notion of meaning containment and to account for the validity of Aristotle’s
Thesis and Boethius’ Thesis as expressing principles about the underlying definitional
relationships that exists between terms in our language. On our account, Aristotle’s
Thesis is valid because no formula is ever compatible with its own negation and Boethius’
Thesis is valid because if a formula, φ posits ψ because of how the terms in φ are defined,
it does not, on this account, also imply ¬ψ. As such, this approach to connexive logic
differs from other attempts to formulate connexive logic in the literature, and it would
be interesting to see if this analysis of connexive logic has relationships either to other
medieval discussions of connexivity or to more recent ones.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Work
Our goal in this chapter was to provide a formal reconstruction of Kilwardby’s modal
logic, his theory of validity and his account of the syllogism. As has become clear, there
are a number of interesting and unique components that go into Kilwardby’s theory
of consequence. One observation, which will be useful in the next chapter, is that
Kilwardby’s modal logic cannot be represented in the usual possible worlds semantics
of modal logic. In our final chapter, our aim is to bring the results of the previous
four chapters together and explore the differences that exist between Kilwardby’s and
Buridan’s theories of logical consequence.
This work also suggests two interesting technical questions for future research. First,
Kilwardby’s analysis of non-syllogistic proposition gives rise to a connexive logic. Do the
semantics developed here naturally generalise to a connexive framework? In particular,
can we use the essential operations to define a notion of implication and/or negation
that is ‘natural’ in the sense that Kilwardby and others intended? If so, then is this
perhaps why medieval authors writing before William of Soissons (e.g. Peter of Spain
and Peter Abelard) wanted to endorse some kind of connexive hypothetical? Some of
these ideas have been developed in the literature, in particular by Chris Martin e.g. [8],
[39], and [40] but so far as we are aware, the idea of connecting this ideas with the notion
15. An operation, ◇ where ¬◇ (p ∧ ¬p) is always true.
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of per se as found in the Posterior Analytics and The Metaphysics has not been deeply
explored.
Second, there is a well-known duality that exists between normal modal logics, on the
one hand, and Boolean algebras with operations on the other. Such algebraic structures
give rise to families of well-studied algebraic structures. Again, two lines are interesting
here. First, it should be noted that we need very weak order conditions to be able
to define structures that mirror the assertoric syllogism. This may be nothing more
than a simple technical observation, but it should be noted. Second, and perhaps more
interestingly, can we use the semantics provided here to find a natural framework for
viewing the logic of essence as a family of algebraic structures closed under particular
operations? It is unclear, but it may be possible, for sufficiently rich algebraic structures.
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4 The Modal Syllogism in John Buridan
4.1 Introduction
The main goal of this chapter is to understand Buridan’s theory of logical consequence
and to situate his modal logic within this theory. To do this we will proceed in two
parts. First, we will start with Buridan’s general theory of inference and assertoric
inferences. Our aim here will be to explore Buridan’s theory so that we can 1) understand
his distinction between formal and material consequences 2) understand his theory of
supposition and see how it can be used to provide ‘truth conditions’ for the various
categorical propositions, and 3) sketch Buridan’s understanding of the syllogism and
explore some of the unique features of his theory. Then, 4) we will explain how Buridan
is able to ‘reduce’ modal syllogistics to his theory of consequence together with his
analysis of modal propositions.1
With this in place we will then turn to modal inferences. We will start with Buridan’s
distinction between divided and composite modal propositions. With these in place we
will then sketch Buridan’s theory of single-premise inferences contained in Book Two of
the Treatise on Consequences. Finally, we will turn to the modal syllogism and highlight
some of the interesting conclusions that Buridan draws.
4.2 The Structure of the Treatise on Consequences
Our main focus in this chapter will be on Buridan’s Treatise on Consequences. From
time to time we will supplement this with passages from the Summulae De Dialetica
when they will help clarify Buridan’s meaning. Hubert Hubien, in his introduction to
the critical edition of the Treatise, dates the work to around 1334[4, p. 9-10] based on
allusions made to a ‘white cardinal’. However this dating is somewhat questionable. The
main concern is that the ‘white cardinal’ was actually the Pope at the time that this
work was written. Given that Buridan makes some unflattering comments about this
‘white cardinal’ it would be a brave move by Buridan to be insulting the current Pope.
1. Buridan distinguishes between two kinds of propositions, subject–predicate propositions and compos-
ite propositions, where composite propositions are composed of several subject–predicate propositions
along with an expression such as ‘if’. We shall see shortly what it means for a proposition to be modal.
To this end, I say that propositions are divided into subject–predicate and compound propo-
sitions. Now a consequence is a compound proposition; for it is constituted from several
propositions conjoined by the expression “if” or the expression “therefore” or something
equivalent.[51, p.66]
The Latin can be found on page 185.
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Buridan’s Treatise on Consequences is divided into four books. Each of these books
follows a general format.
The book opens with a preamble.
A number of definitions are given, remarked on, proved, or agreed to.
A number of conclusions are proved based on the definitions laid down.
The first book outlines Buridan’s general theory of consequence. Here ‘consequence’ is
defined and then divided into a number of different kinds. The notions of ampliation and
supposition are introduced and defined for various kinds of propositions. Buridan also
outlines the various causes of truth for propositions and explains when different kinds of
propositions are true and false. Most of the conclusions are fairly standard results about
consequences, including Ex Impossibile Quodlibet (this is one of the medieval phrases
used to express the principle of explosion2; literally ‘from an impossibility anything
follows’)3 transitivity of consequence4 and how consequence relates to the truth and
possibility of truth.5
Buridan’s second book provides an analysis of modal consequences where the an-
tecedent and conclusion are simple expressions.6 In this chapter, Buridan provides an
analysis of modality using the theory of ampliation and supposition. He then gives a
number of definitions about propositions in which modals occur. In particular, he iden-
tifies two ways that a modal can occur in a proposition. These give rise to two senses:
the composite sense and the divided sense.7 From these definitions and the previous
results in the first book, Buridan proves a number of interesting results about such
propositions. The conclusions are separated into three sections. First he proves con-
clusions for divided propositions. Second he offers some more remarks about composite
modal propositions and proves some conclusions. Finally, he proves conclusions about
the relationship between divided and composite modal propositions.
Buridan’s third book provides a discussion of assertoric syllogisms. The book is divided
into two parts. The first part concerns syllogisms between direct terms.8 The second part
2. Formally, the principle of explosion says for any formulae φ, ψ from φ and ¬φ one may infer ψ.
3. See Book One Conclusions 1 and 7. See [51, p.75] and [51, p.79] respectively.
4. See Book One Conclusion 4
5. See Book One Conclusion 5. See [p.77]sr:10.
6. We will define simple expressions when we introduce the book in more detail. For now, it is easiest
to think of these as terms with nothing modifying them.
7. This is a standard medieval distinction used to cover a number of differences in scope that occur with
various kinds of operations.
8. The distinction between direct and oblique terms is an important one. Buridan explains what oblique
terms are in the following passage
Accordingly, it will first be explained what an oblique term is when it is used with a direct
term that is governed by it as a determination of that direct term, just as an adjective is a
determination of a substantive [term]. For just as when saying ‘A white horse is running,’
the expression ‘white’ determines the expression ‘horse’ to supposit only for white ones,
so if I say ‘Socrates’s horse is running,’ the expression ‘Socrates’s’ restricts the expression
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concerns syllogisms with oblique terms. In this book he discusses the usual Aristotelian
moods, however, he displays considerable originality both in his presentation of these
moods and in his discussion of additional, non-Aristotelian syllogisms involving oblique
terms. He discusses non-standard forms of the various propositions, as well as syllogisms
with oblique terms. Oblique terms are terms that are modified by a genitive or an
accusative construction. For example, in the proposition the term ‘Everything that is a
man’s ass is running’ the term ‘man’s’ is an oblique term since ‘man’ is in the genitive
and in this context implies possession of an ass. Oblique terms are technically interesting
(at least) because they can be seen as a medieval attempt to treat relations within the
context of syllogisms.
Buridan’s fourth and final book brings together the results from the previous three
books. Here he develops his theory of the modal syllogism using the resources proven
in the other three books. All of the English translations given here are drawn from a
recent book by Professor Read, [51].
4.3 Buridan’s Theory of Consequence
The cornerstone of the Treatise on Consequences is the definition of consequence. After
proposing a number of definitions Buridan settles on the following definition:
One proposition is antecedent to another which is such that it is impossible
for things to be altogether as it signifies unless they are altogether as the
other signifies when they are proposed together[51, p.67]. . . 9
First, it should be observed that Buridan’s theory of consequence is a ‘non-reductive’
analysis of consequence. In this definition, the notion of ‘impossibility’ is left unanalyzed.
It is simply taken as a primitive notion. This raises the question of how this definition
relates to the analysis of modality provided in the second book. There, as here, the
modal notions are taken as conceptually primitive. There is no attempt, as in some
other medieval authors10 to define the modalities in terms of temporal operations or
other notions.
Second, Buridan’s definition of consequence reflects his philosophical commitment to
medieval nominalism. His commitments are most clearly seen in his requirement that
the two terms must be “proposed together.” In his rejection of one of the previous
definitions, Buridan remarks:
‘horse’ to supposit only for those that are Socrates’s.[51, p.128]
The Latin can be found on page 185. The basic idea is that an oblique term is an adjective, possessive
etc, that changes the supposition of the term it is modifying and restricts it accordingly. A direct
term lacks such restriction. In the case of ‘Socrates’s horse’ the oblique term ‘Socrates’s’ restricts the
supposition of ‘horse’ to only range over those horses owned by Socrates.
9. For the Latin see page 185.
10. For example Lambert of Auxerre. For a formal reconstruction of his system and some discussion of
his modal theory, see Chapter Five of [62].
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But this definition is defective or incomplete, because ‘Every human is run-
ning, so some human is running’ is a good consequence, but it is possible for
the first to be true with the second not being true , when the second does
not exist at all.[51, p. 67]11
There are some details in this passage that should be teased out to help clarify exactly
what Buridan thinks is going wrong here. Before we fully explain what is going on here,
there is a distinction, drawn by Arthur Prior which he uses to help explain some remarks
that Buridan makes about negative and affirmative propositions in the Sophismata.12.
Prior’s explanation of what is going on in Buridan starts with the following supposition:
Suppose we have several sheets of white paper on which there are black marks
arranged in lines. We may classify the marks according to their shapes.[49,
p.482]
Prior then goes on to distinguish three families of shapes, one for terms (in particular he
includes propositio, affirmativa, and negativa), one for signs of quantity (in particular,
he gives omnis, quaedam, and nulla), and one for copulae (which include est and non
est).[49, p.482].
Prior then goes on to define a sentence as follows:
A line of marks is called a sentence if and only if it consists of a sign of
quantity followed by a term followed by the copula est (or by non est, if the
sign of quantity is quaedam) followed by a term. Thus sentences are any lines
of marks of these four shapes
omnis A est B
quaedam A est B
nulla A est B
quaedam A non est B,
where A and B are marks of the shapes called “terms”.[49, pp.482-483]
With this in place, Prior gives truth conditions for these propositions, relative to the
sheet on which they are written as follows:
Whether sentences are or are not true on their sheets is determined by the
shapes of the marks on their sheets. In this sense, the sentences are “about”
the shapes of the marks. Each term is associated with a particular group of
shapes, which it may be said to connote, though this means no more than
that the presence on a sheet of marks of certain shapes will determine, in
ways which we shall shortly detail, whether or not sentences containing cer-
tain terms are to be counted as “true on their sheets”. The shapes connoted
11. The Latin can be found on page 185.
12. In particular, the eighth chapter of the Sophismata. See [49, p.481]
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by the term propositio are all those which count, by the rules given above,
as shapes of sentences. The shapes connoted by the term negativa are those
of sentences which either begin with nulla or have non est for their copula,
and the shapes connoted by the term affirmativa are those of all sentences
which do not either begin with nulla or have non est for their copula.
The rules by which we classify sentences as true or false on their sheets are
as follows:
(1) A sentence of the type Omnis A est B is true on a sheet if and only if
(i) it is written on the sheet, (ii) there is at least one mark on the sheet of a
shape A (i.e. of a shape connoted by the term A) and (iii) there is no mark
on the sheet of a shape A which is not also of a shape B. For example, the
sentence:
Omnis propositio est affermativa
is true on a sheet if and only if (i) it is on the sheet, (ii) there is at least one
sentence on the sheet and (iii) there is no sentence on the sheet which begins
with nulla or has non est for its copula. [49, p.483-484]
Similar truth conditions are given for the other three types and a sentence. Likewise,
a sentence is said to be false if it is written on the sheet and is not true of that sheet.
With this in place, Prior goes on to define when a sentence on a sheet can be said to
be ‘possibly true’ and can be said to be merely ‘possible’. Prior says that:
A sentence on a sheet may be said to be possibly-true on that sheet if and
only if there is some sheet (that one or another) on which it is true, and
possibly-false on that sheet if and only if there is some sheet (that one or
another) on which it is false.
A sentence on a sheet may be said to be possible on that sheet under the
following conditions:
(1) If it is of the shape Omnis A est B, it is possible on a sheet X if and only
if (i) it is on the sheet X, and (ii) there is some sheet Y such that (a) some
mark on Y is of a shape connoted by A, and (b) no mark on Y is of shape A
but not of shape B. (2) If it is of the shape Nulla A est B, it is possible on
a sheet X if and only if (i) it is on the sheet X, and (ii) there is some sheet
Y such that no mark on Y is at once of shapes A and B.
The possibility-conditions for the other forms may be worked out simi-
larly. . . [49, p.485-486]
What Prior then goes on to note is that for a sentence, S to be possible on a sheet Y,
does not require that S be written on Y. This for Prior, is the distinction between the
‘possibly true’ and the ‘possible’. For a sentence to be possible it does not need to be
written down, whereas for it to be possibly true, it does need to be.
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With the image of the sheets in mind, and the distinction between the possibly true
and the possible, we can hopefully get clearer on Buridan’s definition of logical conse-
quence and the counterexamples that he puts forward. First, recall Buridan’s definition
of logical consequence:
One proposition is antecedent to another which is such that it is impossible
for things to be altogether as it signifies unless they are altogether as the
other signifies when they are proposed together.[51, p.67]
Phrased in terms of sheets, we can express this as saying that one proposition S is
antecedent to another proposition, S′ just in case there is no sheet X such that S is true
of X and S′ is false of X.13
Observe that if we require S to be true at X and S′ to be false at X, they both need to
be written down on the piece of paper. This is what is being required when Buridan says
that the propositions need to be proposed together. With this in place we can then see
why this condition is important. If we were to drop this requirement and instead say that:
S is antecedent to another proposition, S′ just in case there is no sheet X such that S
is true at X and S′ is false at X.
Then we can immediately rephrase Buridan’s counterexample. In the case of ‘Every man
is running, so some man is running’, what Buridan is considering is a situation where
the sentence ‘Every man is running’ is written on some sheet of paper (call it Z), but
there is no sheet of paper where the sentence ‘Some man is running’ has been written
down. In such a situation the antecedent is true, since ‘Every man is running’ is true
of Z and true at Z. However, there is no sheet of paper where ‘Some man is running’ is
true, since the sentence has not been written down.14
In this way, the problem with the defective definition of validity is that it would rule out
as invalid cases where the proposition does not exist. Phrased slightly more metaphys-
ically, this failure is caused by the nominalist insistence that the truth of propositions
are contingent upon an agent thinking, uttering or writing them.15 Phrased in terms of
Prior’s sheets, as a necessary condition for a proposition to be true, it needs to be marked
13. Prior phrases this as:
The most satisfactory definition of validity (on a sheet in a set of sheets) is to say that a
sentence on a sheet may be validly inferred from other sentences on this sheet if and only
if there is no sheet (in the set) of which all the premises-sentences are true but of which
the conclusion-sentence is false.[49, p.489]
Clearly Prior’s definition is broader then the one given above. He restricts his definition to single
premise inferences later on.[49, p.489]
14. Compare [49, p.489-490].
15. For Buridan, as well as many medieval authors, there is a threefold distinction between mental, spoken
and written propositions, which they ground in Aristotle’s remarks in On Interpretation [16a4-16a9].
The standard view is that there is a priority of signification in such propositions. Written propositions
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on the relevant sheet. This is not so for signification. Buridan allows propositions to
signify even if they are not written down or in Prior’s terms, marked on a sheet. In
some ways this is a curious notion, however it appears to be a consequence of Buridan’s
commitment to nominalism.
Third and finally, Buridan’s discussion of consequence frequently alludes to or men-
tions the concept of signification. Signification is a key component in medieval analysis of
language and we will briefly sketch the theory in what follows, so as to better understand
Buridan’s discussion of logical consequence.
4.3.1 Medieval Theories of Language: Buridan’s Theory of Signification
The theory of signification is one of the two related linguistic notions that Buridan em-
ploys in his analysis of consequence.16 The theory of signification analyses the relation-
ship between an utterance in a given language and the concept that the utterance refers
to. For Buridan, utterances can be broken down into two kinds.17 The first kind of ut-
terance is called significative and the second kind is called non-significative. Significative
utterances represent something to the hearer of the utterance, whereas non-significative
utterances do not represent anything. As an example of the first, take any meaningful
word of English. For an example of the second, take any sound or arrangement of letters
that does not mean anything. Significative utterances can then be distinguished between
those that signify by nature and those that signify by convention. Utterances that sig-
nify by nature are things like screams of pain, shouts of joy etc.[5, p. 11] For Buridan,
these are understood by everyone and do not require additional information about the
language in question. In contrast to this are utterances that signify by convention. For
Buridan, Latin, as well as other natural languages are composed of such conventional
utterances. What Buridan means by ‘conventional’ is that the meaning of an utterance
is something that is determined by the linguistic community that a speaker finds her-
self in.18 For example, that the utterance ‘homo’ signifies the concept ‘man’, and not
‘donkey’, is for Buridan a matter of convention. There is nothing in the choice of the
particular utterance of those four letters that connects it with the concept in question
in any ‘natural’ way.19
The important thing to observe for our purposes here, is that, Buridan simple ut-
terances such as ‘man’ or ‘turkey’ immediately signify concepts and by extension also
signify things in the world.
signify spoken propositions which in turn signify mental propositions, however on Buridan’s account,
all three count as propositions for the purposes here. See, for example, [5, p.849] for Buridan’s
discussion of signification.
16. The other is supposition which will be discussed in the next section.
17. All of what follows can be found in[5, pp. 9-10].
18. The Latin term, ad placitum, translated in Klima as ‘conventional’, literally means ‘at one’s pleasure’,
but its medieval usage carries connotation of judgement, and so could also be translated ‘as one judges’
or more colloquially, ‘as one sees fit’.
19. It should be pointed out that for Buridan this ‘conventionalism’ only applies to written and spoken
languages. For Buridan, terms in mental language always signify the things they pick out naturally.
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. . . for Buridan, mental expressions are naturally similar to things outside the
mind, but they are not signs of them. Rather, spoken expressions are signs
of mental expressions and so derivatively signs of external things.[51, p.7]
However, for Buridan the notion of signification is a very ‘coarse grained’ notion:
For example, the written proposition, “A man is white,” signifies the spoken
proposition, which immediately signifies the concepts “man” and “white”
and their combination, the mental proposition, but it ultimately signifies
only men and white things. In particular, “A man is white” and “A man
is not white,” and generally any proposition and its contradictory, have the
same (ultimate) signification.[51, p.8]
The challenge that then emerges for Buridan is to explain how one can give truth
conditions for various complex propositions. This difficulty was further compounded by
the tendency of logicians in Buridan’s days to say that ‘things being as it signifies’ was
a good definition of truth.[51, p.8]. What Buridan instead does is uses the notion of
supposition to provide truth conditions for various propositions.
4.3.2 Medieval Theories of Language: Buridan’s Theory of Supposition
If signification is the relationship that expressions bear to concepts, supposition is the
relationship that different terms have to objects. The basic idea behind supposition is
that “a term, when it occurs in a proposition ‘stands for’ [supponit pro] each member of
a certain class of things and the truth conditions are stated in terms of the relationship
between these classes.”[20, pp. 1-2] When discussing supposition Buridan starts by
looking at the two classes of propositions, affirmative and negative. Buridan tells us
that,
Now in the fifth chapter, I set down further that an affirmative proposition
means that the terms supposit for what are the same, or were or will be or
can be the same, depending on the kind of proposition. For if I say ‘A is B,’
I mean that A and B are the same, and if I say ‘A was B,’ I mean that A
was the same as B, and so on. A negative proposition means the opposite,
namely, that what the subject supposits for and what the predicate supposits
for are not the same or that they were not the same or will not be, and so
on.[51, pp.69-70]20
As Buridan’s examples make clear, when he is speaking of affirmative proposition
here is not yet giving us truth conditions of universal propositions (either affirmative or
negative), but he is describing when unquantified (and particular) propositions are true.
The idea is that a particular affirmative proposition is true if the terms in question
supposit for the same thing and they are false otherwise. Likewise, a negative proposition
20. The Latin can be found on page 185.
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is true if the terms do not supposit for the same thing. Buridan has to restrict this
definition to rule out a number of possible counterexamples (liar sentences, chimeras
etc.) but Buridan is very terse about how this goes, and remarks that a full treatment
of such issues would require another treatise.[52, p. 9] He goes on to address these issues
in the Sophismata.
In the case of universal propositions, Buridan goes on to remark that:
We need to describe different kinds of proposition differently. For depending
on the expressions used, we describe universal [propositions] one way and
particulars another, for example, that nothing for which the subject supposits
is the same as anything for which the predicate supposits, or for a particular,
that something for which the subject supposits is not the same as something
for which the predicate supposits.[51, p.70]21
Here Buridan describes the situation when a universal affirmative proposition is true.
The conditions for universal negative propositions can be similarly worked out, although
they are not explicitly stated by Buridan here.
At this point it would also be helpful to remark on Buridan’s use of the notion of
‘causes of truth’. Buridan gives three examples, and in a style reminiscent of many
modern logic textbooks, leaves the details to the reader to figure out how causes of truth
are to be assigned. These examples are, ‘Colin’s horse cantered well’, ‘The Antichrist
will preach’ and ‘Something which never will be can be.’ The first example illustrates
a past tense proposition, the second illustrates a future tensed example that medieval
philosophers believed to be true and the third illustrates a modal proposition.
If Colin’s horse, which cantered well, is dead, ‘Colin’s horse cantered well’ is
true, but things are not in reality as the proposition signifies. . . [51, p. 63]22
Buridan’s point here is that when we evaluate the truth or falsity of a proposition we
must pay due attention to the presence of modal, temporal and other factors that affect
when we evaluate the truth of a proposition.
Assigning causes of truth to these propositions is straightforward. The first proposition
is true because, in the past things were as the proposition describes (i.e. the subject and
predicate supposit for the same thing). Analogously, the second proposition is true just
in case things will be as the proposition signifies they will be. The third proposition is
more interesting. The proposition contains both modal and tensed verbs.23 All Buridan
says about this is that it is true because things can be as the proposition signifies they
can be. Buridan’s point is that here the signification does not only deal with things that
are, but also with things that can be.
From what Buridan has said, it is clear that the ‘cause of truth’ for a given proposition,
is the set of conditions that are sufficient for the proposition to be true. Buridan himself
21. The Latin can be found on page 185.
22. The Latin can be found on page 185.
23. This example will also be important when we come to discuss Buridan’s view on modality below.
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defines ‘causes of truth’ as “whatever is enough for the proposition to be true”.24 A
present tense proposition will be true if the terms signify as things are.25 A past tense
proposition will be true if the terms signify as was the case etc. For example, the
proposition ‘Socrates is running’ is true just in case there is something (now) that is
Socrates, and that same thing is also running. This formulation has close connections
to Buridan’s phrasing of the expository syllogism as we shall see later in Chapter Five.
Buridan defines causes of falsity by exploiting a connection that exists between true
and false propositions:
Since it is impossible for the same proposition to be both true and false, and
if it is formed it is necessarily true or false, one must assign the cause of truth
and the cause of falsity to the one proposition in opposite ways.[51, p.64]26
Buridan takes it for granted that no proposition can be true and false at the same
time. Now, if the propositions in question are formed, then the cause of truth for one
proposition will be the cause of falsity for its contradictory and vice versa.27 So, the
cause of falsity for a present tense assertoric proposition will be that the terms do not
signify as is the case. For example, the proposition ‘Socrates runs’ will be false just in
case Socrates is not the same as any running thing. This analysis can be extended to
other propositions in the natural way.
Given what we have seen about causes of truth, signification, and supposition, we can
now explain when the four main kinds of categorical propositions are true or false.
Proposition Truth Conditions
Every A is B if and only if everything that A supposits for B also sup-
posits for and there is something that A sup-
posits for.
No A is B if and only if it is not the case that something is supposited
for by both A and B,
Some A is B if and only if there is something that both A and B sup-
posit for.
Some A is not B if and only if there is something both A supposits for and B
does not or there is nothing that A supposits
for.
There is another complication with this analysis. Some terms ampliate their subject or
predicate terms. In essence, what this does is require that we need to consider a broader
range of possible supposita than surface formulation would suggest we need. Ampliation
24. The Latin can be found on page 186.
25. Buridan’s analysis of truth is sometimes referred to as an identity theory.[27] [p.3] This is because for
a proposition such as ‘Socrates is white’ to be true, it needs to be the case that the object picked out
by the name ‘Socrates’ is identical to one of the things signified by the word ‘white’.
26. The Latin can be found on page 186.
27. Again, the formation of the propositions is because of Buridan’s nominalism.
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is another feature of the medieval account of language that emerges from the theory
of supposition. A term is ampliated if it stands for more objects than the term would
normally stand for in a given present tense proposition. The standard example of this is
the term ‘dead’. In the proposition ‘a horse is dead’ the term ‘dead’ ampliates ‘horse’.
Specifically, it ampliates the term to range over horses that used to exist as well as the
horses that currently do exist. The reason for this is straightforward. For many of the
medievals, if a horse is dead, it is not a horse. The horse is a corpse or may have entirely
passed out of existence. So, if the term ‘dead’ did not ampliate, then ‘a horse is dead’
could never be true, because nothing will be both dead and a horse at the same time.
Buridan’s theory of modality applies ampliation to the subjects in modal propositions
where the verb is modalized.28
With all of these concepts in place, we are now able to fully discuss Buridan’s theory
of consequence as well as his theory of modality. We now return to Buridan’s discussion
of consequence.
4.4 Division of Consequence
Within the Treatise on Consequences, after laying down the definition of consequence,
Buridan distinguishes various subclasses of consequences. The first distinction that
Buridan draws is between formal and material consequences. According to Buridan:
“A consequence is called formal if it is valid in all terms retaining a similar
form. Or if you want to put it explicitly, a formal consequence is one where
every proposition similar in form that might be formed would be a good
consequence.[51, p.68]29
For Buridan a consequence is formal, just in case all similar forms of the argument are
also valid, i.e. if we hold everything in the argument constant except (possibly) the
terms, and if the argument remains valid no matter how the terms are changed, then the
argument is formally valid. A material consequence is one that preserves truth but does
not retain validity if the logical form was retained but different terms were substituted,
i.e. “A material consequence, however, is one where not every proposition similar in form
would be a good consequence”.[51, p. 68]30 This is best illustrated with the following
example. The consequence: ‘Some donkey is an animal’ so ‘Some animal is a donkey’
is valid according to Buridan. Moreover, it is valid formally, since it is true regardless
of which terms are used. In this case the argument is an instance of simple conversion.
In contrast the consequence, ‘Some donkey is a man’ so ‘A stick stands in the corner’ is
valid, but is only valid materially. It is valid because it is impossible that something is
both a man and a donkey, and so the definition of consequence is satisfied.31 However,
28. A verb is modalized if it has a modal term, e.g. ‘possibly’, modifying it adverbially.
29. The Latin can be found on page 186.
30. The Latin cane be found on page 186.
31. This is the ‘Ex Impossibili Quodlibet’ principle, or ‘from the impossible anything follows.’
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the inference is not valid in all propositions of a similar form. For example, from ‘Some
man is running’ it does not follow that ‘A stick stands in the corner.’ This definition of
‘formal’ and ‘material’ also generalises to cases where we have conjunctions of terms in
the antecedent or are dealing with multiple antecedent propositions. For example: the
inference from ‘Every man is mortal and Socrates is a man’ to ‘Socrates is mortal’ is
a valid, formal consequence for Buridan, since every uniform replacement of the terms
in the premises and conclusion yield a valid argument. It should be noted here that
for Buridan the terms ‘man’, ‘mortal’, and ‘Socrates’ can be ‘replaced’ or abstractly
represented using term variables. Everything else will remain constant.32 Because of
this it is possible for Buridan to apply his definition of consequences to syllogisms.
In order to do that, we should say a few words about what Buridan takes the form
and matter of a proposition to be. He says,
By the matter of a proposition or consequence we mean the purely categore-
matic terms, namely, the subject and predicate, setting aside the syncate-
goremes attached to them . . . [whereas] we say all the rest pertains to the
form.[51, p. 74]33
According to Buridan, the matter of a proposition is simply the categorematic terms.
These are expressions like ‘Socrates’, ‘human’ ‘animal’ etc. For Buridan everything else
in the proposition pertains to its form. In the case of syllogisms this will be important,
for Buridan includes the number of distinct terms as part of the form and uses this to
avoid considering syllogisms with fewer than three categorical terms.
Using this definition it is easy to distinguish the usual kinds of categorical propositions
(affirmative, negative, universal, particular, indefinite, etc.) from each other on the basis
of their form. For example, the universal differs from the particular by the presence of the
syncategorematic term ‘all’ or some similar term denoting universality.34 Likewise the
particular differs from the indefinite by the presence of the term ‘some’ or a similar term.
As noted, Buridan adds that the number of categorematic terms in the proposition also
pertains to the form of the propositions. For example ‘Every A is A’ and ‘Every B is A’
have different logical forms for Buridan. This becomes important when we differentiate
syllogistic arguments from non-syllogistic ones.
To determine the form and matter of syllogistic arguments, the situation becomes
slightly more complicated. Buridan spends the first few pages of Book Three narrowing
down the possible candidates for what a syllogism is. He then settles on the following
definition of a syllogism:
We want to understand by ‘syllogism’. . . only a formal consequence to a single
32. The more general form of this would be: ‘Every A is B’ and ‘S is A’, therefore ‘S is B’. It should be
observed that for Buridan (as well as Ockham) the copula (in this case ‘is’) is also treated as part of
the logical form of the proposition.
33. The Latin cane be found on page 186.
34. For example: ‘every’.
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simple subject-predicate conclusion by a middle term different from each of
the terms in the conclusion.[51, p.115]35
This definition has a few important points. First, Buridan is interested only in arguments
that are valid in virtue of form. Arguments that will be valid in virtue of the matter
are not considered, presumably because they will be handled by the general definition
of consequence. Likewise, the syllogisms that Buridan wants to deal with are those that
are composed of a ‘simple’ subject–predicate conclusion where the terms in the premises
are linked by a common term. This excludes arguments like disjunctive ‘syllogism’ and
modus ponens as syllogistic arguments properly so called. It also excludes arguments
where the conclusion is a conjunction or disjunction of terms. On this reading, an
argument which were to conclude ‘Every human or donkey is an animal’ would not
count as a syllogism. This is because the term ‘human or donkey’ is a disjunction of
two terms. Second, it should be observed that Buridan defines a syllogism to contain
the premises and is drawn to a conclusion. The terminology here is slightly ambiguous
and invites the question: is a syllogism a pair of premises from which a conclusion can
be drawn, or is it the premises together with a designated conclusion? According to
Buridan, every syllogism has the following property:
We take it that every syllogism links the middle term in the premises with
each extreme from the conclusion, so that on account of that linking the
linking of the extremes is inferred, either affirmatively or negatively. Then
it is clear that every syllogism, as we here intend syllogism, is made up from
only three terms, namely, from two extremes which are the terms of the
conclusion, and from a middle term with which those extremes are linked in
the premises.. . . it follows from this that there are only four figures of this
kind of syllogisms. For the relation of the middle to the extremes in the
premises as subject and predicate is called the syllogistic figure. This can
only happen in four combinations.[51, p.115]36
Because of this, it is clear that there are four possible ways the premises can be arranged.
Buridan then goes on to point out that Aristotle does not need to treat syllogisms
in the ‘fourth figure’ because they can be immediately reduced to the first figure by
transposition of the premises. Buridan also does not provide a detailed discussion of the
fourth figure. This suggests that Buridan is thinking of syllogisms along the lines of an
ordered pair of propositions together with a conclusion. When a syllogism is thought of
along these lines, it is clear why the fourth figure should be included and why sustained
discussion of it is unnecessary. Any pair of premises in the fourth figure are equivalent
to a different pair in the first figure.37
35. The Latin can be found on page 186.
36. The Latin can be found on page 186.
37. One simply needs to change the order of the major and the minor premise and relabel the terms as
required.
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Third, given what Buridan says here, it seems that he is speaking of syllogisms simply
as a particular subclass of formally valid argument. As we already saw in our discussion
of validity, the criterion of validity does not require that the premises of the argument
be true, only that it be impossible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent
false when the antecedent and consequent are proposed together. This is unusual, since
in most Latin authors there is usually an additional requirement that the premises be
true.38 However, this seems not to be what Buridan says in Book Three of the Treatise on
Consequences. This becomes even more surprising when we turn to Buridan’s discussion
of syllogisms in the Summulae.
In this work Buridan discusses syllogisms in a several places. The natural place to
focus our attention will be on Book Five, which is dedicated to the treatment of syllo-
gisms. As a word of caution, it needs to be recalled that the Summulae is a textbook
which is an expanded and revised commentary on Peter of Spain’s Summulae Logicales.
As such, Buridan often cites Peter’s text at the start of a section, and then goes on to
comment on a passage later on. In many cases this makes it hard to pin down exactly
what Buridan thinks. Buridan quotes Peter of Spain as follows (all references are taken
from Klima’s translation):
A syllogism is an expression in which, after some things have been posited, it
is necessary for something else to occur on account of what has been posited
[quibusdam positis necesse est aliud accidere per ea quae posita sunt], as in
Every animal is a substance; every man is an animal; therefore, every man is
a substance; this whole [phrase] is an expression in which after certain things,
namely, the two premises, have been posited, it is necessary for something
else, namely, the conclusion, to occur, i.e., to follow.[5, p.308]
As a mater of fact, Buridan is very clear about what he thinks of this definition. In
responding to one objection to it, Buridan writes:
I reply that although a syllogism is composed of several expressions, it is
nevertheless a single hypothetical proposition, connecting the conclusion with
the premises through the conjunction ‘therefore’. Further it can be relegated
to the species of conditional propositions, for just as a conditional is one
consequence, so too is a syllogism, whence a syllogism could be formulated
as a conditional, in the following manner: ‘if every animal is a substance and
every man is an animal, then every man is a substance’. Strictly speaking,
however, a syllogism has an additional feature in comparison to a conditional
in that a syllogism posits the premises assertively, whereas a conditional does
not assert them. Therefore it would not be inappropriate to place syllogisms
38. I am grateful to Professor Hodges for raising this point with me.
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in a species of hypotheticals different from those that the author enumerated
earlier; that species could then be described, as far as its nominal definition
is concerned in terms of the following expression: a consequence that asserts
the consequent and the antecedent’. . . [5, pp. 308-309]
As can be seen, the conditions that Buridan is here imposing on a syllogism are much
more elaborate then what is stated in the Treatise on Consequences. The requirement
that the consequent and antecedent need to be asserted is completely absent from the
Treatise on Consequences and from Peter of Spain’s text.39One may wonder if the use
of the expression ‘Strictly speaking’ is doing some theoretical work here. Perhaps the
absence of this requirement from the Treatise on Consequences suggests a more general
class of arguments that Buridan is there willing to allow to be counted as syllogistic. It is
also possible that he may have simply forgotten to add this requirement to the Treatise,
although this would be uncharacteristically sloppy of Buridan.
The second thing that should be observed here is Buridan’s use of the term ‘hypothet-
ical’ is somewhat different from how modern logicians use the word. In the Summulae,
Buridan describes a ‘hypothetical’ proposition as:
The second section describes categorical proposition, stating that its principal
parts are subject and predicate. And by this it is clear what distinguishes
it from a hypothetical, for the principal and major parts of a hypothetical
are not subject and predicate, but several propositions, each of which is
composed of a subject and a predicate, as we shall see later in more detail.
[5, p.23]
Buridan elaborates this as follows:
Next, we deal with hypothetical propositions. A hypothetical proposition is
one that has two categorical propositions joined by some conjunction or by
some adverb. And its name derives from ‘hypo’, i.e., ‘sub-’ [under] and from
‘thesis’, i.e., ‘positing’, i.e., as it were, ‘suppositive locution’.[5, p.57]
What sounds odd to modern ears about this use of ‘hypothetical’ is that, for Buridan,
conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals, as well as propositions joined by some adverbs
(such as ‘where’ or ‘when’) count as hypothetical propositions. Normally we reserve the
term ‘hypothetical propositions’ for ‘if...then’ statements and similar.
39. Peter of Spain defines a syllogism in Tractatus IV.2 as follows:
Sillogismus est oratio in qua quibusdam positis necesse est aliud accidere per ea que posita
sunt. Ut ‘omne animal est substantia omnis homo est animal ergo omnis homo est sub-
stantia’. Hoc totum est quedam oratio in qua quibusdam positis, idest duabus premissis
propositionibus, necesse est per illas sequi aliud, idest conclusionem. [44, p. 43]
.
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At this point it should also be observed that when Buridan speaks of conditional
hypotheticals in the Summulae, he means the following:40
A conditional is [a hypothetical proposition] in which two categorical propo-
sitions are joined by the conjunction ‘if’, as in ‘If a man is, an animal is’. 2)
The truth of a conditional requires that the antecedent cannot be true with-
out the consequent, hence every true conditional amounts to one necessary
consequence.[5, p.61]
As Buridan goes on to make clear here, he is thinking of these ‘if...then...’ constructions
as consequences, and it seems to include both relationships that we would now treat
using notation such as φ ⊢ χ (where φ,ψ, andχ are formulae of some language and ⊢ is
a consequence relation) and (φ ∧ ψ)→ ψ.
At this point we should clarify Buridan’s terminology. Syllogisms, as he defines them,
are two premise arguments where the two premises are linked by a common term. The
common term is called the ‘middle term’ while the other two terms are called the ‘ex-
tremes’. The term which occurs in the first premise of the syllogism is called the ‘major
term’ or ‘major extreme’, the term occurring in the second premise is the ‘minor term’
or ‘minor extreme’. What is interesting is Buridan’s requirement that each term must
be distinct from the other two. To illustrate this, observe that by the above definition
the following does not have the form of a syllogism: Every A is B, Every B is B, and
therefore Every A is B. This fails to have the correct form on two counts. First, the
middle term, B, occurs in the conclusion, which is not allowed. Second, there are only
two distinct terms that occur in the argument. The reason for this failure goes back to
Buridan’s formality constraint. Since the number of terms in an argument pertains to
the form of the argument, an argument with only two terms, like the one above, has a
different ‘logical form’ than the syllogisms that Buridan is interested in.41
As we already remarked, from the way Buridan defines a syllogism it is easy to see
that there are four possible ‘figures’ or ways that the middle term can be related to the
extreme terms so as to produce syllogisms. These can be summarized as follows:
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
B-A A-B B-A A-B
C-B C-B B-C B-C
C-A C-A C-A C-A
It should be noted that the presentation of the figures is ‘backwards’ from Aristotle’s
own formulation of the syllogism as well as from some modern presentations. The dif-
ference is due to the formulation of the categorical proposition. For Aristotle (as well as
some medievals) categorical propositions are of the form: first term, copula, quantifier,
40. the passage is, again, a quote from Peter of Spain, but Buridan says nothing in his comments on it
to suggest he disagrees with it, as long as these are not applied to ‘as of now’ consequences.
41. Note that Buridan does not say arguments like the one above are in any sense wrong or bad. They
simply do not have the form of syllogisms. He discusses such ‘syllogisms’ in [5][pp.386-387].
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second term. For Aristotle, the first figure inference Barbara is of the form:
C belongs to every B
B belongs to every A
C belongs to every A
In what follows we will follow Buridan’s notation and terminology.
At this point we may also wonder what kind of inference a syllogism is. Keeping in
mind some recent historical debates about Aristotle’s understanding of the syllogism,
we may wonder how Buridan thinks of syllogisms. 42 At the heart of this debate is
how we ought to think of the syllogistic and how syllogisms should be represented in
modern formalisations.  Lukasiewicz thought of syllogisms as hypothetical propositions
where the antecedent is composed of two categorical propositions and the conclusion is
a single categorical proposition.43  Lukasiewicz argued that the best way to represent
Aristotle’s syllogistic is by means of an axiomatic theory. In contrast, Corcoran thinks of
syllogisms as inferences from two assumed propositions from which another conclusion
can be drawn. Corcoran argues that the best way to represent syllogistic reasoning is
by using a natural deduction system. This will be important when we come to formalise
Buridan’s syllogistic theory. In particular this will have bearing on the kind of proof
theory we use to represent Buridan’s system.
As we have already seen, there are some interesting questions that emerge here, and
because of reasons of space, these issues can only be briefly touched on.44 As we already
observed, the question of where Buridan would fall in this debate seems to depend, to
some degree, on which text of Buridan’s we are reading. In both cases, Buridan does
treat the syllogisms as a hypothetical proposition. However, as we observed, the use
of the term ‘hypothetical’ in Buridan does not naturally map onto the modern usage
of the term, and Buridan is somewhat ambiguous as to what level the consequence is
functioning on. However, he does seem to be somewhat closer to  Lukasiewicz than to
Corcoran. Conversely, when we ask the question, do the premises of a syllogism need
to be true for it to count as a syllogism, Buridan’s own writings do not present an
entirely consistent picture. As we saw, in the Treatise on Consequences, the definition
of a syllogism is simply a particular kind of formal validity, and there is no requirement
that the premises be true. However, in the Summulae the antecedent and consequent
do both need to be asserted. The question that is open here, is do the premises need to
be asserted and be true, or do they merely need to be asserted and the conclusion follow
from the premises? Buridan does not tell us. The only passages I am aware of where
he discusses how truth and falsity relate to asserted propositons is in his discussion of
Fallacies in Book 7.45 The passage reads as follows:
42. This harks back to the disagreement between John Corcoran and  Lukasiewicz over the nature of the
syllogism. See [9] and [36] for the start of this debate.
43. See [9, 696-697] for Corcoran’s formal reconstruction.
44. I am very grateful to Professor Hodges for raising these points in discussion with him. His observations
made me aware of differences between the Summulae and the Treatise that I was not aware of.
45. Again, this passage was helpfully pointed out to me by Professor Hodges
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As to the fourth mode, it is obvious that many poets and philosophers often
put forth false propositions in an interrogative manner, and thus, if, because
of the authority of these authors, someone assents to these propositions as
if they had been put forth assertively, then he will be deceived. For these
expressions, which are materially the same, are different in form, since in a
question the last word is uttered at a high pitch, whereas in an assertion it is
uttered at a low pitch; in writing, however, a question has a question mark
after the last word, whereas the assertion has a full stop. [5, p.534]
This passage is part of a discussion of the fallacy of accent and the fourth mode
pertains to accents. We are interested in the following characteristic:
The fourth characteristic is accent properly so called, which is the modulation
of an utterance with respect to raising or lowering its various parts. And such
accent is usually classified as acute, grave, or circumflex.[5, p.532]
What should be observed here is that the ‘deception’ is not due to the person merely
asserting a false proposition, nor is the assertion of a false proposition a depiction. The
deception occurs when a person has been led to assert a false proposition on the basis of
an authority who was putting forward a proposition in an interrogative manner. In such
a case, the person has failed to notice the relevant phonetic or morphological features
that indicated this difference and thought the authority was asserting the proposition.
Buridan says nothing here about whether asserting a false proposition is acceptable or
possible, he is only outlining one way in which people can be deceived into asserting
false things.
As such, Buridan does not settle this matter for us. His position may be different
from both Corcoran and  Lukasiewicz, however, it may also be possible to read Buridan’s
ideas about assertion as governing how the propositions are treated in the drawing of
the conclusion, in which case he would be somewhat closer to Corcoran on this point.
i.e. the propositions need to be asserted, but they do not need to be true.
Applying Buridan’s definition of formal and material validity to syllogisms is fairly
straightforward. As we have seen, a syllogism is a two premise argument made up
of three terms which meet the criteria we discussed above. A syllogistic argument is
formally valid if it is valid in all terms which have a similar form. In this case, that
similar form would be if we hold the structure of the particular syllogism in question
fixed, and then change the terms.
It should further be noted that the term all in this definition is actually a restricted
quantifier. Buridan, taking note of various propositions in medieval theology, observes
that there are counter-instances to all of the formally valid syllogisms as well as the
principles that support syllogistic validity. This is the rationale for Buridan’s first con-
clusion in Book Three: ‘No syllogisms are formal in the common and customary way of
speaking.’[52][p. 65] His justification is that the following arguments are all invalid:
1. This God is the Father and this same God is the Son, so the Father is the Son.
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2. This Father is not the Son and this same Father is God, so God is not the Son.46
3. Every God is the Divine Father, every Divine Son is God, so every Divine Son is
the Divine Father.47
4. No Son is the Divine Father, every God is the Son, so no God is the Divine Father.48
Buridan’s response to these counterexamples is amusing. Buridan simply says that it
is not his place to speak on matters of theology,49 and takes ‘formal’ in this context
to mean ‘in all terms excluding divine ones’. This is presumably because the standard
medieval solutions to explain what has gone wrong in these sorts of cases would require
Buridan to discuss theological issues (e.g. how one distinguishes the divine persons and
in what sense they are still one.)50 This response is amusing because Buridan makes
copious use of one divine term (deus) throughout Books Two and Four of his work. In
Chapter Four of Book Two Buridan uses divine terms as an example to explain the dif-
ference between his analysis of divided modal propositions and Pseudo-Scotus’. He also
uses divine terms as counterexamples to various modal propositions and syllogisms.51
It should be pointed out that all Buridan wants to restrict in this case are the presence
of divine terms that are problematic for syllogistic validity. In particular, he only needs
to remove the divine terms ‘Father’, ‘Son’, and ‘Holy Spirit’. If Buridan removes these
he does not need to remove the term ‘God’. Third, given what Buridan has said about
consequences, it is quite easy to see how we can classify syllogistic arguments as one
subclass of arguments treated by Buridan’s theory of logical consequence. Recall that
a syllogistic argument is composed of two premises and its conclusion. We can reduce
this to a consequence, in the sense that Buridan defines in Book One, by taking the two
premises, conjoining them together, and taking the consequent to be the conclusion of
the syllogism. Looking at Buridan’s definition of validity, we may wonder how we are
supposed to be able to check that a particular syllogism is valid. It is quite easy to
check for invalidity using this definition, but validity is quite a bit harder. To see which
syllogisms are valid, Buridan puts forward two rules:
We lay down that affirmative syllogisms hold in virtue of the principle, ‘What-
ever are the same as one and the same are the same as each other’. Hence,
from the fact that the extremes are said in the premises to be the same as
46. These serve as counterexamples to the validity of expository syllogisms. This is sufficient to undercut
the validity of all syllogisms on Buridan’s analysis.
47. This is a counterexample to Barbara.
48. This is a counterexample to Celarent.
49. It would be interesting to look at how Buridan’s remarks here are picked up in medieval theology
after him. In particular we may wonder if any medieval theologians explicitly took up the challenge
Buridan gives here, i.e. to develop a syllogistic framework that works when divine terms are allowed.
For a start to this question, see Chapter 7 of [64]. However, that question does not concern us here.
50. See [51], Book Three, Conclusion 1.
51. For a taste of this, see [51] Book Two, Conclusions 5, 6 and, 17 as well as Book Four, Conclusions 9,
10, 15, etc.
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the one middle it is concluded in the conclusion that they are the same as
each other. However, negative syllogisms hold by another principle, ‘Two
things are not the same as each other if one is the same as something and
the other is not’. Thereby an affirmative conclusion must be concluded from
two affirmatives and a negative from an affirmative and a negative, since an
affirmative proposition indicates identity and a negative non-identity.52
These principles are the basis of the expository syllogism. One of the unique features of
Buridan’s analysis of the syllogism is that he bases the validity of the syllogism on these
two rules. In doing this, he departs from Aristotle, who based his syllogistic theory on
the reduction of ‘imperfect’ syllogisms to the ‘perfect’ ones. He also differs from various
medievals who understood the validity of the syllogism in terms of the ‘dictum de omni
et nullo’. We will have quite a bit more to say about these rules and the role of the
expository syllogism in Buridan when we formalise Buridan’s theory in Chapter Five.
However, at this point, we make two observations. First, the principle holds by taking a
singular term and showing that its suppositum either has two properties or that it has
one property and lacks the other. As we have already seen for Buridan, an affirmative
proposition is true if the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing(s). This
principle is a very natural extension of this idea. In the affirmative case, the idea is that
if we can show that one and the same thing have two properties we can conclude that
there is something that has both of those properties. This principle also can be used in
the case of universals in a similar way. Using this Buridan can justify the ‘dictum de
omni et nullo’ and by extension show the first figure syllogisms to be valid.
Second, at the heart of this principle is the idea that we take a singular term that
has the respective properties in question. At this point it should simply be noted that
this principle is not modified or changed when we look at Buridan’s analysis of modal
propositions. Having sketched Buridan’s theory of the syllogism and provided some
explication of how the form/matter distinction works in Buridan’s theory, we now turn
to his analysis of modal propositions.
4.5 Buridan’s Theory of Modality
Having looked at Buridan’s treatment of syllogistics as it pertains to assertoric propo-
sitions, we need to look at Buridan’s theory of modality. Two books of the Treatise on
Consequences are concerned with modality. In the second book, Buridan develops his
theory of consequence for single premise inferences. In the fourth book Buridan com-
bines this material with the material in the third book to deal with syllogistic theory.
Our goal in this section is to provide a brief summary of Buridan’s theory of modality
as presented in Book Two of the Treatise on Consequences. This will serve as the basis
from which we will develop our formal reconstruction of Buridan’s modal syllogistics in
the next chapter, as well as the basis for some of our conjectures about Buridan’s theory
of modality. For Buridan, a modal proposition is one that contains a modal term or
adjective within the proposition itself:
52. The Latin can be found on page 186.
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It should be noted that propositions are not said to be of necessity or of
possibility in that they are possible or necessary, rather, from the fact that
the modes ‘possible’ or ‘necessary’ occur in them.[51, p. 95]53
Buridan’s point is a linguistic one. For a proposition to be modal, a modal term must
occur in the proposition. For example, the proposition ‘Every human is an animal’ is nec-
essarily true (at least for Aristotle), but the proposition is assertoric, because no modal
term or adjective occurs in the proposition.54 Likewise, the proposition ‘Every human
is necessarily running’ is a proposition of necessity and it is false. Modal propositions
can be separated into two different groups: divided modal propositions and composite
modal propositions. Concerning these, Buridan writes:
They are called ‘composite’ when a mode is the subject and a dictum is the
predicate, or vice versa . . . They are called ‘divided’ when part of the dictum
is the subject and the other part the predicate. The mode attaches to the
copula as a determination of it.[51, p. 96]55
For Buridan, the standard form of a proposition is: quantifier, subject, verb, predicate.56
A composite modal proposition is one where the verb is not modalised,57 but either the
subject or the predicate is a modal term. The non-modal term is called the dictum
of the proposition. In Latin the dictum is designated by using an accusative–infinitive
construction. In such a construction the verb of the dictum is placed in the infinitive
and both the terms relating to that verb are placed in the accusative. There are some
challenges with literally translating this into English and it is standard to use dependent
clauses to translate the dictum. For example, ‘That every B is A is necessary’ and ‘It is
possible that some B is A’ are examples of composite modal propositions.
In contrast, a divided modal proposition does not contain a modal term i.e. the subject
or the predicate is not a modal such as ‘possible’, ‘necessary’ etc. Instead it is the verb
that has been modalized. This is best illustrated in English either by the use of verbs
where the modal is an adverb. For example, ‘A person is of necessity an animal’ is a
divided modal proposition for Buridan. In what follows we will often write e.g. ‘A is
necessarily B’ for a divided modal proposition.58
53. The Latin can be found on page 187.
54. On Buridan’s reading this proposition is also necessarily true, as long as the modality is given the
composite reading.
55. The Latin can be found on page 187.
56. This order can be changed in various ways to create non-standard propositions and gives rise to
syllogisms with oblique terms. We will not discuss those sorts of propositions or syllogisms in this
thesis.
57. A verb is modalised if either the modality is a ‘feature’ of the verb, e.g. ‘can’ or if a verb is modified
by a modal adverb, e.g. ‘is of necessity’. See [51, p.172], footnote 9 of Book Two.
58. This is ambiguous in English between ‘A is of necessity B’ and ‘A is necessarily-B’ where the hyphen
indicates that the modality goes with the term, not with the verb. In the first case, according to
Buridan, A is ampliated to the possible, while, in the second case, A is not ampliated. Unless we say
otherwise, ‘A is necessarily B’ should be read as a divided proposition.
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It should be observed that, in divided modal propositions, the negation operation can
occur in three places.59 First, the negation can occur in front of the modalized copula as
in ‘Some A is not necessarily B.’ The second place the negation can occur is between the
modal and the verb as in ‘Some B is necessarily not A’. The third place the negation can
occur is in front of one of the terms as in ‘Some B is necessarily non-A.’ The third location
requires the use of the hyphen, since the distinction is difficult to represent in English.
The main difference between the second and third kind of proposition is that the former
is a negative, particular proposition, whereas the later is actually a positive proposition.
For Buridan, a proposition is counted as negative when the negation occurs in front of
either the modal or the verb;[52][pp.38-39] Otherwise it is positive. This construction is
much more natural in Latin where it is perfectly grammatical and intelligible to write
something like ‘A non est B ’ whereas in English, ‘A not is B’ is not grammatical. To
capture this distinction we will use ‘B is non-A’ for when the negation occurs after the
verb and modifies the term. We will use ‘B is not A’ when the negation modifies the
copula.
This distinction is important, because the truth conditions for negative and affirmative
propositions differ in a number of ways. In assertoric propositions, only affirmative
propositions have ‘existential import’. For example, if the proposition ‘Every A is B’
is true then there must exist some singular term whose supposita are not empty (i.e.
there is something which is A), and everything that is A must also be B. In contrast,
a negative proposition is true if there is nothing that the subject term supposits for or
there is nothing that both subject and predicate supposit for. To see the difference,
observe that for the proposition, ‘A person is non-running’ to be true, there must be
some person who is not running. In contrast the proposition ‘A person is not running’
is true if there are no people in existence at all.
Buridan also points out that if two negations occur in the modal or the verb, or one
occurs in each, then the proposition is equivalent to a positive one. Buridan illustrates
this with the following example ‘B is not possibly not A.’ Buridan observes that this is
clearly equivalent to an affirmative proposition (B is necessarily A), and so Buridan says
he will treat those propositions as affirmative.
Before moving on to discuss the truth conditions of these propositions, it should be
observed that there does not seem to be any principled reason in Buridan’s theory to
prevent us from combining these two kinds of propositions together. For example, ‘It
could be necessary that every A is B’ or ‘It is necessary that some B is possibly A’ seem
to be perfectly good constructions by Buridan’s own lights. The main issue would be
which kind of proposition is this, and if it does not fall into one or the other is this a
problem for Buridan’s anaylsis? Such propositions are not considered by Buridan. And
this should not pose a problem to his theory since, given what Buridan says about each
kind of proposition, the combination should follow from the analysis of the two kinds of
59. Buridan does include truth and falsity among his list of modals. Because of this, it is possible to
use falsity in the composite sense to define something similar to what modern logicians think of as
propositional negation. We will briefly discuss this when we discuss the truth conditions for composite
modal propositions. However we do not count this as one of the possible locations for negation and
we do not intend to treat these modalities in our formalisation of Buridan’s theory.
86
4.5 Buridan’s Theory of Modality
modals discussed in his theory.
Buridan’s analysis of divided modal propositions is one of the unique features of his
modal theory. Buridan tells us that
It should be realised that a divided proposition of possibility has a subject
ampliated by the mode following it to supposit not only for things that exist
but also for what can exist even if they do not.[51, p. 97]60
According to Buridan, in divided modal propositions of possibility, the subject is am-
pliated to supposit for that which is or can be. At this point, one may wonder why it
is only the subject that is ampliated and not the predicate. In a sense, both terms are
ampliated, since both the subject and the predicate are modified by a modal. In the case
of the predicate, the modal component is made explicit by the modal that is modifying
the verb. For example, in the proposition ‘Every man is necessarily an animal’ the pred-
icate animal is modified by modal ‘necessarily is’. In this way, one could say that the
predicate is ampliated. However, this is not a way that Buridan speaks. He only speaks
of the subject being ampliated. One possible reason for this may be that usually when a
term is ampliated there are usually no grammatical markers to indicate that it needs to
be modified to have modal force. For example, in both the proposition ‘Buridan’s horse
is dead’ and ‘every donkey is possibly an animal’ there is nothing in the grammar of
the sentence that suggests that either ‘Buridan’s horse’ or ‘donkey’ needs to range over
things that were Buridan’s horse and things that can be donkeys respectively.
As Buridan goes on, he will later prove that given the assumption about the ampliation
of propositions of possibility, and the equivalences between necessity and possibility, it
follows that propositions of necessity also have their subject ampliated in the same way.61
On Buridan’s theory, ‘Some B is possibly A’ is equivalent to ‘that which is or can be B is
possibly A’. Likewise, ‘Some B is necessarily A’ is equivalent (via Book Two, Conclusion
two) to ‘that which is or can be B is necessarily A’. Why might we think this? According
to Buridan this is a general feature about the way these kinds of verbs ampliate their
subjects. As an example, consider the proposition, ‘Someone labouring was healthy’.
Buridan tells us that this can be true in different ways. This proposition is true if
there is currently someone labouring who was healthy at some point in the past. The
proposition would also be true if there was some person in the past who was labouring.
The case for future tensed propositions is analogous. This seems clear enough, but what
is interesting is that Buridan goes on to remark that,
Thus, because possibility is about the future and all that is possible, the verb
60. The Latin can be found on page 187.
61. See [51], Book Two Conclusion 2. Buridan writes:
In every divided proposition of necessity the subject is ampliated to supposit for those that
can be.[51]
The Latin can be found on page 187.
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‘can be’ similarly ampliates the supposition of the subject to everything that
can be.62
This could be one of the reasons that Buridan thinks that the divided propositions of
possibility and necessity ampliate their subject.63 Buridan’s observation is based on this
connection between temporal and modal propositions. Roughly, we could think of this
as arguing that,
1) Temporal propositions ampliate their subject.
2) If something will be the case, then it can be the case.
3) Therefore: modal propositions also ampliate their subjects.
To see this, assume that modal propositions do not ampliate their subject. We will show
that a counterexample to 2) can then be constructed. Assume for the sake of argument
that Socrates does not currently exist, but that he will, and that he will be white. Then
the following proposition is true: ‘Socrates will be white’ since temporal propositions
ampliate their subjects. By 2) it follows that ‘Socrates can be white’ is also true. But
since we assumed that modal propositions do not ampliate their subject, this holds only
if ‘that which is Socrates can be white’ is true. But it is not, since we assumed Socrates
does not exist.
To muster further support for his theory, Buridan later goes on to contrast this reading
of the modal terms with Pseudo-Scotus’ analysis of modal propositions.64 On Pseudo-
Scotus’ analysis, ‘Some B can be A’ is equivalent to saying ‘That which is B can be A or
that which can be B can be A’. Buridan points out that this definition is not equivalent
to his own. To illustrate the point he uses the proposition ‘A creating God can fail
to be God’. Buridan argues that on his view the proposition comes out false. This is
because the contradictory, ‘Every creating God is necessarily God’ is true on Buridan’s
analysis.65 On Pseudo-Scotus’ reading this must come out false, since the contradictory
of the particular distinctions will have to be conjoined universal propositions. (i.e. the
contradictory of ‘Everything which can be B is not necessarily A or everything that is
B is not necessarily A ’ is ‘Everything which can be B is necessarily A and everything
that is B is necessarily A ’.) The gist of the argument, is that, since God can fail to be
creating, a creating God can be nothing. Then, since God is something, the conjunct
‘Everything that is B is necessarily A ’ is not true.
Buridan prefers the first reading of the divided proposition over the second because,
If I say ‘Every B can be A’, there is just one subject and just one predicate
and a single simply predicative proposition, and the subject is distributed all
62. The Latin can be found on page 187.
63. In modern terms we would express this as the following modal ‘bridge’ principle: Fφ→◇φ, where F
is a future tense operation.
64. See Pseudo-Scotus Questions on the Prior Analytics (included in John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia,
ed. Vivs, Paris 1891-5, vol. 2).
65. Observe that everything which is or can be a creating God is necessarily God. Implicit here is the
assumption that God exists necessarily, which most medievals accepted.
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at once by a single distribution. So it seems better to analyse it by a single
predicative proposition with a single subject and a single predicate, even
though the ampliation of the subject makes the subject of the analysand a
disjunction of the verb ‘can be’ with the verb ‘is’.[51, p. 98]66
This will be important when we propose an analysis of what Buridan’s theory of modality
is. For our analysis to be successful, it should be able to explain why modal terms
ampliate the subject in the way Buridan argues they do. It also needs to be consistent
with the connections he sees between tense and modality.
We should also observe that Buridan does not push his rejection of Pseudo-Scotus’
position too far. He is quite happy to allow people to define divided propositions however
they wish, since names and utterances signify by convention, but he prefers this reading
because of the reasons sketched above.
Given this conventional caveat, there is also an important theoretical benefit to having
uniform ampliation of subject terms. If the modal terms all ampliate their subjects
uniformly, then we obtain an octagon of opposition between the modal propositions of
necessity and possibility. If the ampliation is non-uniform, then such an octagon may
not arise. For example, if we were to posit that ‘No A is necessarily B’ does not ampliate
its subject, but ‘No A is possibly B’ does, then it is easy to check that this will block
the inference from ‘No A is necessarily B’ to ‘No A is possibly B’. What this means is
that the terms need to have a uniform modal ampliation. This leaves only a few possible
options:
1. The subject is ampliated to supposit for what can be.
2. The subject is ampliated to supposit for what necessarily is.
3. The subject is ampliated to supposit for what can contingently be.
4. The subject is not modally ampliated.
Given what we have already seen about temporal propositions, the possibility reading
is the most natural. In practice, the second and third readings will not work very well.
The second reading makes the modal propositions very ‘narrow’ in the sense that they
would only range over the things that are necessarily the subject. The third reading
is also problematic. It would make it very difficult to talk about things which are
necessarily both A and B. The fourth reading seems to be a plausible alternative. The
truth conditions for composite modal propositions are, in a sense, more complicated than
their divided counterparts. However, there is also a sense in which they are much simpler.
In composite modal propositions, we need to understand that the terms ‘possible’ and
‘necessary’ need to be read differently than they are in divided propositions. Buridan
tells us that,
66. The Latin can be found on page 187.
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Here ‘possibility’ is taken not for what can be but for a possible proposi-
tion, which is said to be possible in so far as things can be altogether as it
signifies.[51, p. 105]67
In composite modal propositions the term ‘possible’ ranges over a different class of things
than it does in divided propositions. In the divided case, the modality ranges over the
objects which a term supposits for, e.g. the things that can be A or must be B. In
the composite case the modalities range over different kinds of propositions, not over
different supposita. As we have already seen, a proposition is possible for Buridan just
in case it signifies what can be the case. Likewise, a proposition is necessary if it signifies
what is necessarily the case. Structurally, these propositions are read differently than
the divided ones. For example, a universal affirmative proposition with the modal as
the subject, would read ‘Every possibility is that B is A’ or slightly more fleshed out,
‘Every possible proposition is that B is A’. It is this difference in reading that prompts
Buridan to remind his readers to be very careful to avoid conflating the two senses.68
Another thing to observe is that the supposition in the composite case is different than
it is in the divided case. In the divided case, the subject and predicate both supposit
for objects. In composite modes, the dictum has ‘material supposition’ i.e. the term
supposits for the proposition the dictum names.
When we have a composite modal with the dictum as the subject, Buridan’s analysis of
the proposition is similar, however expressing these propositions in grammatical English
can be somewhat difficult. At this point it is best to simply observe that in such cases
we would analyse these propositions as: every proposition which is X is a possibility,
where X expresses the dictum of the proposition.
Composite modal propositions are simpler, because they do not cause the terms of the
propositions to be ampliated. Buridan observes that because of this, there is very little
that needs to be proven about such propositions and their corresponding syllogisms.
Buridan only has two conclusions discussing syllogisms with composite modals. See [51,
pp. 141-142] Book 4, Conclusions 1 and 2.
In a sense, what we have are two distinct sets of modalities, or better: The location of
the modality in a sentence determines the class of objects we are dealing with. Divided
modals are modals that ampliate their subjects and range over objects. Composite
modals range over dictums/propositions, interact with the signification of terms, but do
not ampliate anything in the dictum.69 Because of this, when we speak of Buridan’s
theory of modality, we need to realize that we are speaking of modality in both of these
senses.
What are the implications that Buridan draws from his theory of modality? In Book
Two he draws 19 conclusions. We will start with the first eight inferences as they all
67. The Latin can be found on page 187.
68. As an easy example of the difference, consider the proposition ‘A white thing can be black’. If we
read this as a divided proposition, then it is true, since there is something which can be white and
can (at a later point) be black. However, the composite reading is impossible, since nothing can be
white and black (all over) at the same time.
69. The lack of ampliation is not trivial. As Buridan points out, some terms cause other terms to be
ampliated. The best example of this is the term ‘dead’.
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pertain to divided modal consequences which are the main focus of our formalisations
in Chapter Five. We will then sketch conclusions 10, 17 and 18, as these conclusions
explain how inferences between divided and composite modal propositions function. We
will need this information for our discussion of Buridan’s ontology in Chapter Six.
Buridan’s first conclusion is that:
From any proposition of possibility there follows as an equivalent another
of necessity and from any of necessity another of possibility, such that if a
negation was attached either to the mode or to the dictum or to both in the
one it is not attached to it in the other and if it was not attached in the one
it is attached in the other, other things remaining the same.[51, p. 99]70
What Buridan means is that it is always possible to convert a proposition of necessity
to a proposition of possibility, by correctly replacing the negations in a proposition. For
Buridan, a proposition is said to be ‘of necessity’ (de necessario) if it explicitly contains
the modal ‘necessary’ and similarly for possibility. As an example, Buridan observes
that ‘Every B is necessarily A’ is equivalent to the proposition ‘Every B is not possibly
not A’, which then yields ‘No B is possibly not A’. This conclusion is important as it
gives some insight into how negation works in Buridan’s logic, and it is necessary to
establish the second conclusion.
The second conclusion shows that divided propositions of necessity ampliate their
subjects to supposit for what does or can exist. Buridan writes:
In every divided proposition of necessity the subject is ampliated to supposit
for those that can be.[51, p. 100]71
Buridan’s proof for this conclusion can be reconstructed as follows: First, let us as-
sume that propositions of possibility ampliate their subjects. Now the proposition ‘Some
B is possibly not A’ contradicts ‘No B is possibly not A’. Observe that both of these are
propositions of possibility and so ampliate their subjects. That they are contradictory
follows from what Buridan assumed about contradictory propositions. Now, from the
previous conclusion, we have ‘No B is possibly not A’ is equivalent to ‘Every B is not
possibly not A’ which (again by the first conclusion) is equivalent to ‘Every B is neces-
sarily A’. But for ‘Every B is necessarily A’ to be equivalent to ‘No B is possibly not A’,
the subjects of both propositions need to be ampliated.
These two conclusions provide the foundation for the analysis of modal propositions
that Buridan goes on to offer in the rest of Book Two of the Treatise. In a number
of places, Buridan needs to ensure that the subject is ampliated for his conclusions to
follow.
In presenting this conclusion Buridan implicitly rejects William of Ockham’s analysis
of propositions of necessity. Due to lack of space we do not have the time to develop this
observation in detail. The full details of this argument can be found in my paper [23].
70. The Latin can be found on page 187.
71. The Latin can be found on page 187.
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Buridan’s argument for this conclusion functions, in some sense, as an argument
against Ockham. Buridan argues that if one wants possibility propositions to ampli-
ate their subjects to the possible (as Ockham does), then one must either reject the
relationships of contradiction that Buridan lays down in Chapter Five, or accept that
necessity propositions also ampliate their subjects in the same way. Conclusions three
and four show, respectively, how necessity and possibility propositions relate to assertoric
propositions. Conclusion three states that:
From no proposition of necessity does there follow an assertoric or vice versa,
except that from a universal negative of necessity a universal negative asser-
toric follows.[51, p. 101]72
While conclusion four propounds that:
From no proposition of possibility does there follow an assertoric or vice
versa, except that from every affirmative assertoric proposition there follows
an affirmative particular of possibility.[51, p. 102] 73
Here Buridan claims that only universal negative necessity propositions entail negative
assertoric propositions, and that only particular affirmative assertoric propositions entail
particular affirmative possibility propositions. Before going on to sketch the motivation
for this, it should be observed that when Buridan speaks of a universal negative of
necessity, what he means is a proposition of the form: ‘Every B is necessarily not A’, as
he gives this form in his proof of the proposition.74 Given the equivalences we discussed
previously, this is equivalent to ‘No B is not necessarily not A’ which in turn is equivalent
to ‘No B is possibly A’. The motivation for these conclusions is as follows: Assume that
No B is possibly A. For Buridan, this means that the set of things that are possibly
B and possibly A are disjoint. Buridan implicitly assumes that everything that is A is
also possibly A, and so it follows that what is A and what is B must also be disjoint.
The reasoning is similar when looking at the particular affirmative of possibility. As
our formal semantics will make perspicuous, the reason that the inference only holds in
these cases is because the subject is ampliated to supposit for possible objects.75
Conclusions five and six address the conversion of modal terms. Conclusion five reads
as follows:
From every affirmative of possibility there follows by conversion of the terms
a particular affirmative of possibility, but not a universal, and from no neg-
ative of possibility does there follow by conversion of the terms another of
possibility.[51, p.103]76
72. The Latin can be found on page 187.
73. The Latin can be found on page 187.
74. See [4, p.65].
75. For the proofs of these conclusions, it should be noted that, from a modern formal perspective, this
amounts to assuming that our frames must be reflexive.
76. The Latin can be found on page 187.
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Conclusion six asserts that:
From no proposition of necessity does there follow by conversion of the terms
another of necessity, except that from a universal negative there follows a
universal negative.[51, p.104]77
In these conclusions Buridan shows that the particular affirmative of possibility and the
universal negative of necessity convert simply. Again, if we think of this in terms of
disjoint sets, the reasoning is clear. If ‘no A is necessarily B’, then the set of things that
are possibly A and the set of things that are possibly B are disjoint. Hence, ‘no B is
necessarily A’ will also be true.
The seventh and eight conclusions discuss the valid inferences that hold between propo-
sitions of contingency. The seventh conclusion asserts that:
Every proposition of each-way contingency having an affirmed mode is con-
verted into [one of] the opposite quality with an affirmed mode, but none is
converted if the result of conversion or what was converted had a negated
mode.[51, p.104]78
While the eighth conclusion reads as follows:
No proposition of contingency can be converted in terms into another of
contingency, but any having an affirmed mode can be converted into another
of possibility.[51, p.105]79
Buridan’s semantics for contingency propositions are tricky and hinge on the location
of the negation operation which Buridan handles by the distinction between ‘affirmed
modes’ and ‘negated modes.’ As Hughes rightly observes:
The other main point that [Buridan] makes about divided contingency propo-
sitions is that ‘it is contingent to be’ and ‘it is contingent not to be’ are
equivalent. In this way ‘contingent’ differs strikingly from ‘necessary’ or
‘possible’. So, if I extend my notation for divided modal propositions by
writing ‘A
Q
a B’ for ‘A is contingent to be B’ etc., we shall find that the two
forms AaB and AiB will be equivalent to the corresponding E and O forms,
which will therefore not be needed. [20][p.100]
The equivalence rests on observing that if something is contingently B then it both can be
B and can fail to be B. If we say that something is contingently not B, this is equivalent
77. The Latin can be found on page 188.
78. The Latin can be found on page 188.
79. The Latin can be found on page 188.
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(assuming double negation elimination) to ‘Something can be B and something can fail to
be B’, yielding the desired equivalence. If the negation occurs after the modal operation,
this means that mode is affirmed. In this case, we read the negation operation as
occurring after the mode, modifying the copula. This reading of contingency propositions
is required for a number of the syllogisms that Buridan claims are valid, to be valid in
our semantics.80
In contrast to this is the case where the mode is negative. In this case, we would
place the negation in front of the modal operation, as in the proposition ‘Every A is
not contingently B’. These create their own contradictory pairings. Hence ‘Every A
is not contingently B’ contradicts ‘Some B is contingently not A’ and hence ‘Some B
is contingently A’ as we have already seen. Likewise ‘Some A is not contingently B’
contradicts ‘No A is contingently B’ and ‘Every A is contingently B’.
In commenting on Buridan, Hughes also notes that these two modal propositions cor-
respond to the cases where the negation occurs outside the scope of the modal operation.
Here we will use Q¯ to represent such cases, and present semantics that also capture these
propositions. These cases correspond to the cases where the negation occurs in front of
the modal. These are needed for some of the conclusions that Buridan discusses in Book
Four of the Treatise, which we will not treat in detail here.
Buridan’s ninth conclusion highlights some of the unique implications that follow from
the material supposition of the dictum. The conclusion states that:
In all composite modals in which the dictum is subject, from a particular
there follows a universal, the rest being unchanged.[51, p.106]81
The proof of this has to do with the relationship between the dictum and signification.
As an example, consider the proposition ‘Some proposition ‘B is A’ is possible’. Buridan
observes that among all the propositions ‘B is A’ each one of these signifies the same
thing as all of the other ones.[4][p.71] Hence, if one of them is true, then all of them
will be true, and vice versa. The upshot of this is that Buridan can dispense with the
universal and particular quantifiers in the context of composite modal propositions.
Buridan’s seventeenth and eighteenth conclusions deal with the relationship between
composite and divided propositions. The seventeenth conclusion shows that the only
composite modal claim that entails a divided modal claim is the particular affirmative.
Buridan doesn’t really prove the positive part of the proposition. He simply remarks
that ‘if “Some B is A” is possible then “Some B can be A” clearly follows.’ This can be
clearly seen, since “‘Some B is A” is possible if and only if “Some B is A” signifies as
can be the case’ and from this it seems clear that something which is or can be B can
be A. Buridan offers counterexamples to rule out the other possible inferences. In the
universal affirmative, he uses the following counterexample:
Although ‘Everything running is a horse’ is possible, it does not follow univer-
80. For example, QMQ Ferison and Bocardo are not valid if the negation is in front of the mode.
81. The Latin can be found on page 188.
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sally that everything running can be a horse, because an ass may be running,
but it cannot be a horse.[51, p.110]82
Buridan’s point is that even though the composite is true (imagine a world in which
only horses are running), the divided sense is clearly false, since a horse can be running,
but it is impossible that a horse be an ass. That nothing follows from the divided to
composite direction is equally clear. Buridan provides counterexamples to these as well.
The reason all of the counterexamples work has to do with the fact that divided terms are
ampliated. For example, the proposition ‘Something white can be black’ is true, because
something which is currently white can be black. However, the proposition ‘Something
white is black is possible’ does not have the dictum ampliated. It is only possible if the
proposition ‘Something white is black’ signifies as can be the case. However it cannot
signify this because ‘Something white is black’ signifies that something white is black
and that is impossible.
So, having sketched elements of Buridan’s modal theory, let us turn to the natural
question this raises. What is Buridan’s theory of modality? That is to say, what does
Buridan think modals actually are? To clarify this question it is helpful to refer to
one modern theory of modality. According to a view popular since the introduction of
Kripke semantics, and having roots going back at least as far as Leibniz, modalities can
be analyzed in terms of possible worlds. On this theory, when we say that ‘φ is possible’
(relative to some world w) what we mean is that ‘there is some possible world accessible
from w such that φ is true at w’. Necessity is defined in a similar manner.
If we were to ask what are the modalities on the Kripke semantics view, the answer
would be that it is a reductive account of modality where possibility and necessity are
reduced to possible worlds and accessibility relations on those worlds.83 In the modern
case, this has led into a number of discussions about the nature and ontology of possible
worlds, discussions about ‘impossible’ worlds, the nature of actuality and many other
philosophical debates. When we ask this question of Buridan’s theory, we are asking for
a few things. First, we want to know what kinds of things these modal operations are.
Can possibility talk be defined in terms of tense? Can it be defined in terms of ‘ways the
world can be’? Does Buridan’s account of modality not yield to any kind of explication?
What we are asking for is an explanation as to what possibility and necessity are. Second,
we are asking for the truth conditions for the various kinds of modal operations. To this
question, hopefully the above remarks have made sufficiently clear when Buridan thinks
various kinds of modal sentences are true or false. Our main concern is with the first
question. What does Buridan take modal talk to be about? Before we present some
possible options, we should observe that in no place in the Treatise on Consequences
does Buridan explicitly attempt to provide a definition or reduction of modality. What
we are doing is a bit of historical reconstruction. There is one other piece of information
that we need to keep in mind. When we speak of Buridan’s theory of modality, it seems
that we are actually dealing with two sets of modal operations.
82. The Latin can be found on page 188.
83. We say that a theory of modality is reductive if modal terms do not occur in the definitions of
possibility and necessity.
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As we already observed, composite and divided modals range over different kinds of
objects and have different sets of truth conditions. Because of this, when we discuss
Buridan’s view, we will need to evaluate proposals against both aspects of his modal
theory. We have already seen that Buridan draws a close connection between temporal
operations like ‘will be’ and ‘was’ and modal operations like ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’.
Could Buridan think that modality can just be defined in terms of temporal operations?
This view was defended by some in the Middle Ages.84 On this view, a proposition is
possible just in case the proposition either was true, is true or will be true. Likewise
a proposition is necessary if it always was, is and will be true. I think it is safe to say
that this view is not Buridan’s view for divided propositions. Buridan says nothing to
explicitly rule out this reading for composite modals. He makes the following remark
which tells against a temporal reading of his divided modalities, “Many are the possible
things which never are, will be or have been”[51, p.72].85 This is found in a list of
propositions that Buridan takes to be uncontroversial and conceded by most people.
It may be possible to reject such a reading by pointing out that it doesn’t follow that
Buridan is one of these people. However, Buridan does not argue against the proposition
in this list, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, this seems to tell against such
a reading. It should be fairly clear how this undermines the temporal reading. The
reason is that if the proposition “Many are the possible things which never are, will be
or have been” is true, then possibility is not exhausted by temporality. While that is
not sufficient to rule out the temporal interpretation as applied to divided propositions,
I think this is enough to suggest we should be looking elsewhere for Buridan’s modal
theory. G. Hughes in his paper on Buridan’s modal logic makes the following remark:
For a long time I was puzzled about what Buridan could mean by talking
about possible but non-actual things of a certain kind. . . what I want to
suggest here, very briefly, is that we might understand what he is saying in
terms of modern ‘possible world’ semantics. . . It seems to me, in fact that
in his modal logic he is implicitly working with a kind of possible worlds
semantics throughout.[20][p. 3]
This is a very interesting proposal. If Hughes’ remarks are correct, then in Buridan we
have a kind of ‘proto possible worlds’ analysis of modality. In order to properly assess
Hughes’ remarks we will need to better situate Buridan within his medieval intellectual
context. This will be done in Chapter Five, and so a complete discussion of this proposal
will have to wait until then. However, two points should be made here. First, it should
be remarked that, because of the success possible worlds semantics has enjoyed in the last
30 years or so, for many philosophers, possible worlds semantics has become synonymous
with modality. For some, to say ‘φ is possible’ is just to assert that φ is true in some
possible world. When we turn to historical situations, however, we need to be very
cautious about anachronism and projecting our philosophical theories onto those who
84. For example, Lambert of Lagny. See [64] for a discussion of Lambert’s logic and a formal reconstruction
of it.
85. The Latin can be found on page 188.
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have come before us. Just because we have a very popular and successful theory, it does
not follow that this is what our philosophical precursors thought.
Second, from what we have already seen in Buridan, there may be some reason to see a
‘proto possible worlds’ analysis in Buridan. This is best seen when we look at composite
modal propositions, which Hughes did not dwell on in his paper. Recall that composite
modal propositions have to do with the relationship between the dictum, the signification
of the proposition that the dictum expresses, and the way that things can be. ‘It is
possible that B is A’ is true for Buridan, just in case it is possible that what the dictum
‘B is A’ supposits for is true. The connection with possible worlds semantics seems to
come from the requirement that things ‘can be such that . . . ’. When Buridan talks of
the ways things can be, a natural thought would be to see in this a sort of ‘possible
worlds’ analysis of modality. The move here that needs to be supported textually is
the idea of there having been multiple different ways that the world could have been.
Unfortunately, there is little in The Consequences that would suggest this beyond the
considerations we have already mentioned. It would be helpful at this point to look at
Buridan’s discussion of modality in the Summulae as well as some of his commentaries
and questions on The Physics to see if Buridan suggests a closer connection between
possibility and ways things could be. We will say more about this in Chapter Six,
starting on page 153.
Another factor that comes into play here is Buridan’s nominalist commitments. As
we have remarked, for a proposition to be true, it must be formed. This raises some
important issues as it relates to the definition of consequence. One such example is the
following argument: ‘No proposition is negative, so no ass is running’[51, p. 67].86 As
Buridan points out, this inference is not a good one. If this argument were valid then
its contrapositive would be valid as well. The contrapositive is ‘Some ass is running’,
therefore ‘Some proposition is negative’. However, this clearly does not follow, if we
allow for propositions to be contingent entities (of either the mental, spoken or written
kind). As Buridan points out, God could wipe out all of the negative propositions while
the donkey is running.87 This requires Buridan to tweak the definition of consequence
to rule out such arguments as valid. The way this is done, implicitly, is by drawing
a distinction between what is true of a situation or of some time and what is true at
something/sometime. This idea was developed by Arthur Prior in his paper The Possibly
True and the Possible. For Buridan, the idea is that ‘No proposition is negative’ may
be true of a given situation even if it is not true at that situation. Already this kind of
distinction seems to point toward a theory of ‘ways the world could be.’
The divided case is more interesting and is what leads Hughes to initially propose that
Buridan had something along the lines of possible worlds in mind. Hughes remarks:
Did he mean by a ‘possible A’, I wondered, an actual object which is not in
86. The Latin can be found on page 188.
87. Implicit in this point is a theological assumption that Buridan does not point out, namely that however
God conceives of truths, God does not form the relevant type of negative propositions, otherwise, this
counterexample would fail.
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fact A but might have been or might become A? My house, e.g., is in this
sense a possible green thing because although it is not in fact green, it could
become green [. . . ]. But this interpretation won’t do; for Buridan wants to
talk e.g., about possible horses; and it seems quite clear that he does not
believe that there are, or even could be things which are not in fact horses
but which might become horses. [20, p.97]
Recall that a divided modal proposition, e.g. ‘A can be B’ is true just in case ‘that
which is or can be A can be B’ is true. Hughes starts with the observation that when
Buridan speaks of ‘that which can be A’ he is not only quantifying over the things that
now exist, and could become A. Buridan’s temporal analogy makes this point very clear.
Recall that, ‘B was A’ has two causes of truth and in the case of ‘that which was B
was A’, this is true even if the object which was both B and A does not exist. Hughes
goes on to point out that when Buridan uses divided modals he wants to quantify over
possible objects as well as actual objects. This is very well supported in the text and in
Buridan’s semantics. But how are we to make sense of this talk about possible objects?
Here Hughes draws a very natural connection between possible objects and possible
worlds.[20, p. 97] He points out one very natural reading of ‘that which is or can be A
can be B’ is as saying that there is some possible world where something is A and there
is another (possibly the same) possible world where the thing which is A is also B.88
This provides a very natural reading of Buridan’s divided modal propositions.
From what we have sketched above, there is a reading of Buridan where the modalities
are understood by a kind of possible worlds semantics. Both divided and composite
modal propositions can be understood in terms of possible worlds. Formally, this invites
us to take up Hughes’ sixth challenge with which he ends for [20]. Here he remarks that,
A much more elaborate project still would be to try to give a Kripke-style
possible worlds semantics for Buridan’s modal system and then an axiomatic
basis for it. [20, p. 108]
Parts of this challenge have been taken up by other authors. For example, in [59]
an axiomatic analysis of Buridan’s modal syllogistic is developed. As we will point out
briefly in the next chapter, this formalisation is not entirely satisfactory. Further, until
my paper [22], a semantic analysis of Buridan’s theory had not been put forward nor has
any formal analysis that takes seriously Buridan’s use of the expository syllogism.89 Our
goal in the next chapter will be to develop a possible worlds semantics that coincides
with what Buridan says in the Consequences. In a sense this will vindicate the claim
that Buridan’s modal syllogism is consistent with and can be understood in terms of a
88. Notice that the requirement is not that the object in question be both A and B at some world. This
would be to confuse the composite and divided sense of the proposition. Consider the proposition
‘Something white can be black’. There will be no world where any object will be both white and
black.
89. There are some mismatches between Thom’s formalisation of Buridan and the inferences that Buridan
says are valid. Specifically, Thom’s formalisation predicts some syllogistic figures to be valid, even
though Buridan denies they are and provides counterexamples for them.
98
4.5 Buridan’s Theory of Modality
possible worlds semantics. In our next chapter we will develop our own semantic and
syntactic reconstruction of Buridan’s logic and show that it is both sound and complete.
In conclusion, we have outlined and developed Buridan’s understanding of the form–
matter distinction as he applies it to propositions and syllogisms. We have explored some
of the implications of this theory as it pertains to the validity of syllogisms. Likewise
we have developed Buridan’s account of modal propositions to unpack Buridan’s use
of the terms ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ and pondered exactly what Buridan takes these
terms to mean. Having done this we now turn our attention to the formal component
of this thesis. In what follows we will use this analysis of Buridan to provide a formal
reconstruction of his modal syllogistics.
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Modal Logic
5.1 Introduction
G. E. Hughes concluded his paper, The Modal Logic of John Buridan[20] with the fol-
lowing challenge:
A much more elaborate project still would be to try to give a Kripke-style
possible worlds semantics for Buridan’s modal system and then an axiomatic
basis for it. I think this could probably be done and would be worth doing;
but it would take us well into the twentieth century. [20][p.108]
To that end, this chapter will pursue two tasks related to this project and in doing so
will answer Hughes’ challenge. Our first aim in this chapter is to develop a Kripke-style
possible worlds semantics for the divided fragment of Buridan’s modal logic. This theory
will be grounded in Buridan’s remarks about how ampliation and supposition are used
to account for the causes of truth for various modal and non-modal propositions. This
will draw strongly from our observations about Buridan’s modal logic in the previous
chapter.
Up until this point in the literature of Buridan there have been no attempts to present
a formal semantics for Buridan’s modal logic, nor, so far as I am aware, has there been
a syntactic treatment of Buridan’s theory of the expository syllogism. Buridan’s modal
logic has been discussed in a number of places informally (e.g. [25] and [35]). In [59]
a syntactic treatment of Buridan’s modal logic was developed, the results of which will
be discussed below. The informal discussions of Buridan’s logic have raised a number of
questions about his logic. Our aim in this chapter is to prove that Buridan’s discussion
of the modal syllogism is consistent, in the sense that we can develop a semantic system
that captures all of the inferences Buridan says are valid, and refutes the ones he says
are not. With this semantics in place, we will extend the semantic theory to include
singular terms, and prove that it is complete with respect to Buridan’s views on the
expository syllogism.
As is well-known, there are a number of different approaches one can take to estab-
lishing the completeness of a logic, which have various virtues. Our aim here will be
to develop a natural deduction system for Buridan’s modal logic. Our motivation for
this system, however, will not be entirely formal in nature and some of the rules, while
inspired by Buridan’s remarks, will not be explicitly justified by Buridan’s remarks in
the Treatise on Consequences.
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In his discussion of the assertoric syllogism, Buridan grounds the syllogism not in
the dictum de omni et nullo, but in the expository syllogism. While Buridan does
not spend very much time discussing differences between how the expository syllogism
works in assertoric cases and how it works in modal cases as we have seen, he does make
use of it in the modal syllogism, and as such formalising this theory suggests a very
natural way to prove completeness for Buridan’s semantics.1 Our goal will be to provide
one representation of Buridan’s logic semantically, and the other syntactically, and to
then show that the systems are sound and complete relative to each other. This will
answer Hughes’ challenge, but also show something more. It will show that Buridan’s
two different ways of treating modal propositions in the Treatise on Consequences are
compatible with each other and show that Buridan’s modal logic can answer to the
standards of modern modal logic. In doing this, we hope this will demonstrate just how
impressive a logician Buridan was.
To that end, this chapter will start by providing an exposition of Buridan’s theory
of the modal syllogism and answer the first part of Hughes’ challenge: developing a
semantics that is able to formalise Buridan’s divided modal syllogisms as outlined in
Book Four of the Treatise on Consequences. After this we will have a brief diversion
to discuss the expository syllogism and its function within Buridan’s theory. We will
then go on to expand the semantics with singular terms and show how we can develop
a proof-theoretic account of the expository syllogism. This will be based on Buridan’s
treatment of singular terms in Books Three and Four of the Treatise. We will conclude
with a proof of completeness using a natural (although not entirely trivial) modification
of the canonical model construction.
We have already laid the foundation for our treatment of single premise inferences
in the previous chapter. We recall a few points about syllogisms before we turn to our
formal treatment of Buridan’s logic.
5.1.1 Syllogisms
In Book Three of Buridan’s Treatise on Consequences Buridan defines a syllogism in the
following way:
In the second chapter, we take it that every syllogism links the middle term
in the premises with each extreme from the conclusion, so that on account
of that linking the linking of the extremes is inferred, either affirmatively or
negatively.[51, p.115]2
From this definition Buridan makes a number of points about syllogisms. First, he
takes it that a syllogism only contains three terms; second, he observes that the middle
term does not occur in the conclusion, and third; that the two extreme terms must
occur in the conclusion.[4][p.82]. Following usual phraseology, Buridan refers to the first
1. In his treatment of the modal syllogism Buridan mentions the use of the expository syllogism in Book
Four Conclusions 6, 9, 12, 18, 19, 23, and 28.
2. e Latin can be found on page 188.
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premise in the syllogism as the major premise and the second premise as the minor
premise. From his definition it also follows that there are only four possible figures. He
remarks that,
It should be noted that the fourth figure differs from the first only in the
transposition of the premises, and that transposition does not permit infer-
ring another conclusion or prevent that inference, but only affects whether
the conclusion inferred is direct when in the first figure and indirect in the
fourth and vice versa.[51, p.116]3
When considering valid syllogisms, Buridan observes that the fourth figure only differs
from the first figure in terms of the order in which the premises occur, and if the conclu-
sion is direct or indirect. Because of this he does not bother to treat the fourth figure.[51,
p.116][4][pp.82-83] Likewise, when we define the syllogism formally and treat Buridan’s
theory we will only consider the first three figures. The treatment of the fourth figure
follows easily from our treatment of the first figure.
When it comes to the modal syllogisms that Buridan takes to be valid, there are a
number of interesting differences between Buridan and other writers on the syllogism.
Stephen Read has very helpfully summarised the syllogisms that Buridan claims are
valid. The tables, which we reproduce below, can be found in[51, pp.41-42, 44] of Read’s
translation of the Treatise. As we are not treating restricted modals in this thesis, we
will only include the cases for L, M, and Q. References to the Treatise can be found in
Read’s Tables.
L M X Q
L L L, M,
Celarent X
Darii, Ferio
L, Barbara
X, Celarent
X
L, M,
Celarent X
M M M Darii, Ferio,
M
M
X M,
Celarent X
∅ Darii, Ferio
M,
∅
Q M, Q M, Q Darii,
Ferio Q,
Q
Table 5.1: Valid First Figure Syllogisms
3. The Latin can be found on page 188.
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L M X Q
L L L,M,
Cesare X,
Camestres X
Festino L,
Camestres,
Baroco X
L,M,
Cesare X,
Camestres X
M L,M,Cesare,
Camestres
X,
∅ ∅ ∅
X M, Cesare X,
Camestres X
∅ Festino M ∅
Q M, Cesare X,
Camestres X
∅ ∅ ∅
Table 5.2: Valid Second Figure Syllogisms
L M X Q
L L,X L,M Darapti X,
Felapton X4,
Datisi X,
Ferison X
Darapti L,
Felapton L,
Datisi L,
Ferison L
L,M
M M M Darapti,
Felaption,
Datisi,
Ferison M
M
X Darapti X,
Disamis X
Darapti M,
Disamis M
Datisi M Darapti M,
Disamis M
Q M, Q Q Disamis M,
Bocardo M,
Datisi Q,
Ferison Q
Q
Table 5.3: Valid Third Figure Syllogisms
In each table, the modal in the leftmost column corresponds to the modality of the
major premise. The modal in the top row corresponds to the modality of the minor
premise. Each of the remaining boxes lists the valid syllogisms in that figure which
4. The original text reads X. However Professor Read notes in his errata that is not correct. The errata
can be found at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~slr/Buridan_errata.html.
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follow from that pair.5 If the conclusion is simply a modal, then this means that the
argument is valid for every syllogism in which the corresponding XXX syllogism is valid.
There is an interesting interpretive question as to whether or not the syllogisms Bar-
bari and Celaront should be included in the first figure tables and the corresponding
weakened modes included for the second and third figure tables. Buridan rarely talks
about Barbari or Celaront. In his formulation of the syllogism Buridan is primarily
interested in syllogistic propositions that can generate valid arguments.[5][p.308] (i.e.
Buridan’s interest is in syllogistic pairs from which some conclusion follows.) He is less
interested in which conclusions those happen to be and how many conclusions can be
drawn from a given pair. This is why Buridan does not need to include Barbari if Bar-
bara is valid or include Celaront if Celarent is valid, nor does he need to treat the fourth
figure syllogisms. However, in cases where Barbara (or Celarent) are invalid, it does not
follow that Barbari will also be invalid. In any mode for which a modal Darii syllogism
is valid (e.g. Darii LXL) it will follow that LXL Barbari is also valid, since universal
affirmative propositions entail particular ones. This does occur in a few cases, most
notably in the LXL mood. Buridan’s phrasing of the conclusions may help settle this
matter. He writes:
From a major [premise] of necessity and an assertoric minor there is always
a valid syllogism in the first figure to a particular conclusion of necessity, but
not to a universal.[51, p.151]6
Buridan’s phrasing certainly allows for Barbari and Celaront to be counted as valid
syllogisms here, since they satisfy the conditions for the conclusion. In addition, if we
are only interested in syllogistic tuples that generate productive pairs, then Barbari and
Celaront should be included, since they are both productive tuples.
Another interesting part of Buridan’s theory stems from his analysis of LXL propo-
sitions in the first figure. In the previous chapter we mentioned the so called ‘two
Barbara’s’ problem, namely the problem of explaining why, for Aristotle, LXL Barbara
is valid, while XLL Barbara is not. In his sixteenth conclusion (just cited above) Buri-
dan rejects the validity of LXL Barbara and Celarent, but affirms the validity of any
inference to a particular conclusion. This is interesting, first, because Buridan makes
no reference to Aristotle here and, second, because Buridan finds a middle way in the
debate about the validity of LXL syllogisms. In rejecting LXL Barbara and Celarent
Buridan rejects Aristotle’s theory of the modal syllogism, to some degree. But Buridan
does affirm LXL Darii, Ferio, Celaront, and Barbari as valid. By doing this, Buridan
agrees with Aristotle that L-X pairs with universal premises are productive, but they do
not produce a universal conclusion, only a particular one. The reason for these validities
goes back to the ampliation of the subject in propositions of necessity. For example, con-
sider the affirmative particular of necessity. For it to be true that ‘Some A is necessarily
B’, there needs to be something that is possibly A and is necessarily B. The validity
5. In these tables we will always list the strongest inferences that follow, and omit reference to weaker
inferences. For example, we would not make mention of Barbari if Barbara follows.
6. The Latin can be found on page 188.
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of each of these syllogisms can be seen as follows: First, as we have already remarked
(see our discussion of conclusions three and four in the previous chapter 92), we need
to assume that everything which exists is also possible. Then in each of the valid first
figure syllogisms the minor premise either entails an assertoric particular proposition or
is an assertoric particular premise. It then follows by Buridan’s fourth conclusion in
Book Two of the Treatise on Consequences, that this entails a proposition of possibility.
In which case, the validity will follow using either LML Darii or Ferio (the validity of
which establishes in Bk. 4 Con. 4).
5.2 Formal Theory
In this section our aim will be to present a formal reconstruction of Buridan’s divided
modal syllogism as contained in the Treatise on Consequence.7
5.2.1 Preliminaries and Semantics
Buridan Language. A Buridan Language
L = ⟨CONS,PRED,V AR,a, e, i, o,L,M,Q, Q¯⟩ where:
CONS is a countable set of singular terms/objects.8
PRED is a countable set of (monadic) predicates.9
Well-Formed Formulae. If A,B ∈ PRED then:
AaB, AeB, AiB, AoB are well-formed.
If A ×B is a well-formed formula where × is one of a,e,i, or o then:∇A ×B is a well-formed formula where ∇ is one of L,M ,Q,Q¯, or -.10
Nothing else is a well-formed formula.
A formula is said to be categorical if it is any of the well-formed formulae above.
In what follows we will introduce another set of formulae which will be called singular
formulae and will make use of CONS. We include the full language here to avoid having
to expand the language later in this chapter. A formula is said be modal if it contains
the symbol L, M , Q, or Q¯. In what follows, we will often contract ‘well-formed formulae’
and speak only of formulae. A brief comment on the notation conventions should be
made here. As Buridan remarks, and as will be clear from our semantic definitions
below, divided modal propositions are different from both composite propositions (which
Buridan treats but will not be treated in this thesis) and from the usual semantics given
7. For a similar treatment of modal propositions by other medieval logicians see chapters 4 and 5 of [62].
8. In what follows we will use terms from the beginning of the alphabet for objects and terms from the
end of the alphabet for variables or worlds.
9. To avoid confusion we will not include Q or R among our predicates.
10. To avoid ambiguity between divided and compounded senses of the modality, we will superscript the
modal operation over the copula. Following standard convention, we will sometimes write X instead
of - for the assertoric proposition.
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in modern logic for the operation ◻. As such, and to help avoid confusing divided modal
propositions with composite ones, we avoid the use of the notation ◻, ◇, and ∇, which
are often (thought not exclusively) used in the modern literature preferring L, M , Q,
and Q¯, which are used less frequently, and are also common in the historical literature
about modal syllogisms.
Buridan Modal Model. A Buridan Modal Model is a tuple:
M = ⟨D,W,R,O, v⟩ such that:
D and W are non-empty sets. D is the domain of objects and W is a set of worlds.
R ⊆W 2.
O ∶W → P(D) s.t. O(w) ⊆D
v ∶W × PRED → P(D)
We require that R be an equivalence relationship.
Semantic Abbreviations. Let P be a term. Using the semantics we can define the
following operations:
V (w,P ) = O(w) ∩ v(w,P )
V (w,¬P ) =D ∖ (O(w) ∩ v(w,P ))
Informally, we can think of V , (and M and L; see below) as giving the supposition or
extension of a particular term. V (w,P ) returns the extension of the predicate for the
objects that exist at w. V (w,¬P ) gives the anti-extension of P at w. It should be noted
that an object will fall into the anti-extension at a world w if it either fails to exist at w
or if it is not in the valuation of P at w. It is for this reason that we use the notation ¬
as it is suggestive of the negation operation in a more familiar setting.
Moving into the modal context, we will want to consider situations where an object,
say d can fall under a predicate (say P ) and cases where an object d does not fall under
a predicate. As such we will need to use both V (w,P ) and V (w,¬P ) in our definitions
of modal operations. As such, we will abuse notation slightly and write, e.g. V (w,K)
with the understanding that K ranges over terms and terms with ¬ in front of them. To
that end we define our modal operations as follows:
M(w,K) = {d ∈D ∶ there is some z s.t wRz and d ∈ V (z,K)}
L(w,K) = {d ∈D ∶ for all z if wRz then d ∈ V (z,K)}11
11. If one finds the use of K unclear, it may be helpful to alternatively think of these as four operations
defined as follows:
M(w,P ) = {d ∈D ∶ there is some z s.t wRz and d ∈ V (z,P )}
M(w,¬P ) = {d ∈D ∶ there is some z s.t wRz and d ∈ V (z,¬P )}
L(w,P ) = {d ∈D ∶ for all z if wRz then d ∈ V (z,P )}
L(w,¬P ) = {d ∈D ∶ for all z if wRz then d ∈ V (z,¬P )}
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When we move to consider the operations M(w,K) and L(w,K), these are being
used to encode the set of objects that are possible relative to a world and are necessary
relative to a world. The basic idea is that an object (d) is possibly K relative to a world
(w) if there is some world v such that wRv and the object d is K at w. From this it
should be clear that, as in the usual semantics for modal logic, the operation R is used
to encode which worlds are accessible from a given world and which worlds are not. In
practice, since we take R to be an equivalence relationship, we can dispense with R in
our formulations of many of these principles. We retain mention of R since we will prove
some results that do not depend on what kind of relationship R is.
At this point we should mention two important caveats. As may have been clear from a
moments reflection on the language in which we are working in, we do not have the ability
to iterate modalities in our well-formed formulae. As such, our language is incapable of
distinguishing between T and stronger modal systems where the characteristic formulae
involve iterative modal operations (such as 4, 5, or B, to give three familiar examples).
As such, the choice to work with a universal accessibility relation is less interesting then
it otherwise might be. In some senses, this is, however, as it should be. As we shall see,
none of Buridan’s conclusions require iterated modalities. In fact, as Read points out in
his review of Thom’s Medieval Modal Systems:
But in fact, this appeal to theses of K4 is unnecessary and misleading. Ax-
ioms 1.12 – 1.15 are only ever used [144, 152– 5, 163–4, 180–4] in conjunction
with 1.11 (the characteristic T-thesis if ◻p then p), but in each case the ap-
peal to T + 4 is unnecessary (for in each case, T simply cancels the L which
4 preserves). . . What little modal labour there is, is carried out by 1.7 – 1.8
(matching the T-theses CLpp and CpMp) and the revised 1.12 – 1.15 (match-
ing the K-theses CLpqCLpLq and CLpqCMpMq–they are also all valid in
S2). [50, p.612]
Buridan’s modal logic is one of the logics treated there, and in our discussion of Buridan’s
modal logic in the previous chapter at no point did we observe Buridan making use of
iterative modal operations. As such, the choice to work with a universal accessibility
relation simplifies some of the formal details.
With this in place, we can simplify the various collections we defined above as follows:
M(w,K) = {d ∈D ∶ there is some z such that d ∈ V (z,K)}
L(w,K) = {d ∈D ∶ for all z d ∈ V (z,K)}12
12. Again, if one finds the use of K unclear, the four operations are defined as follows:
M(w,P ) = {d ∈D ∶ there is some z such that d ∈ V (z,P )}
M(w,¬P ) = {d ∈D ∶ there is some z such that d ∈ V (z,¬P )}
L(w,P ) = {d ∈D ∶ for all z d ∈ V (z,P )}
L(w,¬P ) = {d ∈D ∶ for all z d ∈ V (z,¬P )}
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Using these operations we can define the truth for categorical propositions.
Assertoric Categorical Propositions.
M,w ⊧ AaB if and only if V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B) and V (w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ AeB if and only if V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ AiB if and only if V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ AoB if and only if V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B) or V (w,A) = ∅
Modal Categorical Propositions.
M,w ⊧ A La B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Le B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Li B if and only if M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Lo B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈M(w,B) or M(w,A) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Ma B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Me B if and only if M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Mi B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Mo B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B) or M(w,A) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qa B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qe B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Qa B
M,w ⊧ A Qi B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qo B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Qi B
M,w ⊧ A Q¯a B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Q¯e B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Q¯a B
M,w ⊧ A Q¯i B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) or M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Q¯o B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Q¯i B
The Q¯ notation is used to indicate that the negation occurs in front of the modal operator
instead of after it.
As we have already observed Buridan tells us that modal propositions ampliate their
subject to supposit for what is or can be the case. Because R is universal, we do not
need to mention the union M(w,P ) ∪ V (w,P ). It can be simplified to M(w,P ). The
reason for this is that since R is reflexive (which follows from R being universal), it is
easy to show that V (w,A) ⊆M(w,A). This is proven on 211.
5.2.2 Single Premise Inferences
Just as it is possible to visualize Aristotle’s assertoric propositions as a diagram with four
points, it is possible to envision Buridan’s modal propositions in diagrammatic form. If
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M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B), M(w,A) ≠ ∅
(La)
M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
(Ma)
M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅
(Li)
M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅
(Mi)
M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) = ∅
M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) = ∅
M(w,A) ⊈M(w,B) or M(w,A) = ∅
M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B) or M(w,A) = ∅
(Le)
(Me)
(Lo)
(Mo)
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Figure 5.1: Buridan’s Modal Octagon of Opposition
we limit ourselves to possibility and necessity, we obtain an octagon of opposition.13
Formally, the octagon gives rise to 24 distinct inferences. The proofs of these proper-
ties are all obvious semantic consequences of the system. We present two examples.
1. A
L
a B contradicts A
M
o B
2. A
L
a B is a contrary of A
M
e B
Proof of 1: Normally two propositions are said to be contradictory if the truth of
one entails the falsehood of the other and vice versa. In this context we say that two
well-formed formulae are said to be contradictory if, in every model the truth of one of
the formulae entails the falsity of the other, and the falsity of the one entails the truth
of the other.
Proof. Assume that M,w ⊧ A La B. Then M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅. We
claim that M,w ⊭ A Mo B. If this were not so, then either M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B) or
M(w,A) = ∅ is true. However, it is clear that both of these contradict our assumptions
that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅. The other direction is similar.
13. Adding contingency and negated contingency produces a hexadecagon of opposition. Figure 1 (seen
below) is due to Stephen Read and can be found in his paper Non-Contingency Syllogisms in Buridan’s
Treatise on Consequences [52, p.450].
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Proof of 2: Normally two propositions are said to be contrary if they cannot both be
true, but they can both be false. In this case, we interpret this in the following way:
Two well-formed formulae are said to be contrary if there are no models in which both of
the formulae are true, but there is a model where they are both false. Subcontraries are
treated in a similar way. Two well-formed formulae are said to be subcontrary if there
is a model where both formulae are true, but there is no model where both formulae are
false.
To see that A
L
a B and A
M
e B cannot both be true:
Proof. Assume that 1) M,w ⊧ A La B and 2) M,w ⊧ A Me B. From 1) we have M(w,A) ⊆
L(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅. From 2) we have M(w,A)∩L(w,B) = ∅. Since M(w,A) ≠ ∅
we know that there is some d ∈ M(w,A). From 1) it follows that d ∈ L(w,B) and so
M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅, contradicting 2).
To see that they can both be false consider the following model:
D = {a, b} W = {w1} R =W 2 O(w1) =D
a ∈ v(w1,A) a ∈ v(w1,B) b ∈ v(w1,A)
Since a ∈ v(w1,A) and a ∈ v(w1,B) we have a ∈ M(w1,A) and a ∈ L(w1,B). Hence
M,w1 ⊭ A Me B. Likewise, b ∈ v(w1,A) and b ∉ v(w1,B), we have a ∈ M(w1,A) and
a ∉ L(w1,B), from which it follows that M,w1 ⊭ A La B.
The results of conclusions three through eight in Book Two of the Treatise on Con-
sequences are summarised in Table 4. As in the case of the modal octagon, the proofs
and construction of the relevant countermodels are straightforward. The proofs of the
contradictories can be found on page 239.
5.3 Buridan’s Syllogistic Theory
As we have already seen, according to Buridan a syllogism is an inference from two
premises to a single conclusion composed of three distinct terms. All three propositions
in a syllogism must be categorical. The terms in a syllogism can be arranged in the
following ways:
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
B-A A-B B-A A-B
C-B C-B B-C B-C
C-A C-A C-A C-A
Formally, we define a syllogism, S, to be a triple ⟨M,m,C⟩ such that:
1. M , m, and C are all categorical formulae;
2. M , m, and C have exactly three terms;
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Conclusion Inferences
Conclusion
Three
If M,w ⊧ A Le B then M,w ⊧ AeB
M,w ⊧ A La B does not entail M,w ⊧ AaB
M,w ⊧ A Li B does not entail M,w ⊧ AiB
M,w ⊧ A Lo B does not entafil M,w ⊧ AoB
No assertoric formula entails an L formula.
Conclusion
Four
M,w ⊧ AiB entails M,w ⊧ A Mi B
M,w ⊧ AaB entails M,w ⊧ A Mi B
M,w ⊧ AaB does not entail A Ma B
M,w ⊧ AeB does not entail M,w ⊧ A Me B
M,w ⊧ AoB does not entail M,w ⊧ A Mo B
No M formulae entails an assertoric formulae
Conclusion
Five
M,w ⊧ A Mi B if and only if M,w ⊧ B Mi A
If M,w ⊧ A Ma B then M,w ⊧ B Mi A
No other conversions are valid with M formulae.
Conclusion
Six
if M,w ⊧ A Le B then M,w ⊧ B Le A
if M,w ⊧ A Le B then M,w ⊧ B Lo A
No other conversions are valid with L formulae.
Conclusion
Seven
If M,w ⊧ A Qa B then M,w ⊧ A Qe B
If M,w ⊧ A Qi B then M,w ⊧ A Qo B
If M,w ⊧ A Qa B then M,w ⊭ A Q¯a B and M,w ⊭ A Q¯e B
if M,w ⊧ A Qi B then M,w ⊭ A Q¯i B and M,w ⊭ A Q¯o B
Conclusion
Eight
M,w ⊧ A Qe B does not entail M,w ⊧ B Qe A
M,w ⊧ A Qo B does not entail M,w ⊧ B Qo A
M,w ⊧ A Qa B does not entail M,w ⊧ B Qa A
M,w ⊧ A Qi B does not entail M,w ⊧ B Qi A
M,w ⊧ A Qa B entails M,w ⊧ B Mi A
M,w ⊧ A Qi B entails M,w ⊧ B Mi A
Table 5.4: Summary of Conclusions Three through Eight of Book Two of the Treatise
on Consequences
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3. The predicate of C occurs in M ;
4. The subject of C occurs in m;
5. M and m share a common term that does not occur in C.14
Syllogistic Validity. A syllogism S is valid when the following obtains:
For all Buridan Modal Models M and all worlds w ∈W if M,w ⊧M and M,w ⊧m then
M,w ⊧ C.
We will denote this by ⊧ S.
There are two strategies that can be adopted in showing the correctness of Buridan’s
system. One could simply check that all of the syllogisms that Buridan claims to be valid
are valid in our semantics. They are, but this process is tedious. Instead the process
can be streamlined by proving a number of first figure syllogisms and then using the
inferences in Book Two and the Modal Octagon to reduce the second and third figure
syllogisms to the first figure. The first figure syllogisms are justified by appeals to the
dictum de omni et nullo or other relevant principles and the remaining syllogisms are
then reduced to the first figure. To perform the reduction we will need the following two
principles:
Interchange: Let S = ⟨M,m,C⟩ and S′ = ⟨M ′,m′,C ′⟩ be two syllogisms such that
M =m′, M ′ =m, and C = C ′ then ⊧ S if and only if ⊧ S′.
The proof is trivial.
Proof per impossibile [PPI]:
Formally, let S = ⟨M,m,C⟩ and S′ = ⟨M ′,m′,C ′⟩ be two syllogisms such that C ′ is the
contradictory of m, m′ is the contradictory of C and M =M ′, then we claim that ⊧ S if
and only if ⊧ S′.
Proof. We prove the left to right direction. The other direction is similar. Take an
arbitrary model N and an arbitrary world, wn ∈ N and assume that N,wn ⊭ S′. We
show that N,wn ⊭ S
Since N,wn ⊭ S′ it follows by the definition of a valid syllogism that N,wn ⊧ M ′
and N,wn ⊧ m′ but that N,wn ⊭ C ′. Per our assumption, M = M ′ so N,wn ⊧ M .
Since N,wn ⊭ C ′ and every categorical proposition has a contradictory, it follows by
the definition of contradictory that N,wn satisfies the contradictory of C
′. Per our
assumption, this is m. Hence N,wn ⊧ m. Analogously since N,wn ⊧ m′ it follows that
N,wn ⊭ C. Hence N,wn ⊧ M and N,wn ⊧ m but N,wn ⊭ C. Hence N,wn ⊭ S which
suffices to prove the claim.
14. This definition is standard and can be found in [65].
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Informally what PPI tells us is that if we take a valid syllogism and rearrange it so that
the contradictory of the minor premise is the conclusion and the contradictory of the
original conclusion is the minor premise, then the resulting syllogism is also valid. Using
this we can reduce the validity problem of the third figure to the second, and the second
figure to the first.
For example, consider the case of MLL Camestres. By PPI we need to show that there
is a valid syllogism S = ⟨M,m,C⟩ such that if we replace m with the contradictory of
C, and we replace C with the contradictory of m, we obtain Camestres MLL. Clearly,
the syllogism in question is MMM Darii, which we can show to be valid. Hence MLL
Camestres is also valid.
The proof that our semantics correctly track the validities that Buridan gives in the
Treatise on Consequences is a fairly long and somewhat tedious exercise in checking syl-
logistic validities and invalidities. For reasons of space, this result is proven in Appendix
3. We illustrate some of the proofs and countermodels below.
Proof of LML Darii:
Proof. Assume that 1) M,w ⊧ B La C and that 2) M,w ⊧ A Mi B. It follows that
M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C) and M(w,B) ≠ ∅. From 2 it follows that M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅.
Since M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) is non-empty, let e be an object such that e ∈ M(w,A) and
e ∈M(w,B). From 1) it follows that e ∈ L(w,C) and so M(w,A)∩L(w,C) = ∅. Hence,
M,w ⊧ A Li C.
Countermodel for LXL Barbara:
W={w,x} D={a,b}
O(w1) = O(w2) =D R =W 2
v(w1,A) = v(w1,B) = (w1,C) = {a}
v(w2,A) = {a} v(w2,C) = {a, b}
By construction we have M(w1,B) = {a} (since a ∈ O(w1), a ∈ v(w1,B), and wRw)
and so M(w1,B) is non-empty. M(w1,B) ⊆ L(w1,C) because, in the case of a, a ∈
V (w1,C) and a ∈ V (w2,C) (and so a ∈ L(w1,C))) while in the case of b, b ∉M(w1,B).
Hence,M,w1 ⊧ B La C. To see that M,w1 ⊧ A a B, observe that a ∈ V (w1,A) and
a ∈ V (w1,B), while b ∉ V (w1,A). Hence, V (w1,A) ⊆ V (w1,B). Since a ∈ V (w1,A) we
have V (w1,A) ≠ ∅. However, M,w1 ⊭ A La C since b ∈M(w1,A) and b ∉ L(w1,C), since
b ∉ V (w2,A).
In his book Medieval Modal Systems, Paul Thom claims that all of the first figure
XXM syllogisms are valid.[59][p.178 Thm 9.10a] Only Darii and Ferio are. Consider the
following countermodel for XXM Barbara:
W = {w1,w2} D = {a, b}
O(w1) = O(w2) =D R =W 2
a ∈ v(w1,B) a ∈ v(w1,C)
a ∈ v(w1,A) b ∈ v(w2,C)
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Call this model J. Since a ∈ V (w1,C), a ∈ V (w1,B), and a ∈ V (w1,A) and b ∉ V (w1,B),
it follows that J,w1 ⊧ BaC and J,w1 ⊧ AaB. However, per construction of the model
b ∉M(w1,A), since b ∉ V (w1,A) and b ∉ V (w2,A) and b ∈M(w1,C). Thus M(w1,A) ⊈
M(w1,C) and so J,w1 ⊭ A Ma C.
The reason that Thom gives for this is that XLX Baroco is valid. Unfortunately, it
is not. The proof in the book is flawed and rests on the invalid inference from ‘No B is
A’, it follows that ‘No B is necessarily A’.[59][p.177] To see that the syllogism is invalid,
consider the following countermodel:
W = {w1,w2} D = {a, b} O(w1)D R =W 2
a ∈ v(w1,A) a ∈ v(w1,B) a ∈ v(w1,C) b ∈ v(w2,C)
M,w1 ⊧ A a B since both a ∈ V (w1,B) and b ∉ V (w1,A); likewise M,w1 ⊧ C Lo B
since b ∈ V (w2,C) and b ∉ V (w2,B) and b ∉ V (w1,B). However, M,w ⊧ CaA since
b ∉ V (w,C) while a ∈ V (w,C) and a ∈ V (w,A). Hence M,w ⊭ CoA.
One may, at this point, be tempted to suggest that this follows because of Conclusion
17 in Book Four on the Treatise on Consequences. Here Buridan writes:
From a negative major [premise] of necessity and an assertoric minor there
is always a valid syllogism in the second figure to a particular conclusion of
necessity, but not to a universal; but if the major is affirmative of necessity
or assertoric, there is no valid syllogism to a conclusion of necessity, but it is
valid to an assertoric conclusion.[51, p.152]15
However, as is clear from what Buridan has written, he is claiming that the LXX
syllogisms are productive. This should not be taken to suggest that the XLX syllogisms
are valid. Buridan is quite clear here that he is referring to a major of necessity and an
assertoric minor.
Hence when we read on in Conclusion 17 and come to the following passage:
But that the said moods are valid to an assertoric conclusion is clear, for
from a [premise] of necessity there always follows an assertoric except in the
case where it is true only for those which can be. But this case does not
prevent the truth of a negative assertoric conclusion.[51, p.152]16
The referent of ‘the said moods’ should be seen as referring back to the LXX syllogisms,
not the XLX ones as is noted by Read in footnote 16.[51, p.176 fn16]
5.4 The Expository Syllogism
The inferential process called Ekthesis or ‘setting out’ occupies an unusual place in the
history of logic. The inference was used by Aristotle to provide alternative deductions
15. The Latin can be found on page 188.
16. The Latin can be found on page 188.
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of various third figure syllogisms in the Prior Analytics. For example, Aristotle uses the
technique when proving Darapti:
When both P and R belong to every S, it results of necessity that P will
belong to some R. For since the positive premise converts, S will belong to
some R; consequently, since P belongs to every S and S to some R, it is
necessary for P to belong to some R (for a deduction through the first figure
comes about). It is also possible to carry out the demonstration through
an impossibility or through the setting-out (ekthesis). For if both terms
belong to every S, then if some one of the S’s is chosen (for instance N),
then both P and R will belong to this; consequently, P will belong to some
R.[55][p.9,28a18 − 25]
The key move that is made here, which has raised questions for interpreters afterwards,
is ‘what exactly is this term N that has been selected?’ If it is another general term,
then the argument looks circular, but if not, then what kind of term is it?17 When the
medievals took up the study of the Prior Analytics, they chose to read the term selected
here as a singular term, at least in the assertoric case. They also simplified the inference
somewhat and referred to it as the expository syllogism.
Expository syllogisms differ from categorical syllogisms in at least two important ways:
First, unlike in the categorical syllogism, the middle term in an expository syllogism
needs to be a singular term, where a singular term is a term that refers to a particular
object. For example, the following is a expository syllogism:
Socrates is wise
(The same) Socrates is human
Therefore Something wise is a human.
Second, when we turn to the writings of Buridan, the expository syllogism is not justified
by means of the dictum de omni et nullo. Instead, Buridan provides two rules that justify
such syllogisms. The first rule states that
Whatever are the same as one and the same are the same as each other.[51,
pp.116-117] 18
It is important to stress that when Buridan speaks of identity here, he does not mean
that the terms A and B are identical, but that the singular terms in each of the premises
of the syllogism refer to the same object.19
Buridan distinguishes two kinds of expository syllogisms: affirmative and negative.
As an example of each, consider the following:
17. For references and a more complete discussion of how to understand Ekthesis see the discussion in
e.g.[55],[38]
18. The Latin can be found on page 188. The principle comes from Aristotle. See Sophistical Refutations
[168b28-29]
19. Buridan discusses this in the fifth chapter of the first book of his Treatise on Consequences[51, pp.69-
71][4, p.25].
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1) This C is an B and the same C is a A, so some B is A
2) This C is an B and the same C is not A so not every B is A[51, pp.116-117][4][pp.84-
85]
Obviously, the principle cited above justifies 1). However, the principle is not sufficient
to justify 2). Buridan notices this and uses a different principle to justify 2), namely
that:
Two things are not the same as each other if one is the same as something
and the other is not[51, p.117].20
As in the case of the affirmative rule used above, the principle is used to show that a
negative particular proposition is true.21 In what follows, I will refer to the first rule as
the ‘rule of sameness’ and the second as the ‘rule of difference.’
In both cases, these rules explain how singular terms relate to categorical propositions.
Consider one of Buridan’s examples:
The first part is clear by an expository syllogism. For if B can be A, then
designate such a B as C. Then this C is or can be B and the same thing can
be A; so that which can be A is or can be B.22
There are two inferences which should be noted. The first inference is the move from
an affirmative particular categorical proposition to a singular term which falls under
both terms. We might think of this as a form of existential instantiation. If one has
shown that ‘Some B can be A’, then this inference allows for a (new) singular term to
be selected which is possibly B and possibly A.
The second inference, namely the move from ‘This C is possibly B’ and ‘The same C
can be A’ to ‘Some B can be A’, is justified by the rule of sameness. In this context, the
use of the words ‘this’ and ‘this same’ are important in designating the singular term.
It is the presence of these words that Buridan uses to avoid context shifts which could
invalidate the principle.23 Since the C in ‘This C is possibly B’ and the C in ‘This same
C is possibly A’ are the same, we may use the principle to infer that ‘possibly B’ and
‘possibly A’ supposit for the same thing, and so infer that some B is possibly A.
For what comes later, it is helpful to observe that the expository syllogism, in some
ways, looks very similar to a kind of existential elimination. The idea is that we start
20. The Latin can be found on page 188.
21. It should be observed that these two principles are not Buridan’s formulation of the dictum de omni
et nullo but are separate principles. Buridan formulates the dictum de omni et nullo as “dici de omni
applies when nothing is taken under the subject of which the predicate is not predicated. . .Dici de
nullo applies when nothing is taken under the subject of which the predicate is not denied.”[5][p.306]
22. The Latin can be found on page 189.
23. It is important to note that if the term ‘this same’ does not occur, then we can create counterexamples
to Buridan’s principle. For example, ‘This person is running’ said pointing to one person ‘This person
is not running’ said pointing to another person, therefore ‘Something is running that is not running’,
which is impossible.
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from two singular terms, ‘This C is B’ and ‘The same C is A’ and then we remove
the singular term C to conclude that ‘Some B is A’. This similarity will be helpful for
thinking about formal reconstructions of Buridan’s theory.
There is an interesting metaphysical question which we will raise only to set aside.
Buridan does not limit himself to only looking at singular terms that actually do or do
not fall under a particular term. He also considers objects that can, or must, or only
contingently fall under a particular term. On Buridan’s reading of modal propositions,
‘Some B can be A’ is true if something can be B (even if it currently is not or does not
exist), that can also be A.[22] Formally, this raises the question of exactly what do the
categorical operators and the copulae range over? Do they range over names of terms
and names of singular objects? If they do not, what exactly would the nature of these
possible objects be and how would this fit with Buridan’s commitment to nominalism?
With our understanding of the expository syllogism in place, we now turn to see how
Buridan used the theory to analyse the assertoric and modal syllogism. Unlike Aristotle
and many medieval authors, Buridan does not ground the assertoric syllogism in the
dictum de omni et nullo. Instead, Buridan observes that:
Affirmative syllogisms hold in virtue of the principle, ‘Whatever are the same
as one and the same are the same as each other’. Hence, from the fact that
the extremes are said in the premises to be the same as the one middle it is
concluded in the conclusion that they are the same as each other. However,
negative syllogisms hold by another principle, ‘Two things are not the same
as each other if one is the same as something and the other is not’.24
Buridan’s claim is that all of the syllogisms where the conclusion is affirmative are
justified by the principle of sameness while those which are negative are justified by the
principle of difference. The other important difference about Buridan’s analysis is that,
unlike Aristotle, he starts in the third figure, and then reduces the other figures to the
third. He writes:
It is obvious that expository syllogisms are self-evident, especially in the third
figure; and all six modes of the third figure are easily proved by reducing them
to expository syllogisms.25 [5][p.324]
In each case, this is done by using the affirmative term to select a particular object
which instantiates the required term, and then use one of the two principles to derive
the desired proposition. Buridan proves Darapti as follows:
From the premises of this syllogism it follows that some C is A and the
same C is B, whence it is inferred, by an expository syllogism, that some
24. The Latin can be found on page 189.
25. The Latin can be found on page 189.
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B is A; since, therefore, this conclusion follows from the premises of the
expository syllogism, and those premises followed from the premises of the
original syllogism, it follows that the conclusion validly followed from the
premises of the original syllogism, by the rule ‘whatever follows from the
consequent follows from the antecedent.’[5][p.324]
What is interesting here is how exactly Buridan obtains the propositions ‘Some C is
A’ and ‘The same C is B’. To obtain one of these propositions is simple. First, we use
subalternation to infer that ‘Some B is C’ from ‘Every B is C’ and then convert ‘Some
B is C’ to ‘Some C is B’. Now, in order to get a singular term, we need to apply an
exposition principle that allows us to select one of the singular terms that falls under
C. This move is similar to a kind of existential introduction, in that we are picking an
object that is an instance of the truth of ‘Some C is B’.
What is slightly unclear is that Buridan seems to again use C for the singular term
that he has selected. We will use the term D to avoid confusion. So we use an exposition
principle to conclude that this D (which is a C) is B. From this point there are two
ways that Buridan’s reasoning could go. One way would be to use the assumption that
‘Every B is A’, combined with ‘This D is B’ to infer that ‘The same D is A’. If we use
the dictum de omni, the inference would follow. But then it seems that the third figure
syllogisms require the dictum de omni in addition to the rules for expository syllogism,
which is not what Buridan claims. The other way would be to take this as a given rule,
i.e. if you have shown that ‘Every B is A’ and you have shown ‘This D is B’ you may
conclude ‘The same D is A’. This reading ties in naturally with Buridan’s discussion of
the causes of truth for a proposition. He writes:
Let me say first, that every proposition with an undistributed general term,
or one similar in form to it, has or can have more causes of truth than
a proposition with the same general term distributed, other things being
equal. . . E.g., if I say ‘A human is running’, this would be true if only Socrates
were running, and if only Plato were, and so on, and no less if they all were.
But if the term is distributed, it can only have one cause of truth on account
of that term, namely, that it holds for all of them, not only for one or two.[51,
p.65]26
Buridan’s point here is that while ‘A human is running’ only requires one individual
to be both a human and running for the proposition to be true, the proposition ‘Every
human is running’ requires that each individual who is a human also be running. Hence,
if ‘Every human is running’ is true, then if Socrates is a human, it follows that he is
running. This licences the move from ‘This D is B’ and ‘Every B is A’ to the ‘This same
D is A’, since whatever is B is also A, and we have already shown that ‘This D is B’,
so it must also be A. This will also provide an alternative way of proving the validity of
the dictum de omni et nullo.
26. The Latin can be found on page 189.
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One final point about Buridan’s theory concerns the presence of negative propositions.
Buridan, like many medieval authors, allows his theory to contain empty terms, i.e. terms
where there are no objects that do fall or can fall under the term. In the case of negative
particular propositions, for example, ‘Not every A is B’, this requires there be two ways
for the proposition to be true.27 First, there could be some object which is A, but is not
B. The other way this proposition could be true is if there are no A’s. This is important,
because the move from ‘Not every A is B’ to ‘This C is A’ and ‘This same C is not B’
is invalid if we have not already shown that A is non-empty.
It is important to note that while Buridan uses the expository syllogism within his
modal logic, he spends very little time describing what has changed when one moves to
a modal framework. In fact, his mention of the expository syllogism is somewhat terse.
For example, when stating the proof of the 18th conclusion, he simply writes
In the third figure a syllogism is always valid to a conclusion of necessity
from a universal major of necessity and an assertoric minor. . . The first part
of the conclusion would be evident in all moods by expository syllogisms.[51,
p.152]28
Likewise, within the rest of the Treatise on Consequences, when Buridan uses the
expository syllogism to discuss modal propositions, he simply remarks that φ can be
shown by an expository syllogism, or something similar.29 Likewise, Buridan says noth-
ing about the use of expository syllogisms in his treatment of the modal syllogism in the
Summulae. In terms of reconstructing Buridan’s thoughts on this matter, this leaves us
with scant information to go on, except that we should be able to make modal singular
terms (e.g. ‘This D can be A’, ‘The same D is necessarily B’ etc.) fit into the same mold
as non-modal terms.
What we then need to formalise are the following:
1. The syllogistic framework that Buridan is working in.
2. The principles of sameness and difference.
3. The instantiation principles.
4. Rules that capture the subaltern, contrary and contradictory relationships between
the various categorical and modal propositions.
It is to this formalisation that we now turn.
27. We use the formulation ‘Not every A is B’ to stress that the particular negative proposition is the
contradictory of the universal affirmative proposition and because this is closer to Aristotle’s formu-
lation. It should be observed that for the universal affirmative, we need to assume that there is some
term that falls under the subject.
28. The Latin can be found on page 189.
29. For example, see Book Four Conclusions 6,9, 19, and 23.
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In order to formalise the expository syllogism we will need to expand both our language
and the semantics of the system. On the side of the language, we will need to expand the
language to allow for formulae that will stand in for singular propositions and we will
need to add a conjunction operation. This is added merely as a technical convenience to
simplify some of the details of the completeness proof (in particular the construction of
the canonical models). On the side of the semantics, we will need to expand the models
so as to have the correct semantic clauses to make a completeness proof with singular
elements possible. We also have to formalise the expository syllogism. We will start
with the language changes.
Buridan Language. Let L = ⟨CONS,PRED,a, e, i, o,L,M,Q, Q¯,∧⟩ where:
CONS and PRED are disjoint, countable sets.
We will use CONS for singular terms and will denote them with underlined lowercase
letters (to avoid confusion with the categorical operations). We will use PRED for cate-
gorical terms, and will denote them with capital letters. To avoid confusion we will avoid
using the letters L, M, Q, R, and V for terms.
Well-Formed Formulae. Let A,B ∈ PRED and d ∈ CONS be well-formed formulae
then:
AaB, AeB, AiB, AoB, daB, deB are well-formed.
If A ×B is a well-formed formula where × is one of a, e, i, or o then:∇A ×B is a well-formed formula where ∇ is one of L,M,Q,Q¯, or -.
if daB is well-formed, then so is ∇daB.
if deB is well-formed, then so is ∇deB.
if φ and ψ are both well-formed formulae then φ ∧ ψ is well-formed.
Nothing else is a well-formed formula.
The operations a,e, i and o should be understood as before. A well-formed formula is
categorical if it is only formed from elements of PRED. If it contains an element from
CONS it is said to be singular.
5.5.1 Semantics
In the case of the semantics, we need to add clauses that give truth conditions for singular
propositions. To that end, we add a new function to our semantics that assigns elements
CONS to elements of the domain. For simplicity, we will assume that this function is
surjective. This is done as follows:
Buridan Modal Model (Expanded). A Buridan Modal ModSpruyt’s el is a tuple:
M = ⟨D,W,R,O, c, v⟩ such that:
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D and W are non-empty sets. D is the domain of objects and W is a set of worlds.
R ⊆W 2 which is an equivalence relationship.
O ∶W → P(D).
c ∶ CONS →D such that c is surjective.
v ∶W × PRED → P(D).
With this in place, all that we need to add are clauses that deal with the relationship
between particular objects and the terms that fall under them as well as clauses for ∧.
To that end, we add the following clauses to our theory:
New Propositions.
M,w ⊧ faA if and only if c(f) ∈ V (w,A)
M,w ⊧ feA if and only if c(f) ∉ V (w,A)
M,w ⊧ f La A if and only if c(f) ∈ L(w,A)
M,w ⊧ f Me A if and only if c(f) ∉ L(w,A)
M,w ⊧ f Ma A if and only if c(f) ∈M(w,A)
M,w ⊧ f Le A if and only if c(f) ∉M(w,A)
M,w ⊧ f Qa A if and only if c(f) ∈M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A)
M,w ⊧ f Qe A if and only if M,w ⊧ f Qa A
M,w ⊧ f Q¯a A if and only if c(f) ∈ L(w,A) ∪L(w,¬A)
M,w ⊧ f Q¯e A if and only if M,w ⊧ f Q¯a A
M,w ⊧ φ ∧ ψ if and only if M,w ⊧ φ and M,w ⊧ ψ
When we write well-formed formulae, we will underline singular terms so that they
stand out (and, in principle, to distinguish the singular term a from the operation that
denotes universal affirmative propositions i.e. the a in AaB. However in practice we will
simply avoid writing formulae such as aaA.)
As in the case of categorical propositions, the singular contingency and non-contingency
propositions can be reduced to combinations of the L and M operations along with meta-
level negation. The other feature of these propositions that should be observed is that
in singular propositions
L
a contradicts
L
e ,
M
a contradicts
M
e , and
Q
a contradicts
Q¯
e .
This is intended to directly parallel the cases in categorical propositions. In the context
of modern modal logic, these can be thought of as modal operations where the negation
occurs after the modal. E.g. d
L
e A can be thought of as saying that d is possibly not A.
We will remind the reader of this on occasion, to avoid confusion.
5.5.2 Proof Theory
As we have just remarked above, the principles of the expository syllogism function in
a way that is similar to existential instantiation. Recall that in usual first-order logic,
existential instantiation is the rule:
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From ∃xφ infer φ[x/a]
Where [x/a] is the result of uniformly replacing all of the occurrences of x with a and
the term a is appropriately restricted so as to be a new term in the proof.
The challenge with existential instantiation both in our framework and in usual first-
order logic, is that:
Proofs in a system employing this latter rule [existential instantiation] do
not obey the principle that each line of a proof is a semantic consequence of
all the assumptions that are ‘active’ at that point in the proof. For, even if∃xFx were semantically implied by whatever active assumptions there are,
it is not true that Fy will be implied by those same assumptions, since the
rule’s restriction on variables requires that y be new.[45, p.12]
This is a challenge for formulating our completeness proof and for developing our
treatment of Buridan’s logic. As such, we will develop the idea of the expository syllogism
in a way that avoids these sorts of problems. In what follows, we will treat the expository
syllogism as a kind of existential elimination, which simplifies the technical challenges.
With the completeness result in place, it would then be much easier to formulate a proof
theory where the expository syllogism is treated as a kind of existential instantiation,
show that the proof theory is equivalent (in the appropriate sense) to what is developed
below, and conclude that it is also complete with respect to our semantic theory. This
project will not be done in this thesis, for reasons of time and space.
The proof theory we develop here is a natural deduction system where we will use
the notation C(φ) to pick out a contradictory of φ.30 We state this as an assumption to
reduce the number of rules that we need to consider in the completeness proof. In what
follows it may be helpful to recall that:
A a B contradicts A o B
A i B contradicts A e B
A
L
a B contradicts A
M
o B
A
L
i B contradicts A
M
e B
A
M
a B contradicts A
L
o B
A
M
i B contradicts A
L
e B
A
Q
a B contradicts A
Q¯
o B
A
Q
i B contradicts A
Q¯
e B
30. If φ is assertoric, an L or an M formula, then C(φ) is unique. If φ is either Q and Q¯ then there will
be two formula, equivalent to each other, but not the same formula. See Appendix Three for further
elaboration of this.
123
5 A Formal Reconstruction of Buridan’s Modal Logic
In the case of singular propositions, these are mostly the same, except, as we have
already remarked, it is the a and e propositions that contradict in the assertoric, necessity
and possibility cases, e.g f a A contradicts f e A and f
L
a A contradicts f
M
e A. In the
case of contingency, f
Q
a A contradicts f
Q¯
e A.
The proof system that we will make use of here is a Gentzen type natural deduc-
tion system. In this system proofs are presented as trees of formulae. Following
Prawitz[47, p.22], we say that if Π1, . . . ,Πn are sequences of well-formed formulae then(Π1, . . . ,Πn/A) is the tree obtained by arranging the configuration of Π’s such that the
Π’s end on a horizontal line immediately above A.
Instances of inference rules are also defined as in Prawitz[47]. The basic idea behind
these rules is that we use the sequence Π1, . . . ,Πn to list the formulas that occur above
a particular designated formula, A. When it comes to expressing inference rules, we will
use this notation to express the idea of what formulae are needed to license a particular
inference. This will involve nesting the notion in such a way as to make it clear which
sets of formulae are used in the derivation of a particular formula. For example, the
conditions for ∧ elimination can be given as:
⟨⟨Γ, φ⟩, ⟨∆, ψ⟩, ⟨Γ ∪∆, φ ∧ ψ⟩⟩
This says that, if we have a derivation of φ using Γ and a derivation of ψ using ∆,
then we are allowed to derive φ ∧ ψ from the union of Γ and ∆.
In order to better categorise our rules we introduce three tables, one for elimination
rules, one for introduction rules, and one that relates the various propositions to one
another. To reduce the number of rules present, we will use the symbol ∇ to range over
modal operations M,L, Q¯ and Q, in that order. We will use ∆ to refer to the operations
L,M,Q and Q¯ in that order. We use this notation to allow us to express multiple rules
as a schema. For example, when we write the rule:
[Ma fA]
f
∇
e B
e∆-introduction
A
∆
e B
What this rule tells us is that:
If from assuming
M
a fA we can derive
L
e fB then we may infer A
L
e B.
If from assuming
M
a fA we can derive
M
e fB then we may infer A
M
e B.
If from assuming
M
a fA we can derive
Q
e fB then we may infer A
Q¯
e B.
If from assuming
M
a fA we can derive
Q¯
e fB then we may infer A
Q
e B.
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AiB
[faA ∧ faB]
C Exposition +
C
AoB
[faA ∧ feB]
C A i A Exposition −
C
A
L
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f La B]
C
Exposition L+
C
A
L
o B
[f Ma A ∧ f Le B]
C A
M
i A Exposition L−
C
A
M
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Ma B]
C
Exposition M+
C
A
M
o B
[f Ma A ∧ f Me B]
C A
M
i A Exposition M−
C
A
Q
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Qa B]
C
Exposition Q
C
A
Q¯
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Q¯a B]
C A
M
i A
Exposition Q¯
C
A a B d a A
DDO
d a B
A e B d a A
DDN
d e B
A e B d a B
DDN
d e A
A
L
a B d
M
a A
DDO
d
L
a B
A
L
e B d
M
a A
DDN
d
L
e B
A
L
e B d
M
a B
DDN
d
L
e A
A
M
a B d
M
a A
DDO
d
M
a B
A
M
e B d
M
a A
DDN
d
M
e B
A
M
e B d
L
a B
DDN
d
L
e A
A
Q
a B d
M
a A
DDO
d
Q
a B
A
Q¯
a B d
M
a A
DDO
d
Q¯
a B
d
Q¯
a A d
M
a A
Q¯-Out
d
L
a A
d
Q¯
a A d
M
e A
Q¯-Out
d
L
e A
φ ∧ ψ ∧ Elimination
φ
φ ∧ ψ ∧ Elimination
ψ
φ C(φ)
Ex Falso Quodlibet
ψ
Table 5.5: Elimination Rules
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d a A ∧ d a B
Expository Syllogism +
A i B
d a A ∧ d e B
Expository Syllogism −
A o B
d
M
a A ∧ d La B
Expository Syllogism L+
A
L
i B
d
M
a A ∧ d Le B
Expository Syllogism L−
A
L
o B
d
M
a A ∧ d Ma B
Expository Syllogism M+
A
M
i B
d
M
a A ∧ d Me B
Expository Syllogism M−
A
M
o B
d
M
a A ∧ d Qa B
Expository Syllogism Q
A
Q
i B
d
M
a A ∧ d Q¯a B
Expository Syllogism Q¯
A
Q¯
i B
A i A
[faA]
faB
a-introduction
AaB
[faA]
feB
e-introduction
AeB
A
M
i A
[f Ma A]
f
∇
a B
a∇-introduction
A
∇
a B
[f Ma A]
f
∇
e B
e∆-introduction
A
∆
e B
feA
Empty Exposition
A o B
f
L
e A
Empty Exposition
A
∇
o B
d
L
a A
Q¯-In
d
Q¯
a A
d
L
e A
Q¯-In
d
Q¯
a A
φ ψ ∧ Introduction
φ ∧ ψ
daA
Necessity Introduction
d
L
a A
deA
Necessity Introduction
d
L
e A
d a A
Reflexivity
d
M
a A
d
L
e A
Reflexivity
d e A
[φ]
ψ
[φ]C(ψ)
C-IntroductionC(φ)
Table 5.6: Introduction Rules
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A
L× B
Modal SubalternationL
A
M× B A
Q
a/e B
Modal SubalternationQ
A
M
a B
A
Q
i/o B
Modal SubalternationQ
A
M
i B
A a B
Subalternation+
A i B
A e B
Subalternation−
A o B
A
L/M
a B
Subalternation+
A
L/M
i B
A
L/M
e A
Subalternation−
A
L/M
o B
A
Q
a/e B
Subalternation+
A
Q
i/o B
A
Q¯
a/e A
Subalternation−
A
Q¯
i/o B
d
Q
a A
Q sing Equivalence
d
Q¯
e A
d
Q¯
a A
Q¯ sing Equivalence
d
Q
e A
A
Q
a B
Q a − e Equivalence
A
Q
e B
A
Q
i B
Q i − o Equivalence
A
Q
o B
A
Q¯
a B
Q¯ a − e Equivalence
A
Q¯
e B
A
Q¯
i B
Q¯ i − o Equivalence
A
Q¯
o B
d
Q
a A
Q −Out
d
M
a A ∧ d Me A d
M
a A ∧ d Me A
Q − In
d
Q
a A
C(C(φ))
CC Elimination
φ
Table 5.7: Interaction Rules
Here f denotes a new constant that does not occur previously in the proof, while d
has no such restriction.
The specifications of the proper inference rules are clear from the way the rules are
given. For a complete list of the definitions of the proper inference rules see Appendix
Four, 244.
As the reader will have observed, a number of the rules used here are improper inference
rules and we need to stipulate how assumptions are to be discharged. We do this as
follows:
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The various forms of Expository Syllogism are as follows:
For the assertoric cases:⟨⟨Γ1,A i B⟩, ⟨Γ2,C, ⟩⟨Λ,C⟩⟩
Where Λ = Γ1 ∪ (Γ2 − Γ3) where Γ3 consists of some d a A ∧ d a B ∈ Γ2 such that d
does not occur in Λ or C.
For the modal cases:⟨⟨Γ,A ∇i B⟩, ⟨Γ2,C, ⟩⟨Λ,C⟩⟩
Where Λ = Γ ∪ (Γ2 − Γ3) where Γ3 consists of some formula d Ma A ∧ d ∆a B ∈ Γ2 such
that d does not occur in Λ or C
For Empty Exposition we have in the assertoric case:
⟨⟨Γ, feA⟩, ⟨Γ,AoB⟩⟩
Where we require that f does not occur in Γ.
In the modal case:⟨⟨Γ, f Le A⟩, ⟨Γ,A ∇o B⟩⟩
Where we require that f does not occur in Γ.
The rule for Necessity Introduction is:⟨⟨Γ,A × B⟩⟨Γ,A L× B⟩⟩
Where Γ is a set of singular formulae of possibility or necessity, i.e. Γ does not con-
tain any propositions of contingency or non-contingency, and it contains no categorical
formulae either. A formula is said to be modalised if and only if it is not of the form
A
∇× B or d ∇× B where ∇ is any one of L,M ,Q, or Q¯.
With the exception of the rules using ∧ and Necessity Introduction, each of the modal
rules is a natural modal analogue of a principle of Buridan’s that we have discussed.
Buridan discusses Ex Impossible Quodlibet in Book One, Conclusion 1.
The idea behind Necessity Introduction is not entirely foreign to our discussion of
what we have already seen. We can think of the rule for Necessity Introduction as a very
restricted generalisation of Conclusions 4 and 5 of Book Two, to singular propositions.
Conclusions 4 and 5 told us when an assertoric proposition follows from a necessary
proposition and when an assertoric proposition entails a proposition of possibility. Ne-
cessity Introduction is a kind of ‘corollary’ to this. It tell us that if we have a set of
singular modalised formulae and this set entails an assertoric singular proposition, then
it must also entailed the corresponding proposition of necessity. While more general
forms of Necessity Introduction can be formulated for this system (obviously by allow
other kinds of modal formulae to occur in Γ), it turns out that for completeness this is
form is sufficient.
Each instance of Expository Syllogism+ and Expository Syllogism− corresponds to the
principles of sameness and difference respectively, for various assertoric or modal singular
terms. The rule for the various forms of exposition are straightforward elimination rules
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for the i and o categorical formulae. In the assertoric case, the idea here is that if we
have proved AiB from Γ and then can show some formula C by assuming faA ∧ faB
(assuming that f satisfies the criteria listed) we may conclude C. Slightly less formally,
this is a natural modification of the idea of existential elimination for AiB and AoB.
The modal cases generalise this to cover the various combinations of modal introduction.
The rules DDO and DDN can either be thought of as the dictum de omni et de nullo
or as a kind of modus ponens, (e.g. if ‘Every A is B’ and ‘c is A’ then ‘c is B’.) The
remaining rules capture the square and octagon of opposition that Buridan endorses, and
outline how Q and Q¯ function. In the case of rules of subalternation, these rules simply
capture the usual subalternation inferences as expressed in the square of opposition and
the modal octagon. It should be noted that since negative singular propositions should
be read as having the negation coming before the modal (e.g. f
Q
e A should be read as
saying the singular term f is not contingently A), the rules for Q − sing are not entirely
parallel with the cases for categorical propositions since, following Buridan, e.g. A
Q
e B
is translated as ‘Every A is contingently not B’.
With this theory in place, it will follow as a corollary of completeness theorem and
our results in Appendix Three that this system can prove all of the conclusions about
divided modal propositions in Book Two of the Treatise on Consequences. However,
the system developed so far does not identify or pick out the syllogistic inferences that
Buridan considers in Books Three and Four. Thus, our strategy here, following Buridan’s
remarks in Book Three, is to identify the particular features that account for syllogistic
structures and use these to define syllogisms. As such, we define a syllogistic structure
S to be a tuple ⟨M,m⟩ along with a designated conclusion C that satisfies the following
constraints:
1. M, m, and C are all categorical propositions;
2. M, m, and C have exactly three terms;
3. The predicate of C occurs in M ;
4. The subject of C occurs in m;
5. M and m share a common term that does not occur in C.31
If {M,m} ⊢ C is provable and M ,m, and C are as above, then we call {M,m} ⊢ C. In
what follows we will drop the brackets and simply write M,m ⊢ C.
First, it should be observed that these criteria are used to rule out a number of valid
inferences as non-syllogistic. This is in keeping with Buridan’s own language where
he distinguishes valid syllogisms from other kinds of valid arguments. For example,
inferences such as:
B
L
a C,A
L
a B entails B
M
i A
and
BaC,BaB entails BaC
31. This definition is standard and can be found in e.g.[65].
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both fail to constitute syllogistic structures. In the first case, conditions 3 and 4 are
violated while in the second conditions 2 and 5 are both violated. It should be observed
however that both of these inferences are formally valid for Buridan.
Second, we claim that the proof system is able to prove all of the syllogisms that
Buridan claims are valid. This will follow from the completeness proof combined with
what we have already established about the semantics for the system. What is inter-
esting, we conjecture, is that the reasoning used in the proof system tracks, to some
degree, Buridan’s own claims about the expository syllogism. Unfortunately, due to
space constraints, we are unable to provide a proof of this result in the present work.
Since both the semantics and proof theory for Buridan’s divided fragment are based on
objects that satisfy particular sets of properties, one natural way to prove completeness
would be to use the various propositions to ‘force’ objects to belong to particular classes
of models. This is the approach we will use here. The proof of completeness is fairly
routine, being a variation of the usual canonical model construction, modified for singular
terms. In this chapter we will prove completeness for the general case where Γ is any
set of consistent formulae in our language. The specific case using syllogistic structures
as the basis for maximally consistent sets is an easy corollary. The generalised case for
when the consistent set is not a syllogistic structure is an easy extension of the results
presented here. We begin by recalling the definitions of consistency, inconstancy, and
maximality.
Consistency and Inconsistency. Γ is inconsistent if for some φ Γ ⊢ φ and Γ ⊢ C(φ).
Γ is consistent just in case it is not inconsistent.
Maximally Consistent Set. A set Γ is Maximally Consistent if Γ is consistent and
there is no consistent set ∆ such that Γ is a proper subset of ∆.
Given any set of categorical or singular propositions, we can extend it to a maximally
consistent set of propositions using the usual Lindenbaum construction. We assume
that we have a well-ordering of the well-formed formulae in our language. Given a
consistent set γ we proceed entirely as usual. If we are working with a syllogistic structure
S = ⟨M,m⟩ consistent with a designated conclusion C, we let γ0 = be the initial three
propositions M , m, and C.
We let γn+1 = γn ∪ {φn+1} if γn ∪ {φn+1} is consistent, and γn+1 = γn if γn ∪ {φn+1} is
inconsistent. We then let Γ = ⋃n<ω γn.
With such maximally consistent sets in hand, we now want to verify that they preserve
all of the inferential relationships that we will need for the construction of our canonical
model. The following lemma establishes this.
Maximally Consistent Set Lemma. Let Γ be a maximally consistent set. Then the
following hold:
1. φ ∈ Γ if and only if Γ ⊢ φ;
2. Exactly one of φ,C(φ) ∈ Γ;
3. At most one of A a B,A e B ∈ Γ;
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4. At most one of A
L
a B,A
L
o B ∈ Γ;
5. At most one of A
L
a B,A
M
e B ∈ Γ;
6. At most one of A
L
a B,A
L
e B ∈ Γ;
7. At most one of A
L
e B,A
M
a B ∈ Γ;
8. At most one of A
L
e B,A
L
i B ∈ Γ;
9. If A a B ∈ Γ then A i B ∈ Γ;
10. If A e B ∈ Γ then A o B ∈ Γ;
11. If A
∇
a B ∈ Γ then A ∇i B ∈ Γ;
12. If A
∇
e B ∈ Γ then A ∇o B ∈ Γ;
13. If A
L× B ∈ Γ then A M× B ∈ Γ;
14. If A
Q× B ∈ Γ then A M× B ∈ Γ;
15. A
Q
i B ∈ Γ if and only if A Qo B ∈ Γ;
16. A
Q
a B ∈ Γ if and only if A Qe B ∈ Γ;
17. A
Q¯
i B ∈ Γ if and only if A Q¯o B ∈ Γ;
18. A
Q¯
a B ∈ Γ if and only if A Q¯e B ∈ Γ;
19. If AiB ∈ Γ then A Mi B ∈ Γ;
20. A i B ∈ Γ if and only if there is some m such that m a A ∈ Γ and m a B ∈ Γ;
21. A
L,M,Q
i B ∈ Γ if and only if there is some m such that m Ma A ∈ Γ and m L,M,Qa B ∈
Γ;
22. AoB ∈ Γ if and only if either there is some m such that m a A ∈ Γ and m e B ∈ Γ
or there is no n s.t. n a A ∈ Γ;
23. A
L,M,Q¯
o B ∈ Γ if and only if either there is some m such that m Ma A ∈ Γ and
m
L,M,Q¯
e B ∈ Γ or there is no n s.t. n Ma A ∈ Γ;
24. A a B ∈ Γ if and only if 1) there is some m such that m a A ∈ Γ and 2) if m a A ∈ Γ
then m a B ∈ Γ;
25. A e B ∈ Γ if and only if for all m if m a A ∈ Γ then m e B ∈ Γ;
26. A
∇
a B ∈ Γ if and only if there is some m such that m Ma A ∈ Γ and 2) for all n if
n
M
a A ∈ Γ then n ∇a B ∈ Γ;
27. A
∇
e B ∈ Γ if and only if for all m if m Ma A ∈ Γ then m ∆e B ∈ Γ;
28. m
Q
a A ∈ Γ if and only if m Ma A ∈ Γ and m Me A ∈ Γ.
29. if m
Q¯
a A ∈ Γ and m Ma A ∈ Γ then m La A ∈ Γ.
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30. if m
Q¯
a A ∈ Γ and m Me A ∈ Γ then m Me A ∈ Γ.
31. φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ
Two observations should be made before proving the MCS Lemma. First, it should
be observed that the subcontraries are not included in this lemma because they follow
from 2 and 3-7, depending on which subcontrary is in question. For example, assume
that neither AiB nor AoB ∈ Γ. Then by 2, it follows that AaB and AeB ∈ Γ which
contradicts 3. Second, it should be observed that the resulting M.C.S.s are used to
provide models for the entire divided fragment of Buridan’s modal logic, not only for the
syllogistic inferences.
The proof of each of these propositions is fairly routine and follows from the construc-
tion of Γ and the rules that we have formulated. When a group of cases are similar, but
only require the application of a slightly different rule, we will provide an instance and
observe that the other cases are similar.
The proofs of 1 and 2 are routine and follow from the properties of a Maximally Con-
sistent Set.
Proof of 3 : immediate from Subalternation+
Proof of 4 : immediate from Subalternation−
Proof of 5 : Assume that 5 is false, then we could have A a B ∈ Γ and A e B ∈ Γ
where Γ is a maximally consistent set. Then by 4, we have A o B ∈ Γ, contradicting the
consistency of Γ.
Proof of 6 : Assume 6 is false, then we could have A
L
a B ∈ Γ and A Lo B ∈ Γ where Γ is
a maximally consistent set. Then by Modal SubalternationL we have A
L
o B ⊢ A Mo B.
By 1. it follows that A
M
o B ∈ Γ. But this is the contradictory of A La B, which means Γ
is inconsistent, violating 2.
Proof of 7 : Assume that 7 is false, thenA
L
a B ∈ Γ andA Me B ∈ Γ. ByModal Subalternation−
it follows that A
M
o B ∈ Γ, which contradicts 2.
The proofs of 8-10 are similar.
The proofs of 11-14 are immediate from the relevant rules of Subalternation.
Proof of 15 : immediate from Modal SubalternationL.
Proof of 16 : immediate from Modal SubalternationQ.
Proof of 17 : immediate from Q i − o Equivalence.
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Proof of 18 : immediate from Q a − e Equivalence.
The Proof of 19 and 20 are analogous using the Q¯ Equivalences.
Proof of 21 : Assume that AiB ∈ Γ. Now, consider the following proof:
AiB
[faA ∧ faB] ∧ −Elimination
faA
Reflexivity
f
M
a A
[faA ∧ faB] ∧ −Elimination
faB
Reflexivity
f
M
a B ∧ − Introduction
f
M
a A ∧ f Ma B
ExpositorySyllogismM+
A
M
i B Exposition+
A
M
i B
Hence A
M
i B ∈ Γ by 1.
Proof of 22 : For the left to right direction, assume that AiB ∈ Γ but that for all n, we
have either naA /∈ Γ or naB /∈ Γ. By 2 and some logic we have: for all n, either neA ∈ Γ
or neB ∈ Γ. If either disjunct holds, we show AeB follows. We will prove the case for
the first disjunct and note that the case of the second disjunct is similar.
Now, consider the following proof:
AiB
[naA ∧ naB] ∧ −Elimination
naA neA
Ex Falso Quodlibet
AeB Exposition+
AeB
Hence, AeB ∈ Γ, contradicting 2. Hence there is some n such that naA and naB ∈ Γ.
For the other direction, assume that there is some m such that maA ∈ Γ and maB ∈ Γ.
Then, it follows by ∧ Introduction and Expository Syllogism that AiB ∈ Γ.
The Proof of 23 is similar to the proof of 22, only changing the relevant Exposition
and Expository Syllogism rules.
For example, assume that A
M
i B ∈ Γ but that for all n, either n Le A ∈ Γ or n Le B ∈ Γ.
Consider the following proof:
A
M
i B
[n
M
a A ∧ n Ma B] ∧ −Elimination
n
M
a A n
L
e A
Ex Falso Quodlibet
A
L
e B
ExpositionM+
A
L
e B
It would then follows that A
L
e B ∈ Γ, contradicting 2. Hence there is some n such
that n
M
a A and n
M
a B.
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The other direction is straightforward. Assume that there is some n such that n
M
a
A∧n Ma B ∈ Γ. It then follows by ExpositionM that there is some n such that A Mi B ∈ Γ.
Proof of 24 : For the right to left direction, assume that AoB ∈ Γ. Assume for a con-
tradiction that 1) there is some m such that maA and 2) ∀n if naA then naB. From 1)
it follows that AiA. Taking l as a witness for the existential we have:
laA laA ∧ Introduction
laA ∧ laA
Exposition+
A i A
with this and 2) it then follows by a-introduction that AaB ∈ Γ, contradicting the
consistency of Γ.
For the left to right direction, assume that we have two cases to consider: If maA ∈ Γ
and meB ∈ Γ, then it follows by Expository Syllogism− that AoB ∈ Γ. Otherwise, if for
no term, n is naA ∈ Γ then it follows by Empty Exposition that AoB ∈ Γ.
The Proof of 25 is similar, only using the relevant cases of Expository Syllogism∇ and
Empty Exposition∇.
Proof of 26 : This is the contrapositive of 24.
Proof of 27 : This is the contrapositive of 22.
Proof of 28 : This is the contrapositive of 25.
Proof of 29 : This is the contrapositive of 23.
Proof of 30 : This is immediate from Q − In and Q −Out.
The Proof of 31 and 32 are immediate from both instances of Q¯ −Out.
Proof of 33 : this is immediate from the introduction and elimination rules for ∧.
As the reader will have noticed, with the exception of the first rule and the last, each
of these rules is a natural extension of results that Buridan discusses. For example,
inferences 5–10 together with 13–15 capture the inferences in the modal octagon. The
relationships of contradictories are covered by the presence of the operation C().
We can use this system to prove the various conclusions that Buridan proves in his
Treatise on Consequences. For example, using Exposition and Reflexivity we can prove
Buridan’s conclusion 4 in Book Two of his Treatise on Consequence, namely that AiB
entails A
M
i B, as was done in the proof of 21. As an easy corollary of this, we have:
A
L
e B entails A e B.
Alternatively, we can derive the proof as Buridan proves it (and infer 21 as a corollary).
To that end we want to show that A
L
e B ⊢ A e B:
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[faA]
f
M
a A A
L
e B
DDNL
f
L
e B
Reflexitivity
f e B
[faB]
f
M
a B A
L
e B
DDNL
f
L
e A
Reflexitivity
f e A
e − Introduction
AeB
This will turn out to be a very important conclusion, because it textually justifies the
inclusion of Reflexivity as a rule which in turn ensures that our models are reflexive.
5.6 Soundness and Completeness
The soundness of ⊢ is, with one exception, an easy (but tedious) consequence of the
semantics presented above. As such, the full details have been relegated to Appendix
Four starting on page 237.
The only rules that are not straightforward are the cases for Necessity Introduction. To
that end, we claim that the rules:
For all d
For all d, if Γ ⊢ daA then Γ ⊢ d La A
For all d, if Γ ⊢ deA then Γ ⊢ d Le A
both preserve validity, where Γ is a set of singular modalised formulae. In order to prove
this, we will prove two lemmas first. The first lemma tells us what singular formulae
follow from other singular formulae. The second tells us what categorical formulae follow
from singular formulae. As a corollary of the second lemma, we will infer that singular
formulae never entail universal categorical formulae.
Lemma 1 : Singular Propositions
1. c
M
a A ⊭ caA
2. c
L
e A ⊭ ceA
3. if c
L
a A ⊧ caA then c La A ⊧ c La A.
4. if c
M
e A ⊧ ceA then c Me A ⊧ c Me A.
First, observe that 3 and 4 are included for exhaustiveness, but are trivial. For 1)
consider the following countermodel:
D = {c} W = {w,x}
R =W 2
O(w) =D
v(w,A) = ∅
v(x,A) =D
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Likewise, for 2:
D = {c} W = {w,x}
R =W 2
O(w) =D
v(w,A) =D
v(x,A) = ∅
Lemma 2 : Let Γ be a set of singular formulae then for all A, B we have:
1. Γ ⊭ A ∇a B
2. Γ ⊭ A ∇e B
3. Γ ⊧ A i B if and only if for some d Γ ⊧ daA and Γ ⊧ daB
4. Γ ⊧ A o B if and only if for some d Γ ⊧ daA and Γ ⊧ doB
5. Γ ⊧ A L,M,Q,Q¯i B if and only if either for some d Γ ⊧ d Ma A and Γ ⊧ d L,M,Q,Q¯a B or
for no d does Γ ⊧ d a A
6. Γ ⊧ A L,M,Q,Q¯o B if and only if either for some d Γ ⊧ d Ma A and Γ ⊧ d M,L,Q¯,Qe B or
for no d does Γ ⊧ d Ma A
The proofs of 3–6 immediately follow from the semantic definitions (and will be ap-
pealed to in the MCS Lemma below)
The general strategy for constructing countermodels in the case of 1 and 2 is also
straightforward. We sketch the case for AaB and observe that the other cases are sim-
ilar. In the case of 1) Take an arbitrary model, M and world w ∈ W and assume that
M,w ⊧ Γ. Let f be an element such that c(f) does not occur in Γ. Let Mf be the same
as M, expect f ∈ V (w,A) and f ∉ V (w,B). Hence Mf ⊭ AaB, however, since f does not
occur in Γ we have Mf ⊧ Γ. This follows because in this system, the only valid inferences
from singular categorical propositions of the form:
d
∇
a A or d
∇
e A to d
∇
a B or d
∇
e B occur when a universal affirmative or negative categor-
ical proposition holds.32 As such adding c(f) will not provide a counterexample to any
of the formulae in Γ.
The soundness of both kinds of necessity introduction follows as a straightforward
corollary of Lemmas 1 and 2 together with our observation.
In the case of:
32. The verification of this is a straightforward observation following from the general observation that,
d
∇
a A,A
∇
i B ⊭ d ∇a B and d ∇a A,A ∇o B ⊭ d ∇e B in the affirmative case. The negative case is also
similar.
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For all d, if Γ ⊢ daA then Γ ⊢ d La A
Take an arbitrary d and assume that Γ ⊢ daA. As the proof of Γ ⊢ daA is shorter then
n it follows by our inductive hypothesis that Γ ⊧ daA also. From Lemma 2. it follows
that Γ ⊭ A ∇a B, Γ ⊭ A ∇e B, Γ ⊭ B ∇a A, and Γ ⊭ B ∇e A. By our observation, it follows
that the only way Γ ⊧ daA is if it follows from a singular categorical proposition. By
Lemma 1, this is only possible if Γ ⊧ d La A.
5.6.1 Completeness
Completeness. If M,m ⊧ C then M,m ⊢ C
Our proof of completeness will be by the usual canonical model construction, modified
for our language. In defining our canonical model, some care needs to be taken to ensure
that the relation R is universal.33
To that end, assume that M,m ⊬ C. Then M ,m, and C(C) is consistent. Hence there
exists an M.C.S. Λ containing M ,m, and C(C).
First, we first define our canonical model:
Let MC = ⟨WC ,DC ,RC ,OC , cC , vC⟩ where:
WC={Γ:Γ is a maximally consistent having exactly the same modal singular sen-
tences as Λ.}.
DC={n: n occurs in some maximally consistent set Γ ∈WC}.
ΓRCΘ iff 1) Γ and Θ are in WC and 2) for all terms singular terms c and terms A
if c
L
e A ∈ Γ then c e A ∈ Θ.
OC(Γ)={n: n occurs in Γ and Γ in WC}.
cC(n) = n.
v(Γ,A) = {n ∶ naA ∈ Γ}
At first glance, it may seem that our requirement that Γ is a maximally consistent
set having exactly the same modal singular sentences as Λ is too weak a condition to
ensure that Γ and Λ make all of the same modal formulae true. In fact it is not, as the
following proof shows:
For all M.C.S. Γ, ∆ if Γ and ∆ contain exactly same modal singular sentences then for
all modal formulae φ φ ∈ Γ if and only if φ ∈ ∆.
Take arbitrary Γ and ∆ and assume the antecedent. We only need to consider the 16
possible modal categorical formulae. For the cases of A
∇
i B recall that A
∇
i B ∈ Γ if and
only if ∃m such that m Ma A ∈ Γ and m ∇a B ∈ Γ by the M.C.S. Lemma 23. We then have
m
M
a A ∈ Γ and m ∇a B ∈ Γ if and only if m Ma A ∈ ∆ and m ∇a B ∈ ∆ since Γ and ∆
contain exactly the same modal singular formulae. An analogous proof holds for the o
categorical formulae using M.C.S. lemma 24.
33. I am grateful to Professor Hodges for suggesting how this might be done.
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For the various universal propositions, we prove the cases for A
L
a B and observe that
the rest are similar. Assume that A
L
a B ∈ Γ this holds if and only if C(A La B) ∉ Γ by
M.C.S. 2, if and only if A
M
o B ∉ Γ by MCS Lemma 24, this holds if and only if there is
some m such that m
M
a A ∈ Γ and for all m if m Ma A ∈ Γ then m La B ∈ Γ. However, since
Γ and ∆ agree on all singular modal formulae, both of these properties are preserved
in ∆. Hence there is some m such that m
M
a A ∈ ∆ and for all m if m Ma A ∈ ∆ then
m
L
a B ∈ ∆. Hence by M.C.S. Lemmas 24 and 2, it follows that A La B ∈ ∆.
With these definitions in place, it is routine to verify that we can define the canonical
analogues and that they have the following properties:
i V C(Γ,A) = v(Γ,A) ∩O(Γ) = {n ∶ naA ∈ Γ}.
ii V C(Γ,¬A) =D ∖ (v(Γ,A) ∩O(Γ)) = {n ∶ naA ∉ Γ}.
iii MC(Γ,A) = {n ∶ There is some ∆ such that ΓR∆ and n a A ∈ ∆}
= {n ∶ There is some ∆ such that n a A ∈ ∆}
iv LC(Γ,A) = {n ∶ For all ∆ if ΓR∆ then n La A ∈ ∆} = {n ∶ For all ∆n La A ∈ ∆}
In the proof of i., the first equivalence is definitional. The proof of ii follows by basic
set theory. In the case of iii. the right to left inclusion is trivial. For the left to right
direction, take an arbitrary term m ∈ {n ∶ There is some ∆ such that n a A ∈ ∆}. We
need to show that ΓR∆ this follows immediately by our construction of W . The reason
for this is because of how we constructed WC . To see this, observe that, for any two
M.C.S.s Γ and ∆, Γ and ∆ contain all of the same modalised singular formulae. (Recall
that Γ and ∆ are M.C.S.s in WC). Now, observe that the contrapositive of the second
condition on RC and the maximality of Γ and Θ this is equivalent to:
For all singular terms c and terms A if caA ∈ Θ then c Ma A ∈ Γ.
Now, clearly since all the M.C.S. that are in WC agree on their singular modal for-
mulae, the consequent of the hypothetical is satisfied. This form of the R condition is
very useful.
Hence the consequent of the contrapositive of R is satisfied.
The case of iv. is similar.
Semantic clauses for the various formulae are analogous to the ones given before and
can be seen below.
As an easy corollary of this and the MCS Lemma, observe that we have the following:
1. if ΓRCΘ and AiB ∈ Θ then A Mi B ∈ Γ
2. if ΓRCΘ and A
L
e B ∈ Γ then A e B ∈ Θ
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Second, observe that we an alternative way to demonstrate that ΓRCΓ. Take arbi-
trary c and A. From c
M
e A ∈ Γ it follows that c e A ∈ Γ by the rule reflexivity.
Before proving each categorical case, the following lemmas will be very useful in what
follows.
Existence Lemma
Let Γ be a Maximally Consistent Set in WC . Then we claim that:
A
M
i B ∈ Γ if and only if there exists M.C.Ss ∆ and Ξ such that, for some m,
1. m
M
a A ∈ Γ and m Ma B ∈ Γ
2. m a A ∈ ∆ and m a B ∈ Ξ
3. ΓRC∆ and ΓRCΞ, and so
4. MC(Γ,A) ≠ ∅ and MC(Γ,B) ≠ ∅.
Left to Right :
Assume that A
M
i B ∈ Γ. Then by the MCS Lemma part 21 for some m, m Ma A ∈ Γ and
m
M
a B ∈ Γ, proving (1).
We construct ∆ and Ξ as follows: let δ = {b Le A ∈ Γ : for every singular term b and
categorical term A} ∪ {b La A ∈ Γ : for every singular term b and categorical term A}.
By construction δ ⊆ Γ and so δ is consistent. We claim that δ∪{maA} and δ∪{maB}
are both consistent. Assume not. We prove the case for δ∪{maA} and observe that the
other case is analogous. First, suppose δ ∪ {maA} is inconsistent: it follows by C-Intro
that δ ⊢ meA. As δ is a set of modalised singular formulae, it follows by Necessity
Introduction that δ ⊢ m Le A. Since δ ⊆ Γ it follows that Γ ⊢ m Le A contradicting the
consistency of Γ.
Let ∆ be an MCS extending δ ∪ {maA} and let Ξ be an MCS extending δ ∪ {maB}.
First, observe that ∆ ∈ WC and Ξ ∈ WC . This follows since Γ ∈ WC and ∆ and Ξ
agree with Γ on all modalised singular formulae. Second, observe that m a A ∈ ∆ and
m a B ∈ Ξ, proving (2).
Now recall that ΓRCΘ iff for all singular terms c and terms A if c
L
e A ∈ Γ then
c e A ∈ Θ. Take an arbitrary singular term g and term A such that g Le A ∈ Γ. It then
follows that g
L
e A ∈ δ and hence by construction that g Le A ∈ ∆ and g Le A ∈ Ξ. That
g e A ∈ ∆ and g e A ∈ Ξ follows by the rule Reflexivity. Hence ΓRC∆ and ΓRCΞ, proving
(3).
Proof of 4: This follows from 2 and 3.
Right to Left
Immediate from 1. and the MCS Lemma part 21.
In what follows we will mostly be using Existence Lemma 4.
The previous result, togeather with the results:
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1. if ΓRCΘ and AiB ∈ Θ then A Mi B ∈ Γ
2. if ΓRCΘ and A
L
e B ∈ Γ then A e B ∈ Θ
forms the basis of what is normally called the Existence Lemma in standard treatments
of modal logic. e.g. [13, p.200]. As will become clear, our existence lemma together with
these two observations will have a very similar function.
To establish some other important properties, the following lemmas will be used ex-
tensively:
MC-Lemma
Let Γ be an M.C.S. Then for all singular terms c and terms, A:
c ∈MC(Γ,A) if and only if c Ma A ∈ Γ.
Proof :
Left to Right direction:
Assume that c ∈ MC(Γ,A). Then by iii on 138 there is some M.C.S. ∆ such that 1)
ΓR∆ and 2) caA ∈ ∆. Recall that the contrapositive of 1) states that:
if c a A ∈ ∆ then c Ma A ∈ Γ. This combined with 2) entails that c Ma A ∈ Γ as desired.
Right to Left direction:
Assume that c
M
a A ∈ Γ. We construct an M.C.S. ∆ such that caA ∈ ∆ and ΓR∆.
Let δ = {d Le A ∶ d Le A ∈ Γ}. We claim that δ ∪ {caA} is consistent. Assume it is
not. Then δ ⊢ ceA by C-Introduction. Since δ is modalised, it follows by Necessity
Introduction that δ ⊢ c Le A. Now, since δ ⊆ Γ it follows that c Le A ∈ Γ, contradicting the
consistency of Γ. So δ ∪ {caA} is consistent. Let ∆ be an M.C.S. based on δ ∪ {caA}.
Clearly caA ∈ ∆, per construction. Likewise, ΓR∆, since per construction ∆ contains
every instance of d
L
e A for any d and A that occur in Γ.
As an easy corollary of this construction, observe that if Γ ∈WC then ∆ ∈WC . This
follows since ∆ contains every instance of d
M
a A for any d and A that occur in Γ, as we
noted above.
LC −Lemma
Let Γ be an M.C.S. Then for all singular terms c and terms, A:
c ∈ LC(Γ,A) if and only if c La A ∈ Γ.
Proof :
Left to Right direction:
Assume that c ∈ LC(Γ,A). Assume that c La A ∉ Γ. Then c Me A ∈ Γ, since Γ is an M.C.S.
We claim that if this were the case then there exists and M.C.S. ∆ such that c e A ∈ ∆
and ΓR∆, contradicting our assumption that c ∈ LC(Γ,A).
We construct ∆ as follows: Let δ = {A Le B ∶ A Le B ∈ Γ}. We claim that δ ∪ {ceA} is
consistent. This follows by an argument analogous to the one used in the MC only using
the negative singular form of Necessity Introduction. As before ∆ is an M.C.S. based on
δ ∪ ceA, and clearly c e A ∈ ∆ and ΓR∆.
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Right to Left direction:
Assume that c
L
a A ∈ Γ. Now, assume that there is some ∆ such that ΓR∆ and ceA ∈ ∆
i.e. c ∉ LC(w,A). Then c a A ∈ ∆ since c La A ∈ Γ and ΓR∆. This contradicts the
consistency of Γ. Hence c ∈ LC(w,A).
With these two lemmas in place, we now introduce the following notational shorthand:
Similarly to our semantics, we define the following negative operations:
MC(Γ,¬A) = {c ∶ ΓR∆ and ceA ∈ ∆}
LC(Γ,¬A) = {c ∶ if ΓR∆ then ceA ∈ ∆}
From the MC and the LC Lemmas we have the following easy corollaries:
For all MCS Γ
1. c ∈MC(Γ,¬A) if and only if c Me A ∈ Γ
2. c ∈ LC(Γ,¬A) if and only if c Le A ∈ Γ
To prove 1. observe that c ∈MC(Π,¬A) if and only if c ∉ LC(Π,A). Hence c La A ∉ Π.
Since Π is an M.C.S. it follows that c
M
e A ∈ Π
The proof of 2. is similar.
In what follows we will refer to 1. as the M¯C Lemma and 2. as the L¯C Lemma.
We now prove the main lemma for our completeness proof:
Truth Lemma :
For all formulae φ, and all MCS Π ∈WC we have:
φ ∈ Π if and only if MC ,Π ⊧ φ
As each categorical and singular proposition has a contradictory, by MCS Lemma 1.
we will only need to consider the left to right direction. The right to left direction will
follow from the observation that if φ ∉ Π then C(φ) ∈ Π (by the MCS Lemma) and so
MC ,Π ⊧ C(φ) (which will follow from the left to right direction) which entails MC ,Π ⊭ φ
since Π is an MCS.
For singular propositions we have the following cases to consider:
1. if caA ∈ Π then c ∈ V C(Π,A).
2. if ceA ∈ Π then c ∉ V C(Π,A).
3. if c
L
a A ∈ Π then c ∈ LC(Π,A).
4. if c
M
e A ∈ Π then c ∉ LC(Π,A).
5. if c
M
a A ∈ Π then c ∈MC(Π,A).
6. if c
L
e A ∈ Π then c ∉MC(Π,A).
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7. if c
Q
a A ∈ Π then c ∈M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A).
8. if c
Q
e A ∈ Π then c ∈M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A).
9. if c
Q¯
a A ∈ Π then c ∉M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A).
10. if c
Q¯
a A ∈ Π then c ∉M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A).
The cases of 1 and 2 are trivial and follow by construction. 3-6 follow from the
MC Lemma and the LC Lemma. 7-10 are also easy consequences of the MC and M¯C
Lemmas.
For categorical formulae we have 16 cases to consider.
Assertoric cases:
Assume that AaB ∈ Π. First observe that V C(Π,A) is non-empty. To see this observe
that since Π is a maximally consistent set, it follows by the MCS Lemma that AiB ∈ Π
and so there is some m such that maA ∈ Π. Hence V C(Π,A) is non-empty. Next,
observe that V C(Π,A) ⊆ V C(Π,B). To see this, assume not. Then there is some n
such that naA ∈ Π and neB ∈ Π. Then it follows by MCS Lemma 22 that Π ⊢ AoB
and so AoB ∈ Π, contradicting the consistency of Π. Hence V C(Π,A) ⊆ V C(Π,B) and
V C(Π,A) is non-empty. i.e. MC ,Π ⊧ AaB.
Assume that AiB ∈ Π. We claim that V C(Π,A) ∩ V C(Π,B) ≠ ∅. This holds if and
only if there is some m such that maA ∈ Γ and maB ∈ Γ. This is immediate from MCS
Lemma 20. From V C(Π,A) ∩ V C(Π,B) ≠ ∅ it follows that MC ,Π ⊧ AiB, as desired.
The proofs for e and o are corollaries.
Modal Propositions:
1. If A
M
a B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Ma B
2. If A
M
e B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Me B
3. If A
M
i B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Mi B
4. If A
M
o B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Mo B
5. If A
L
a B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A La B
6. If A
L
e B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Le B
7. If A
L
i B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Li B
8. If A
L
o B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Lo B
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9. If A
Q
a B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Qa B
10. If A
Q
e B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Qe B
11. If A
Q
i B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Qi B
12. If A
Q
o B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Qo B
13. If A
Q¯
a B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Q¯a B
14. If A
Q¯
e B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Q¯e B
15. If A
Q¯
i B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Q¯i B
16. If A
Q¯
o B ∈ Π then MC ,Π ⊧ A Q¯o B
Proof of 1 :
Assume that A
M
a B ∈ Π. We need to show two things. First, that MC(Π,A) is
non-empty and second, that MC(Π,A) ⊆MC(Π,B). Observe that by SubalternationM
we have A
M
i B ∈ Π. By the Existence Lemma it follows that MC(Π,A) ≠ ∅.
To prove the second, take an arbitrary term m and assume that m ∈MC(Π,A). Then
by the MC Lemma it follows that m
M
a A ∈ Π However, it follows from A Ma B ∈ Π and
m
M
a A ∈ Π that m Ma B ∈ Π, using DDO. Hence, m ∈MC(Π,B) by the MC Lemma, as
required.
Proof of 2 :
Assume that A
M
e B ∈ Π. We need to show that MC(Π,A)∩LC(Π,B) = ∅. So, assume
that MC(Π,A) ∩LC(Π,B) ≠ ∅.
From our assumption it follows that there is some term n such that n ∈MC(Π,A) ∩
LC(Π,B). Then by the MC Lemma it follows that n Ma A ∈ Π and the LC Lemma
entails that n
L
a B ∈ Π. However, n Ma A ∈ Π and our assumption that A Me B ∈ Π entails
n
M
e B ∈ Π by the DDN, contradicting the consistency of Π.
Proof of 3 :
Assume that A
M
i B ∈ Π. We need to show that MC(Π,A)∩MC(Π,B) ≠ ∅. This follows
immediately from the Existence Lemma and the MC Lemma.
Proof of 4 :
Assume that A
M
o B ∈ Π. We need to show that either MC(Π,A) is empty, or that
MC(Π,A) ⊈ LC(Π,B).
Assume that neither of these are the case, then 1) MC(Π,A) ≠ ∅ and 2) MC(Π,A) ⊆
LC(Π,B). From 1) it follows that there is some M.C.S. Λ and some term m such that
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maA ∈ Λ and ΠRΛ. By an argument analogous to the ones we have used above, it
follows that m
M
a A ∈ Π and so Π ⊧m Ma A.
Now, assume that n
M
a A ∈ Π for an arbitrary n. Then, by the MC Lemma it follows
that n ∈ MC(Π,A). By 2) it follows that n ∈ LC(Π,B). By the LC Lemma, it follows
that n
L
a B ∈ Π. Hence by the MCS Lemma 26, it follows that A La B ∈ Π, contradicting
the consistency of Π.
Necessary Propositions:
Proof of 5 : Assume that A
L
a B ∈ Π. We need to show that 1) MC(Π,A) is non-empty
and that 2) MC(Π,A) ⊆ LC(Π,B).
To show 1), observe that A
L
a B ⊢ A Mi B. It then follows by the Existence Lemma
and MC Lemma that MC(Π,A) is non-empty.
To see that MC(Π,A) ⊆ LC(Π,B), take an arbitrary n ∈ MC(Π,A). By the MC
Lemma, it follows that n
M
a A ∈ Π. It then follows by the DDO that n La B ∈ Π. By the
LC Lemma it follows that n ∈ LC(Π,B).
Proof of 6 :
Assume that A
L
e B ∈ Π. We need to show that MC(Π,A)∩MC(Π,B) = ∅. Assume not,
then MC(Π,A) ∩MC(Π,B) ≠ ∅ and so there is some term m such that m ∈MC(Π,A)
and m ∈ MC(Π,B). It then follows by the MC Lemma that m Ma A ∈ Π and that
m
M
a B ∈ Π. By ∧ Introduction and Expository SyllogismM+, it follows that A Mi B ∈ Π
contradicting the consistency of Π.
Proof of 7 :
Assume that A
L
i B ∈ Π. We need to show that MC(Π,A) ∩ LC(Π,B) ≠ ∅. By MCS
Lemma 21 it follows that there is some n such that n
M
a A ∈ Π and n La B ∈ Π. Hence
by the MC Lemma n ∈MC(Π,A) and by the LC Lemma it follows that n ∈ LC(Π,B).
Hence MC(Π,A) ∩LC(Π,B) ≠ ∅.
Proof of 8 :
Assume that A
L
o B ∈ Π. Assume for a contradiction that 1) MC(Π,A) is non-empty
and that 2) MC(Π,A) ⊆MC(Π,B).
From 1) it follows by the MC Lemma that there is some term d such that d
M
a A ∈ Π.
From 2) and the MC Lemma it follows that, for all terms n if n
M
a A then n
M
a B.
From these it follows by aM introduction thatA
M
a B ∈ Π, contradicting the consistency
of Π.
Contingency Propositions:
Proof of 9 & 10 :
For 9, assume that A
Q
a B ∈ Π. We need to show that 1) M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and that 2)
M(w,A) ⊆ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)).
To see 1) it follows by subalternation that A
M
a B ∈ Π and that A Mi B ∈ Π. By the
Existence Lemma and MC Lemma it follows that M(w,A) ≠ ∅.
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For 2) take an arbitrary d and assume that d ∈M(w,A). It then follows by the MC
Lemma that d
M
a A ∈ Π. Since A Qa B ∈ Π, it follows by the DDO that d Qa B. It then
follows by Q − Out and ∧ elimination that d Ma B ∈ Π and d Me B ∈ Π. It then follows
by the MC Lemma and the M¯C Lemma, that d ∈ (M(w,B) and d ∈M(w,¬B)). Hence
d ∈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)), completing the proof.
For 10, assume that A
Q
e B ∈ Π. Again, we need to show that 1) M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and that
2) M(w,A) ⊆ (M(w,B)∩M(w,¬B)). By Qa− e Equivalence it follows that A Qa B ∈ Π,
and by the previous proof, we are done.
Proof of 11 & 12 :
For 11, assume that A
Q
i B ∈ Π. We need to show that M(w,A)∩M(w,B)∩M(w,¬B) ≠∅. It suffices to show, by the MC Lemma and that M¯C Lemma the following: there
exists a m such that:
1. m
M
a A ∈ Π
2. m
M
a B ∈ Π
3. m
M
e B ∈ Π
However, by M.C.S. lemma 21. it follows that there is some m such that m
M
a A ∈ Π
and that m
Q
a B ∈ Π. By M.C.S. Lemma 28 it follows that:
there is some m such that m
M
a A ∈ Π, m Ma B ∈ Π, and m Me B ∈ Π, which is what we
needed to show.
For 12 assume that A
Q
o B ∈ Π. Again, we need to show that M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩
M(w,¬B) ≠ ∅. By Qi − o Equivalence it follows that A Qi B ∈ Π, which entails the
conclusion by our proof of 11.
Proof of 13 & 14 : As in the cases of Q the case of
Q
e will follow from
Q¯
a.
Assume that A
Q¯
a B ∈ Π We need to show that M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) = ∅.
Assume that it is not. Then by the MC and M¯C Lemmas it follows that there is some
m such that 1) m
M
a A ∈ Π, 2) m Ma B ∈ Π, and 3) m Me B ∈ Π. By 2) and 3) it
follows by Q − In that m Qa B ∈ Π. Which together with 1) entails that A Qi B ∈ Π by
Expository SyllogismQ+. This contradicts the consistency of Π.
Proof of 15 & 16 : As in the cases of Q the case of
Q¯
o will follow from
Q¯
i
Assume that A
Q¯
i B ∈ Π. We need to show that either M(w,A) is empty or that
M(w,A) ⊈ M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B). Assume that neither of these is the case. Then 1)
M(w,A) is non-empty and 2) M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B). By the MC Lemma
and 1 it follows that there is some m m
M
a A ∈ Π.
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Now, assume that, for an arbitrary n that n
M
a A ∈ Π. By the MC Lemma it follows
that n ∈ MC(Π,A) and by 2) it follows that n ∈ MC(Π,B) and that n ∈ MC(Π,¬B).
Again, by the MC Lemma and the M¯C Lemma it follows that n
M
a B ∈ Π and n Me B ∈ Π.
It then follows by Q − In that n Qa B ∈ Π.
As n was arbitrary, it follows that ∀n if n Ma A then n Qa B.
From both of these things, it then follows by the M.C.S. Lemma 26, that A
Q
a B ∈ Π,
contradicting the consistency of Π.
To conclude our proof of completeness recall that we assumed M,m ⊬ C. Then there
exists an M.C.S. Ω such that M ,m, and C(C) are all inΩ. We construct MC with Ω as
the M.C.S. used to select which M.C.S.s are in WC . By the Truth Lemma, it follows
that MC,Λ ⊧ M , MC,Λ ⊧ m and MC,Λ ⊧ C(C). Hence by the truth lemma and the
MCS Lemma MC,Λ ⊭ C. Hence M,m ⊭ C as claimed.
By contra-position it then follows that if M,m ⊧ C then M,m ⊢ C.
Q.E.D.
5.7 Conclusion
It is difficult to fully appreciate how valuable Buridan’s contribution to the history
of modal logic is. In presenting Buridan’s work on the modal syllogism in light of
modern logic some of this value should become clear: First, Buridan’s semantic analysis
of modal propositions and his treatment of the expository syllogism naturally line up
with each other, in the sense that the two systems fit seamlessly together. Because of
this it is possible to show that the formal analogues of these two systems are sound
and complete. Second, unlike Aristotle, whose remarks about the modal syllogism have
confused his interpreters and require elements of his metaphysics to explain the validity
of the apodictic modal syllogistic (see e.g. [37] and [38] and it is still unclear if Aristotle’s
modal logic can be given a plausible reading, either in natural language or formally),
Buridan’s theory follows clearly and perspicuously from the assumptions that he lays
down. Within the Treatise on Consequences his reasoning is flawless, the syllogisms
that he treats as valid are indeed so, and his counterexamples establish the invalidity of
the invalid ones. Third, the semantics that he employs suggest an interesting extension
of the usual resources for variable domain first-order modal logic, and the resources he
employs point to some interesting and potentially fruitful technical developments.
In answering Hughes’ challenge we are able to see just how impressive Buridan’s
treatment of modal logic was. Beyond being an original reformulation of the modal
syllogism, we see that Buridan’s logic is able to answer to the highest standards expected
of modern logic. With this in mind, it is no wonder that Buridan’s work on logic came
to be so dominant in the late Middle Ages, nor that contemporary study of his work
proves to be enlightening.
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6.1 Introduction
In our previous chapters we have been exploring two very different accounts of modality
and the modal logics that they yield. Our goal in this chapter is to bring together these
two theories and explore a number of natural questions that have emerged during this
study of these two theories.
The general structure of this chapter will proceed in the following way: we will first
start with a fairly brief sketch of the history of modal logic. Our goal here is to situate
Kilwardby and Buridan within the logical developments of their times and to see how
their views on modality map onto the general spectrum of views on offer at the time. As
we shall see, situating Buridan in this history proves to be non-trivial. After situating
these two views, we will go on to look at some of the connections, common ground
and differences that exist between Buridan and Kilwardby. We will start with the most
concrete connection, by comparing Kilwardby’s treatment of per se modalities with
Buridan’s discussion of essential properties and essences in a number of works (but with
particular attention to the Summulae de Dialectica).
The next topic we will treat in this chapter is the ontological underpinnings of Buri-
dan’s framework. We will attempt to see if we can obtain a clearer view of how Buridan
conceives of modality and the ontology that underpins his modal theory. We will frame
this debate in terms of the modern debate between contingentism and necessitism, as
this will help us get clearer on the ontological question. We will use these theories to
help answer two questions that arise in the context of Buridan’s analysis of modality.
Of these, one will look at the question of the ontological status of the objects in Buri-
dan’s theory and the other will concern the sorts of inferences that Buridan admits in
his modal theory. The first question can be broached by asking ‘what sorts of objects
does Buridan’s nominalist ontology commit him to when he talk about non-existent or
‘possible objects’ in some of the passages in the Treatise on Consequence?’ The second
can be discerned by looking at some of the inferences that Buridan accepts and rejects
as valid. In particular, we should enquire as to whether Buridan’s views about the infer-
ential relationship between divided and composite modal propositions commit Buridan
to a rejection of the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae.
The Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae, named in honour of Ruth Barcan Marcus,
can be formulated as:
BF ◇∃xφx→ ∃x◇ φx
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CBF ∃x◇ φx→◇∃xφx
Let v and w be worlds and Dw and Dv be the set of objects that exist at w and
v respectively. The logical significance of the Barcan formula is that it amounts to
requiring that if wRv then Dw ⊆ Dv. The converse Barcan formula requires that if
wRv then Dv ⊆Dw. The philosophical importance of these formulae has been discussed
at length in various places, and a number of philosophical positions closely connect
the validity of these formulae to necessitism, the view that necessarily, everything is
necessarily something. For example, see [66]. We will argue that, because Buridan
seems committed to reject both of these propositions, and given some other remarks
by Buridan, he is committed to some sort of contingentism. We will discuss what this
means for Buridan’s ontology and its relationship to the modal syllogism. As we develop
this framework, we will be exploring the suitability of understanding Buridan’s modal
logic in terms of the modern notions of possible worlds.
In the final section of this chapter, we will raise a meta-level question about the project
that we have been undertaking. Throughout these logical reconstructions we have been
analysing the modalities present in medieval authors by means of Kripke frames, a
modern formal apparatus. How valid is this construction? What exactly is the point of
doing this, and, more importantly, can we conclude anything substantive about medieval
modal theories based on their representations within the lights of modern logic? Here
we will argue that this issue relates closely to the interpretive gloss offered on the Kripke
semantics used to formalise the theories1. We will argue that in the case of Buridan, the
use of possible worlds semantics is historically appropriate and the results of our modal
logic may prove useful for interpreting Buridan’s logic. In the case of Kilwardby we will
argue that this is not the case and that our formal treatment of Kilwardby should be
read as offering a modern take on Kilwardby’s logic.
6.2 Situation Figures within Modal History
In order to situate Kilwardby and Buridan’s modal theories, it may be helpful to rehearse
some of the main details of the development of medieval theories of modality and modal
logic. Broadly, there were three main groups whose thinking and writings influenced
the development of medieval modal logic. As we have already remarked in a couple
of places, the medieval study of modal logic was one that developed and was deeply
influenced by the Greek sources that were available to them. The most influential of
these, at first, were Boethius’s translations of Aristotle’s De interpretatione and the
Categories as well as Porphyrius’s Isogoge.2 Later, as more of Aristotle’s works became
available, the rest of the Organon exerted a considerable influence on medieval theories
of modality, as we have already seen in the case of Kilwardby. A second influence
came through the theological writings of a number of ‘Church Fathers’ in particular
Augustine, who had a considerable impact on the way modality was understood and
1. By gloss we mean, what sort of motivation that is offered to interpret the various parts of the math-
ematical model (e.g. W,R,O,D, c and v in the case of Buridan)
2. See [33, p.505]
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conceived. Most of these writings influenced the development of modal theories focusing
around theological issues such as God’s power and on the sorts of things that it was
possible or impossible for God to do. Third, and finally, there was the influence of
medieval Arabic logicians/philosophers, who we will not discuss in detail here.
Our survey in this section will cover a few selected interpretations of modality that
are relevant to our discussions of Buridan and Kilwardby. We will start by looking at
the statistical interpretation of modality, the potential interpretation of modality and
(briefly) the temporal interpretation of modality, and discuss the role that essentialism
and modal conversion rules played in these 12th and 13th century developments. We will
then look at theories of modality in the 14th and in particular some of the contours of
Duns Scotus’ modal theory.
6.2.1 Modal Logic in the 12th & 13th centuries
In the 12th and 13th centuries, approaches to modality were closely connected with
a number of related Aristotelian metaphysical ideas. Our commentary here follows
Knuuttila’s in [33] observing, the standard view of the time can be well summed up in
the following passage from Aquinas’ commentary on the Peri Hermeneias:
In necessary matter, all affirmative propositions are determinately true; this
holds for propositions in the future tense as well as in the past and present
tenses; and negative ones are false. In impossible matter the contrary is the
case. In contingent matter, however, universal propositions are false and
particular propositions are true. This is the case in future tense propositions
as well as those in the past and present tenses. In indefinite ones, both are
at once true in the future tense propositions as well as those in the past and
present tenses. [33, p.507]
There are a number of things here that are interesting, but our main focus will be to
observe that the ideas of necessity, impossibility, and contingency are closely tied to the
matter of the proposition. The matter of a proposition can be elucidated in the following
way:
If the predicate is per se in the subject, it will be said to be a proposition
in necessary or natural matter, for example, ‘Man is an animal’ and ‘Man
is risible’. If the predicate is per se repugnant to the subject, as in a way
excluding the notion of it, it is said to be a proposition in impossible or
remote matter, for example ‘Man is an ass’. If the predicate is related to the
subject in a way midway between these two, being neither per se repugnant
to the subject nor per se in it, the proposition is said to be in possible or
contingent matter. [33, p.508]
It is helpful to observe that by the time we come to Aquinas, we have a very succinct
and clear presentation of the ideas of per se predication of terms, and the relationship
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between them and the matter of a proposition. Aquinas’s theory is one example of what
is referred to as a statistical model for modality. In such a model, the notion of necessity
is connected with a notion of containment or of omni-temporal actuality of something
within all members of a species, contingency with some members of the species possessing
the property and impossibility with no members of the species possessing the property.
As we have already seen (see page 13), Kilwardby’s theory of modality falls under this
framework, specifically under the second disjunct.
Another view that was considered during the middle ages was the view of possibility
as potency or the potential interpretation of modality. As in the previous case, the
inspiration for this view came from Aristotle, in this case by way of Metaphysics V.12
and IX.1. In these passages potency is described as a principle of motion where something
is either an activator or a receptor of the relevant influence. Modal notions were then
developed based on these ideas, often following Aristotle’s observation that this is one
legitimate sense of ‘can’. Something is necessary on this view if its potency is never
unrealised, i.e. the thing in question is always actual. Their nature is such that they are
always actual.[33, p.513] Similarly, a thing is impossible if its potency is never actualised.
The original idea behind this theory was to account for various kinds of changes in
objects.
A third approach to understanding possibility and necessity is to employ various no-
tions of time and tense. The view was motivated by Aristotle’s comments in the Peri
Hermeneias 9.19 A23-24. In this much studied passage, Aristotle draws a distinction
between what is necessary without qualification and what is actual. Interpreting this
passage and the distinctions that Aristotle was using gave rise to a number of differ-
ent interpretations.3 However, what eventually developed was a view of modality that
sought to unpack modal notions by thinking of them in temporal terms. One very sim-
ple view is to read ‘possibly φ’ as saying that either φ is true, was true or will be true.
Likewise, ‘necessarily φ’ is read as saying that φ is true, was always true and will always
be true. This is the temporal interpretation of modality. We note this view, only to set
it aside, as it does not play an important role in either Kilwardby or Buridan’s modal
logic.
6.2.2 Modal Logic in the 14th century
As we move to look at the time when Buridan wrote, one observes that in the intellectual
landscape of 14th century, a number of important changes had occurred over the past
200 years. Most important among them for our purposes was that:
In contrast to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, many Scholastics of the
fourteenth and fifteenth viewed the world as radically contingent, depending
upon a divine will able to will other than it does will. Belief in God’s ab-
solute power to do anything that does not involve a contradiction meant a
concomitant belief that only some of the logically possible possibilities could
be actual at any one time. . . Moreover, since this world unfolds its events over
3. See [33][p.516] and references given there.
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time, it seemed possible that alternative futures still lay open to divine and
human choice– that what would come to pass was not ultimately determined
or perhaps even determinate.[18][p.2]
It is these two commitments, combined with the idea of God’s omniscience, that led
to a number of interesting and striking problems for medieval theologians. The devel-
opments are equally important for the analysis of possibility. The impact of Aquinas’
statistical views on modality seems to have been underwhelming. For example, when we
look at Dominican discussions of possibility and necessity in the 1320’s and 1330’s we
find that
And yet absent from their works are the Thomist analysis of necessity and
contingency according to Aristotelian causal theory, the Thomist emphasis
on providence and its allied compatibilism, the Principle of Plenitude, and
other hallmarks of Aquinas system. [18][p.123]
What we find in place of this view is the final view in the history of modal logic that
we are interested in, the view that something is possible just in case it is within (or
compatible with) the absolute power of God to bring it about. According to Knuuttila,
this view has its origin in the bible[30, p.199] and was present in Christian writers as
early as Tertullian. However, it is John Duns Scotus who is usually credited with the
development of this view and of seeing the implications this had for logic and meta-
physics more generally. In his writings Scotus rejects Aristotle’s thesis that the present
is necessary, and develops a conception of synchronic alternatives.[31, p.129] Scotus’s
view can be described as follows:
The main lines of Scotus’ theory of modality are easy to understand without
any speculative interpretations. This depends on the fact that his starting
point is a criticism of the statistical interpretation of modality. An extensive
discussion about the theory of modality is to be found in distinction 39 of the
first book of Scotus’ commentary on the Sentences. . . According to Scotus a
causatum can be contingent only if the first cause functions in a contingent
way. The contingency of phenomena in a causal chain depends on whether
the whole universe (which is ultimately reducible to the first cause) could be
different. Scotus take this to be conceptually possible. [30, p.225]
What is important here is the idea that the actual world does not need to be the way
it is. Scotus’ ideas cut against the statistical interpretation of modality and
Scotus often treated modal notions in a way which shows similarities to what
has been done in the contemporary possible worlds semantics. [31, p.130]
As Knuuttila goes on to observe, there are a number of interpretations of Scotus that
make his views appear to be very modern in spirit.
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Punch’s interpretation of Scotus’s modal theory is possibilistic and that of
Mastrius is conceptualistic and mind dependent. I have argued that Scotus’s
theory of purely logical possibilities is not possibilistic in any standard sense
and that that it is not mind dependent at this level either.[31, p.142] 4
What is important for our purposes here is to observe that, broadly speaking, there
are important philosophical parallels that exist between modern theories of modality and
the theory of modality advocated by Scotus. In part, this is important in our attempts
to situate Buridan’s theory, and it is also important when we turn to think about the
relationship between the formal systems we have developed for these two figures and the
faithfulness of our representations of them.
This leaves us with the question of situating Buridan within these theories. As we have
already remarked in a few places, Buridan does not attempt to offer an interpretation
or a gloss on what it means for a proposition to be necessary or possible in the Treatise
on Consequences. As such, this means that any attempt to situate Buridan’s analysis
must be somewhat speculative in nature. From what we know of the life of Scotus, he
was lecturing on the Sentences at the University of Paris from 1302, subsequently being
expelled from France in June 1303, returning to Paris in April 1304. He remained in
Paris, likely around October of 1307. From this, it is seems likely that Scotus’ views, both
theological and philosophical (including his views on modality) would have been in the
air while Buridan was a student in Paris.5 The difficulties become further complicated
when we observe that Buridan’s philosophical positions are, generally speaking, not
consistent with Scotus. However, there seems to be at least one place where Buridan
does make implicit use of Scotus’ views on modality.
Buridan seems to show some awareness of Scotus’ views on modality in his Quaestiones
super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis. According to Knuuttila,
In question 22 of the first book of the questions on Aristotle’s Physics, Buri-
dan analyzes the terms “potency” and “possibility” as follows. One can take
these terms to refer (1) to a proposition which expresses something that is
possible, (2) to something which can be actualized by the interplay of an
active potency and a passive potency which exist in nature, or (3) to some-
thing which can be realized by the supreme active potency which is God’s
omnipotence. He says that things which are possible in sense (2) are also
possible in sense (3) and the same holds of (1) as far as propositions are
treated. . . Even though divine omnipotence is the ultimate executive power,
the possibilities which can be realised are possible by themselves. As for
4. By ‘possibilistic’ Knuuttila writes: “In the possibilist theories, possible worlds are treated as having
some kind of reality, either all of them as having equal being as Lewis thinks, or the actual world of
ours as having the superior sort of being.”[31, p.142]
5. Even this is not entirely clear. Scotus would have likely been a master in the English nation and as
such, it is unclear how quickly or completely Scotus’ views on modality would have been disseminated
to the other nations in the university. However, it is not unreasonable to suppose that by the time
Buridan was an Art’s master (some 15-20 years later) these views would have been known.
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the unrealized possible beings (possibilia), Buridan states that they have no
existence and are not founded on anything.[32, p.71]
As Knuuttila goes on to point out, the view of possibility that Buridan sketches in the
Questions on the Physics is one that only makes sense in the framework of the modal
metaphysics developed by Scotus. What this suggests is that by the time Buridan wrote
his Quaestiones he was aware of Scotus’ position and was willing to make use of it in
understanding the distinction between something that is physically possible/impossible
and something that is possible simpliciter. This offers some further evidence for seeing
Buridan’s modal theory in the Summulae and perhaps the Treatise on Consequences as
being aware of Scotus’ modal theory, albeit developed in a different direction.
One final point, if this sort of theologically informed modal view is what Buridan
is working with, then it does make some sense as to why he might not have wanted
to offer a gloss or an interpretation of necessity and possibility. As is well-known, the
Arts faculty at the University of Pairs had, by the time of Buridan, gotten itself into
theological troubles with the church a number of times, perhaps most famously in the
condemnation of 1277, but other times as well. By Buridan’s time Arts masters were
normally required to promise to not speak on matters outside of their discipline (i.e. on
matters of theology) and at least one point in the Treatise on Consequences Buridan
makes reference to this.6 Because of this, if Buridan wanted to avoid courting theological
controversy, it would be prudent of him to avoid mentioning any more theologically
relevant ideas concerning modality than he needs to in order to establish his conclusions
about modal consequences.
6.3 Per Se per Buridan & Kilwardby
There are a few challenges that are present if we want to compare and contrast Buri-
dan and Kilwardby’s accounts of modality. First, and perhaps most glaringly, while
Kilwardby offers us some explanation and motivation for the different sorts of modal op-
erators that he is using (those that are per se and per accidens), Buridan does not offer
us a similar sort of distinction for the sorts of modal operations that he is using.7 This
entire chapter is intended to help us better compare these two theories. A second, and
related problem comes from both the historical and philosophical distance between Kil-
wardby and Buridan. Kilwardby’s metaphysics and ontology are fundamentally realist
in nature, while Buridan is a chief defender of nominalism.
On the metaphysical front, things are not as grim as they appear. As has been pointed
out by Klima (see [27],[28]), while seeking to be a nominalist, Buridan also wants to
6. As we have already noted, this was in the context of the validity of the syllogism as it relates to
the presence of Trinitarian terms. Buridan remarks that: “Now whether according to another way of
speaking syllogisms in divine terms are formally valid and what that form is, I leave to the theologians.
And it should be noted and always kept in mind that, because it is not for me, an Arts man, to decide
regarding the foregoing beyond what was said. . . ”[51]Book Three, Conclusion 1
7. So far as I am aware, the closest we get to this in the Treatise on Consequences is the difference
between divided and composite modalities. However, in neither case are these modal operations
reduced to simpler notions nor are we given explicit motivation for how they should be analysed.
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‘affirm’ the ‘existence’ of essences and admit them into his theories. This has been
coined Buridan’s “essentialist nominalism”. In order to better discuss the relationship
between Kilwardby and Buridan’s analysis of modality, it will prove helpful to start with
this natural touchstone. While (so far as I am aware) Buridan does not use per se to
provide a distinction between different sorts of modalities, Buridan does have quite a bit
to say about essences and essential properties, which we will review below.
6.3.1 Buridan’s Essentialist Nominalism
When speaking of an ‘essentialist nominalism’ it is very important that we be clear on
exactly what such a position amounts to.8
Before we venture into this directly, it may be helpful to set aside a few possible
misconceptions. First, the debate between medieval realists and nominalists was not
a debate between those who accepted the existence of ‘platonic’ or ‘abstract objects’
(the realists) and those who denied their existence (the nominalists). Both camps took
Aristotle to have soundly refuted such a position, to the point that some found the
‘platonic’ view so absurd that they doubted if Plato really subscribed to it.9 Hence both
parties to this debate took the objects in question to be just as individual and temporal
as any other object would be.[26, p.476]
So then, what is the difference between nominalists like Buridan and realists? At this
point it is helpful to distinguish between ‘pre-Ockham’ realists, like Giles of Rome and
Kilwardby, and ‘post-Ockham’ realists such as Burley, Scotus, etc.10 The main difference
between ‘pre-Ockham’ realists and both nominalists and ‘post-Ockham’ realists was that:
while the former [‘pre-Ockham’ realists] would consider abstract terms in
the accidental categories to be essential predicates of their particulars, the
latter would reject this assumption. . .
What seems to be at the bottom of the “older realist” commitment, then,
in interpreting abstract accidental terms as the genera and species, that
is, essential predicates of their particulars. To be sure, even those authors
who can justifiably be regarded as “older realists” in the sense of working
within the semantic framework outlined above plus endorsing the view that
abstract terms in the accidental categories are essential predicates of their
supposita. . . were prepared to regard several abstract terms as non-essential
predicates of their supposita. [26, p.483, ft 18]
What then makes Buridan an essentialist nominalist? In [27, p.740] Klima suggests
that we can draw a distinction between ‘predicate-essentialism’ and ‘realist essentialism’.
The view attributed to Buridan here is that Buridan wants to be able to attribute
essential predicates to things, but in doing so, he is not committed to positing some
8. As is pointed out in [27, p.739], on many contemporary conceptions, nominalism and essentialism
turn out to be in strong tension or are flat out incompatible.
9. See [26, p.476] and the references in ft.7 to Giles of Rome and John Wyclif.
10. The terms ‘pre-Ockham’ and ‘post-Ockham’ are not ideal terms, since, for example, Burley is con-
temporaneous with Ockham. However, they are better then using terms such as ‘older’ and ‘newer’.
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shared common essence. The challenge, of course, is to see if it is actually possible to
pull these two notions apart in a way that is coherent.
So then, how does Buridan conceive of essential predication? The following quote
offers some insight:
Since something is called a predicable because it is apt to be predicated of
many things, it is reasonable to distinguish the species or modes contained
under the term ‘predicable’ according to the different modes of predication.
Therefore, everything that is predicated of something is either predicated
essentially, so that neither term adds some extraneous connotation to the
signification of the other; or it is predicated denominatively, so that one
term does add some extrinsic connotation to the signification of the other.
This division is clearly exhaustive, for it is given in terms of opposites. [5,
p.106]
What is interesting here is how Buridan goes about defining essential and denominative
predication. The definition of essential predication is cashed out in terms of what is
‘added’ to the connotation of a term. This is, at least at first glance, different from
Kilwardby’s conception of a per se necessity, where the consequent of the predication is
understood in the antecedent. However, things become more interesting when we try to
flesh out Buridan’s definition. In order to do this, we need to look at the connotation
of a term. So far as I am aware, Buridan does not explicitly define connotation, how-
ever, there are numerous examples that make it clear how Buridan sees the relationship
working. For example:
The terms ‘white’ and ‘black’ connote qualities of the substances for which
they supposit, and it is on account of these [qualities] that [the substances] are
said to be such and such; again, the terms ‘two cubits long’ and ‘three cubits
long’ [connote] the quantities [of substances] by which they are measurable.
But it is in accordance with another mode of pertaining to [adiacentia], or
relation [habitudo], that terms from the category of time [quando When?],
such as ‘today’ or ‘tomorrow’, appellate the motion of the heavens around
the things of which we say that they are today or will be tomorrow, and so
on for the other cases. [5, p.880]
The point is that a term like ‘black’ or ‘two cubits long’ supposits for the particular
object in question (the thing that is black, the thing that is two cubits long etc.) but
it also connotes additional information about the thing for which it supposits. For
example, in the proposition ‘Socrates is black’ both ‘Socrates’ and ‘black’ supposit for
the same object, namely Socrates, but in this case the term ‘black’ provides additional
information about Socrates. From this definition we can see how predicates get many
of the properties they are usually taken to have. For example, on Buridan’s account,
accidental (denominative) predicates can cease to be true about an object, even if the
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object still exists. For example, ‘Socrates is walking’ will be true as long as Socrates is
walking, but when he stops walking, the proposition becomes false. Likewise, the only
way that an object can cease to have an essential property is if that object ceases to
exist. For example, in the proposition ‘Socrates is a human’, both ‘Socrates’ and human
supposit for Socrates, and since ‘humanity’ does not connote anything extraneous about
Socrates, the only way this proposition could be false, is if Socrates ceased to exist. For
this interpretation to work, we need to place quite a bit of emphasis on the connotation
of the particular words and the way they constrain when a term can and cannot be truly
predicated of a thing.
The role of connotation is also closely connected with Buridan’s analysis of appellative
terms, and some discussion of this will help us get clearer on what is going on with
connotation and essential terms.
First, translation of the term ‘appellatio’ varies from author to author and situation to
situation. For example, in many authors other then Buridan, ‘appellatio’ is best trans-
lated by ‘connotative’ or similar expressions. This is because Buridan’s understanding
of appellative terms is an idiosyncratic one. According to Lambert of Auxerre (Lagny)
there are four possible ways that ‘appellatio’ can be understood:
Because appellation is a kind of supposition, supposition was considered first.
Now we must discuss appellation.. . . Now it is essential to know that ‘appel-
lation’ is used in four ways. In one way, proper names, or the proper name
of any person, is called appellation. In this connection it is said that some-
one has the appellation ‘Peter’ or ‘William’. Taken in this way, appellation
is nothing other than the establishment of an utterance for signifying some
complex or noncomplex thing; and ‘appellation’ is often used this way in
obligations, in connection with which it is said that ‘A’ appellates Socrates
or appellates that a man is running. ‘Appellation’ used in the second way is
a property of names in according with which names are called appellative. In
this sense appellation is nothing other than the positing of a common nature
containing more than one suppositum under it. (Appellation is something
common when it belongs to more than one but something proper when it
belongs to one.)
‘Appellation’ used in the third way is the acceptance of a term for a sup-
positum or {212} for supposita contained under its thing signified, whether
or not those supposita are existing things. ‘Appellation’ taken in this way
applies to terms having supposita under them either actually or potentially,
and also to names of things signified. Used in the fourth way, ‘appellation’ is
the acceptance of a term for a suppositum or for suppositia actually existing.
[34, pp. 113-114]
As Lambert goes on to observe, every instance of appellation requires an instance of
supposition, while the converse does not hold.[34][p.114] The first sense of appellation
is the one that is most closely connected with the dictionary definition of ‘appellare’,
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meaning to name. This sense is just the usual action of giving something a name. The
second sense of appellation is an extension of this, where a particular name supposits for
something that is common (here called a common nature) to multiple supposita. This is
further subdivided into common appellation if the name supposits for multiple objects,
and proper appellation if it supposits for only one name. The third sense of appellation
is when a term is taken for a particular suppositum, regardless of whether or not the
thing exists. In this sense, the name ‘Socrates’ (referring to the historical philosopher)
appellates a philosopher, even though Socrates does not currently exist. The final sense
of appellation imposes the condition that the suppositum of the appellated term must
actually exist.
Buridan distinguishes appellative and non-appellative terms in the following way:
Now we turn to appellation. Some terms are appellative and others are not.
For substantial terms in the nominative case or terms not connoting anything
at all beyond the things for which they supposit are not appellative terms
properly speaking. But every term connoting something other than what it
supposits for is called ‘appellative’ and appellates that which it connotes as
pertaining to [adiacens] that which it supposits for, as when ‘white’ [album]
appellates whiteness as pertaining to that which the term ‘white’ [album] is
apt to supposit for.[5, p.291]
As is clear from this definition, appellation is defined in terms of connotation. As in
the case of essential terms, non-appellative terms do not connote anything more then
they supposit for. However, what an appellative term does is “always appellates its form,
whether it is placed on the side of the subject, i.e., before the verb, or on the side of the
predicate, i.e., after the verb” [5, p.291]. Buridan’s take on this classical expression is
the following:
So I say that, conventionally, by the ‘matter’ of a term we usually understand
that for which the term is apt to supposit. . . But by the ‘form’ of a term we
usually understand whatever the term appellates, whether it is an accident
or a substance and whether it is matter or form, a composite of matter
and form, or an aggregate of many things. For example, the term ‘wealthy’
supposits for a man, and so the man is called its ‘matter’, and it appellates
houses, lands, and money, and other things he possesses as pertaining to him
as to their possessor, and so such things, insofar as [ea ratione qua] they are
possessed, are called the ‘form’ of the term ‘wealthy’ [5, p.292]
So, on Buridan’s account of essences, a property is essential to an object if that object
is among the supposita of the property in question, and the property does not connote
anything additional to what the object is.
What are we to make of the difference between Buridan and Kilwardby on Essences?
In one sense, there is not much of interest to say here that has not already been said
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in connection with other debates between realists and nominalists in the Middle Ages.
Buridan’s approaches to essences is cast in terms of the individuals and the connotation
of terms, while Kilwardby grounds the essences of things in the meaning of the terms,
which are things do not simply reduce down to the objects that fall under a particular
term. It is, however, helpful to see the two theories in some detail to appreciate just
how different they are.
6.4 Expositio, Modal and Essential
In the previous chapter we spoke at length about Buridan’s theory of the expository
syllogism and how a slightly extended version of it could be used to provide a basis for
the modal syllogism. At this point, two natural questions present themselves. First,
‘How does Kilwardby conceive of the expository syllogism?’ and second, ‘In what ways
does Kilwardby’s conception of the expository syllogism differ from Buridan’s?’ It is to
these questions that we now turn.
In his writing on Aristotle’s logic, Kilwardby observes that there are three methods
by which a syllogism can be perfected.11 According to Aristotle, first figure syllogisms
are perfect and require no further justification to make them evident.12 Hence, one way
to perfect a particular non first figure syllogism is to show that one can transform that
syllogism into a valid first figure one. For example, Ferison, (‘No B is C’, ‘Some B is A’
therefore ‘Not every A is C’), can be reduced to Ferio, by observing that ‘Some B is A’
is equivalent to ‘Some A is B’. Normally such transformations involve either converting
one of the premises, switching the major and minor premise, or moving from a universal
premise to a particular one.
The second way is to prove the syllogism per impossibile. This form of inference
involves assuming the contradictory of the conclusion and showing that a contradiction13
follows from this assumption together with the major and minor premises. The third
way of showing an inference is perfect is by use of an expository syllogism. As we have
already seen, the expository syllogism usually involves selecting a singular term and
using these singular terms to show that a particular inference is valid. According to
Kilwardby, the principle of expository syllogism always yields a valid conclusion and one
that is evident to the senses.
Kilwardby writes:
And he [presumably, Aristotle] says that it can shown per impossibile, and
11. The notion of perfectibility is connected to our ability to know if a particular syllogism is valid or
not. Aristotle remarks that: “I call that a perfect syllogism which needs nothing other than what has
been stated to make plain what necessarily follows; a syllogism is imperfect, if it needs either one or
more propositions which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down, but have not
been expressly stated as premises.” Prior Analytics 24b23-26.
12. For Barbara and Celarent see Prior Analytics 26a3-12, for Darii and Ferio, see Prior Analytics 26a16-
30.
13. Here a contradiction amounts to deriving either (AaB and AoB) or (AiB and AeB) for some terms A
and B.
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also by exposition. To show it by exposition is to descend to some designated
individual and to posit a singular beyond the universal, and so to exhibit what
was proposed to the senses. So if some designated object is taken under the
middle of which each of the extremes is said it is necessary that one extreme
is said particularly of the other extreme.14[61, p.149]
What is important to note here is that, in the case of the assertoric syllogism, the
terms selected for the expository syllogism are always singular terms. When we move
to the modal context, this will not be the case. The main reason for this should be
obvious. As we have already seen, for Kilwardby the truth of necessary propositions do
not require that there be anything that necessarily or actually falls under the subject.
As such, the move from ‘Some B is necessarily A’ to ‘This C is A’ and ‘This same C is
B’ would be invalid if C refers to some object that does not currently exist. Kilwardby
is well aware of this problem and fixes it in a natural way. According to Kilwardby,
the term ‘C’ in the expository syllogism can either refer to a particular singular object
(presumably we can do this if we have already shown that such an object exists) or we
can descend to a term that is less general than the terms in the premise, but of which it
is true to say, ‘This C is necessarily A’ and ‘This same C is necessarily B’.15
Given what we have already seen formally, the idea is that we need to find the following
inferences:
Premise Less General Term
‘Every A is per se necessarily B’ entails A ≤ B
‘Some A is per se necessarily B’ entails ∃C, such that C ≤ A and C ≤ B
‘No A is per se necessarily B’ entails ¬∃C, such that C ≤ A and C ≤ B
‘Not every A is per se necessarily B’ entails A ≰ B
Given what we have set up, our theory does not have any problem tracking this theory.
We can always make the required inferences. In the worst case, we will have to select
one of the terms, (either A or B) to stand in as our ‘less general term’.16
We can reconstruct the negative syllogism Thom considers[60, p.152]:
‘Some C is necessarily not A’, ‘Every B is necessarily A’ therefore ‘Some C is necessarily
not B’ as follows: First, select some common term D, such that D ≤ C and D ≰ A.
14. Et dicit quod per impossible ostendi potest; similiter etiam per expositionem. Et est ostendere per
expositionem descendere ad aliquid individuum signatum et ponere singulare extra suum universale,
et sic ad sensum manifestare propositum. Si ergo sub medio accipiatur aliquid signatum de quo dicitur
utrumque extremorum necesse est extremum de extremo dici particulariter.
15. Kilwardby writes: “Et dicendum, ut dicant aliqui, quod non fit hic expositio per singularia vere sed
per minus universalia, et illa sumi, dicunt, universaliter sic ‘Necesse est omnem hominem esse animal,
necesse est quoddam album non esse animal, ergo necesse est album non esse hominem.’ Et exponi
devet ‘album’ non per aliquid signatum sensible, sed per aliquid particulare album cuiusmodi est nix.
Et ideo sumi debet universaliter, et fiet sillogismus in secundo secunde sic‘Necesse omnem hominem
esse animal, necesse nullam nivem esse animal, ergo necesse est nullam nivem esse hominem.’ Et
ita cum nix sit aliquod album, necesse est aliquod album non esse hominem. Consequenter facienda
est expositio in quinto tertie, et fiet sillogismus expositorius in secundo tertie. Et ita utrobique fit
sillogismus expositorius in eadem figura cum eo qui exponitur, licet non in eodem modo. Sic satis
bene dici potest.”
16. This will occur in cases where A is lower bound of a particular sequence in which B occurs and B is
immediately above A.
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Then D ≰ A, together with ‘Every B is necessarily A’ (B ≤ A) entails that D ≰ B, which
together with D ≤ A entails that ‘Some C is necessarily not B’ as desired.
In fact, what this analysis suggests is that Kilwardby could have, if he so desired,
restricted the expository syllogism in the modal case to only allow for the selection of
less general terms. If singular terms happened to fall under a particular general term, this
would be covered by the inclusion of meaning of the singular terms in the general terms.17
On this reading, it would seem that Kilwardby could have placed a much lower stress
on the particular individuals that fall under particular predicates then other medievals
(say, Buridan for example) did. What seems to be more important for Kilwardby is the
relationships that hold or fail to hold between the particular terms of interest.
As we saw in Buridan, the validity of the expository syllogism was based on two rules,
one dealing with the case when one singular term was affirmative and the other negative
(the principle of difference) and one when both premises were affirmative (the principle
of sameness). What, according to Kilwardby, accounts for the validity of the expository
syllogism?
According to Kilwardby, the validity of the expository syllogism is the principle ‘what-
ever follows from the consequent also follows from the antecedent.’ He writes:
But it may be asked how the syllogism of this figure is perfected by means
of an exposition, since it is necessary that what follows from a universal
proposition, follows from a singular proposition because a singular contrac-
tion is made in the universal proposition to some of these singulars. And it
is said that the necessity of this is seen through the principle: what follows
from the consequent follows from the antecedent.18 [61, p.150]
For Kilwardby, the validity of the expository syllogism is grounded in a much simpler
way then Buridan’s. His observation is simply that, in each case, the inferences to the
singular terms follow from the particular syllogisms, and the inferences from the singular
terms/less general terms also meet the request definition of validity.
Unfortunately, while what Kilwardby says is true, it is somewhat uninformative as
to why these inferences are valid. Part of this likely stems from Kilwardby’s interest
in the syllogism. Unlike Buridan, Kilwardby does not ground his understanding of the
syllogism in the expository syllogism. This, combined with Kilwardby’s more textually
based approach to the modal syllogism (in contrast with Buridan’s more systematic
presentation of a modal syllogism that is weaker then Aristotle’s), suggests that the
17. For this to work, it would be required that singular terms are the ‘lowest’ elements in any sequence
of ≤. While this assumption was not made in our formal treatment of Kilwardby, it can be accommo-
dated. For example, we could select a particular subset, S of terms to be singular terms, and impose
requirements on ≤ and v requiring that each term in S be incomparable with all of the others in S
and require that every term not in S is greater than or incomparable with every element in S.
18. Sed queretur de expositione per quam perficit quosdam sillogismos huius figure, qua necessitate se-
quatur ad propositiones universales quod sequitur ad singulares quando fit contractio subiecti in
propositionibus universalibus ad hoc aliquod et singulare. Et dicendum quod necessitas patet per
hanc maximam: Quod sequitur ad consequens sequitur ad antecedens.
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expository syllogism played a much less important role in Kilwardby’s analysis of the
syllogism then it did for Buridan.
Likewise, Buridan and Kilwardby’s approach to the expository syllogism in the context
of modal propositions is very different. Because of Buridan’s ampliative reading of the
subject, Buridan does not run afoul of Kilwardby’s condemnation in 1277 since, in
Buridan’s case, the subject is ampliated to cover all of the objects that do or could ever
fall under that proposition. However, Buridan’s analysis of the expository syllogism is
entirely based on singular terms which is entirely in keeping with the key roles supposition
and ampliation play in Buridan’s analysis of the syllogism and his nominalism more
generally. In contrast, Kilwardby’s use of the expository syllogism admits both singular
terms and less general categorical terms. To a nominalist, the inclusion of terms of
various degrees of generality will be unsatisfactory if such terms cannot ultimately be
reduced down to the singular terms that either do or do not fall under those other terms.
Given Kilwardby’s realist commitments, this is clearly not a problem for his logic.
This reading seems closer to what Aristotle might have had in mind with his use
of the expository syllogism, and also allows Kilwardby to preserve the validity of the
expository syllogism for modal operations without having to raise any theologically or
metaphysically loaded questions. This is not the case for Buridan, as we shall see in the
next section.
There is one other tangential question that is worth asking at this point, though
Kilwardby does not address the question here: On Kilwardby’s theory, is the expository
syllogism naturally valid, like the syllogisms or is it only accidentally valid? From what
we have seen formally, we would predict that the inference would be a naturally valid
inference, as meaning is preserved when we descend to a common term, and then reascend
to the terms above it.
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A few times in our discussion of Buridan’s logic we have flagged some of the inter-
esting metaphysical comments or assumptions that Buridan has been making. These
observations are best summed up in the following passage, due to G. Hughes:
A short digression seems in order here. For a long time I was puzzled about
what Buridan could mean by talking about possible but non-actual things of
a certain kind. Did he mean by a ‘possibly A’, I wondered, an actual object
which is not in fact A, but might have been or might become, A?. . . But this
interpretation will not do; for Buridan wants to talk, e.g., about possible
horses; and it seems quite clear that he does not believe that there are, or
even could be, things which are not in fact horses but which might become
horses. What I want to suggest here, very briefly, is that we might understand
what he says in terms of modern ‘possible world semantics’. Possible world
theorists are quite accustomed to talking about possible worlds in which there
are more horses than there are in the actual world. And then, if Buridan
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assures us that by ‘Every horse can sleep’ he means ‘Everything that is or can
be a horse can sleep’ we could understand this to mean that for everything
that is a horse in any possible world, there is a (perhaps other) possible world
in which it is asleep. It seems to me, in fact, that in his modal logic he is
implicitly working with a kind of possible worlds semantics throughout. [20,
p.9]
Hughes’ remarks here nicely summarise a natural set of questions that emerge when we
look at Buridan’s modal logic, which we will place under the heading of Buridan’s modal
ontology. Buridan talks quite freely about things which can be water even if they are
not water, or of stars and planets that can be in a particular position in the sky, even if
they currently are not.19 The first question to ask then, is what is the ontological status
of these objects? When Buridan speaks of these objects, what exactly are they? As the
example of water makes clear, Buridan is not only speaking of objects that currently do
exist but might be in a different configuration, but also of things that do not exist.
A second and related question that flows out of this concerns the permanence of these
objects.20 To cast this in even more modern terms, where would Buridan stand on the
debate between necessitism and contingentism? Very briefly, we can sum up the two
positions with the following quote:
Call the proposition that it is necessary what there is necessitism and its
negation contingentism. In slightly less compressed form, necessitism says
that necessarily everything is necessarily something; still more long-windedly:
it is necessary that everything is such that it is necessary that something is
identical with it. [66, p.3]
Our methodology for answering these questions is as follows. In his book Modal
Logic as Metaphysics[66] Williamson sets out a number of arguments for necessitism
and reflects on a number of consequences that follow from adopting necessitism. What
we will do is see in which places Buridan goes along with Williamson (or it seems like
he would) and in which places he differs from Williamson. The idea is that we will use
Modal Logic as Metaphysics as giving us a collection of criteria for identifying someone
who holds to some flavour of necessitism. We use Modal Logic as Metaphysics as this is
one of the most recent and most through defences of necessitism.
Our goal here is twofold. First, historically, by comparing Buridan’s views to this mod-
ern question we will hopefully gain a somewhat better understanding of exactly what
Buridan was or was not up to with his modal theory. Second, we will see how Buridan’s
logic and his theory connect to this interesting metaphysical debate and see how Buri-
dan’s modal logic better relates to modern modal logic and modal metaphysics. In doing
19. See Treatise on Consequence Book Two Chapter 4 P1.
20. At this point we will limit our attention to what can be gleaned from Buridan’s logic. As the quote
from Knuuttila’s treatment of Buridan’s physics suggests, there are other places where this topic
comes up. We will not include this in the discussion in part because of scope and in part because I
was not able to look at the Renaissance edition of Buridan’s text.
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this we will also have the opportunity to focus on a few features of Buridan’s modal logic
that will help us better understand Buridan’s position. In order to accomplish this, we
will first sketch some of the key features of necessitism. After doing this, we will look
at the inferences and principles that Buridan accepts and see if they commit Buridan to
either necessitism or contingentism or are consistent with both. We will argue that Buri-
dan’s position on a number of features of his modal language are not compatible with
necessitism but that his remarks on modality show that he thinks about it in ways that
are shared by the necessitist. In particular, Buridan seems to be committed to denying
the Barcan and Converse-Barcan formulae. As we shall see, this renders his modal logic
inconsistent with necessitism and consistent with contingentism. Next, drawing on some
of the larger metaphysical themes within Buridan we will argue that his metaphyiscal
commitment to nominalism, together with his views about propositions, seem to commit
Buridan to a kind of contingentism about possible objects.
6.5.1 Necessitism and Contingentism: The Case of Modal Logic as
Metaphysics
In his recent book, [66] Williamson offers a spirited, vigorous and insightful defence
of necessitism. As we have already remarked, this is the view that “it is necessary
that everything is such that it is necessary that something is identical with it”[66][p.3].
Williamson offers a number of arguments for this position within his book and he iden-
tifies a number of key principles that either follow from necessitism, imply it, or are
required for us to formulate the relevant distinctions between the two positions. We will
employ a number of these factors as ways of testing to see where Buridan might have
fallen on such a debate.
The first distinction we will need is the distinction between the predicative reading of
a modal attribution and the attributive reading of a modal attribution. According to
Williamson:
Someone might object that it is absurd to postulate a non-concrete possible
stick, because being concrete is necessary for being a stick. But that is to
mistake the intended sense of ‘possible stick’. The objector reads ‘x is a
possible stick’ as equivalent to something like ‘x is a stick and x could have
existed’. Call that the predicative reading. On this reading, it is trivally
necessary that that all sticks are concrete.
On the relevant alternative reading ‘x is a possible stick’ is simply equivalent
to ‘x could have been a stick’. Call that the attributive reading of ‘possible
stick’. . . it is not necessary that all possible sticks are sticks on the attributive
reading. [66][p.10]21
21. Throughout this book, Williamson holds that ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ are not best thought of as
contradictory pairs, i.e. that something is non-concrete if and only if it is abstract, but are better
thought of as contraries. See [66][p.7]
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As Williamson later points out the necessitist will (unless context or other features of
the way the proposition is expressed) want to conceive of modal attributions following
the attributive reading. Not only does this help the necessitist avoid being confused
with other, less plausible theories (e.g. Meinongianism)[66][pp. 18-21] but it also avoids
some trivialising issues with the theory.
The next feature of this debate that is worth highlighting here is that the quantifiers
used in the formulation of necessitism and contingentism need to be understood as
unrestricted quantifiers that range over absolutely everything.
Both necessitists and contingentists can also use quantifiers with various re-
strictions, and may always regard such uses as typical of everyday discourse.
In particular, necessitists can simulate contingentist discourse by tacitly re-
stricting their quantifiers to the concrete. Then they sound like contingen-
tists, saying ‘Concrete things are only contingently something’. But they just
mean that concrete things are only contingently something concrete. The re-
striction makes the words express different claims from those they express
when used unrestrictedly. The disagreement is made explicit only when both
sides use their quantifiers unrestrictedly. In what follows, our interest is in
the unrestricted uses. [66][p.15]
In what follows in our treatment of Buridan, it will be important to establish that
he views the quantifiers in his modal theory as sufficiently non-restricted to not run
afoul of this issue. To see why this is an interpretive problem, say that we argue for
the conclusion that Buridan is a contingentist. One natural response would go, ‘you
cite evidence X,Y and Z for showing that what Buridan says requires him to reject
necessitism, but it is consistent with what Buridan says that these quantifers be read in
a restricted way, and so he is not required to reject necessitism.’ Interpretively, there
is a helpful warning here: so far as I am aware the medievals did not discuss issues
related to unrestricted generality, and so it will not be clear what Buridan thinks on the
matter. As such, we will need to present some evidence about how Buridan understands
his modal propositions.
From a formal perspective, perhaps the most important feature of necessitism is its
commitments to the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae. Williamson writes:
The metaphysical disputes discussed in Chapter 1 between contingentism
and necessitism turns out to be intimately connected with some technical
issues in quantified modal logic, over two principles usually known as the
Barcan formula and its converse. When those principles are interpreted in
the relevant way, they are typically accepted by necessitists, and rejected
by contingentists. Indeed, in some natural logical settings, each of them
is equivalent to the central necessitist claim that necessarily everything is
necessarily something. [66][pp. 31]
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What is important to observe is that22 from the validity of the Barcan Formula, the
Converse Barcan Formula, and necessitation, it is possible to derive the necessitist claim
that “necessarily everything is necessarily something’.’[66][p.38]
While there are other important features of necessitism that Williamson highlights, the
collection of quotes and thumbnail sketches of the view are sufficient for what will follow.
Williamson also points out a number of consequences that, he argues, the contingentist
is under pressure to adopt. The main one which interests us is the following:
The challenge to contingentists is to identify a fallacy in Barcan Marcus’s
proof. . . They have a natural line. Her proof involves the claim that ¬∃yx = y
strictly implies ∃x¬∃yx = y, in other words:
(8) ◻(¬∃yx = y → ∃x¬∃yx = y)
. . . As we have seen, contingentists cannot accept (8) as a theorem, where
(8) is the necessitation of (11)[(¬∃yx = y → ∃x¬∃yx = y)]. . . thus a contin-
gentist must either reject (11) as a theorem or reject the rule of necessita-
tion. . . First, suppose that the contingentist rejects (11) as a theorem. But
(11) is a theorem of standard non-modal first-order logic. It is simply an
instance of ‘existential generalisation’, A → ∃xA. Thus the contingentist is
under pressure to adopt some form of ‘free logic’ in which that principle is
not unrestrictedly valid. [66][p.39]
Williamson goes on to point out that by duality, the contingentist is also required to
deny the principle ∀vA → A. What is important to observe here is that contingentism
is under pressure to work in a sort of free logic, one where particular inferences require
that the objects in question already exist.
As a brief foreshadowing of Buridan, it is worth observing that, in the eyes of at least
one metaphysician, there are analogues of these principles identified by Buridan. In his
book The Nature of Necessity, Plantinga observes that:
Jean Buridan once remarked that
(31) Possibly everything is F
does not in general entail:
(32) Everything is possibly F.
That is, he rejected
(33) necessarily, if possibly everything is F, then everything is possibly F.
His counterexample is as follows. God need not have created anything; hence
it is possible that (34) Everything is identical with God.
It does not follow from this, he says, that everything is possibly identical
with God. You and I, for example are not.
[46][p.58]
22. Assuming that one is working in classical first-order logic.
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Plantinga does not include references for this and it is not actually clear what passage
in Buridan he has in mind. What seems likely here is that he is extrapolating from
a number of Buridan’s counterexamples in Book Two where Buridan starts from the
assumption that God is the only one creating. We will have quite a bit more to say
about this counterexample of Buridan’s in what follows.
6.5.2 Quantification in Buridan
Before we turn explicitly to see how Buridan’s modal logic relates to necessitism and
contingentism, we should pause and think about how quantification works in Buridan’s
modal logic. As we already saw, there is a natural way that necessitists can express
contingentist questions speaking within their logical framework, namely by restricting
the quantification of their quantifiers.
We have already seen that Buridan’s logic has the resources to express different sorts of
restricted quantifiers. Throughout his writing in the Treatise on Consequences Buridan
uses the phrase ‘quod est X’ (‘that which is X’) as a way of making explicit the ampliation
of a particular subject term by particular modal operations. For example,
It should be realised that a divided proposition of possibility has a subject
ampliated by the mode following it to supposit not only for things that exist
but also for what can exist even if they do not. Accordingly, it is true that
air can be made from water, although this may not be true of any air which
exists. So the proposition ‘B can be A’ is equivalent to ‘That which is or can
be B can be A’.[51, p.97]
Elsewhere Buridan observes that ampliation is blocked in cases where ‘quod est’ is
used. He remarks that:
‘That which is B is A’, does not permit the ampliation of the subject, namely,
of ‘B’; for [B] is contracted and restricted to the present by the verb ‘is’ in
the present tense, which precedes it.[51, p.83]
What is important here is that, in modal propositions, Buridan intends that the
subject be ampliated in the most general way possible. I.e. that when the subject
is ampliated, it should range over all of the things that could possibly fall under the
subject, including the things that do not exist. How does this relate to quantification?
In the following way. We have already seen that, for Buridan, ‘Some A is B’ is true
if there is an object of which we can say, ‘This thing is A’ and ‘This same thing is
B’. Thus, if the supposition of the subject term ranges over everything that can fall
under the subject, the quantification inherits the range given by the ampliation of the
subject and the predicate. Since Buridan seems to be intending his unrestricted modal
propositions as ranging over everything that is or can be, it seems a fair extrapolation of
Buridan’s views that he intended the proposition to range over all of the relevant objects
in question.
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Because of how Buridan uses his quantifiers, there is a way that Buridan could mimic
both necessitist and contingentist readings of various modal propositions. On the con-
tingentist reading (according to Williamson), ‘Every A is necessarily B’ states that ‘Ev-
erything that is concretely A is necessarily B’ while the necessists would hold that ‘Every
A is necessarily B’ states that ‘Everything that is concretely A or is non-concretely A is
necessarily B’. Notice that all we have done here is made the range of the quantification
explicit in both cases. It is also instructive to notice the parallel with how Buridan sets
up his modal framework. These sorts of quantifiers give Buridan a way to talk about
either sort of quantification, regardless of which reading he would regard as the correct
reading of the proposition.
As such, it seems that it would be an unmotivated view of Buridan’s modal logic
to argue that he is implicitly restricting his quantification to only range over concrete
objects. For such a reading to be plausible, a gloss would need to be offered “although
this may not be true of any air which exists” which either restricts the range of the
supposita of air in this passage or argue that here Buridan means to only speak of
concrete objects. The second disjunct seems to go directly against what is said in
the passage23 while the first disjunct goes against the spirit of Buridan’s unrestricted
ampliation of the subject. As such it seem that a fair extrapolation of Buridan’s logic is
to see him quantifying over absolutely everything.24
6.5.3 Predicative and Attributive Readings
As we have already seen the distinction between predicate and attributive readings
of the modal operations is important for understanding and formulating necessitism.
What is interesting to observe here is that, broadly speaking, Buridan’s ways of reading
the various terms within his modal logic are either attributive readings or do not fall
under either. As we have already seen, Buridan reads divided modal propositions as
ranging over the things that ‘can be A’ or ‘are necessarily B’. Formally, we treated
these as ranging over classes of object in the domain. For example, A
L
a B is true
if and only if M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅. Here we defined M(w,A) as
M(w,A) = {d ∈ D ∶ there is some z s.t wRz and d ∈ V ′(z,A)}. Likewise L(w,B) was
defined as {d ∈ D ∶ for all z if wRz then d ∈ V ′(z,B)}. What is important to see here
is that the formal readings offered match Williamson’s gloss on the attributive reading,
assuming that by ‘x could have been a stick’ he intends the modality ‘could’ to be read
as a diamond and not as a counterfactual. M(w,A) picks out the class of all objects that
could have been A. Likewise L(w,A) picks out the class of all objects that are necessarily
A. The point here is that Buridan seems to situate his discussion of modal logic within
an attributive framework. Given Buridan’s ampliative reading of the subject and his
23. This assumes that ‘if something does not exist then it is not concrete’, a principle which seems to
not be ruled out by anything Williamson has said, and is in keeping with the spirit of non-concrete
objects.
24. Again, it should be stressed that this is an extrapolation from Buridan’s views as presented in the
Treatise on Consequences. There may be other passages in Buridan’s works that tell against such a
reading. If so, I am currently unaware of them.
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views about the expository syllogism, this is not surprising. On Buridan’s account,
the predicative reading of ‘x is a possible stick’, namely ‘x is a stick and x could have
existed’ is too narrow in its ampliative force. First, such a reading does not cover the
cases where x could have been a stick and x could have existed. Second, such a reading
is starting to have a bit of similarity with his rejection of Pseudo-Scotus’ reading of the
modal operations. Buridan’s point was that we should not analyse ‘some stick can exist’
as ‘either there is something that is a stick and it can exist or there is something that
can be a stick and can exist’. The possible parallel requires us to observe that the first
disjunct of Pseudo-Scotus’ reading of the modal operation is the predicative reading that
Williamson comments about.
6.5.4 Barcan & Converse Barcan
As we mention in our previous chapter, our primary focus in this work has been Buri-
dan’s analysis of divided modal propositions. Buridan distinguishes two kinds of modal
propositions, composite and divided modals. The second half of Book Two of the Trea-
tise on Consequences addresses inferences between composite modal propositions, and
the relationship between composite and divided propositions. Our main interest here
will to be to sketch enough of Buridan’s theory to allow for us to unpack the following
conclusions:
from no affirmative composite of possibility does there follow a divided one
of possibility with the mode affirmed, or conversely, except that from an affir-
mative composite with an affirmed dictum there follows a divided particular
affirmative. . . . from no composite affirmative of necessity does there follow
a divided one of necessity with an affirmed mode, nor conversely, except that
from a divided universal negative there does follow a composite universal
with a negated dictum. . . . from no proposition, [whether] assertoric, of pos-
sibility or of necessity does there follow one of contingency with both modes
affirmed; similarly, from none of contingency does there follow an assertoric
or one of necessity, but there does follow one of possibility. [51, pp. 55-57] 25
Grammatically, composite modal propositions are ones where the modality occurs
as one of the two terms in the proposition.26 In English these kinds of modals are
usually translated with the presence of a ‘that’ clause. The other term in a composite
modal proposition is normally a categorical proposition as well. For example, ‘that
‘Every A is B’ is necessary’ and ‘it is possible that ‘No B is A” are both composite
modal propositions. In Latin such propositions are distinguished by the presence of an
accusative-infinitive construction. Buridan offers the following two examples: “Hominem
currere est possibile et haec: Necessarium est hominem esse animal”. [4, Bk2-C2]
25. These are conclusions 17–19 of Book Two.
26. For our purposes here, as well as Buridan’s, we will assume that a proposition is either composite
or divided, and not both, i.e. we will not consider cases where one of the terms is a modal and the
copula is modified by a modal term. For example, we will rule out cases like: that ‘Every A is B’ can
be necessary.
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Here the clauses ‘Hominem currere’ (a man runs) and ‘hominem esse animal’ (a man
is an animal) are examples of the accusative-infinitive construction.
When referring to composite modal propositions, Buridan refers to the infinitive–
accusative construction as the dictum. For example, in ‘it is possible that ‘No B is A”
‘No B is A’ is the dictum of the proposition. The truth conditions for these propositions
are also very different from the ones for divided modal operations. Composite modals
do not ampliate either the subject or the predicate to supposit for anything. Instead,
Buridan discusses the signification of such propositions.
Here ‘possibility’ is taken not for what can be but for a possible proposition,
which is said to be possible in so far as things can be altogether as it signifies.
So in the examples above, saying ‘Every possibility is that B is A’ is the same
as to say ‘Every possible proposition is that B is A’. . . It should also be noted
that in the proposition ‘Every possibility is that B is A’, the predicate ‘that B
is A’ supposits materially for the proposition ‘B is A’, and does not supposit
for itself, since the phrase ‘That B is A’ is not a proposition.[51, p.49]
There are a number of points to pay attention to here. The main one that concerns us
is Buridan’s point that the proposition which falls under the ‘that’ clause supposits for
the proposition itself, and then the modal term is assessed based on if the proposition
is in fact the way the term describes. For example, in ‘it is necessary that ‘Every man
is an animal” the sentence ‘Every man is an animal’ supposits for that proposition, and
it is true just in case it is necessary, which, according to Aristotle, it is.
After this, Buridan goes on to discuss an important grammatical difficulty that occurs
because of the Latin in which the propositions are expressed. The main problem here
has to do with propositions like: ‘Nullum B esse A est possibile’. Here ‘nullum’ could be
either nominative or accusative, and so it is ambiguous as to whether the quantifier is
part of the accusative–infinitive construction, and thus part of the dictum, or if it ranges
over the whole proposition.
Notice that in some ways this analysis is much closer to the way modern modal logic
relates to propositions. The modal operator binds to the truth of the entire proposition,
not to the various terms in the proposition ampliating the supposition of various terms.
In other ways, this is rather different. The modals here are not functioning as operators
(as they do in our standard modal logics), but instead they function as terms that modify
various propositions. These term-based operations expand the expressive power of the
syllogistic logic in some very interesting ways. For example, if we add the modality
‘false’ to our language (as Buridan does), then we can define an operation that looks
very similar to what we now think of as propositional negation.27
When it comes to thinking about truth conditions between these sorts of propositions,
it is easiest if we resort to the usual kinds of relationships that we think of in an operator-
based modal logic. We have already argued that Buridan’s account of modal logic is in
the same spirit as possible worlds semantics, and as such, reading his operations this
27. The idea here is that, we equate not − φ with φ is false (or perhaps even more clearly ‘it is false that
φ’). Then observe that ‘φ is false’ is clearly a composite modal of falsity.
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way should not do too much damage. Strictly speaking, since Buridan does not offer
us a reductive account of modality, it would be safer if we consider truth conditions in
terms of the primitive notions of possibility and necessity. Those persuaded that Buridan
is working with a kind of possible worlds semantics can then supply the needed truth
conditions.
What we have said so far should be enough to help us understand the importance of
Buridan’s final conclusions in Book Two. When we come to the four conclusions listed
above, it will be helpful to take them each in turn. First,
From no affirmative composite of possibility does there follow a divided one
of possibility with the mode affirmed, or conversely, except that from an affir-
mative composite with an affirmed dictum there follows a divided particular
affirmative.[51, p.110]
What this tells us that ‘it is possible that ‘some A is B” entails ‘Some A is possibly
B’, but that in the other cases there is no valid inference.28 From what we have already
seen, this makes sense. Reading, ‘it is possible that ‘some A is B” as telling us that there
is some world where ‘Some A is B’ is true, we know from what Buridan has already said,
that this is only true if there is some object, say D, such that ‘This D is A’ and ‘The
same D is B’. But then, it is possible that ‘This D is A’ and it is possible that ‘This D
is B’. As we have already seen, it follows by expository syllogism then that ‘Some A is
possibly B.’ At first glance, this might seem to look like Buridan endorsing the Barcan
formula and we can find such a view in the literature.29
However things are somewhat more complicated when it comes to translating Buri-
dan’s logic into first-order logic, and ∃x ◇ (Ax ∧Bx) is not equivalent to A Mi B, as the
quantifier gets the ampliation of the terms wrong.30 The problem is that the quantifica-
tion used here does not range over the specific world at which the formula is evaluated,
but should range over all of the objects at all of the worlds.
So, at least here, it seems Buridan is not committed to either of the Barcan formulae.
In fact, a counterexample to the Barcan formula is easily seen to follow from Buridan’s
consideration of the definition of possibility modals. Recall that Buridan said: “Accord-
ingly, it is true that air can be made from water, although this may not be true of any
air which exists.31”[4][p.58]. Let us assume that this situation does indeed obtain, there
is some air that can be made from water. Let us assume further that there is currently
28. This is equally clear since, even if something can be A and can be B, it does not entail that something
can be A and B at the same world. i.e. (◇A ∧◇B)→◇(A ∧B) is not valid.
29. See [35, pp.158,160 fn. 56] In addition to Lagerlund’s own concerns about his proof, the comments
we make here raise similar problems of Lagerlund’s formalisation of ‘Every B is necessarily not A ⇒
That every B is not A is necessary.’
30. A proper spelling out of this would require a formal reconstruction of Buridan’s composite modal
propositions and then a proof of the inference in a system that does not validate the Barcan and Con-
verse Barcan formulae. Unfortunately, due to time and space constraints, this will not be attempted
here.
31. Unde sic est uerum quod aer potest fieri ex aqua, licet hoc non sit uerum de aliquo aere qui est.
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no water but that there will be. Then, we have A
M
i W (reading A for air and W for
water) is true, and hence so is ◇∃x(Ax ∧Wx) but ∃x◇ (Ax ∧Wx) is not true because
no water currently exists at the world of evaluation ex hypothesi.
For the Converse Barcan formula, things are a little bit more tricky but Buridan will
reject it, given the following sorts of remarks:
As to whether the proposition ‘A horse is an animal’ is necessary, I believe it
is not, speaking simply of a necessary proposition, since God can annihilate
all horses all at once, and then there would be no horse; so no horse would
be an animal, and so ‘A horse is an animal’ would be false, and so it would
not be necessary. But such [propositions] can be allowed to be necessary,
taking conditional or temporal necessity, analysing them as saying that every
human is of necessity an animal if he or she exists, and that every human is
of necessity an animal when he or she exists.[51, p.141]
Informally, what Buridan is pointing out here is that it is entirely possible for all
objects to cease existing. It is within the power of God to bring it about that no horses
exist, or in fact ever existed. More to the point, such objects also lose all of the properties
that they might have, upon ceasing to exist concretely. As such, it seems that Buridan
allows for objects to pass out of existence.
As is well-known, we can use this to construct a counterexample to the Converse
Barcan formula along the usual lines. Let us assume that some horse exists. Then,
clearly given what Buridan has said above, it is clearly possible that this horse does
not exist and hence, ∃x◇¬Ex, where Ex stands for ‘x exists’. However, since Buridan
maintains that horses (and objects more generally) lose their properties once they cease
to exist, ◇∃x¬Ex, will turn out to be impossible on Buridan’s view, as it would require
the existence of a non-existent object.
From what we’ve shown here, it seems then, that Buridan would be some sort of
contingentist. What he says about his modal logic suggests he would deny the validity
of the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae. As further support for this, we should
observe that to formalise the divided fragment of Buridan’s modal logic, we did not
need to impose any sort of domain restriction on the models.32 This does raise some
interesting questions, as Buridan does opt for a particularly broad reading of the modal
operations and his definitions of quantification could be interpreted in nonstandard ways.
6.6 The Role of Kripke Semantics in the History of Logic
Before concluding, we end with one meta-level reflection on the relationship between
modern formal logic and the historical logics of Kilwardby and Buridan. In the case
32. At this point this is fairly weak evidence as the most likely inferences to require such domain assump-
tions will be the conclusions discussed above, which were not formalised.
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of both Kilwardby and Buridan we have provided formal reconstructions of their theo-
ries that are, at least in some sense, grounded in a Kripke-style semantics for possible
worlds.33
In this section we will proceed as follows. We will first start by considering our for-
malisation of Buridan. Drawing on what we have already seen concerning Scotus and
the development of modalities, it seems natural to think of Buridan’s logic in terms of
possible worlds and this is no serious anachronisism. Hence, the corresponding formal
representation of Buridan’s logic using Kripke semantics is motivated, and is interpre-
tively useful. As such, the variable domain modal logic together with our formal recon-
struction does have value in understanding how Buridan thought about modality, and
on how we might read the modal operations in Buridan. In arguing for this conclusion
we will discuss one methodology that can be used to ground this interpretation.
We will then move on to consider Kilwardby’s modal logic. Here the case is far less
clear in both directions. Historically, we will argue that there is good reason to be scep-
tical about thinking of Kilwardby’s modal theory in terms of possible worlds semantics.
As we have already seen in our analysis of Kilwardby’s views, it makes better sense
to view his modal theory as a sort of essentialist (a subspecies of statistical) modality.
See page 13. Conversely, while the formal reconstruction of Kilwardby’s modal logic is
based on Kripke semantics, the combination of it with the lattice-theoretic machinery
makes its interpretation as a kind of possible worlds semantics less clear. As such, we
will argue that our formalisation is best understood as a way of drawing connections
between Kilwardby’s ideas about modal logic and modern theories of modality.
6.7 Buridan, Modality and Kripke Semantics
The natural question that arises at this point is to ask, what do these formalisations
tell us about the modal theories of the two thinkers we have studied. What can we take
away from such regimentations?
Obviously, the answer to this question turns on which figure we look at. In this section
we will focus mostly on Buridan. This is for a few reasons. First, on the formal side,
our reconstruction of Buridan’s modal logic is much closer to modern accounts of modal
logic, and does not require any additional logical or conceptual primitive machinery,
as in the case of Kilwardby. As such, focusing on Buridan’s modal logic introduces
fewer complications in discussing possible worlds semantics and it seems that the case
of Buridan provides us with a situation in which we could learn more about his logic
through formalisation. Also, as we have seen, historically there were ideas that are in
33. In this section we will talk exclusively about possible worlds and Kripke semantics. From a formal
perspective we could very well have used any of the other well-known semantic frameworks for devel-
oping modal logics, e.g. Topological semantics, co-algebras, Boolean algebras with operations, etc. In
what follows we will use Kripke semantics to refer to the formal machinery we used, while we will use
‘possible worlds’ and variants to cover the usual interpretation of the Kripke semantics which range
over the various positions in contemporary, diachronic readings of modality. This is intended to be
very generious in its scope and, for example, the account should be indeterminate between actualism
and various ersatzisms or contingentism vs. necessitism.
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the same spirit as modern discussions of possible worlds semantics and these may have
influenced Buridan.
Second, and related to this, is that to unpack Kilwardby’s analysis of modality is one
that, at least according to our formalisation, requires more then just the usual Kripke
semantics for modal logic.34 Given how we are using the term Kripke semantics, there is
already a good case to be made for the contention that Kilwardby’s modal logic cannot
be expressed using the usual resources of Kripke semantics.
Third, there is a bit more literature where people want to make inferences about how
the modalities can be conceived of in Buridan. So far as I am aware, there is less of
a discussion about this in the literature on Kilwardby’s modal logic. We have already
cited Hughes’ paper where he argues for the conclusion that Buridan’s modal logic is
best understood in terms of ‘possible worlds’.
Turning then to Hughes, he starts with the following remark:
It seems to me, in fact, that in his modal logic he is implicitly working with
a kind of possible worlds semantics throughout. [20, p.97]
What are we to make of claims like this? The historically precise person may want
to pull away or resist such a claim. First, is not this talk of ‘possible worlds’ all rather
anachronistic? It seems safe to say that Buridan was not working with Kripke semantics,
and we have already observed that Buridan does not attempt to explain or reduce modal
terms to anything more primitive. Why not simply be content with the observation that
there is a reconstruction of Buridan’s modal logic using modern logic (in this case, using
Kripke semantics) and observe that, in so far as Kripke semantics captures the modern
notion of possible worlds, Buridan’s modal logic is consistent with that? There are two
possible views here. One that argues that any attempt to formalise a historical logical
system is bad or anachronistic and should not be done. Another, slightly more positive
position would be the one where we can show that this or that logical formalisiation
is consistent with a particular historical figure’s logic, or that it is an adequate repre-
sentation of this figure’s position, but that the logical system tells us little more than
that.
In contrast, there is, of course, another natural line that we could take here. We
have a formal reconstruction of Buridan that seems to be faithful to his views35 and
formally adequate, both in the sense that it captures all of the validities and invalidities
that Buridan claims about his modal system and also in the sense of being sound and
complete. So, why should we not use this as a guiding interpretation of Buridan’s
modal logic and see where this takes us? At the heart of this idea is to view the
formal reconstruction of Buridan’s modal logic just like any other sort of interpretation
of a historical work, only, in this case, it happens to be done in a formalised language
34. Given what we have already said about Fine and Aristotle, this is to be expected, and is probably
a good thing. If we are correct in seeing Kilwardby as situating his theory of modality within the
‘statistical’ tradition, then it makes sense that a model done purely in terms of possible worlds
semantics would be incorrect.
35. In a moment we will consider one interesting objection to exactly how faithful our reconstruction is.
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using mathematical and logical machinery. Charges of anachronism are, on this analysis,
simply missing the point rather severely. Just as one would not object to using a different
language or vocabulary or framework to articulate a particular historical perspective,
perhaps one should not reject the use of a mathematical language to analyse historically
interesting logical figures.
Moves like this are not unprecedented in the history of logic. For example, Malink,
writing on the assertoric syllogism remarks:36
As such the heterodox dictum de omni et de nullo is informative. It states
that, for any A and B A is aX -predicated of B if and only if A is aX predi-
cated of everything which B is aX predicated. Given classical propositional
and quantifer logic, this implies that the relation of aX -predication is both
reflexive and transitive. In other words, it implies that the following holds
for any A,B,C:
Reflexivity: AaXA
Transitivity: if AaXB and BaXC then AaXC [38, p.66]
In a footnote, Malink goes on to observe that the reason aX is reflexive is because∀Z(AaXZ ⊂ AaXZ) is a theorem of first-order logic.37 He also observes that it follows
as a corollary that AaXA is always valid. This is one of the features that makes his
interpretation heterodox. The interesting move that is made here is the direction that
Malink goes with his interpretative pressure. He does point to passages in Aristotle
that also seem to suggest AaXA is always valid.
38 But he also uses the basis of his
reconstruction in classical logic to motivate this interpretation of Aristotle. In fact,
Malink makes good uses of the resources of classical logic as the framework for his
interpretation of Aristotle, while freely acknowledging that these resources were not
available to Aristotle.39
Malink’s approach here seems, at least at first glance, to be a reasonable one. If
we can offer a faithful interpretation of a historical figure’s logic that is textually well-
informed, formally adequate, and captures the key notions that an author was working
with, then we are allowed to use this as a basis for an interpretation of that figure’s logic
(or ideas more generally). Our aim here will be to briefly sketch how such a methodology
functions.
36. In what follows Malink uses AaXB in the same way that we used AaB, to express that ‘B is predicated
of every A’, or equivalently, ‘every A is predicated of B’.
37. If this is unclear, simply treat aX as a binary relation on terms, and have the quantifiers range over
terms. This yields the more familiar: ∀z(R(a, z) ⊃ R(a, z))
38. See [38, p.69], Prior Analytics 2.15 andPrior Analytics A2.22
39. In formulating the dictum de omni, Malink remarks that: “The formulae on the right-hand side
employ the resources of modern propositional and quantifier logic. Of course, these resources were
not available to Aristotle. Nevertheless, the four equivalences give, I think, a sufficiently faithful
representation of Aristotle’s views on the semantics of assertoric propositions.”[38, p.37]
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The value of each of these criteria as necessary conditions for ensuring that our logical
interpretations remain faithful to the author should be clear.40 That our interpretation
be textually well-grounded and well-interpreted needs to be the starting and foundational
point of any sort of analysis. One might justify this by observing that if we fail to
understand the texts that our particular interpretation is based on, then we have failed
in attempting to understand our author’s logic and views.
The formal adequacy of the theory is the logical flip-side to this. Just as we need to
ensure that the interpretation of our author is well-grounded in the text, we need to
ensure that the formal machinery we are using accurately captures the inferences and
ideas that they are working with. Minimally, this means that the formal system that
we are working in should, if the author has been careful, correctly handle all of the
valid and invalid inferences that the author claims are valid. The reason for the ‘careful’
caveat is that our sources are human and as such, may make logical mistakes. Ideally
this should be identified in the interpretive stage, if the mistakes are obvious. If they
are not obvious, then things become much more difficult.41
However, in some sense, this is only the starting point for the formal adequacy. As we
saw in our reconstruction of Buridan, there is more our logic can do than simply get the
validities and invalidities correct. Our system can also systematically recapture the kinds
of proofs and inferences that Buridan is making within the Treatise on Consequences.
Though it is a rather difficult question to say when two proofs are the same, we can make
do with the following weaker kind of adequacy. A formal construction of an informal
argument is formally adequate in this way, when it:
1. Translates all of the features of the informal argument into the formal framework.
2. Each step that is made in the informal argument is a valid inference in the formal
framework.
3. The underlying language of the framework is robust enough to express the relevant
propositions that the author is using.
As we already shown in Chapter Five, our reconstruction of Buridan allows us to do this
with all of the conclusions in the Treatise on Consequences.
In terms of the translation, the language that we use maps fairly naturally onto the
parts of Buridan’s logic that we are interested in modelling. We are able to follow his use
of introducing schematic terms for the features he treats as variable and hold constant
most of the things he holds constant. The only feature that is not clearly preserved in
our representation is the presence of the copula, which we will discuss below.
Again, consider the following remarks by Calvin Normore concerning William of Ock-
ham’s modal logic:
40. At this point, we can only offer a shallow justification of this approach. A through defence of the kind
of historiography that is being argued for here would require considerably more space then is allowed
in the present work.
41. The case of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is an excellent example of when one needs to be very careful
to distinguish between a logical mistake on the part of the author, and an analysis of modality or
predication that is deeply different from our modern way of formalising and representing things. In
the case of Aristotle it is entirely possible that both issues are present.
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On this picture, then, Ockham does not think that all affirmative assertoric
present-tensed sentences commit one to the actual existence of what their
terms stand for. Some, for example those involving semantic expressions
such as “signifies” or “true”, do not. Such expressions affect the supposition
of terms in sentences containing them, so they may stand for things that do
not exist. Unlike the usual semantics for late twentieth-century modal and
tense logics, which analyze modal and tense locutions in terms of quantifica-
tion over an expanded domain of past, future, or possible objects, Ockham’s
semantics does not attempt to eliminate modal or tense expressions in fa-
vor of assertoric ones. . . . Contemporary quantification theory runs together
counting and existential commitment. Ockham keeps them separate. For
him quantity is the business of quantifiers, but existential commitment is
the business of the copula. Thus when we use quantifiers together with non-
assertoric copulae there is no commitment to the things under discussion
existing in the sense in which present and actual things exist.42[43, p.92]
While the general thrust of this passage is clear, there are a few points that should
be developed. First, it should be noted that Ockham and Buridan seem to be following
similar ideas about the nature of modality. Comments like Hughes’ not withstanding,
the account offered by Buridan is a non-reductive one, just like Ockham’s is. This point
is important and we will come back to it in a moment.
Second, what are we to make of the remark that ‘Contemporary quantification theory
runs together counting and existential commitment’? This should probably be viewed as
a complaint about the language of first-order logic and the way quantifiers are interpreted
within this framework. Recall that the standard semantics for first-order quantification
tell us that A ⊧ ∃xφx if and only if there is some element, a in the domain s.t. A ⊧ φ[x/a].
What Normore contends is that Ockham avoids ‘running together’ the conjunction on the
right hand side of the biconditional, i.e. the clauses that require there be an object that
exists in the domain, and the satisfaction clause for a particular formula. For Ockham,
these are separate parts of the logic, where the object’s existence or non-existence in a
particular domain is handled by the quantifier, and the status of the object as regards its
existence is handled by the copula. The problem with standard accounts of first-order
logic is that this distinction is collapsed.
What should we make of this? First, matters may not be quite as straightforward as
Normore makes them. While we may grant that counting and existential commitment
need to be kept separate in medieval logical theories, there is still the question of ex-
actly what the quantifiers in Ockham’s semantics are counting. Put in a more modern
framework, one standard way to think of (⟨1⟩-type) quantifier is as a function from the
domain of objects to elements of the power-set of the domain. In modern semantics,
the natural question is to then ask, what is the domain we are applying our quantifiers
to? To put the worry more colloquially, if we say that ‘Every dinosaur was an animal’
what is the quantifier ranging over? Things that exist? Things that existed but do not
42. It is worth observing that this concern is not unique to Normore. A similar worry is raised by Henry
in [19]. Similar issues arise throughout the book.
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now? It seems that, while we may want to keep these issues separated, we will need to
fix the range of things we are counting over before we can decide the truth or falsity
of the proposition in question. So there does need to be some connection between the
copula and the quantifier, at least when it comes to analyzing the truth or falsity of a
particular proposition. However, given what we have said about quantifiers, it may be
that the copula should actually take priority in such propositions, since on theories like
Ockham’s, it tells us the range of the domain. Alternatively, we could develop a formal
reconstruction of propositions that does exactly this and allows for the various readings
of the quantifier.43
Let us take these ideas and develop them into a slightly more radical position. Here is
a natural objection to the formalisation project: the formal techniques of modern quan-
tificational logic are inappropriate to be used to analyse medieval theories of logic. The
reasons for this are clear from the quotes above. In terms of expressive power, modern
logical systems lack the required resources to separate out important logical distinctions
that are needed to capture the medieval theories. For example, the distinctions Normore
highlights in Ockham. Semantically, modern logical analysis of medieval theories such as
Buridan’s and Ockham’s are fundamentally reductionistic in nature, which runs against
the spirit of the theories.
What are we to make of such an objection? First, it is very important that we be clear
on exactly what kind of systems we are interested in when it comes to logic. The following
example may prove useful. It is a well-known result that there are a number of natural
frame conditions that are inexpressible within the framework of propositional modal
logic. For more information see the discussion in Chapter Seven of [13]. For example,
one cannot give modal formulae that force the accessibility relation to be irreflexive, anti-
symmetric or asymmetric. So, what are we to do if we want to study modal systems
where we can express such axioms? The well-known answer is that we need to expand
the expressive resources of our language to be able to capture such things. In this case,
such examples are used to motivate various kinds of hybrid logics, where we add literals
that allow us to evaluate particular propositions at particular worlds. In the case of
something like Normore’s concern, this becomes strong motivation for the separation
and addition of the necessary formal distinctions required to capture these distinctions.
The logics presented in this dissertation do not limit themselves in such a way, and the
resulting systems do have the expressive power necessary to capture the relevant class
of distinctions. What Normore’s argument suggests is that we are limiting ourselves to
the well-known systems and languages of logic, which is exactly what makes the study
of such logics of potential interest to contemporary logicians as well as historians.
Reading this as an objection to the logical vocabulary is no objection to our project.
It should be noted that what Normore observes about Ockham’s logic also seems to be
the case for Buridan’s logic. Buridan spends considerable time discussing the function
of the copula in various modal sentences. Syntactically, we have done something similar
to what Normore attributes to Ockham’s logic. When we represent a proposition as
43. For some modern attempts to do something in this spirit, see e.g. Lesniewski’s works on Logic and
Ontology. [57]
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A
M
a B, for example, we are tracking two things; the modal on top notes the quality of
the copula, while the term underneath tracks the kind of quantifier that is being used
in this sentence.44 In fact, given some of the difficulties that result with translating our
semantics into modern modal predicate logic, this may in some sense offer further sup-
port for Normore’s reservation about using standard quantificational logic to represent
medieval logic. From a modern point of view this is also offers another reason for the
study of medieval logical theories, they give rise to comparatively weak-looking logics
that are not always expressible with the usual resources of first-order logic.45
6.8 Kilwardby and Modern Modal Logic
When we move to Kilwardby’s modal logic, our formal reconstruction raises a number
of more interesting questions.
First, let us recall that according to the statistical definition of modality given above,
a categorical proposition is necessary if the subject is per se the predicate and contingent
if it is neither per se nor is it incompatible with the subject.
What is important to observe is that the definition of necessity given here does not
need to make any appeal to a synchronic notion of possibility in order to ground the
definitions of possibility, necessity or contingency. This view seems to offer one of the
best ways of thinking about Aristotle’s modal logic, as the following quote makes clear:
In semantics, I follow the path-breaking work of Johnson and Thomason.
Johnson showed us how to understand Aristotle’s modal sentences in terms
of structured sets which makes no appeal to possible worlds. . . . One has to
regard this kind of semantical analysis of the modal syllogistic as particularly
appropriate if one thing that Aristotelian metaphysics are in any way implicit
in that syllogistic. For, Aristotle’s metaphysics envisages a single world. [60,
p.5]
We have already argued that Kilwardby’s theory is best situated in the statistical
tradition. Given Kilwardby’s desire to follow Aristotle’s logic, and seeing the keys to
understanding Aristotle’s logic in his ontology, it is unsurprising sense that we would
encounter these problems in our treatment of Kilwardby as well.
There are two questions that make this difficulty sharp. First, does our interpreta-
tion of the modal operators, ◻ and ◇ require a synchronic reading of the operators to
make sense in the context of possibility. If this is so, then what parts of our modal
logic crucially turn on this difference and how does it affect our formal treatment of
Kilwardby?
44. Recall that in divided modal propositions, the modal term occurs adverbially (or is equivalent to one
that is, in the case of words like can) so that A
M
a B should be translated into English as saying that
‘Every B is possibly B’.
45. It is worth noting that this goes against a slightly generalised interpretation of the syllogism as the
monadic fragment of first-order logic. While it is possible to translate Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic
into first-order logic, this may not generalise to other modal syllogistic theories, e.g. Buridan’s.
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On all of the standard readings of the modal operators in modal logic, there does
seem to be something fundamentally synchronic about the reading.46 For example, the
epistemic reading of ◻a as ‘knows’ in effect says that (an agent a) knows that φ just in
case φ is true in all of the worlds that the agent believes are compatible with the real
world. What is clear from each of these cases is that the interpretation offered on the
formal models requires a synchronic reading of the modal operations.
So, what does this says about our reconstruction of Kilwardby’s modal logic? First, it
is important to note that the main use for the modal semantics is to separate necessary
propositions from contingent and possible ones. While the distinction between per se
and per accidens does make use of this modal notion, it does not actually need to.47
Likewise, the main interpretive work required to separate these two senses of necessity is
given by ⟨T,≤⟩, not by the modal semantics. As such, the additional semantic machinery
is necessary for understanding Kilwardby’s logic and does seem to be, in some sense,
motivated by his theory.
Unlike in our treatment of Buridan’s modal logic, what we have is a formal reconstruc-
tion of Kilwardby’s logic that is an attempt to relate his logic to contemporary possible
worlds semantics. It preserves some of the features of Kilwardby’s logic, but does work
in a framework that is rather alien to his motivations and thought. It is worth pointing
out, however, that the use of possible worlds semantics is anachronistic (and as such our
formal model should not be used as an interpretive tool in understanding Kilwardby).
What sort of framework would fare better? One natural way forward would be to
approach the syllogism from an entirely tree-based semantics. The idea here, following
Malink (and ultimately Thomason and Johnson) would be to view the syllogism as a
relationship between ordered terms, where the order is given by underlying assumptions
about Aristotelian ontology.
6.9 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to bring together a number of philosophical implications for
our analysis of Kilwardby and Buridan. The topics covered here are somewhat diverse
but serve to bring out some of interesting differences and similarities between Buridan
and Kilwardby’s approaches to modality.
As should be clear from what we have written, the accounts of modality offered and
defended by Kilwardby and Buridan are very different in nature. Kilwardby’s under-
standing of the modal syllogism and of modality more generally is fundamentally con-
nected to a statistical understanding of modality. The role of the expository syllogism
makes this dependence particularity clear. In order to not run afoul of theological issues,
Kilwardby’s modal logic needs to select less general terms for expository proofs in the
modal syllogism.
Likewise, Buridan’s modal logic raises a number of interesting philosophical questions
46. Here we will only focus on the philosophically motivated readings of ◻ and ◇. For example, we will
not consider topological or dynamic-programming-based interpretations of these operations.
47. This is because of the constraint that if A ≤ B then for all w, v(A,w) ⊆ v(B,w).
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that we have explored in detail here. Particular attention has been directed to exploring
the sort of modal ontology necessary to make sense of Buridan’s modal logic. What we
have argued for is that Buridan’s ontology is contingentist in nature and an interesting
form of the position. Likewise we have also seen that it is consistent with Buridan’s
historical situation that his modal framework is a synchronic notion of possibility. As
such, it is possible to view Buridan as working with a proto-possible worlds semantics
and to view our formal reconstruction of his logic as showing just how unique and original
his contribution to the history of modal logic was.
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7.1 Conclusions
Our main aim in this work was to explore, compare and contrast two different theories
of modality. On the one hand, we had the modal theory of Robert Kilwardby. As we
have argued, his theory is best situated within the statistical interpretation of modality.
Kilwardby’s discussion of the modal syllogism represents one of the earliest systematic
Latin Medieval engagements with Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Kilwardby’s theory is sys-
tematic in nature and attempts to find a reasonable balance between textual faithfulness
to Aristotle and offering a well-motivated interpretation of the Prior Analytics.
On the other hand, we had Buridan’s account of modality, that, we have argued,
is best understood as being in the same vein as the modal theory of Duns Scotus.
Buridan’s modal logic is a systematic theory developed around his theories of supposition
and ampliation. The resulting modal syllogism is one that shows a high degree of
innovation and independence. In this work, Buridan shows little regard for Aristotle’s
modal syllogism and prefers to develop his own theory of the modal syllogism. As we
have seen, the resulting system integrates a number of important parts of medieval
modal theory in a coherent way. The expository syllogism is used by Buridan to ground
the assertoric syllogism, and we see in this theory how it also connects with the modal
syllogism.
Formally, we have been able to develop logical systems that capture the ideas in each
of Buridan and Kilwardby. In the case of Kilwardby, we develop a formal reconstruc-
tion that pairs up the idea of terms being weakly ordered based on meaning with the
usual account of necessity to develop a formal model that captures Kilwardby’s views
about the apodictic fragment of the modal syllogism. The resulting logic draws on a
number of different logical features. The key idea is to include relationships that encode
the definitional aspects of containment and incompatibility between various terms in a
language. We also showed how it is possible to extend this framework to allow for the
addition of the usual Boolean operations of ∧,¬,∨,→, etc. We then showed how it was
possible to define a connexive notion of implication and demonstrated that it seems to
capture Kilwardby’s notion of natural consequence.
In the case of Buridan’s modal logic, we have seen a number of interesting results.
First, we have provided a formalisation of Buridan’s modal logic using a single domain
together with an implicit predicate that tracks the various objects that exist at various
worlds. Using a fairly obvious definition of the modal operations which closely follows
Buridan’s own remarks about modal ampliation, we showed (in the appendix) that it
was possible to reconstruct Buridan’s modal logic and prove all of the conclusions that
he claims are valid in Books Two and Four of the Treatise On Consequences. In addition
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we provided a syntactic reconstruction of Buridan’s modal logic based on his remarks
concerning the expository syllogism. While at first glance these systems look different
from each other, we were able to show that these two systems are sound and complete
relative to each other.
7.2 Some Historical Questions
There do seem to be some natural historical questions that this work has left open.
One question concerns the relationship between the notion of meaning containment we
attempted to formalise in Kilwardby and its connection to logics that prove various ‘con-
nexive theses’ such as Aristotle’s thesis. As has been well-documented in the literature,
e.g. [42][41],[48] there have been a number of different interpretations offered for what
is supposed to motivate connexive logic. Some, such as the three referenced above, at-
tempt to change the logical operations in order to obtain a connexive system. What our
reading of Kilwardby suggests is a different approach where connexive theorems emerge
from the relationships that are formally imposed on terms in the language.
As we have seen, it is the notion of meaning containment that is central to Kilwardby’s
reason for viewing natural implication as validating the various connexive principles we
discussed. This view merits development in at least two directions. The first direction
is to go back to two other groups of medieval authors and see if this is a plausible
interpretation of how they understood connexive implication. The first group of medieval
authors who will need to be looked at are those who subscribe to a connexive logic and
we will need to see if this notion of meaning containment plays an important role in their
theorising or if Kilwardby’s views are idiosyncratic. The most natural starting place for
such a project are the writings of Peter Abelard and Peter of Spain. Both authors
hold to a connexive theory of implication and write extensively on implication. We
have already seen some evidence that for Abelard this is so. Peter of Spain’s treatment
of implication in his Syncategoreumata is of particular interest, since, like Kilwardby,
he explicitly rejects ex falso. Perhaps even more interesting is that he also responds
to arguments that are purported to establish the validity of ex falso by means of an
argument very similar to C.I. Lewis’. The second group are those medieval authors who
talk about the validity of logical consequence in terms of meaning containment or who
distinguish a number of different senses of logical consequence, one of which is based on
meaning containment. The question here is, does this account of logical consequence
have connexive elements to it? If it does not, are there features about how meaning
containment is understood that render it clearly classical (or some other sort of logic)?
Another set of questions are naturally raised by our exploration of Buridan’s modal
logic. Two questions and one extension present themselves for further analysis. First, we
have set up a framework for exploring how medieval writers could discuss the question
of contingentism and necessitism and more general ontological considerations raised by
modal logic. It would be interesting to see if there are medieval thinkers whose writings
on modal logic either commit them to or seem to suggest a necessitist position. This
would be interesting on a few levels. On one level, it would present a prefiguring of the
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views defended by Williamson et al. On another level, in so far as there is an objection
to necessitism that proceeds by arguing that the view is unintuitive and unnatural, this
would, to some degree, tell against it. On a third level, and most importantly, the
arguments put forward by medieval authors in defense of this position would prove to be
interesting and raise the prospects of exploring the relationship between medieval and
modern views on this topic.
A natural second question concerns the relationship between Buridan’s modal logic
and the modal logic of other nominalists, both those who came before (e.g. Ockham) and
those who came after him. We have already briefly touched on the relationship between
Buridan and Ockham as it concerns the ampliation of the subject in propositions of
possibility and necessity. During the time this thesis was being revised, we have published
a paper[23] which begins to address some of these issues. The paper was not included
as it was not part of the original text of this thesis.
The obvious natural extension of our analysis of Buridan’s logic is to expand the
formal treatment of Buridan’s modal logic to account for his analysis of composite modal
propositions. Ideally, in such a framework we would be able to represent all of the modal
inferences that Buridan takes to be valid and be able to verify (or refute) a number of
conjectures about Buridan’s logic that have been made in the literature. For example,
in [25], it is claimed that Buridan’s logic requires him to work in S5, while [35] claims
that Buridan is committed to the validity of the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae.
While we have argued against the second claim in this thesis informally, it would be
helpful to explore Buridan’s modal logic in its full generality to be able to attest to the
soundness of such claims.
7.3 Some Formal and Technical Questions
Formally, there are a number of interesting issues that should be addressed in future
work. The most important one concerns the representation and formalisation of Kil-
wardby’s modal logic. As we have already seen, a possible worlds based reconstruction
of Kilwardby’s modal logic is somewhat anachronistic and seems to raise a number of
difficult problems for how to interpret Kilwardby’s logic. As is fairly well-known, there
is an alternative framework for formalising syllogistic validity. This is done in terms of
preorders and can be found in, e.g. [38]. The basic idea behind this is the following:
Suppose that T = ⟨T,≤⟩ is a preorder. We build well-formed formulae out of the elements
of T, and say that:
T ⊧ AaB if and only if A ≤ B
T ⊧ AeB if and only if ¬∃C ∈ T (C ≤ A and C ≤ B)
T ⊧ AiB if and only if ∃C ∈ T such that C ≤ A and C ≤ B
T ⊧ AoB if and only if A ≰ B
Working in this framework has the benefit of defining the syllogistic propositions by
means of the relationship between terms, and makes no reference to the objects that
may or may not fall under the terms. However, this also becomes a problem, since for
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medieval authors (such as Kilwardby and Buridan), AaA is not always true. Likewise,
we would need to find an interpretation of the modal operations that makes sense of
Kilwardby’s modal inferences. The natural way of doing this, which we have already
seen in [38], is to think of modal operators as designated upsets of a particular family of
terms. To deal with the reflexivity issue, we would need to work with a weaker structure
than a preorder.
If such a structure could be identified that is suitable for Kilwardby’s logic, it would
then be interesting to explore when such structures can be expressed using syllogistic
propositions. In particular, the following two questions seem like natural generalisations
of this approach. First, can any preorder be expressed as a (possibly infinite) set of
categorical propositions? If so, can we use this to provide an alternative proof that
the usual Boolean operations cannot be defined using categorical formulae? We have
already seen that we can give semantics for syllogistic systems in terms of preorders. Does
this afford us any new or interesting insights into the nature of syllogistic propositions?
Likewise, is there a mathematical structure that can be used to account for the syllogistic
systems employed by the medievals that ‘abstracts’ away the particular objects that fall
under a given term?
A second technical question concerns the modal strength that is needed to capture all
of Buridan’s modal logic. As we stated in Chapter Four, because of the language that we
are working in, it is not possible to express inferences stronger than T. In particular, we
cannot iterate modal operations. We chose to work in a stronger system so as to simplify
a number of the proofs and to leave open the question as to what system Buridan may
be working in. In order to provide a proper answer to the question of the strength of
Buridan’s modal logic, we would need to provide a complete treatment of Buridan’s
modal logic. This would require a treatment of composite modal propositions, as well
as a systematic discussion and exegesis of Buridan’s treatment of the interrelationship
between divided and modal propositions in Chapter Two of the Treatise. These are the
places where it is most likely for Buridan to make use of iterative modals, and as such,
is a future project for formal analysis.
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Latin references to many of the passages in Buridan we quote can be found below.
8.1 Chapter Four
1. Et ad hoc declarandum, dico quod propositio diuiditur in propositionem categori-
cam et hypotheticam. Consequentia autem est propositio hypothetica; constituta
enim est ex pluribus propositionibus coniunctis per hanc dictionem “si” uel per
hanc dictionem “ergo” aut aequiualentem.[4, p.21]
2. Nunc de syllogismis determinandum est ex obliquis terminis. Propter quod prim-
itus supp onendum erit quod obliquus terminus quando cum recto construitur a
quo regitur est sicut determinatio illius recti, quasi sicut adiectiuum est deter-
minatio substantiui. Sicut enim dicendo ‘Equus albus currit’ haec dictio ‘albus’
determinat hanc dictionem ‘equus’ ad supponendum solum pro illis albis, ita si
dico ‘Equus Socratis currit’ haec dictio ‘Socratis’ contrahit hanc dictionem ‘equus’
ad supponendum pro illis qui sunt Socratis solum.[4, p.98]
3. Illa propositio est antecedens ad aliam propositionem quam impossibile est esse
ueram illa alia non existente uera illis simul formatis.[4, p.21]
4. Sed haec descriptio deficit uel est incomplete, quia hic est bona consequentia:
Omnis homo currit; ergo aliquis homo currit et tamen possibile est primam esse
ueram secunda non existente uera, immo secunda non existente.[4, p.21]
5. Deinde, in quinto capitulo, etiam suppono quod propositio affirmatiua designat
quod idem sit pro quo termini supponunt, aut fuit aut erit aut potest esse idem,
secundum exigentiam propositionum. Si enim dico “A est B”, designo quod idem
sit A et B, et si dico “A fuit B”, designo quod A fuit idem quod B, et sic de aliis.
Propositio autem negatiua oppositum designat, scilicet quod idem non sit.[4, p.20]
6. Et exponatur totum secundum exigentiam propositionum. Oportet enim, de pro-
prietate sermonis, aliter dicere de uniuersali et aliter de particulari, ut quod nihil
est idem pro quo subiectum supponit alicui pro quo praedicatum supponit uel,
particulariter, quod aliquid pro quo subiectum supponit non est idem alicui pro
quo praedicatum supponit.[4, p.25]
7. Quia si equus Colini est mortuus qui bene ambulauit, haec est uera: ‘Equus Colini
bene ambulauit’ et non est ita in re sicut ista propositio significat [4, p.17]
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8. Et intelligo per ‘causas ueritatis’ alicuius propositionis ⟨propositiones⟩ quarum
quaelibet sufficeret ad hoc quod propositio esset uera.[4, p.19]
9. Cum enim impossibile sit eandem propositionem esse simul ueram et falsam et
quam libet si formetur necesse sit esse ueram uel falsam, necesse est modo contra-
dictorio causam ueritatis et causam falsitatis eiusdem propositionis assignare.[4,
p.18]
10. Consequentia “formalis” uocatur quae in omnibus terminis ualet retenta forma
consimili. Vel si uis expresse loqui de ui sermonis, consequentia formalis est cui
omnis propositio similis in forma quae formaretur esset bona consequenti. . . [4,
pp.22-23]
11. Sed consequentia materialis est cui non omnis propositio consimilis in forma ⟨quae
formaretur⟩ esset bona consequentia [4, p.23]
12. Et dico quod in proposito, prout de materia et forma hic loquimur, per ‘materiam’
propositionis aut consequentiae intelligimus terminos pure categorematicos, scilicet
subiecta et praedicata, circumscriptis syncategorematicis sibi appositis. . . sed ad
formam pertinere dicimus totum residuum.[4][p.30]
13. Volumus ergo per ‘syllogismum’ in sequentibus intelligere solum consequentiam
formalem ad unam conclusionem categoricam per medium ab utraque extremitate
dictae conclusionis diuersum.[4, p.82]
14. Quod omnis talis syllogismus exigit in praemissis coniunctionem utriusque extrem-
itatis conclusionis cum medio, propter quam coniunctionem infertur coniunctio ex-
tremitatum inter se, uel affirmatiue uel negatiue. Sic igitur manifestum est quod
omnis syllogismus, prout hic de syllogismo intendimus, est constitutus ex tribus
terminis solum, scilicet ex duabus extremitatibus, quae sunt termini conclusionis,
et ex termino medio, cum quo illae extremitates coniunguntur in praemissis. . . Et
ultra sequitur ex his quod huiusmodi syllogismorum sunt solum quattuor figurae.
Vocatur enim “figura syllogistica” ordinatio medii ad extremitates in praemissis
secundum subiectionem et praedicationem. Hoc autem non potest fieri nisi secun-
dum quattuor combinationes. [4, p.82]
15. Deinde, in quarto capitulo, supponendum est quod syllogismi affirmatiui tenent
in uirtute istius principii: ‘Quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem inter se sunt
eadem’. Unde ex eo quod extremitates designantur in praemissis dici eaedem uni
medio concluduntur in conclusione dici eaedem inter se. Negatiui autem syllogismi
tenent per illud aliud principium: ‘Quorumcumque duorum unum est idem alicui
cui reliquum non est idem illa non sunt inter se eadem’. Et ob hoc contingit quod
affirmatiua conclusio indiget concludi ex ambabus affirmatiuis et negatiua ex una
affirmatiua et alia negatiua, quondam propositio affirmatiua designat identitatem
et negatiua non identitatem.[4, p.84]
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16. Sed notandum est quod propositiones non dicuntur “de necessario” aut “de possi-
bili” ex eo quod sunt possibiles aut necessariae, immo ex eo quod in eis ponuntur
isti modi “possibile” aut “necessarium”.[4, p.56]
17. Compositae “uocantur in quibus modus subicitur et dictum praedicatur uel econuerso
. . . Sed “diuisae” uocantur in quibus pars dicti subicitur et alia pars praedicatur.
Modus autem se tenet ex parte copulae, tamquam eius quaedam determinatio.[4,
p.57]
18. Supponendum est quod propositio diuisa de possibili habet subiectum ampliatum
per modum sequentem ipsum ad supponendum non solum pro his quae sunt sed
etiam pro his quae possum esse quamuis non sint.[4, p.58]
19. Deinde, quia possibilitas est ad futura et omnino ad possibilia, ideo similiter hoc
uerbum “potest” ampliat suppositionem subiecti ad omnia quae possunt esse.[4,
p.27]
20. Si dico: ‘Omne B potest esse A’ ibi est unicum subiectum et unicum praedicatum
et una propositio simpliciter categorica, et subiectum est simul unica distributione
distributum. Ideo melius esse uidetur quod exponatur per propositionem unam
etiam categoricam, de uno subiecto et uno praedicato, licet propter ampliationem
subiecti fiat in subiecto exponentis disiunctio huius uerbi “est” ad hoc uerbum
“potest”. [4, p.59]
21. Et capitur hic “possibile” non quia possit esse sed pro propositione possibili, quae
ex eo dicitur “possibilis” quia qualitercumque significat ita potest esse. [4, p.69]
22. Ad omnem propositionem de possibili sequi per aequipollentiam aliam de neces-
sario et ad omnem de necessario aliam de possibili, sic se habentes quod si fuerit
apposite negatio uel ad modum uel ad dictum uel ad utrumque in una non ap-
ponatur ad illud in alia et si non fuerit apposite in una apponatur in alia, aliis
manentibus eisdem.[4, p.61]
23. In omni propositione de necessario diuisa subiectum ampliatur ad supponendum
pro his quae possunt esse. [4, p.63]
24. Ad nullam propositionem de necessario sequi aliquam de inesse uel econverso,
praeter quod ad uniuersalem negatiuam de necessario sequitur uniuersalis negatiua
de inesse.[4, p.64]
25. Ad nullam propositionem de possibili sequi aliquam de inesse uel econtra, praeter
quod ad omnem propositionem affirmatiuam de inesse sequitur particularis affir-
matiua de possibili. [4, p.65]
26. Ad omnem affirmatiuam de possibili sequi per conuersionem in terminis particu-
larem affirmatiuam de possibili, sed non uniuersalem, et ad nullam negatiuam de
possibili sequi per conuersionem in terminis aliam de possibili.[4, p.66]
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27. Ad nullam propositionem de necessario sequi per conuersionem in terminis aliam de
necessario, praeter quod ad uniuersalem negatiuam sequitur uniuersalis negatiua.[4,
p.67]
28. Omnem propositionem de contingenti ad utrumlibet habentem modum affirmatum
conuerti in oppositam qualitatem de modo affirmato, sed nullam sic conuerti si
conuertens uel conuersa fuerit de modo negato.[4, p.68]
29. Nullam propositionem de contingenti posse conuerti in terminis in aliam de con-
tingenti, sed omnem habentem modum affirmatum posse conuerti in aliam de
possibili. [4][p.68]
30. Tamen licet haec sit possibilis “Omne currens est equus”, non sequitur quod uni-
uersaliter omne currens possit esse equus.[4, p.76]
31. In omnibus modalibus compositis in quibus dictum subicitur ad particularem sequi
uniuersalem caeteris non mutatis.[4, p.70]
32. Multa sunt possibilia quae nunquam sunt, erunt uel fuerunt. [4, pp.27-28]
33. Nulla propositio est negatiua; ergo nullus asinus currit. [4, p.21].
8.2 Chapter Five
1. Deinde, in secundo capitulo, supponam quod omnis talis syllogismus exigit in
praemissis coniunctionem utriusque extremitatis conclusionis cum medio, propter
quam coniunctionem infertur coniunctio extremitatum inter se, uel affirmatiue uel
negatiue. [4, p.82]
2. Sed notandum est quod haec quarta figura non differs a prima nisi secundum
transpositionem praemissarum, quae quidem transpositio nihil operatur ad aliam
conclusionem inferendam uel ad illationem impediendam, sed solum operatur quod
conclusio illata si esset directa in prima figura esset indirecta in quarta et econuerso.[4,
p.82]
3. Ex maiore de necessario et minore de inesse in prima figura ualet semper syllo-
gismus ad conclusionem de necessario particularem, sed non ad uniuersalem.[4,
p.124]
4. Ex maiore negatiua de necessario et minore de inesse ualet semper <syllogismus>
in secunda figura ad conclusionem de necessario particularem, non ad uniuersalem;
sed si maior sit affirmatiua de necessario uel de inesse non ualet syllogismus ad
conclusionem de necessario, ualet tamen ad conclusionem de inesse..[4, p.125]
5. Quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem inter se sunt eadem. [4, p.84]
6. Quaecumque inuicem sunt eadem, a quocumque unum eorum est diuersum ab
eodem reliquum est diuersum. [4, p.84]
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7. Prima pars patet per syllogismum expositorium. Quia si B potest esse A, signetur
illud B et sit hoc C. Tunc sic: hoc C est uel potest esse B et ipsum idem potest
esse A; ergo quod potest esse A est uel potest esse B.[4, p.66]
8. Upponendum est quod syllogismi affirmatiui tenent in uirtute istius principii:
Quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem inter se sunt eadem. Unde ex eo quod
extremitates designantur in praemissis dici eaedem uni medio concluduntur in
conclusione dici eaedem inter se. Negatiui autem syllogismi tenent per illud al-
iud principium: Quorumcumque duorum unum est idem alicui cui reliquum non
est idem illa non sunt inter se eadem. [4, p.84]
9. Postea, de quarta reductione, manifestum est quod syllogismi expositorii sunt per
se euidentes, maxime in tertia figura; et faciliter omnes sex modi tertiae figurae
probantur per reductionem ad syllogismos expositorios. [6, 5.2.4] Second last para-
graph.
10. Et dicam primo quod omnis propositio de aliquo termino communi non distributo
habet uel habere potest, aut sibi consimilis in forma, plures causas ueritatis quam
propositio de eodem termino communi distributo, caeteris similiter manentibus.[4,
p.18]
11. In tertia figura ualet semper syllogismus ad conclusionem de necessario ex maiore
uniuersali de necessario et minore de inesse, sed ex maiore de inesse non ualet ad
conclusionem directam de necessario, nec etiam ex maiore de necessario si sit par-
ticularis.Prima pars conclusionis in omnibus modis esset manifesta per syllogismos
expositorios, scilicet in Darapti, in Felapton, Datisi et Ferison.[4, p.126]
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The aim of this Appendix is to show that the properties P1-P7 hold in our semantics as
well as some of the other claims that we made in Chapter Two. What we will do here is
show that our semantics correctly track the inferences in the assertoric syllogism. This
will suffice to establish these properties.
Recall that Kilwardby Model for Immediate Signification is given by the following:
Let KI = {D,W,T,R,≤,⊴, ∣, c, v} where
D,W , and T are non-empty sets. (Informally, D is our Domain, W is a set of
worlds, and T is a set of interpreted terms or predicates)
R ⊆W 2.
⊏,⊴,and ∣ are subsets of T 2 and satisfy the conditions given below.
c ∶ Terms→ T .
v ∶W × T → PD.
We require that ≤ and ⊴ be preorders on T and that ∣ is irreflexive and symmetric.
We further require that our orders have the following properties:
1. ∀x, y if x ⊴ y then x ≤ y.
2. ∀x, y, z if x ≤ y and y ⊴ z then x ⊴ z.
3. ∀x, y if x ≤ y then not x∣y
4. ∀x, y, z if x ≤ y and y∣z then x∣z.
These will be referred to as order properties 1–4.
As before, we impose the following conditions:
1. For all terms, A,B c(A) ≤ c(B) iff for some w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
2. For all terms, A,B if c(A) ⊴ c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
3. For all terms, A,B if c(A)∣c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) = ∅
We will refer to these as valuation conditions 1–3.
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KI,w ⊧ AaB if and only if c(A) ≤ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ AeB if and only if ¬∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ AiB if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B)T ,w ⊧ AoB if and only if c(A) ≰ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.a B if and only if c(A) ⊴ c(B)
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.e B if and only if c(A)∣c(B)
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.i B if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D ⊴ c(B) or D ≤ c(B)
and D ⊴ c(A)
KI,w ⊧ A p.s.o B if and only if ∃D ∈ T s.t. D ≤ c(A) and D∣c(B)
KI,w ⊧ A p.a.a B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then v(x,A) ⊆ v(x,B).
KI,w ⊧ A p.a.e B if and only if ∀v ∈W if wRv then KI, v ⊧ AeB.
KI,w ⊧ A p.a.i B if and only if ∀v ∈W if wRv then KI, v ⊧ AiB.
KI,w ⊧ A p.a.o B if and only if ∀v ∈W if wRv then KI, v ⊧ AoB.
9.0.1 Single Premise Inferences
We will start by proving some general properties about assertoric propositions in the
Square of Opposition:
AaB contradicts AoB AeB contradicts AiB
AaB and AeB are contrary AiB and AoB are subcontrary
AaB implies AiB AeB implies AoB
AeB simply converts to BeA AiB simply converts to BiA
AaB accidentally converts to BiA
Recall that two propositions are said to be contradictory if the falsity of the one implies
that the other is true, and vice versa. Two propositions are contrary if they cannot both
be true, but can both be false. Two propositions are said to be subcontrary if they can-
not both be false, but can both be true. In our formal model, we interpret this as follows:
Two formulae φ and ψ are said to be contradictory if for all models, K and all
worlds w ∈W K,w ⊧ φ if and only if K,w ⊭ ψ.
Two formulae φ and ψ are said to be contrary if there is no model, K and no world
w ∈ W such that K,w ⊧ φ and K,w ⊧ ψ, but there is at least one model and one
world where K,w ⊭ φ and K,w ⊭ ψ.
Two formulae φ and ψ are said to be subcontrary if there is no model, K and no
world w ∈W such that K,w ⊭ φ and K,w ⊭ ψ, but there is at least one model and
one world where K,w ⊧ φ and K,w ⊧ ψ.
In the case of simple conversion we will simply prove that the two propositions are
equivalent, while in accidental conversion we will treat this as an implication.
That AaB contradicts AoB and that AeB contradicts AiB are immediate from the
semantics. To see that AaB and AeB are contraries, first, assume that for some model
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KI and some world, w ∈ W we have KI,w ⊧ AaB and KI,w ⊧ AeB. Then we have
c(A) ≤ c(B) and for no D ∈ T D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B). But since ≤ is reflexive, we
have c(A) ≤ c(A) and we already have assumed c(A) ≤ c(B). Hence, ∃D ∈ T such that
D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B) contradicting our assumption.
For the subcontraries, assume that for some model KI and some world, w ∈W we have
KI,w ⊭ AiB and KI,w ⊭ AoB. Then we have KI,w ⊧ AeB and KI,w ⊧ AaB, since these
are contradictories. However, we have already shown that KI,w ⊧ AeB and KI,w ⊧ AaB
cannot both be true. Hence there is no model where AiB and AoB are both false.
To see that AaB and AeB can both be false, and to see that AiB and AoB can both
be true consider the following counter-model:
D = {a, b} W = {w} R = {(w,w)}
T = {A,B} ⊴= {(A,A), (B,B)} ∣ = ∅≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (B,A)}
c(A) = A c(B) = B
v(w,A) = {a, b} v(w,B) = {b}
Normally we will simply observe that the model is a Kilwardby Model. However, in
a few cases we will verify these conditions. For the order properties we need to show that:
1. ∀x, y if x ⊴ y then x ≤ y.
2. ∀x, y, z if x ≤ y and y ⊴ z then x ⊴ z.
3. ∀x, y if x ≤ y then not x∣y
4. ∀x, y, z if x ≤ y and y∣z then x∣z.
Condition 1 clearly holds. In the case of 2., observe that there are no distinct terms
y,z such that y ⊴ z. Hence the only case we need to consider is when c(B) ≤ c(A) and
B ⊴ B. But clearly the consequent is satisfied. Condition 3. clearly holds, since ∣ is
empty, and likewise, condition 4 is vacuously satisfied.
Likewise, for the valuation conditions, we need to verify that:
1. For all terms, A,B c(A) ≤ c(B) iff for some w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
2. For all terms, A,B if c(A) ⊴ c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,B).
3. For all terms, A,B if c(A)∣c(B) then for all w ∈W v(w,A) ∩ v(w,B) = ∅
In the case of condition 1, observe that c(B) ≤ c(A), c(A) ≤ c(A), and c(B) ≤ c(B).
As we have v(A) = {a, b} and v(B) = {b}. it is easy to verify that v(w,A) ⊆ v(w,A),
v(w,B) ⊆ v(w,B), and v(w,B) ⊆ v(w,A).
In the case of condition 2 we only have one world to consider and it clearly holds by
inspection of the valuation function, while the case of condition 3 is vacuously true.
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In such a model clearly c(A) ≰ c(B) since v(w,B) is a proper subset of v(w,A). Hence
M,w ⊭ AaB. However, since c(B) ≤ c(A) and c(B) ≤ c(B), it follows that ∃D D ≤ c(A)
and D ≤ c(B) from which it follows that M,w ⊭ AeB. Consequently, it is easy to see
that M,w ⊧ AiB and M,w ⊧ AoB.
To see that AaB implies AiB, assume that for some model KI and some world, w ∈W
we have KI,w ⊧ AaB. Then c(A) ≤ c(B). Since ≤ is reflexive, it follows that c(A) ≤ c(A).
Hence, there is some D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B). Therefore KI,w ⊧ AiB.
To see that AeB implies AoB assume that for some model KI and some world, w ∈W
we have KI,w ⊧ AeB. Then it follows that there is no D such that D ≤ c(A) and
D ≤ c(B). But ≤ is reflexive, and so c(A) ≤ c(A). Hence it would have to be the case
that c(A) ≤ c(B), but then it would follow that exists D such that D ≤ c(A), which
would contradict our assumption. Hence c(A) ≰ c(B) and so KI,w ⊧ AoB.
We will refer to the previous two inferences as subalternation.
In the cases of simple conversion we need to show:
1. AeB is equivalent to BeA
2. AiB is equivalent to BiA
However, both of these are trivial. Take an arbitrary model KI and arbitrary world
w then observe that KI,w ⊧ AeB iff it is not the case that there is some D such that
D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B) iff it is not the case that there is some D such that D ≤ c(B)
and D ≤ c(A) iff KI,w ⊧ BeA. The first and last biconditionals are given by the
truth conditions, the middle biconditional follows by basic logic. The proof that AiB is
equivalent to BiA is very similar.
Accidental conversion: Take an arbitrary model KI and arbitrary world w and assume
that KI,w ⊧ AaB. Then c(A) ≤ c(B). Since ≤ is reflexive, it follows that c(A) ≤ c(A).
But then it follows that there is some D (in this case A) such that D ≤ c(B) and
D ≤ c(A). Hence KI,w ⊧ BiA.
Square of opposition properties for Per Se Necessary Propositions:
A
p.s.
a B contradicts A
p.s.
o B A
p.s.
e B contradicts A
p.s.
i B
A
p.s.
a B and A
p.s.
e B are contrary A
p.s.
i B and A
p.s.
o B are subcontrary
A
p.s.
a B implies A
p.s.
i B A
p.s.
e B implies A
p.s.
o B
To see that A
p.s.
a B contradicts A
p.s.
o B assume that A ⊴ B and that ∃D such that
D ≤ A and D∣B. Assume that E ≤ c(A) and E∣B. By order property 3, it follows that
E ≰ B. Then, since A ⊴ B and E ≤ c(A) it follows that E ⊴ B by order property 2.
Hence E ≤ c(B) by order property 1, which is a contradiction.
To see that A
p.s.
e B contradicts A
p.s.
i B, assume that A∣B and that ∃D D ≤ c(A) and
D ⊴ B or D ≤ c(B) and D ⊴ A. We prove that the right disjunct leads to a contradiction
and note that the proof that the left disjunct leads to a contradiction is similar. Assume
that D ≤ c(A) and D ⊴ B. Since D ≤ c(A) and A∣B, it follows by order property 4 that
D∣B, which, by order property 3 entails that D ≰ B. But from D ⊴ B it follows by order
property 1 that D ≤ c(B), which is a contradiction.
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To see that A
p.s.
a B and A
p.s.
e B are contrary, first assume that for some model M
and some w ∈ W , we have M,w ⊧ A p.s.a B and M,w ⊧ A p.s.e B. Then it follows that
c(A) ⊴ c(B) and that c(A)∣c(B). By order property 1, c(A) ⊴ c(B) entails c(A) ≤ c(B).
Likewise, c(A)∣c(B) entails c(A) ≰ c(B), which is a contradiction.
To see that A
p.s.
a B and A
p.s.
e B can both be false, recall our previous countermodel:
D = {a, b} W = {w} R = {(w,w)}
T = {A,B} ⊴= {(A,A), (B,B)} ∣ = ∅≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (B,A)}
c(A) = A c(B) = B
v(w,A) = {a, b} v(w,B) = {b}
Clearly c(A) ⋬ c(B). Likewise, it is not the case that c(A)∣c(B). Hence, M,w ⊭ A p.s.a
B and M,w ⊭ A p.s.e B.
To see that A
p.s.
i B and A
p.s.
o B are subcontrary, first assume that for some modelM and some w ∈W , we have M,w ⊭ A p.s.i B and M,w ⊭ A p.s.o B. As in the previous
case, it would then follow that M,w ⊧ A p.s.e B and M,w ⊧ A p.s.a B, which is impossible,
since these are contraries.
To see that these can both be true, consider the following model:
D = {a, b} W = {w} R = {(w,w)}
T = {A,B,C} ⊴= {(A,A), (B,B), (B,A), (C,C)} ∣ = {(C,B), (B,C)}≤= {(A,A), (B,B), (B,A), (C,C), (C,A)}
c(A) = A c(B) = B c(C) = C
v(w,A) = {a, b} v(w,B) = {b} v(w,C) = {a}
In this case, since c(B) ≤ c(B) and B ⊴ A, it follows by basic logic that M,w ⊧ A p.s.i B.
However, since c(C) ≤ c(A) and C ∣B, it follows that M,w ⊧ A p.s.o B as desired.
To see that A
p.s.
a B implies A
p.s.
i B, assume that for some model KI and some world,
w ∈ W we have KI,w ⊧ A p.s.a B. Then we have c(A) ⊴ c(B). From this it follows that
c(A) ≤ c(A) (by reflexivity). Hence, there is some D such that D ⊴ c(B) and D ≤ c(A).
That KI,w ⊧ A p.s.i B follows by basic logic.
Likewise, to show that AeB implies AoB, assume that for some model KI and some
world, w ∈ W we have KI,w ⊧ AeB. From this it follows that c(A)∣c(B). Since ≤ is
reflexive, we have c(A) ≤ c(A). Hence, there is some D such that D ≤ c(A) and D∣c(B),
and so KI,w ⊧ AoB.
Square of opposition properties of Per Accidens Necessary Propositions:
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A
p.a.
a B is contrary to A
p.a.
o B A
p.a.
e B is contrary to A
p.a.
i B
A
p.a.
a B and A
p.a.
e B are contrary A
p.a.
i B and A
p.a.
o B are subcontrary
A
p.a.
a B implies A
p.a.
i B A
p.a.
e B implies A
p.a.
o B
The proofs of each of these propositions is a straight-forward. For example, to see
that A
p.a.
a B is contrary to A
p.a.
o B, take an arbitrary model J, and world w ∈W . Then
J,w ⊧ A p.a.a B if and only if ∀x ∈W if wRx then v(w,A ⊆ v(w,B) if and only if ¬∀x ∈W
if wRx then v(w,A ⊈ v(w,B). However, it follows from A p.a.o B that ∀x ∈ W if wRx
then v(w,A ⊈ v(w,B). Hence these are contrary.
9.1 Inferences Between Per Se, and Assertoric Propositions.
Since Kilwardby restricts his treatment of the modal syllogisms to per se necessary
proposition, we will only treat inferences between per se and assertoric propositions.
A
p.s.
a B implies A a B
A
p.s.
e B implies A e B
A
p.s.
i B implies A i B
A
p.s.
o B implies A o B
For the proofs of each of these propositions, assume that KI is an arbitrary model and
that w ∈W .
To see that A
p.s.
a B implies A a B, assume that KI,w ⊧ A p.s.a B. Then c(A) ⊴ c(B).
By order property 1, it follows that c(A) ≤ c(B) and hence KI,w ⊧ A a B.
To see that A
p.s.
e B implies A e B, assume that KI,w ⊧ A p.s.e B. Then c(A)∣c(B).
Now, assume that for some D D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B). Since D ≤ c(A) and c(A)∣c(B)
it follows by order property 4 that D∣c(B) and hence D ≰ c(B), contradicting our
assumption. Hence for no D is D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B) and so KI,w ⊧ A e B.
To see that A
p.s.
i B implies A e B, assume that KI,w ⊧ A i B. Then there is some
D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ⊴ c(B) or D ≤ c(B) and D ⊴ c(A). That D ≤ c(A) and
D ≤ c(B) follows from both disjuncts by order property 1.
To see that A
p.s.
o B implies A o B, assume that KI,w ⊧ A p.s.o B. Hence, there is some
D such that D ≤ c(A) and D∣c(B). Now, assume for a contradiction that c(A) ≤ c(B).
Then since ≤ is transitive, it follows that D ≤ c(B). However, from D∣c(B) it follows by
order property 3 that D ≰ c(B), which contradicts our assumption. Hence c(A) ≰ c(B)
and so KI,w ⊧ A o B.
9.2 Kilwardby’s Validities
In this section we will show that our account of Kilwardby’s logic correctly follows the
assertoric syllogisms in terms of validity and invalidity for the three figures. With this
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in place we will then use this to give proofs for properties P1-P7. In doing this we will
not treat the fourth figure, as it can easily be obtained from the first.
We start with the validities: We claim that the following syllogisms are valid:
First Figure Barbara Celarent Ferio Darii
Second Figure Cesare Camestres Festino Baroco
Third Figure Datisi Disamis Ferison Bocardo
Darapti Falapton
We will omit proofs of weakened syllogisms (such as Barbari) since they will follow by
subalternation.
Proofs: In each case, let KI be an arbitrary Kilwardby Model and w ∈W :
First Figure
Barbara
Assume that KI,w ⊧ BaC and KI,w ⊧ AaB. Then it follows that c(B) ≤ c(C) and that
c(A) ≤ c(B). It then follows by transitivity that c(A) ≤ c(C) and so KI,w ⊧ AaC. This
proves Barbara. Barbari also follows by subalternation.
Celarent
Assume that KI,w ⊧ BeC and KI,w ⊧ AaB. From the first assumption it follows that
there is no D such that D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(C). From the second assumption, it follows
that c(A) ≤ c(B). Assume for reductio that there is some D such that D ≤ c(A) and
D ≤ c(C). Then this together with the second assumption entails D ≤ c(B). However,
this contradicts the first assumption.
Ferio
Assume that KI,w ⊧ BeC and KI,w ⊧ AiB. From the first assumption it follows that
there is no D such that D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(C). From the second assumption, it follows
that there is some D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B). Assume for reductio that
c(A) ≤ c(C). Then by the second assumption it follows that there is some D such that
D ≤ c(C) and D ≤ c(B), clearly contradicting the first assumption.
Darii
Assume that KI,w ⊧ BaC and KI,w ⊧ AiB. From the first assumption we have that
c(B) ≤ c(C). From the second assumption it follows that there is some D such that
D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B). It then clearly follows from the first assumption that there is
some D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(C). Hence, KI,w ⊧ AiC.
Second Figure
Cesare
Assume that KI,w ⊧ CeB and KI,w ⊧ AaB. By accidental conversion, it follows that
KI,w ⊧ BeC. This is now Celarent, which we already have shown to be valid.
Camestres
Assume that KI,w ⊧ CaB and KI,w ⊧ AeB. It then follows that 1) c(C) ≤ c(B) and 2)
there is no D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(B). Assume for reductio that there is some
D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(C). Then by 1, it follows that there is some D such
that D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(A), contradicting 2.
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Festino
Assume that KI,w ⊧ CeB and KI,w ⊧ AiB. It follows by simple conversion that KI,w ⊧
BeC. This is now Ferio, which we have shown is valid.
Baroco
Assume that KI,w ⊧ CaB and KI,w ⊧ AoB.It then follows that 1) c(C) ≤ c(B) and 2)
c(A) ≰ c(B). Assume for reductio that c(A) ≤ c(C). From 1) and the assumption it
follows that c(A) ≤ c(B), contradicting 2).
Third Figure
Datisi
Assume that KI,w ⊧ BaC and KI,w ⊧ BiA. It follows by simple conversion that
KI,w ⊧ AiB. This is Darii, which we have already shown to be valid.
Disamis
Assume that KI,w ⊧ BiC and KI,w ⊧ BaA. Then it follows that 1) there is some D
such that D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(C) and 2) c(B) ≤ c(A). By 1) and 2) (using transitivity)
it follows that there is some D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(C). Hence KI,w ⊧ AiC.
Ferison
Assume that KI,w ⊧ BeC and KI,w ⊧ BiA. Then it follows that 1) there is no D such
that D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(C) and 2) there is some D such that D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(A).
Assume for reductio for c(A) ≤ c(C). Then this together with 2) it follows that there is
some D such that D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(C), contradicting 1). Hence c(A) ≰ c(C) and so
KI,w ⊧ AoC.
Bocardo
Assume that KI,w ⊧ BoC and KI,w ⊧ BaA. Then it follows that 1) c(B) ≰ c(C) and
that 2) c(B) ≤ c(A). Assume for reductio that c(A) ≤ c(C). Then this together with 2)
entails, by the transitivity of ≤ that c(B) ≤ c(C), contradicting 1).
Darapti Assume that KI,w ⊧ BaC and KI,w ⊧ BaA. Then it follows that 1) c(B) ≤
c(C) and that 2) c(B) ≤ c(A). Then clearly, ∃D such that D ≤ c(A) and D ≤ c(C).
Hence KI,w ⊧ AiC.
Felapton Assume that KI,w ⊧ BeC and KI,w ⊧ BaA. Then it follows that 1) for no
D do both D ≤ c(B) and D ≤ c(C) hold. Further we have 2) c(B) ≤ c(A). Assume that
c(A) ≤ c(C). Then c(B) ≤ c(C) by the transitivity of ≤. Hence ∃D such that D ≤ c(B)
and D ≤ c(C), contradicting 1). So c(A) ≰ c(C) and so KI,w ⊧ AoC.
These are all of the syllogism we needed to show were valid.
The proof of the invalidities is an fairly straightforward exercise in constructing coun-
termodels. We list them in the table that follows in the order Major, Minor, Conclusion.
We will only give the counterexamples for the first figure configurations. After this,
we will prove a short theorem that tells us how to reduce syllogisms in the other two
figures to the first figure. Since AeB implies AoB and AaB implies AiB, if a particular
pair of premises does not entail a and i or e and o (as the case may be), we will group
countermodels together as is useful.
The following are all invalid on our semantics:
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aae aao
aie aio aia
aee aeo aea aei
aoe aoo aoa aoi
eaa eai
eie eia eii
eee eeo eea eei
eoe eoo eoa eoi
iae iao iaa iai
iie iio iia iii
iee ieo iea iei
ioe ioo ioa ioi
oae oao oaa oai
oie oio oia oii
oee oeo oea oei
ooe ooo ooa ooi
Consider the following countermodel:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a}≤=T 2 ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =D
Call this model, J. Observe that since v(A) = v(B) = v(C) = D, we have J,w ⊧ AaB,
J,w ⊧ BaC, J,w ⊧ AaC, J,w ⊧ AiB, J,w ⊧ BiC, J,w ⊧ AiC (as well as some other
consequences). It is also easy to see that J,w ⊭ AoC and J,w ⊭ AeC.
Because of this, the following inferences are clearly invalid:
aae aao aie aio
iae iao iie iio
Consider the following countermodel:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a}≤={(A,A), (B,B), (C,C)}} ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) = ∅
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Call this model, J1. Observe that since v(A) = v(B) = v(C) = ∅, we have J1,w ⊧ AeB,
J1,w ⊧ BeC, J1,w ⊧ AeC, J1,w ⊧ AoB, J1,w ⊧ BoC, J1,w ⊧ AoC (as well as some
other consequences). It is also easy to see that J1,w ⊭ AiC and J1,w ⊭ AaC.
Because of this, the following inferences are clearly invalid:
eea eei eoa eoi
oea oei ooa ooi
Consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a}≤={(A,A), (B,B), (C,C)(A,C)}} ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = v(C) = {a} v(B) = ∅
Call this model, J2. Observe that since v(A) = v(C) = D and v(B) = ∅ we have
J2,w ⊧ AeB, J2,w ⊧ BeC, J2,w ⊧ AaC, J2,w ⊧ AiB, J2,w ⊧ BoC, J2,w ⊧ AoC (as well
as some other consequences). It is also easy to see that J2,w ⊭ AoC and J2,w ⊭ AeC.
Because of this the following are clearly invalid:
eee eeo eoe eoo
oee oeo ooe ooo
Consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a, b}≤={(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B), (C,B)}} ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = {a} v(B) =D
v(C) = {b}
Call this model, J3. Observe that since v(A) = {a}, v(B) = D, and v(C) = {b} we
have J3,w ⊧ AaB, J3,w ⊧ AiB, J3,w ⊧ BiC, J3,w ⊧ AoC, J3,w ⊧ AeB (as well as some
other consequences). It is also easy to see that J3,w ⊭ AaC and J3,w ⊭ AiC.
Because of this the following are clearly invalid:
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aia iia iii iaa
iai
Consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a, b}≤={(A,A), (B,B), (C,C)}} ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = {a} v(B) = {b}
v(C) =D
Call this model J4. Observe that since v(A) = {a}, v(B) = {b}, and v(C) =D we have
J4,w ⊧ AeB, J4,w ⊧ AoB, J4,w ⊧ BaC, J4,w ⊧ BiC, J4,w ⊧ AaC, and J4,w ⊧ AiC. (as
well as some other consequences). It is also easy to see that J4,w ⊭ AeC and J4,w ⊭ AoC.
From this it is clear that the following inferences are invalid:
aee aeo aoe aoo
iee ieo ioe ioo
Consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a, b}≤={(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (B,C)}} ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = {a} v(B) = {b}
v(C) = {b}
Call this model J5. Observe that since v(A) = {a}, v(B) = {b}, and v(C) = {b} we have
J5,w ⊧ AeB, J5,w ⊧ AoB, J5,w ⊧ BaC, J5,w ⊧ BiC, J5,w ⊧ AeC, and J5,w ⊧ AoC. (as
well as some other consequences). It is also easy to see that J5,w ⊭ AaC and J5,w ⊭ AiC.
From this it is clear that the following inferences are invalid:
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aea aei aoa aoi
iea iei ioa ioi
Consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a, b}≤={(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B)}} ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = {b} v(B) = {b}
v(C) = {a}
Call this model J6. Observe that since v(A) = {b}, v(B) = {b}, and v(C) = {a} we have
J6,w ⊧ AaB, J6,w ⊧ AiB, J6,w ⊧ BeC, J6,w ⊧ BoC, J6,w ⊧ AeC, and J6,w ⊧ AoC. (as
well as some other consequences). It is also easy to see that J6,w ⊭ AaC and J6,w ⊭ AiC.
From this it is clear that the following inferences are invalid:
eaa eai eia eii
oaa oai oia oii
Consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a, b}≤={(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B)}} ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = {b} v(B) = {a, b}
v(C) = {b}
Call this model J7. Observe that since v(A) = {b}, v(B) = {b}, and v(C) = {a} we have
J7,w ⊧ AaB, J7,w ⊧ AiB, J7,w ⊧ BeC, J7,w ⊧ BoC, J7,w ⊧ AeC, and J7,w ⊧ AoC.
(as well as some other consequences). It is also easy to see that J7,w ⊭ AeC and
J7,w ⊭ AoC.
From this it is clear that the following inferences are invalid:
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oae oao oie oio
Consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
T = {A,B,C} D = {a, b}≤={(A,A), (B,B), (C,C), (A,B)}} ⊴= ∅∣ = ∅
c(A) = A c(B) = B
c(C) = C
v(A) = {a, b} v(B) = {a}
v(C) = {b}
Call this model J8. Observe that since v(A) = {b}, v(B) = {a}, and v(C) = {b} we
have J8,w ⊧ AiB, J8,w ⊧ BeC, J8,w ⊧ BoC, and J8,w ⊧ AiC (as well as some other
consequences). It is also easy to see that J8,w ⊭ AeC
From this it is clear that eie is invalid.
This completes the counterexamples for the first figure.
9.2.1 Second and Third Figure Syllogisms
For the second and third figure, we can use the principles of interchange and proof per
impossibile that we outlined in our treatment of Buridan’s modal logic to prove a useful
lemma. Recall that:
Interchange: Let S = ⟨M,m,C⟩ and S′ = ⟨M ′,m′,C ′⟩ be two syllogisms such that
M =m′ and M ′ =m, then ⊧ S if and only if ⊧ S′.
The proof is trivial.
Proof per impossibile [PPI]:
Formally, let S = ⟨M,m,C⟩ and S′ = ⟨M ′,m′,C ′⟩ be two syllogisms such that C ′ is the
contradictory of m, m′ is the contradictory of C and M =M ′, then we claim that ⊧ S if
and only if ⊧ S′.
The clause for validity is an easy adaption of how we defined validity in Chapter 3.
We say that ⊧ S if and only if for all Kilwardby Models, KI and all worlds w ∈ W , if
KI,w ⊧M and KI,w ⊧m′ then KI,w ⊧ C.
The proofs for both of these propositions are completely analogous to what we proved
in the case of Buridan models. In what follows, to make the proofs easier to read we
write Contra for the contradictory of a given proposition.
With this in place we can now prove the following reduction lemma:
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Reduction Lemma 1. Any triple in the second or third figure is equivalent to one
triple in the first figure.
The proof of this lemma is an combinatorial exercise using PPI and interchange. Re-
call that the second and third figures are of the form:
C × B B × C
A × B B × A
A × C A × C
To reduce a second figure syllogism, assume that ‘S’ is a triple. Then by PPI S is
equivalent to a triple S’ of the form:
C × B
Contra(A × C)
Contra(A × B)
However, this is clearly now in the first figure, where C is now the middle term, A
is still the subject and B is now the predicate. Hence S′ is a first figure triple that is
equivalent to S
To reduce a third figure syllogism, assume that ‘S’ is a triple. Then by Interchange S
is equivalent to a triple of the form:
A × C
B × C
B × A
By PPI this is equivalent to:
A × C
Contra(B × A)
Contra(B × C)
and by Interchange again, this in turn is equivalent to:
Contra(B × A)
A × C
Contra(B × C)
204
9.2 Kilwardby’s Validities
which is clearly a first figure syllogism where B is now the subject, C is still the
predicate and A is the middle term.
It follows as an easy corollary of this problem that if a syllogism is valid in the first
figure, then by using the algorithm outlined above, we can find valid syllogisms in the
second and third figure. Similarly, if a syllogism is invalid in the first figure, by applying
this algorithm, we can find invalid syllogisms in the second and third figure. As we
have considered all possible combinations of terms in the first figure, it follows that we
have exhausted all of the terms in the second and third figures also, since the difference
between the figures only concerns the order in which the terms occur in the formulae.
With this in place, we can now reduce the invalidity of syllogisms in the second and
third figure to syllogisms in the first figure.
As such, for the three figures we are considering, the following syllogisms are valid:
Figure Valid Syllogism
First Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio
Second Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco
Third Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Bocardo, Ferison
With what we have proven above, we are now in a position to see that P1 through P7
all hold for syllogisms. Each case follows by a simple inspection of the table for valid
syllogisms.
P1 In every syllogism, one premise must be universal.
P2 In every syllogism, one premise must be affirmative.
P3 In first figure syllogisms, the major must be universal
P4 In first figure syllogisms, the minor must be affirmative
P5 In second figure syllogisms, the major must be universal.
P6 In second figure syllogisms, one of the premises must be negative.
P7 In third figure syllogisms, the minor must be affirmative.
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Syllogism
Our aim in this appendix is to verify that all of the syllogisms Buridan claims are
valid, are valid on our semantics, and conversely, that if Buridan says a syllogism is not
valid then it is not valid in our semantics either. In what follows, we will only treat
modal syllogisms, as the assertoric syllogisms are an easy exercise in semantic proofs
and counterexample construction and so are left as an exercise to the reader.
In what follows we will work with the semantics for Buridan modal models lacking
the function c ∶ CONS → D on page 122. This is in part to avoid confusion with the
term C. In what follows, we will use the operation Contra to denote the contradictory
of a proposition. Recall that our semantics are defined as follows:
Buridan Modal Model. A Buridan Modal Model is a tuple:
M = ⟨D,W,R,O, v⟩ such that:
D and W are non-empty sets. D is the domain of objects and W is a set of worlds.
R ⊆W 2 which is reflexive.
O ∶W → P(D) s.t. O(w) ⊆D
v ∶W × PRED → P(D)
Semantic Abbreviations. Let P be a term, and Q either a term or the negation of a
term. Using the semantics we can define the following operations:
V (w,P ) = O(w) ∩ v(w,P )
V (w,¬P ) =D ∖ (O(w) ∩ v(w,P ))
M(w,Q) = {d ∈D ∶ there is some z s.t wRz and d ∈ V (z,Q)}
L(w,Q) = {d ∈D ∶ for all z if wRz then d ∈ V (z,Q)}
Using these operations we can define the truth for categorical propositions.
Assertoric Categorical Propositions.
M,w ⊧ AaB if and only if V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B) and V (w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ AeB if and only if V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ AiB if and only if V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ AoB if and only if V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B) or V (w,A) = ∅
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Modal Categorical Propositions.
M,w ⊧ A La B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Le B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Li B if and only if M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Lo B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈M(w,B) or M(w,A) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Ma B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Me B if and only if M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Mi B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Mo B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B) or M(w,A) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qa B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qe B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Qa B
M,w ⊧ A Qi B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qo B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Qi B
M,w ⊧ A Q¯a B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Q¯e B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Q¯a B
M,w ⊧ A Q¯i B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) or M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Q¯o B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Q¯i B
Recall that we defined a syllogistic triple S, to be a triple ⟨M,m,C⟩ such that:
1. M , m, and C are all categorical formulae;
2. M , m, and C have exactly three terms;
3. The predicate of C occurs in M ;
4. The subject of C occurs in m;
5. M and m share a common term that does not occur in C.1
Syllogistic Validity. A syllogistic triple S is valid (and called a ‘syllogism’) when the
following obtains:
For all Buridan Modal Models M and all worlds w ∈W if M,w ⊧M and M,w ⊧m then
M,w ⊧ C.
We will use the term ‘triple’ as a shorthand for ‘syllogistic triple’ to range over S,
regardless of whether S is valid or not. We will use the term ‘figure’ here to refer to how
the terms are arranged in the various formulae.
1. This definition is standard and can be found in [65].
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Before moving onto our discussion of validity and invalidity, the following Reduction
Lemma is extremely useful for reducing the number of cases that need to be considered
for both validity and invalidity.
Lemma 1 : Any triple in the second or third figure is equivalent to one triple in the
first figure.
The proof of this lemma is an easy combinatorial exercise using PPI and Interchange.
Recall that second and third figure triples are of the form:
Second Figure Third Figure
Major Premise C
∇× B B ∇× C
Minor Premise A
∇× B B ∇× A
Conclusion A
∇× C A ∇× C
To reduce a second figure syllogism or triple, assume that S is a triple. Then by PPI,
S is equivalent to a triple S′ of the form:
C
∇× B
Contra(A ∇× C)
Contra(A ∇× B)
However, this is clearly now in the first figure where the term C is now the middle
term, A is still the subject and B is now the predicate. Hence S′ is a first figure triple
that is equivalent to S.
To reduce a third figure triple, assume that S is a triple. Then by PPI S is equivalent
to a triple of the form:
B
∇× C
Contra(A ∇× C)
Contra(B ∇× A)
By Interchange this is equivalent to:
Contra(A ∇× C)
B
∇× C
Contra(B ∇× A)
and by PPI this in turn is equivalent to:
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Contra(A ∇× C)
B
∇× A2
Contra(B ∇× C)
which is clearly in the first figure where B is now the subject, C is still the predicate
and A is the middle term.
As such, if we want to check that a particular syllogism is valid or invalid in the second
or third figure, it suffices to check the corresponding syllogism in the first figure.
Validity
Our aim in this section is to treat the validity of the syllogisms in the three figures.
Recall that Read’s tables, which are based on a textual analysis of Buridan’s Treatise
on Consequences, give the following syllogisms as valid[51, p.41,42,44]:
L M X Q
L L L, M,
Celarent X
Darii L, Fe-
rio L, Bar-
bara, Celar-
ent X
L, M,
Celarent X
M M M Darii, Ferio,
M
M
X M,
Celarent X
∅ Darii, Ferio
M,
∅
Q M, Q M, Q Darii,
Ferio Q,
Q
Table 10.1: Valid First Figure Syllogisms
L M X Q
L L L,M,
Cesare X,
Camestres X
Festino L,
Camestres,
Baroco X
L,M, Cesare,
Camestres X
M L,M,Cesare,
Camestres
X,
∅ ∅ ∅
X M, Cesare,
Camestres X
∅ Festino M ∅
Q M, Cesare,
Camestres X
∅ ∅ ∅
Table 10.2: Valid Second Figure Syllogisms
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L M X Q
L L,X L,M Darapti X,
Felapton X,
Datisi X,
Ferison X
Darapti L,
Felapton L,
Datisi L,
Ferison L
L,M
M M M Darapti,
Felaption,
Datisi,
Ferison M
M
X Darapti X,
Disamis X
Darapti M,
Disamis M
Datisi M Darapti M,
Disamis M
Q M, Q Q Disamis M,
Bocardo M,
Datisi Q,
Ferison Q
Q
Table 10.3: Valid Third Figure Syllogisms
We will first show that all of the first figure syllogisms are valid in our semantics.
With this and the lemma proved above, we can then check the validities for the tables in
the second and third figure. In cases where a particular syllogism or class of syllogisms
follows from what we have already shown about single premise inferences, we will group
the syllogisms together.
Before we do this, we should note a few obvious semantic consequences:
For all models N and all worlds, w ∈W we have:
1. L(w,A) ⊆ V (w,A)
2. V (w,A) ⊆M(w,A)
3. L(w,A) ⊆M(w,A)
4. Q(w,A) ⊆M(w,A)
Proof of 1 and 2 : Take an arbitrary model M and world w ∈ W . Assume that
c ∈ L(w,A), then for all v if wRv then c ∈ V (v,A). Since R is reflexive, it follows that
wRw, hence c ∈ V (w,A) proving 2. Continuing on, since wRw and c ∈ V (w,A), it follows
by the definition of M that c ∈M(w,A), proving 1.
Proof 3 : Obvious from the second part of the previous proof. Assume that c ∈
V (w,A). Then since R is reflexive, we have wRw and hence c ∈M(w,A).
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Proof 4 : Obvious from the definition of Q. Take an arbitrary model M and world
w ∈ W . Assume that c ∈ Q(w,A. Then c ∈ M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A) and so c ∈ M(w,A).
We will often implicitly appeal to these.
Syllogistic Validity & Triple Invalidity
In this section, we prove the required validities and invalidities for the various figures.
The presentation of these results is organised as follows: In each subsection we will treat
a particular class of modal propositions. The syllogisms will be grouped so as to cover
multiple cases when the inferences are fairly trivial. For example, we group LLL and
LLM together because L propositions always entail M propositions. Similarly for the
case of Le to Xe and others. Likewise we group propositions such as LML and LQL
together, since Q entails M. Because of how these sections are organised, there are some
redundancies (for example, how we treat proving both LLL and LML) in our proofs, but
there should be no omissions.
First Figure LLL/LLM-Syllogisms
First observe that in each case the LLM syllogism follows from the LLL syllogisms since
we have A
L× B ⊧ A M× B. Since A Le B ⊧ A e B, this will handle the case for LLX
Celarent.
LLL/LLM Barbara
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B La C and N,w ⊧ A La
B. Then it follows that 1) M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C), 2) M(w,B) ≠ ∅, 3) M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B),
and 4) M(w,A) ≠ ∅.
We need to show that M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C). The first conjunct
follows from 4). For the second part of the conjunct observe that from 3) together with
semantic consequence 3. (p. 213) it follows that M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,B) and that this
together with 1) entails M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C).
LLL/LLM/LLX Celarent
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Le C and N,w ⊧
A
L
a B. Then it follows that 1) M(w,B) ∩M(w,C) = ∅ and 2) M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B).
It suffices to show that M(w,A) ∩ M(w,C) = ∅. Assume that this isn’t the case,
then M(w,A) ∩M(w,C) ≠ ∅. So take an arbitrary term d such that d ∈ M(w,A)
and d ∈ M(w,C). By 2) it follows that d ∈ M(w,B) and so M(w,B) ∩M(w,C) ≠ ∅
contradicting 1.
LLL/LLM Darii
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B La C and N,w ⊧
A
L
i B. Then we have 1) M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C), 2) M(w,B) ≠ ∅ 3) M(w,A) ∩ L(w,B) ≠∅. It suffices to show that M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) ≠ ∅. Take an arbitrary d such that
d ∈M(w,A)∩L(w,B). Then d ∈M(w,A) and d ∈ L(w,B), and so d ∈M(w,B). By 1),
it follows that d ∈ L(w,C), which with some basic set theory completes the proof.
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LLL/LLM Ferio
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Le C and N,w ⊧
A
L
i B. Then we have 1) M(w,B)∩M(w,C) = ∅, 2) M(w,A)∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅. It suffices
to show that M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C). Assume for reductio that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C). By 2)
there is some d such that d ∈ M(w,A) and d ∈ L(w,B). Based on our assumption it
follows that d ∈ L(w,C), contradicting 1).
First Figure LML/LMM/LQL/LQM-Syllogisms
There are two things to note here. First, recall that A
Q× B ⊧ A M× B. As such the LQL
syllogisms will follow from the validity of the LML syllogisms and the validity of the
LQM syllogisms will follow from the validity of the LMM syllogisms. Second, recall that
A
L× B ⊧ A M× B. As such the validity of the LMM syllogisms will follow from the validity
of the LML syllogisms. As such we will only treat the LML syllogisms.
The cases of LQX Celarent and LMX Celarent will follow from the validity of LML
Celarent, since A
L
e B ⊧ A e B.
LML/LLM Barbara
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B La C and N,w ⊧
A
M
a B. Then it follows that 1) M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C), 2) M(w,B) ≠ ∅, 3) M(w,A) ⊆
M(w,B), and 4) M(w,A) ≠ ∅.
We need to show that M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C). The first conjunct
follows from 4). The second conjunct is immediate from 1) and 3).
LML Celarent
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Le C and N,w ⊧
A
M
a B. Then it follows that 1) M(w,B) ∩M(w,C) = ∅ and 2) M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,B).
It suffices to show that M(w,A) ∩ M(w,C) = ∅. Assume that this isn’t the case,
then M(w,A) ∩M(w,C) ≠ ∅. So take an arbitrary term d such that d ∈ M(w,A)
and d ∈ M(w,C). By 2) it follows that d ∈ M(w,B) and so M(w,B) ∩M(w,C) ≠ ∅
contradicting 1.
LML/LMM Darii
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B La C and N,w ⊧
A
M
i B. Then we have 1) M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C), 2) M(w,B) ≠ ∅ 3) M(w,A)∩M(w,B) ≠∅. It suffices to show that M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) ≠ ∅. Take an arbitrary d such that
d ∈ M(w,A) ∩M(w,B). Then d ∈ M(w,A) and d ∈ M(w,B). By 1), it follows that
d ∈ L(w,C), which with some basic set theory completes the proof.
LLL/LLM Ferio
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Le C and N,w ⊧
A
M
i B. Then we have 1) M(w,B)∩M(w,C) = ∅, 2) M(w,A)∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅. It suffices
to show that M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C). Assume for reductio that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C). By 2)
there is some d such that d ∈ M(w,A) and d ∈ M(w,B). Based on our assumption it
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follows that d ∈ M(w,C), contradicting 1). Hence M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C) and so N,w ⊧
A
L
o C. The proof establishing M(w,A) ⊈M(w,C) is analogous.
MLM
First Figure LXL/LXX-Syllogisms
LXX Barbara
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B La C, and 3)
N,w ⊧ A a B. Then 1)M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C), 2) V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B) and V (w,A) ≠ ∅. It
suffices to show that V (w,A) ≠ ∅ and V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,C). The first conjunct follows
from 3). For the second conjunct, take an arbitrary d such that d ∈ V (w,A) then
d ∈ V (w,B), and so d ∈M(w,B). This, with 1) entails d ∈ L(w,C) and so d ∈ V (w,C),
completing the proof.
LXX Celarent Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Le
C, and N,w ⊧ A a B. Then 1)M(w,B)∩M(w,C) = ∅, 2) V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B). We need
to show that V (w,A)∩V (w,C) = ∅. Assume this is not the case. Then there is some d
such that d ∈ V (w,A) and d ∈ V (w,C). Then it follows that d ∈ V (w,B), d ∈M(w,B)
and d ∈M(w,C), contradicting 1).
LXL Darii
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B La C, and
N,w ⊧ A i B. Then 1) M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C), 2) V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) ≠ ∅. We claim that
M(w,A)∩L(w,C) ≠ ∅. Take an arbitrary d such that d ∈ V (w,A) and d ∈ V (w,B) (we
can do this since their intersection is non-empty). Then d ∈M(w,A) and d ∈M(w,B).
By 1) it follows that d ∈ L(w,C) and so M(w,A) ∩L(w,C) ≠ ∅.
LXL Ferio
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Le C, and N,w ⊧
A i B. Then 1) M(w,B) ∩M(w,C) = ∅, 2) V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) ≠ ∅. It suffices to show
that M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C). Assume that this is not the case. Then M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C).
Using 2) take an arbitrary d such that d ∈ V (w,A) and d ∈ V (w,B). Then d ∈M(w,A).
However, we also have d ∈M(w,B), which by our assumption entails that d ∈ L(w,C)
and so d ∈M(w,C). But then M(w,B) ∩M(w,C) ≠ ∅, contradicting 1).
While LXX Darii and Ferio are not listed in Read’s table, they are valid on our
semantics and LXX Darii is needed for our second and third figure reductions as will
be seen below. Buridan does not appear to explicitly mention these syllogisms when
treating the first figure.
LXX Darii
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B La C, and
N,w ⊧ A i B. Then 1) M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C) and 2) V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) ≠ ∅. So, take
an arbitrary d such that d ∈ V (w,A) and d ∈ V (w,B). Then d ∈ M(w,B) and so
d ∈ L(w,C). Hence d ∈ V (w,C) and so d ∈ V (w,A) ∩ V (w,C) as required.
LXX Ferio
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Le C, and N,w ⊧
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A i B. Then it follows that M(w,B)∩M(w,C) = ∅ and that 1) V (w,A)∩V (w,B) ≠ ∅.
So, take and arbitrary term d such that d ∈ V (w,A) and d ∈ V (w,B). Then it follows
that d ∈M(w,B) and so d ∉M(w,C) which entails d ∉ V (w,C). Hence d ∈ V (w,A) and
d ∉ V (w,C). From this it follows that V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,C). Hence J,w ⊧ AoC.
First Figure MMM/MLM Syllogisms and MXM Darii and MXM Ferio
Since A
L× B ⊧ A M× B, the MLM syllogisms will follow from the MMM syllogisms.
Likewise since AiB ⊧ A Mi B, this will cover the cases for MXM Darii and MXM Ferio.
MMM/MLM Barbara
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Ma C, and
N,w ⊧ A Ma B. Then it follows that M(w,B) ⊆M(w,C), M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B) and that
M(w,A) ≠ ∅. That N,w ⊧ A Ma C follows by the transitivity of ⊆.
MMM/MLM Celarent
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Me C, and
N,w ⊧ A Ma B. Then it follows that 1) M(w,B) ∩L(w,C) = ∅, 2) M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B),
and that 3) M(w,A) ≠ ∅. Now, take an arbitrary term such that d ∈ M(w,A). Then
by 2)d ∈M(w,B), which by 3) entails that d ∉ L(w,C). Hence M(w,A) ∩L(w,C) = ∅,
as desired.
MMM/MLM Darii
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Ma C, and
N,w ⊧ A Mi B. Then it follows that 1) M(w,B) ⊆M(w,C) and 2) M(w,A)∩M(w,B) ≠∅. Using 1), take an arbitrary d such that d ∈ M(w,A) d ∈ M(w,B). Then by 2),
d ∈M(w,C). That N,w ⊧ A Mi C follows from the semantic definitions.
MMM/MLM Ferio
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Me C, and
N,w ⊧ A Mi B. Then it follows that 1) M(w,B) ∩ L(w,C) = ∅ and that 2) M(w,A) ∩
M(w,B) ≠ ∅. Assume for reduction that 3) M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C). Then by 2) it follows
that there is some d such that d ∈ M(w,A) and d ∈ M(w,B). From the first conjunct
and 3) it follows that d ∈ L(w,C). Hence M(w,B) ∩ L(w,C) ≠ ∅, contradicting 1).
Hence M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C). It then follows by basic logic that N,w ⊧ A Mo C as desired.
The case for MLM Ferio is follows by modal subalternation.
First Figure MQM-Syllogisms
These follow from the MMM syllogisms, since Q formulae entail M formulae, and the
MMM syllogisms are all valid (as shown above).
First Figure XLM/XLX-Syllogisms
XLM Barbara
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Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B a C, and
N,w ⊧ A La B. Then it follows that 1) V (w,B) ⊆ V (w,C), 2) M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and 3)
M(w,A) ≠ ∅. Together with 3) it suffices to show that M(w,A) ⊆M(w,C). So, assume
that d ∈M(w,A). Then by 2) d ∈ L(w,B). Hence d ∈ V (w,B) since wRw always holds.
Then by 1) it follows that d ∈ V (w,C) and so d ∈M(w,C), which is what we wanted to
show.
XLM/XLX Celarent XLM Celarent is very similar.
For XLX Celarent, let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that
N,w ⊧ B e C, and N,w ⊧ A La B. Then it follows that 1) V (w,B) ∩ V (w,C) = ∅
and 2) M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B).
It suffices to show that V (w,A)∩V (w,C) = ∅. Assume that this is false, then there is
some d such that d ∈ V (w,A) and d ∈ V (w,C). Since wRw it follows that d ∈M(w,A)
and so by 2) that d ∈ L(w,B) and so, d ∈ V (w,B). But then V (w,B) ∩ V (w,C) ≠ ∅
contradicting 1).
For XLM Celarent, let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that
N,w ⊧ B e C, and N,w ⊧ A La B. Then it follows that 1) V (w,B) ∩ V (w,C) = ∅
and 2) M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B).
It suffices to show that M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) = ∅. Assume that this is false, then
there is some d such that d ∈ M(w,A) and d ∈ L(w,C). Since wRw it follows that
d ∈ V (w,C). By 2) it also follows that d ∈ L(w,B) and so, d ∈ V (w,B). But then
V (w,B) ∩ V (w,C) ≠ ∅ contradicting 1).
XLM Darii
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B a C, and
N,w ⊧ A Li B. Then it follows that 1) V (w,B) ⊆ V (w,C) and 2) M(w,A)∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅.
Using 2) Take an arbitrary d such that d ∈M(w,A) and d ∈ L(w,B). Since wRw always
holds, it follows that d ∈ V (w,B). Hence by 1), it follows that d ∈ V (w,C) and so
d ∈M(w,C). Hence M(w,A) ∩M(w,C) ≠ ∅ and so N,w ⊧ A Mi C.
XLM Ferio
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B e C, and N,w ⊧
A
L
i B. Then it follows that 1) V (w,B) ∩ V (w,C) = ∅ and 2) M(w,A) ∩ L(w,B) ≠ ∅.
It suffices to show that M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C), so assume that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C). Using
2) take an arbitrary d such that 3) d ∈ M(w,A) and 4) d ∈ L(w,B). It then follows
by 3) and our assumption that d ∈ L(w,C). Since wRw always holds, it follows that
d ∈ V (w,C) and (from 4) ) d ∈ V (w,B). But then V (w,B)∩V (w,C) ≠ ∅, contradicting
1).
First Figure XXM Syllogisms
XXM Darii
This follows from XXX Darii since AiB ⊧ A Mi B.
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XXM Ferio
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B e C, and
N,w ⊧ A i B. Then 1) V (w,B)∩V (w,C) = ∅ and 2) V (w,A)∩V (w,B) ≠ ∅. It suffices
to show that M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C). Assume that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C). Using 2), take an
arbitrary d such that 3) d ∈ V (w,A) and 4) d ∈ V (w,B). Then it follows from 3) that
d ∈M(w,A). From 4) and 1) it follows that d ∉ V (w,C) and so d ∉ L(w,C). However,
by 3) and our assumption, it follows that d ∈ L(w,C), which is a contradiction. Hence
M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C) as desired.
First Figure QMQ Syllogisms
The QQQ, QQM, and QMM syllogisms will all follow from the QMQ syllogisms since Q
formulae entail M formulae. The QLQ syllogisms will follow since L formulae entail M
formulae. In the cases of QXQ and QXM both Darii and Ferio will follow from QMQ
since AiB ⊧ A Mi B.
QMQ Barbara and QMQ Celarent
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Qa C, and
N,w ⊧ A Ma B. Then M(w,B) ⊆ (M(w,C) ∩M(w,¬C)), M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,B), and
M(w,A) ≠ ∅. That N,w ⊧ A Qa C, follows from what we just observed by the transitivity
of ⊆.
Celarent follows because
Q
a and
Q
e are equivalent.
QMQ Darii and QMQ Ferio
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Qa C, and N,w ⊧
A
M
i B. Then 1) M(w,B) ⊆ (M(w,C) ∩M(w,¬C)) and 2) M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅.
Using 2 take an arbitrary d such that d ∈M(w,A) and d ∈M(w,B). From 1) it follows
that d ∈ (M(w,C)∩M(w,¬C)). Hence (M(w,A)∩(M(w,C)∩M(w,¬C))) ≠ ∅. Hence
N,w ⊧ A Qi C.
Second and Third Figure Reductions
Given PPI and Interchange, we need to reduce the second and third figures to the first
figure. In the case of the second figure, if we say that this is done using PPI, we simply
mean that one instance of the rule for PPI has been used. In the third figure, if we are
reducing the syllogism to the second figure, then when we say that ‘it follows by PPI
and Interchange’ or similar expressions, we mean that PPI is applied once and then
the major and minor premises are inverted using Interchange. If we are reducing the
syllogism to the first figure, what we mean by PPI and Interchange is what was shown
in the Reduction Lemma.
Again, we will do this by groups of syllogisms. First, observe that in each combination
of modals, Cesare can be reduced to Celarent by converting the major premise (which
we have already shown to be valid in Chapter Four).
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Camestres can be reduced to Darii by PPI. For Camestres we need to check the
following cases:
LLL, LLM, LML, LMM, LMX, LXX, LQL, LQM, LQX, MLL, MLM, XLM, XLX,
QLM, and QLX. We can simplify this to the following cases:
LLM :
LLM Camestres is of the form C
L
a B,A
L
e B ⊧ A Me C. By PPI this is valid if and only
if C
L
a B,A
L
i C ⊧ A Mi B, i.e. if and only if LLM Darii is valid. LLM Darii is valid, etc.
LMM :
LMM Camestres is of the form C
L
a B,A
M
e B ⊧ A Me C. By PPI this is valid if and only
if C
L
a B,A
L
i C ⊧ A Li B, i.e. if and only if LML Darii is valid. LLL Darii is valid, etc.
LMX LMX Camestres is of the form C
L
a B,A
M
e B ⊧ A e C. By PPI this is valid if
and only if C
L
a B,A
X
i C ⊧ A Li B, i.e. if and only if LXL Darii is valid. LXL Darii is
valid, etc.
LXX
LXX Camestres is of the form C
L
a B,A e B ⊧ A e C. By PPI this is valid if and only
if C
L
a B,A
X
i C ⊧ A i B, i.e. if and only if LXX Darii is valid. But LXX Darii is valid,
etc.
MLL:
MLL Camestres is of the form C
M
a B,A
L
e B ⊧ A Le C. By PPI this is valid if and only
if C
M
a B,A
M
i C ⊧ A Mi B, i.e. if and only if MMM Darii is valid. But MMM Darii is
valid, etc.
XLM XLM Camestres is of the form C a B,A
L
e B ⊧ A Me C. By PPI this is valid
if and only if C a B,A
L
i C ⊧ A Mi B, i.e. if and only if XLM Darii is valid. But XLM
Darii is valid, etc.
XLX XLX Camestres is of the form C a B,A
L
e B ⊧ A e C. By PPI this is valid if
and only if C a B,A i C ⊧ A Mi B i.e. if and only if XXM Darii is valid. But XXM Darii
is valid, etc.
MLM MLM Camestres is of the form C
M
a B,A
L
e B ⊧ A Me C. By PPI this is valid
if and only if C
M
a B,A
L
i C ⊧ A Mi B, i.e. if and only if MLM Darii is valid. But MLM
Darii is valid, etc.
QLX
QLX Camestres is of the form C
Q
a B,A
L
e B ⊧ A e C. By PPI this is valid if and only
if C
Q
a B,A i C ⊧ A Mi B, i.e. if and only if QXM Darii is valid. But QXM Darii is valid,
etc.
This completes the cases for Camestres.
For Festino we need to consider the modal combinations: LLL, LML, LMM, LXL,
LQL, LQM, MLL, MLM, XLM, XXM, and QLM. Again, this can be simplfied to the
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following cases: LML, LXL, LQM, MLL, XLM, XXM, and QLM.
By simple conversion, we can reduce Festino to Ferio. Hence we need to verify that:
LML, LXL, LQM, MLL, XLM, XXM, and QLM Ferio are all valid, which can be easily
seen by cross-referencing the table and our first figure proofs.
For Baroco we use PPI to reduce it to Barbara. We have the following modal com-
binations to consider:
LLL, LLM, LML, LMM, LXX, LQL, LQM, MLL, MLM, XLM, and QLM
Again we can simplify this to the following inferences:
LML, LXX, MLL, XLM, LQL, and QLM
LML
LML Baroco is of the form C
L
a B,A
M
o B ⊧ A Lo C. By PPI this is valid if and only
if C
L
a B,A
M
a C ⊧ A La B i.e. if and only if LML Barbara is valid. But LML Barbara is
valid, etc.
For the remaining cases excluding LQL and QLM, it suffices to show that:
LXX, LMM, MMM, and XLM Barbara are valid. To see this, observe that from the
validity of LML Barbara, we also have the validity of LMM Barbara, LLM Barbara,
MLM Barbara, LLL Barbara, and MLL Barbara since L implies M. By inspection of the
Read’s table and our proofs, these three clearly hold.
LQL Baroco:
This follows from LML Baroco, observing that A
Q
o B entails A
M
i B.
QLM Baroco:
This follows from MLM Baroco, observing that C
Q
a B entails A
M
a B.
This completes the treatment of Baroco and of the second figure.
For the third figure we need to consider the following syllogisms:
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L M X Q
L L,X L,M X,Darapti L,
Felapton L,
Datisi L,
Ferison L
L,M
M M M Darapti,
Felaption,
Datisi,
Ferison M
M
X Darapti X,
Disamis X
Darapti M,
Disamis M
Datisi M Darapti M,
Disamis M
Q M, Q Q Disamis M,
Bocardo M,
Datisi Q,
Ferison Q
Q
Table 10.4: Valid Third Figure Syllogisms
Before continuing, there is one small caveat that needs to be mentioned here. In
the table, the justification for the validity of the LXX figures is based on a reference
to Thom’s theorem 9.10b, which is derived from 9.10a and was shown to be invalid
in Chapter Four for XXM Barbara and XXM Celarent.[51, p.44, fn.e] Using PPI and
Interchange it can be easily checked that XXM Celarent reduces to LXX Ferison and
that XXM Barbara reduces to LXX Bocardo and, hence, both of these will be invalid
on our semantics. As there is no other reference to Buridan claiming these, we will omit
both from our treatment of Buridan.
First, all of the cases for Ferison reduce to Festino by PPI and Interchange. Accord-
ing to the table, we then need to check the following cases for Ferison:
LLL, LLM, LLX, LML, LMM, LXX, LXL, LQL, LQM, MLM, MMM, MXM, MQM,
QLM, QLQ, QMQ, QXQ, and QQQ.
We can simplify this to the following modal combinations:
LLL, LLX, LML, LXX, MLM, MMM, MXM, QMQ, and QQQ.
We will prove the contingency cases directly; for the rest we reduce them using PPI
and Inversion.
In the case of Ferison, we need to consider: MLM, XLM, MLL, LMM, LML, and MLX
Ferison.
All of these except for MLX Ferison have already been reduced. LMX Ferison can
easily be shown to reduce to LXL Darii.
For Datisi we need to check the following cases: LLL, LLM, LLX, LML, LMM, LXL,
LQL, LQM, MLM, MMM, MXM, XLX, XMM, XXM, QLM, QLQ, QMQ, QXQ, and
QQQ.
We can reduce this to the following modal combinations:
LLX, LML, MMM, XLX, XXM, and QMQ
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We will prove the contingency modals directly and reduce the rest to the first figure.
LLX Datisi reduces to XLM Ferio, which we have shown to be valid.
LML Datisi reduces to LML Celarent, which we have shown to be valid.
MMM Datisi reduces to LMM Darii, which we have shown to be valid.
XLX Datisi reduces to XXM Celarent, which we have shown to be valid.
XXM Datisi reduces to LXX Ferio, which we have shown to be valid.
We prove the contingency case directly: QMQ Datisi
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Qa C and
N,w ⊧ A Mi B. Then we have 1) M(w,B) ⊆ Q(w,C), 2) M(w,B) ≠ ∅ 3) M(w,A) ∩
M(w,B) ≠ ∅. It suffices to show that M(w,A)∩Q(w,C) ≠ ∅. Take an arbitrary d such
that d ∈ M(w,A) ∩M(w,B). Then d ∈ M(w,A) and d ∈ M(w,B). So by 1) it follows
that d ∈ Q(w,C) which suffices to prove the claim.
For Disamis we need to check the following cases: LLL, LLM LLX, LML, LMM, LXX,
LQL, LQM, MLM, MMM, MQM, XLX,XMM, XQM, QLM, QLQ, QMQ, QXM, QQQ
Again, we can simplify this to the following modal combinations:
LML, LLX, LXX, MMM, XLX, QMQ, and QXM.
We will reduce these to the first figure using PPI and Interchange.
LML Disamis reduces to MLM Celarent, which we have already seen is valid.
LLX Disamis reduces to XLM Celarent, which we have already seen is valid.
LXX Disamis reduces to XXM Celarent and is one of the syllogisms we are not treating
because the justification for inclusion rests on Thom’s mistake.
MMM Disamis reduces to LML Celarent, which we have shown to be valid.
XLX Disamis reduces to XLX Celarent, which we have shown to be valid.
We prove the contingency cases directly:
Disamis QMQ
Let N be an arbitrary model and let w ∈W . Assume that N,w ⊧ B Qi C and N,w ⊧
B
M
a A. Then we have 1) M(w,B)∩Q(w,C) ≠ ∅, 2) M(w,B) ⊆M(w,A). It suffices to
show that M(w,A)∩Q(w,C) ≠ ∅. Take an arbitrary d such that d ∈M(w,B)∩Q(w,C).
Then d ∈ M(w,B) and d ∈ Q(w,C). Then by 1) it follows that d ∈ M(w,A) which is
what we needed to prove.
Disamis QXM Read’s table states that SD 5.7.4 rule six gives counterexamples to
this claim. [51, p.44 fn. z] Our logic agrees with this, rejecting this as invalid. Consider
the following countermodel:
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W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = a v(x,A) = ∅
v(w,B) = a v(x,B) = b
v(w,C) = ∅ v(x,C) = b
Call this model J. First, observe that V (w,A) = V (w,B) = {a} and so V (w,B) ⊆
V (w,A) and V (w,B) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊧ BaA. Likewise, observe that since wRx
and V (x,B) = {b} we have b ∈ M(w,B) and b ∈ M(w,C). Likewise, since wRw and
b ∉ V (w,C) we have b ∈ M(w,¬C). Hence b ∈ Q(w,C) and so M(w,B) ∩Q(w,C) ≠ ∅
and so J,w ⊧ B Qi C. However, observe that M(w,A) ∩M(w,C) = ∅ since b ∉M(w,A)
and a ∉M(w,C). Hence J,w ⊭ A Mi C.
For Bocardo we need to consider the following cases:
LLL, LLX, LML, LMM, LXX, LQL, LQM, MLM, MMM, MQM, QLM, QLQ, QMQ,
QXM, QQQ
This can be simplified to the following cases: LML, LLX, LXX, MMM, QMQ, QMX,
QQQ
As before, we prove the modal cases without contingency by reduction and prove the
contingency cases directly.
LML Bocardo reduces to MMM Barbara, which we have already shown is valid.
LLX Bocardo reduces to XLM Barbara, which we have already shown is valid.
LXX Bocardo reduces to XXM Barbara, which is one of the syllogisms we are not treat-
ing because the justification for inclusion rests on Thom’s mistake.
MMM Bocardo reduces to LML Barbara, which we have shown to be valid.
For the contingency cases observe that since A
Q
o B is equivalent to A
Q
i B, and with
the exception of QXM Baroco, each of these syllogisms is a form of Disamis, which we
have already shown to be valid. QXM Baroco is invalid on our semantics. As in the case
of QXM Disamis, our semantics agree with Buridan’s observations in SD 5.7.4 that this
triple is invalid, as is clear from the following countermodel:
Consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = a v(x,A) = ∅
v(w,B) = b v(x,B) = b
v(w,C) = a v(x,C) =D
Call this model J. First, observe that V (w,B) ⊈ V (w,A). As such J,w ⊧ BoA.
Second, observe that M(w,B) ⊆ M(w,C) ∩M(w,¬C). This follows since b ∈ V (x,C)
and b ∉ V (w,C). However, observe that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C). To see this, first observe
a ∈M(w,A) (since a ∈ V (w,A)) and that a ∈ L(w,C) since a ∈ V (x,C) and a ∈ V (w,C).
Second, observe that b ∉M(w,A). Hence J,w ⊭ A Mo C
This completes our treatment of the information presented in Read’s tables and this
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suffices to verify that all of the inferences that Buridan accepts as valid are also valid in
our logic.
Invalidity
Our aim in this section is to show that every inference that Buridan claims is invalid
is also invalid in our logic. This is a large combinatorial task. In this appendix, we
will do two things to shorten our discussion and save unnecessary repetition. First,
we will only discuss syllogisms that Buridan discusses. As such, we will not consider
modal combinations where the underlying assertoric syllogism is invalid, e.g. the triple
B
L
i C,A
L
i B ⊭ A Li C. Second, we will produce countermodels for all of the first figure
triples that are invalid and exhaust the space of possible combinations. To that end, we
need to show that the following are invalid:
L M X Q
L Barbara X,
Darii X, Ferio
X, Q
Q, Barbara X,
Darii X, Ferio X
Barbara L, Bar-
bara M, Celar-
ent L, Celarent
M, Darii X, Fe-
rio X
Q
M L, Q, X L, Q, X L, Q, X, Bar-
bara M, Celar-
ent M
L, Q, X
X L, Q, Barbara
X, Darii X, Ferio
X
L, M, Q, X L, Q, Barbara
M, Celarent M
L, M, Q, X
Q L, X L, X L, Barbara Q,
Celarent Q, Bar-
bara M, Celar-
ent M, X
L,X
I.e. we need to show that the following are all invalid:
LLQ, LMQ, LQQ, MLL, MLQ, MLX, MML, MMQ, MMX, MXL, MXQ, MXX, MQL,
MQQ, MQX XLL, XLQ, XML, XMM, XMQ, XMX, XXL, XXQ, XQL, XQM, XQQ,
XQX, QLL, QLX, QML, QMX, QXL, QXX, QQL, and QQX
as well as:
LLX Barbara, LLX Darii, LLX Ferio, LMX Barbara, LMX Darii, LMX Ferio, LXL
Barbara, LXL Celarent, LXM Barbara, LXM Celarent, MXM Barbara, MXM Celarent,
XLX Barbara, XLX Darii, XLX Ferio, XXM Barbara, XXM Celarent, QXQ Barbara,
QXQ Celarent, QXM Barbara, and QXM Celarent.
Recall that LXL Barbara and LXL Celarent were treated in Chapter Five, starting
on page 114.
At this point we can cull the number of cases we need to consider down to an easier
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number by recalling a number of properties of single premise inferences (which we also
used in our treatment of validity):
1. A
L× B ⊧ A M× B
2. A
Q× B ⊧ A M× B
3. A i B ⊧ A Mi B
4. A
L
e B ⊧ A e B
5. A
L
a B ⊧ A Li B
6. A
L
e B ⊧ A Lo B
7. A
Q
a B ⊧ A Qi B
8. A
Q
e B ⊧ A Qo B
9. A
M
a B ⊧ A Mi B
10. A
M
e B ⊧ A Mo B
With that in mind we provide the countermodels as follows:
LLQ, LMQ, MMQ, MLQ, XXQ, MXQ, XMQ Triples
Consider the following countermodel:
W = {w} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) =D
Call this model J. Then clearly, M(w,A) =M(w,B) =M(w,C) =D and similarly for
L and V. Hence, J,w ⊧ B La C, J,w ⊧ A La B, and J,w ⊧ A La C as well as J,w ⊧ B Li C,
J,w ⊧ A Li B, and J,w ⊧ A Li C.
Further we also have: J,w ⊧ B Ma C, J,w ⊧ A Ma B, and J,w ⊧ A Ma C as well as
J,w ⊧ B Mi C, J,w ⊧ A Mi B, and J,w ⊧ A Mi C.
We also have: Further we also have: J,w ⊧ B a C, J,w ⊧ A a B, and J,w ⊧ A a C as
well as J,w ⊧ B i C, J,w ⊧ A i B, and J,w ⊧ A i C.
But J,w ⊭ A Qi C and J,w ⊭ A Qa C as M(w,¬C) = ∅. This suffices to give coun-
termodels for LLQ, LMQ, MMQ, MLQ, XXQ Barbara and LLQ, LMQ, MMQ, MLQ,
XXQ Darii.
Consider the following countermodel:
224
W = {w} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) =D v(w,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Then clearly, M(w,A) = M(w,B) = D and M(w,C) = ∅ and
similarly for L and V. Hence, J,w ⊧ B Le C, J,w ⊧ A La B, and J,w ⊧ A Le C as well as
J,w ⊧ B Lo C, J,w ⊧ A Li B, and J,w ⊧ A Lo C.
Further we also have: J,w ⊧ B Me C, J,w ⊧ A Ma B, and J,w ⊧ A Me C as well as
J,w ⊧ B Mo C, J,w ⊧ A Mi B, and J,w ⊧ A Mo C.
We also have: J,w ⊧ B e C, J,w ⊧ A a B, and J,w ⊧ A e C as well as J,w ⊧ B o C,
J,w ⊧ A i B, and J,w ⊧ A o C.
But J,w ⊭ A Qi C and J,w ⊭ A Qa C as M(w,C) = ∅. This suffices to give countermod-
els for LLQ, LMQ, MMQ, MLQ, XXQ Celarent and LLQ, LMQ, MMQ, MLQ,MXQ,
XXQ Ferio.
QQL, QQX, MQL, MQX, XXL, and XQL Triples
Consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = a, b O(w) = O(x) =D
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Clearly M(w,A) = M(w,B) = M(w,C) = D and similarly for
Q. Also notice that L(w,A) = L(w,B) = L(w,C) = ∅. Hence J,w ⊧ B Qa C and
J,w ⊧ B Qi C. Likewise, J,w ⊧ A Qa B and J,w ⊧ A Qi B.
In addition we also have J,w ⊧ B Ma C and J,w ⊧ B Mi C. Likewise, J,w ⊧ A Ma B and
J,w ⊧ A Mi B.
However, observe that J,w ⊭ A La C and J,w ⊭ A Li C since L(w,C) = ∅ andM(w,A) ≠∅. Similarly, because of v, it follows that J,w ⊭ A a C and J,w ⊭ A i C.
This suffices to give countermodels for QQL, QQX, MQL, MQX, XXL, and XQL
Barbara and QQL, QQX, MQL, MQX, XXL, and XQL Darii.
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,C) = {b} v(w,B) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) = {a}
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Call this model J. Clearly M(w,A) = M(w,B) = M(w,C) = D and similarly for
Q. Also notice that L(w,A) = L(w,B) = L(w,C) = ∅. Hence J,w ⊧ B Qe C and
J,w ⊧ B Qo C. Likewise, J,w ⊧ A Qe B and J,w ⊧ A Qo B.
In addition we also have J,w ⊧ B Ma C and J,w ⊧ B Mi C. Likewise, J,w ⊧ A Ma B and
J,w ⊧ A Mi B.
And since v(w,B) = ∅, we also have J,w ⊧ B e C and J,w ⊧ B o C. Likewise,
J,w ⊧ A e B and J,w ⊧ A o B.
However, observe that J,w ⊧ A Mi B and that J,w ⊧ A Ma B. Hence, J,w ⊭ A Le B and
J,w ⊭ A Lo B. Further, observe that we also have J,w ⊧ A i B and J,w ⊧ A a B. Hence
J,w ⊭ A e B and J,w ⊭ A o B as desired.
This suffices to give countermodels for QQL, QQX, MQL, MQX, XXL, and XQL
Celarent and QQL, QQX, MQL, MQX, XXL, and XQL Ferio.
LQQ and MQQ Triples
For Barbara and Darii:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,C) = {a} v(w,B) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) = {a}
Call this model J. First, observe that J,w ⊧ A Qa B since a ∈M(w,A) and a ∈M(w,B)
and a ∉ L(w,B). Further observe that J,w ⊧ B La C since a ∈M(w,B) and a ∈ L(w,C).
Based on this it is also easy to see that J,w ⊧ A Qi B J,w ⊧ B Li C.
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C) per construction of the model. Hence
J,w ⊧ A La C and J,w ⊧ A Li C. From this it follows that J,w ⊭ A Qa C and J,w ⊭ A Qi C
as required.
For Celarent and Ferio:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = {a} v(w,C) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Call this model J. First, observe that J,w ⊧ A Qa B since a ∈
M(w,A) and a ∈ M(w,B) and a ∉ L(w,B). Further observe that J,w ⊧ B Le C since
a ∈ M(w,B) and a ∉ M(w,C). Based on this it is also easy to see that J,w ⊧ A Qi B
J,w ⊧ B Lo C.
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊈ M(w,C) ∩M(w,¬C) since a ∉ M(w,C). Hence
J,w ⊭ A Qe C and J,w ⊭ A Qo C.
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QLL, QLX, QML, QMX, QXL, and QXX Triples
For Barbara, Darii:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = {a} v(w,C) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) = {a}
Call this model J. Now, observe that since a ∈ V (w,A) and a ∈ V (w,B) it follows
that a ∈M(w,A) and a ∈M(w,B). Further, a ∈ L(w,A), a ∈ L(w,B), a ∈M(w,C) and
a ∉ L(w,C). Hence J,w ⊧ B Qa B and J,w ⊧ A La B. We also have J,w ⊧ A Qi B and
J,w ⊧ A Li B.
Further, since
Q
a and
Q
e are equivalent, and because
Q
i and
Q
o are equivalent, we have
J,w ⊧ A Qe B and J,w ⊧ A Qo B
However, V (w,A) ∩ V (w,C) = ∅, M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) = ∅. Hence J,w ⊭ AaC,
J,w ⊭ AiC, J,w ⊭ A La C, and J,w ⊭ A Li C. Hence Barbara and Darii are invalid.
For Celarent and Ferio:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(x,C) = {a} v(x,B) = ∅
Call this model J. Now observe that v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C). Hence J,w ⊧ AaB
and J,w ⊧ AaB. Further, observe that since a ∈M(w,B), a ∈M(w,C) and a ∉ L(w,C),
it follows that J,w ⊧ B Qe C (recall that Qe is equivalent to Qa). Further, observe that
M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and that a ∈M(w,A). Hence J,w ⊧ A La B and J,w ⊧ A Li B. The
minor formulae of possibility follow from the necessity formulae.
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C), and that M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) ≠ ∅. Hence
J,w ⊭ A Le C and J,w ⊭ A Lo C. This gives countermodels for Celarent and Ferio.
XQM, XQX, XMX, XML, and XMM Triples
For Barbara and Darii:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = ∅ v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = {b} v(x,C) = ∅
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Call this model J. First, observe that a ∈ V (w,B) and a ∈ V (w,C). Hence J,w ⊧
BaC. Next, observe that since b ∈ M(w,A) and b ∈ M(w,B) and b ∉ L(w,B) (since
b ∉ V (w,B)) so we have J,w ⊧ A Qa B and J,w ⊧ A Ma B.
However, observe that M(w,A) ∩M(w,C) = ∅ since a ∉ V (x,A) and a ∉ V (w,A)
and b ∉ V (w,C) and b ∉ V (x,C). We also have V (w,A) ∩ V (w,C) = ∅. Hence we have
J,w ⊭ A Ma C, J,w ⊭ A Mi C, J,w ⊭ A a C, and J,w ⊭ A a C. We also have J,w ⊭ A La C
andJ,w ⊭ A Li C, since M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) = ∅ and M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C), giving the
required countermodels.
For Celarent and Ferio:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,C) = {a} v(w,B) = ∅
v(x,B) = v(w,C) = {a} v(x,A) = ∅
Call this model J. First, observe that a ∉ V (w,B) and a ∈ V (w,C). Hence J,w ⊧ BeC.
Next, observe that since a ∈ M(w,A) and a ∈ M(w,B) and a ∉ L(w,B). So we have
J,w ⊧ A Qa B and J,w ⊧ A Qi B. We also have J,w ⊧ A Ma B and J,w ⊧ A Mi B.
However, observe that V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,C) and V (w,A) ∩ V (w,C) ≠ ∅. Further,
M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C) and M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊭ A Me C, J,w ⊭ A Mo
C, J,w ⊭ A e C, and J,w ⊭ A o C. It also follows that M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,C) and
M(w,A) ∩M(w,C) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊭ A Le C and J,w ⊭ A Lo C as well.
MLX, MMX, MXL, and MXX Triples
For Barbara and Darii:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = {a} v(w,C) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) = {a}
Call this model J. Observe a ∈ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,B), a ∈ M(w,B) a ∈ M(w,C).
Hence J,w ⊧ B Ma C and J,w ⊧ A a B. Further, we have a ∈M(w,A) and a ∈ L(w,B).
Hence M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and M(w,A) ∩ L(w,B) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊧ A La B and
J,w ⊧ A Li B.
However, observe that V (w,A)∩V (w,C) = ∅, and that M(w,A)∩L(w,C) = ∅. Hence
J,w ⊭ A La C, J,w ⊭ A a C, J,w ⊭ A Li C, and J,w ⊭ A i C.
For Celarent and Ferio:
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W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = {a} v(x,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Observe a ∈ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,B), a ∈M(w,B) a ∉ L(w,C), and
a ∈ L(w,B). Hence M(w,B) ∩ L(w,C) = ∅ and so we have J,w ⊧ B Me C. Further,
we have J,w ⊧ A La B, J,w ⊧ A Li B, J,w ⊧ A Ma B, J,w ⊧ A Mi B, J,w ⊧ A a B, and
J,w ⊧ A i B.
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊆M(w,C) and that M(w,A) ∩M(w,C) ≠ ∅. Hence
J,w ⊧ A Ma C and J,w ⊧ A Mi C. Hence J,w ⊭ A Lo C and J,w ⊭ A Le C. Likewise,
observe that V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,C) and that V (w,A) ∩ V (w,C) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊭ A o C
and J,w ⊭ A e C.
MLL and MML Triples
Observe that the invalidity of the MML triples entails the invalidity of the MLL triples.
For MML Barbara and Darii consider the following model:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(w,B) = {a} v(x,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Now, observe that we have a ∈M(w,A), a ∈ L(w,B), a ∈M(w,C).
From this it follows that J,w ⊧ B Ma C, J,w ⊧ B Mi C, J,w ⊧ A La B, and J,w ⊧ A Li B.
However, we also have that a ∉ L(w,C), From this, plus what we observed above, it
follows that J,w ⊭ A La C, J,w ⊭ A Li C, which yields the required countermodel.
For MML Celarent and Ferio consider the following model:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(w,B) = {a} v(x,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Now, observe that we have a ∈M(w,A), a ∈ L(w,B), a ∉ L(w,C).
From this it follows that J,w ⊧ B Me C, J,w ⊧ B Mo C, J,w ⊧ A La B, and J,w ⊧ A Li B.
However, we also have that a ∈M(w,C). From this, plus what we observed above, it
follows that J,w ⊭ A Le C, J,w ⊭ A Lo C, which yields the required countermodel.
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XQQ Triples
It should be observed that the countermodel given below is also a countermodel for
MQQ, although we have already treated that case above.
For Barbara and Darii, consider the following model:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(x,C) = {a} v(x,B) = ∅
Call this model J. Observe that we have a ∈ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,B), and a ∈ V (w,C).
Hence J,w ⊧ BaC. We also have a ∈ V (w,B) and a ∈ V (w,C) and so J,w ⊧ B Ma C.
Further, observe that J,w ⊧ A Qa B and J,w ⊧ A Qi B since a ∈ M(w,A), a ∈ M(w,B),
and a ∉ L(w,B).
However, we also have M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C) and M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C). From these it
follows that J,w ⊧ A La C and J,w ⊧ A Li C and so J,w ⊭ A Qa C and J,w ⊭ A Qi C.
For Celarent and Ferio, consider the following model:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,C) = {a} v(w,B) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) = {a}
Call this model J. Observe that we have a ∈ V (w,A), a ∉ V (w,B), and a ∈ V (w,C).
Hence J,w ⊧ BeC. We also have a ∉ L(w,B) and a ∈ M(w,C) and so J,w ⊧ B Me C.
Further, observe that J,w ⊧ A Qa B and J,w ⊧ A Qi B since a ∈ M(w,A), a ∈ M(w,B),
and a ∉ L(w,B).
However, we also have M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C) and M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C). From these it
follows that J,w ⊧ A La C and J,w ⊧ A Li C and so J,w ⊭ A Qe C and J,w ⊭ A Qo C (recall
that
Q
a is equivalent to
Q
e and similarly for
Q
i and
Q
o formulae).
XLQ Triples
For Barbara and Darii, consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
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Call this model J. Observe that a ∈ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,B), and a ∈ V (w,C). Hence
J,w ⊧ BaC. Similarly, observe that a ∈M(w,A) and a ∈ L(w,B). Hence J,w ⊧ A La B
and J,w ⊧ A Li B.
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,C) and that M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) = D. Hence
it follows that J,w ⊭ A Qa C.
For Celarent and Ferio, consider the following model:
W = {w} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = {a} v(w,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Observe that a ∈ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,B), and a ∉ V (w,C). Hence
J,w ⊧ BeC. Similarly, observe that a ∈ L(w,A), and a ∈ L(w,B). Hence J,w ⊧ A La B
and J,w ⊧ A Li B.
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,¬C) and that M(w,A)∩L(w,¬C) =D. Hence
it follows that J,w ⊭ A Qe C and that J,w ⊭ A Qo C since a ∉M(w,C).
LLX Barbara, Darii, and Ferio, LMX Barbara, Darii, and Ferio
For Barbara and Darii, consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = ∅ v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) = {a}
Call this model J. Observe that M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C), since a ∈ L(w,B),a ∈ M(w,B)
and a ∈ L(w,C). Likewise, M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) since a ∈ M(w,A) and a ∈ L(w,B).
Hence we have J,w ⊧ B La C, J,w ⊧ A La B, J,w ⊧ A Li B. It is also easy to see
that M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,B) and M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊧ A Ma B and
J,w ⊧ A Mi B.
However, observe that V (w,A) = ∅ and so J,w ⊭ A a C and J,w ⊭ A i C.
For Ferio, consider the following countermodel.
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,C) = {a} v(w,B) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = {b} v(x,C) = ∅
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Call this model J. Observe that b ∈M(w,B) and b ∉M(w,C). Likewise, a ∈M(w,C)
and a ∉M(w,B). Hence M(w,B) ∩M(w,C) = ∅. Likewise, observe that b ∈M(w,A)
and b ∈M(w,B). Hence M(w,A)∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅. From this it follows that J,w ⊧ B Le C
and J,w ⊧ A Li B. However, observe that V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,C) and V (w,A) ≠ ∅ since
a ∈ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,C) and b ∉ V (w,A). Hence J,w ⊧ AaC and so J,w ⊭ AoC.
LXM Barbara, Celarent and MXM Barbara and Celarent, LXQ Darii and Ferio
Observe that if an LXM syllogism is invalid, then the LXL syllogism and the LXQ
syllogisms must also be invalid.
For Barbara and LXQ Darii consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = {b}, v(x,B) = v(x,C) = {a}
Call this model J. First observe, that a ∈M(w,B), a ∈ L(w,C) and that b ∉M(w,B).
Hence M(w,B) ≠ ∅ and that M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C). Hence J,w ⊧ B La C. Similarly, since
b ∉ V (w,A) and a ∈ V (w,A) and a ∈ V (w,B), it follows that V (w,A) ≠ ∅ and that
V (w,B) ⊆ V (w,C). Hence J,w ⊧ AaB.
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊈ M(w,C). This follows since b ∈ M(w,A) and
b ∉ M(w,C). Hence J,w ⊧ A Lo C and so J,w ⊭ A Ma C. For MXM Barbara, simply
observe that we also have J,w ⊧ B Ma C.
For LXQ Darii, observe that J,w ⊧ AiB. Further, J,w ⊭ A Qi C since b /∈ M(w,C)
and a ∉M(w,¬C) i.e. M(w,A) ∩M(w,C) ∩M(w,¬C) = ∅.
For Celarent consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = {a} v(w,C) = {b}
v(x,A) = v(x,C) = {b} v(x,B) = ∅
Call this model J. First observe that a ∈ M(w,B), a ∉ M(w,C), b ∈ L(w,C), b ∈
M(w,C), and b ∉ M(w,B). Hence M(w,B) ∩M(w,C) = ∅. So we have J,w ⊧ B Le C
and J,w ⊧ B Me C. Observe that we also have a ∈ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,B), and b ∉ V (w,A).
Clearly then V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B) and V (w,A) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊧ AaB. We also have
J,w ⊧ AiB.
However, observe that M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) = {b} and so J,w ⊧ A Li C and so J,w ⊭
A
M
e C as desired.
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For LXQ Ferio, observe that M(w,A)∩(M(w,C)∩M(w,¬C)) = ∅ since b ∉M(w,¬C)
and a ∉M(w,C). Hence N,w ⊭ A Qo C.
XLX Barbara, Darii, and Ferio
For Barbara and Darii, consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a} v(w,A) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) =D
Call this model J. First observe that a ∈ V (w,B), a ∈ V (w,C), and b ∉ V (w,B).
Hence V (w,B) ⊆ V (w,C) and V (w,B) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊧ BaC. Also, observe that
b ∈ M(w,A), b ∈ L(w,B) and a ∈ L(w,B). Hence we have M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and
M(w,A) ≠ ∅. Hence J,w ⊧ A La B. We also have J,w ⊧ A Li B.
However, observe that V (w,A)∩V (w,C) = ∅ and so J,w ⊧ A e C. Hence J,w ⊭ A i C
and J,w ⊭ A a C.
For Ferio, consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,C) = {a} v(w,B) = {b}
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(w,C) =D
Call this model J. First, observe that b ∉ V (w,C) and a ∉ V (w,B). Hence V (w,B)∩
V (w,C) = ∅. From this it follows that J,w ⊧ BeC. Likewise, observe that b ∈M(w,A)
and b ∈ L(w,B). Hence M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅. From this it follows that J,w ⊧ A Li B.
However, observe that a ∈ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,C) and b ∉ V (w,A). Hence V (w,A) ≠ ∅
and V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,C). From this it follows that J,w ⊧ AaC and so J,w ⊭ AoC.
QXQ Barbara, Celarent and QXM Barbara and Celarent
For QXQ and QXM Barbara consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = {b} v(x,B) = v(w,C) = ∅
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Call this model J. First, observe that a ∈ M(w,B), a ∈ M(w,C), a ∉ L(w,C) and
that b ∉ M(w,B). Hence M(w,B) ⊆ (M(w,C) ∩M(w,¬C) and M(w,B) ≠ ∅. Hence
J,w ⊧ B Qa C. Likewise, observe that since b ∉ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,A), and b ∈ V (w,B), it
follows that J,w ⊧ AaB.
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊈ M(w,C) ∩M(w,¬C) since b ∈ M(w,A) and b ∉
M(w,C). Hence J,w ⊭ A Qa C and J,w ⊭ A Ma C.
For QXQ and QXM Celarent consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,C) = {a} v(w,B) =D
v(x,A) = v(x,C) = {b} v(x,B) = ∅
Call this model J. First, observe that a ∈ M(w,B), a ∈ M(w,C), a ∉ L(w,C) and
that b ∉ M(w,B). Hence M(w,B) ⊆ (M(w,C) ∩M(w,¬C) and M(w,B) ≠ ∅. Hence
J,w ⊧ B Qe C. Likewise, observe that since b ∉ V (w,A), a ∈ V (w,A), and b ∈ V (w,B), it
follows that J,w ⊧ AaB.
However, observe that b ∈ M(w,A) and b ∈ L(w,C). Hence M(w,A) ⊈ (M(w,C) ∩
M(w,¬C)) and M(w,A) ∩ L(w,C) ≠ ∅. Hence it follows that J,w ⊭ A Qe C and
J,w ⊭ A Me C.
LQX Barbara, Darii, and Ferio
For Barbara and Darii, consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = ∅ v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = v(x,C) = {a}
Call this model J. Clearly a ∈M(w,A), a ∈M(w,B). To see that M(w,B) ⊆ L(w,C),
observe that a ∈ V (w,C) and a ∈ V (x,C). Hence J,w ⊧ B La C. Likewise, observe that
M(w,A) ⊆ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) since a ∈ M(w,A) and a ∉ V (w,B) and hence in
a ∈M(w,¬B). Likewise, since a ∈ V (x,B) it follows that a ∈M(w,B) as claimed.
However, J,w ⊭ AaC since V (w,A) = ∅.
For LQX Ferio, consider the following countermodel.
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W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a, b} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,C) = {a} v(w,B) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = {b} v(x,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Clearly J,w ⊧ B Le C since a ∉M(w,B) and b ∉M(w,C). Likewise,
J,w ⊧ A Qi B since b ∈M(w,A), b ∈M(w,B) since b ∈ V (x,B) and b ∈M(w,¬B) since
b ∉ V (w,B).
However, clearly V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,C) since b ∉ V (w,A) and a ∈ V (w,A) and a ∈
V (w,C). Hence J,w ⊭ AoC.
XLL
For Barbara and Darii consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = v(w,C) = {a}
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = {a} v(x,C) = ∅
Call this model J. Observe that clearly V (w,B) ⊆ V (w,C) since a ∈ V (w,B) and a ∈
V (w,C). Likewise, observe that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) since a ∈M(w,A) and a ∈ L(w,B).
Hence it follows that J,w ⊧ BaC, J,w ⊧ A La B, and J,w ⊧ A Li B.
However, since a ∉ V (x,C) it follows that a ∉ L(w,C) and so M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,C), i.e.
J,w ⊭ A La C and J,w ⊭ A Li C.
For XLL Celarent and Ferio consider the following countermodel:
W = {w,x} R =W 2
D = {a} O(w) = O(x) =D
v(w,A) = v(w,B) = {a} v(w,C) = ∅
v(x,A) = v(x,B) = ∅ v(x,C) = {a}
Call this model J First observe that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) since a ∈ V (w,B) and a ∉
V (x,A). That M(w,B) is non-empty follows from a ∈ V (w,B). Hence J,w ⊧ A La B
and J,w ⊧ A Li B. Next, observe that V (w,B) ∩ V (w,C) = ∅ since v(w,C) = ∅. Hence
J,w ⊧ BeC
However, observe that M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,C) since a ∈ M(w,C), because a ∈ V (x,C)
and a ∈M(w,A) as we already observed. Hence J,w ⊭ A Lo C and J,w ⊭ A Le C.
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Conclusion
This completes our treatment of invalidities in the first figure. This, together with our
treatment of validities in the first figure exhausts all of the possible triple combinations
for categorical formulae. By the Reduction Lemma, it follows that we have also ex-
hausted all of the combinations in the other two figures as well. The verification of the
invalidities in the second and third figure can be accomplished by reducing these to the
first figure. This is a straightforward exercise, however, due to reasons of length we will
not include them here.
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We remarked in Chapter Four that, for the most part, the soundness of our proof rules
with respect to our semantics was an easy exercise. For the sake of completeness and
for ease of verification, this appendix provides the proofs for the rules not treated in
Chapter Four as well as contains the specifications for rule of inference. In this appendix
we will proceed as follows: We will start by recalling the semantic and proof-theoretic
rules that we are working with, including the full details of how the inferential rules
work. We will then prove soundness, starting with the interchange rules, followed by the
introduction rules and concluding with the elimination rules.
Semantics
Recall that a Buridan Modal Model is defined as follows:
Buridan Modal Model (Expanded). A Buridan Modal Model is a tuple:
M = ⟨D,W,R,O, c, v⟩ such that:
D and W are non-empty sets. D is the domain of objects and W is a set of worlds.
R ⊆W 2 which is universal.
O ∶W → P(D).
c ∶ CONS →D such that c is surjective.
v ∶W × PRED → P(D).
As before, we define the following shorthand for use in our semantic definitions model:
Semantic Abbreviations. Let P be a term. Using the semantics we can define the
following collections:
V (w,P ) = O(w) ∩ v(w,P )
V (w,¬P ) =D ∖ (O(w) ∩ v(w,P ))
M(w,K) = {d ∈D ∶ there is some z s.t wRz and d ∈ V (z,K)}
L(w,K) = {d ∈D ∶ for all z if wRz then d ∈ V (z,K)}
Recall that we are using K as a variable to range over terms and their negations.
With these in place, recall that the truth conditions for the various formulae are as
follows:
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Assertoric Categorical Propositions.
M,w ⊧ AaB if and only if V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B) and V (w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ AeB if and only if V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ AiB if and only if V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ AoB if and only if V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B) or V (w,A) = ∅
Modal Categorical Propositions.
M,w ⊧ A La B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Le B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Li B if and only if M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Lo B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈M(w,B) or M(w,A) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Ma B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Me B if and only if M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Mi B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Mo B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B) or M(w,A) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qa B if and only if M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) and M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qe B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Qa B
M,w ⊧ A Qi B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Qo B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Qi B
M,w ⊧ A Q¯a B if and only if M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B) = ∅
M,w ⊧ A Q¯e B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Q¯a B
M,w ⊧ A Q¯i B if and only if M(w,A) ⊈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) or M(w,A) ≠ ∅
M,w ⊧ A Q¯o B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Q¯i B
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New Propositions.
M,w ⊧ faA if and only if c(f) ∈ V (w,A)
M,w ⊧ feA if and only if c(f) ∉ V (w,A)
M,w ⊧ f La A if and only if c(f) ∈ L(w,A)
M,w ⊧ f Me A if and only if c(f) ∉ L(w,A)
M,w ⊧ f Ma A if and only if c(f) ∈M(w,A)
M,w ⊧ f Le A if and only if c(f) ∉M(w,A)
M,w ⊧ f Qa A if and only if c(f) ∈M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A)
M,w ⊧ f Qe A if and only if M,w ⊧ f Q¯a A
M,w ⊧ f Q¯a A if and only if c(f) ∈ L(w,A) ∪L(w,¬A)
M,w ⊧ f Q¯e A if and only if M,w ⊧ f Qa A
M,w ⊧ φ ∧ ψ if and only if M,w ⊧ φ and M,w ⊧ ψ
We recall here that the operation e places the negation in front of the modal operation
when we are dealing with singular terms. So, for example, f
Q
e A should be read as
saying that (the object named by) f is not contingently A. With this, the rules and
truth conditions that relate Q and Q¯ should be clear. In Chapter Four we made use of
the operation C(φ) to pick out the contradictory formula of φ, where φ is not of the form
ψ ∧χ. Strictly speaking, we should not speak of the contradictory formula of φ, since in
a number of places this is not uniquely defined. However, as we shall prove below, such
formulae are logically equivalent we will retain this way of speaking. We here indicate
that every formula φ appropriately restricted (i.e. restricted to exclude formulae of the
form φ∧ψ) has a contradictory. Recall that, given two formulae φ and ψ, we say that φ
and ψ are contradictory if and only if for all M and w ∈W we have M,w ⊧ φ if and only
if M,w ⊭ ψ. As an easy corollary of this, observe that if two formulae φ and ψ are both
contradictory of χ, then φ and ψ are equivalent. As
Q
a and
Q
e,
Q
i and
Q
o,
Q¯
a and
Q¯
e, and
Q¯
i and
Q¯
o are all equivalent, C(φ) is not uniquely defined. However nothing substantial will turn
on this, and we stipulate that in these cases C(φ) returns the affirmative proposition (a
or i) if φ is affirmative and C(φ) returns the negative proposition if φ is negative (e or
o).
Based on these definitions, it is immediate from our semantics that the following are
contradictory pairs:
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A a B contradicts A o B
A i B contradicts A e B
A
L
a B contradicts A
M
o B
A
L
i B contradicts A
M
e B
A
M
a B contradicts A
L
o B
A
M
i B contradicts A
L
e B
A
Q
a B contradicts A
Q¯
o B
A
Q
i B contradicts A
Q¯
e B
and that in the case of singular propositions, the following obtains::
d a A contradicts d e A
d
L
a A contradicts d
L
e B
d
M
a A contradicts d
M
e B
d
Q
a A contradicts d
Q¯
e B
Based on the definition of contradictory propositions and C() we have the following
easy corollaries:
Let φ and ψ be contradictory propositions. Then for no model M and w ∈ W do we
have M ⊧ φ and M,w ⊧ ψ. To see this, assume not. Then for some M and w ∈ W , we
have M ⊧ φ and M,w ⊧ ψ. As φ and ψ are contradictory, it follows that M,w ⊭ ψ and
M,w ⊭ φ which is a contradiction.
That for no model M and w ∈W do we have M ⊧ φ and M,w ⊧ C(φ), follows by the
definition of C(φ).
As we proved in the previous appendix, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 :
For all models N and all worlds, w ∈W we have:
1. L(w,A) ⊆ V (w,A)
2. V (w,A) ⊆M(w,A)
3. L(w,A) ⊆M(w,A)
Proofs of these claims can be found in the appendix on the adequacy of our semantics
to capture Buridan’s treatment of the modal syllogism.1 We will often implicitly appeal
to this lemma without explicit reference. When we do reference it, the principles will be
cited as lemma 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 respectively.
We will also make use of the following relationships, often without explicitly mention-
ing it.
For all M, w ∈W , and d ∈D we have
1. See page 211.
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4. d ∈ L(w,A) if and only if d ∉M(w,¬A)
5. d ∈M(w,A) if and only if d ∉ L(w,¬A)
Proof of 4. Take arbitrary M, w and d. Then we have d ∈ L(w,A) if and only if for all
x ∈W if wRx then d ∈ V (x,A) if and only if it is not the case that there is some x ∈W
such that wRx and d ∉ V (x,A) if and only if it is not the case that there is some x ∈W
such that wRx and d ∈ V (x,¬A) if and only if d ∉M(w,¬A).
Proof of 5. Take arbitrary M, w and d. Then we have d ∈M(w,A) if and only if there
is some x ∈W such that wRx and d ∈ V (x,A) if and only if it is not the case that for all
x ∈W if wRx then d ∉ V (x,A) if and only if it is not the case that for all x ∈W if wRx
then d ∈ V (x,¬A) if and only if d ∉ L(w,¬A).
As an easy corollary of 4. and 5. we have the following:
For all M, w ∈W , and d ∈D we have
6. d ∈ L(w,A) ∪L(w,¬A) if and only if d ∉M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A)
Take arbitrary M, w and d. Then we have d ∈ L(w,A)∪L(w,¬A) if and only if either
d ∈ L(w,A) or d ∈ L(w,¬A).
For the left to right direction, observe that if d ∈ L(w,A) then by 4, d ∉M(w,¬A) and
so d ∉ M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A). Likewise, if d ∈ L(w,¬A) then d ∉ M(w,A) by 5. Hence
d ∉M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A).
For the right to left direction, assume that d ∉ L(w,A) ∪L(w,¬A). Then d ∉ L(w,A)
and d ∉ L(w,¬A). Hence by 4 and 5 d ∈ M(w,A) and d ∈ M(w,¬A). Hence d ∈
M(w,A) ∩M(w,¬A).
11.1 Natural Deduction Rules
It should be recalled that our proof system is a natural deduction framework, composed
of three tables of rules. One table is for elimination rules, another for introduction rules,
and a third for interaction rules.
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AiB
[faA ∧ faB]
C Exposition +
C
AoB
[faA ∧ feB]
C A i A Exposition −
C
A
L
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f La B]
C
Exposition L+
C
A
L
o B
[f Ma A ∧ f Le B]
C A
M
i A Exposition L−
C
A
M
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Ma B]
C
Exposition M+
C
A
M
o B
[f Ma A ∧ f Me B]
C A
M
i A Exposition M−
C
A
Q
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Qa B]
C
Exposition Q
C
A
Q¯
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Q¯a B]
C A
M
i A
Exposition Q¯
C
A a B d a A
DDO
d a B
A e B d a A
DDN
d e B
A e B d a B
DDN
d e A
A
L
a B d
M
a A
DDO
d
L
a B
A
L
e B d
M
a A
DDN
d
L
e B
A
L
e B d
M
a B
DDN
d
L
e A
A
M
a B d
M
a A
DDO
d
M
a B
A
M
e B d
M
a A
DDN
d
L
e B
A
M
e B d
L
a B
DDN
d
L
e A
A
Q
a B d
M
a A
DDO
d
Q
a B
A
Q¯
a B d
M
a A
DDO
d
Q¯
a B
d
Q¯
a A d
M
a A
Q¯-Out
d
L
a A
d
Q¯
a A d
M
e A
Q¯-Out
d
L
e A
φ ∧ ψ ∧ Elimination
φ
φ ∧ ψ ∧ Elimination
ψ
φ C(φ)
Ex Falso Quodlibet
ψ
Table 11.1: Elimination Rules
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d a A ∧ d a B
Expository Syllogism +
A i B
d a A ∧ d e B
Expository Syllogism −
A o B
d
M
a A ∧ d La B
Expository Syllogism L+
A
L
i B
d
M
a A ∧ d Le B
Expository Syllogism L−
A
L
o B
d
M
a A ∧ d Ma B
Expository Syllogism M+
A
M
i B
d
M
a A ∧ d Me B
Expository Syllogism M−
A
M
o B
d
M
a A ∧ d Qa B
Expository Syllogism Q
A
Q
i B
d
M
a A ∧ d Q¯a B
Expository Syllogism Q¯
A
Q¯
i B
A i A
[faA]
faB
a-introduction
AaB
[faA]
feB
e-introduction
AeB
A
M
i A
[f Ma A]
f
∇
a B
a∇-introduction
A
∇
a B
[f Ma A]
f
∇
e B
e∆-introduction
A
∆
e B
feA
Empty Exposition
A o B
f
L
e A
Empty Exposition
A
∇
o B
d
L
a A
Q¯-In
d
Q¯
a A
d
L
e A
Q¯-In
d
Q¯
a A
φ ψ ∧ Introduction
φ ∧ ψ
daA
Necessity Introduction
d
L
a A
deA
Necessity Introduction
d
L
e A
d a A
Reflexivity
d
M
a A
d
L
e A
Reflexivity
d e A
[φ]
ψ
[φ]
C(ψ)
C-Introduction
C(φ)
Table 11.2: Introduction Rules
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A
L× B
Modal SubalternationL
A
M× B A
Q
a/e B
Modal SubalternationQ
A
M
a B
A
Q
i/o B
Modal SubalternationQ
A
M
i B
A a B
Subalternation+
A i B
A e B
Subalternation−
A o B
A
L/M
a B
Subalternation+
A
L/M
i B
A
L/M
e A
Subalternation−
A
L/M
o B
A
Q
a/e B
Subalternation+
A
Q
i/o B
A
Q¯
a/e A
Subalternation−
A
Q¯
i/o B
d
Q
a A
Q sing Equivalence
d
Q¯
e A
d
Q¯
a A
Q¯ sing Equivalence
d
Q
e A
A
Q
a B
Q a − e Equivalence
A
Q
e B
A
Q
i B
Q i − o Equivalence
A
Q
o B
A
Q¯
a B
Q¯ a − e Equivalence
A
Q¯
e B
A
Q¯
i B
Q¯ i − o Equivalence
A
Q¯
o B
d
Q
a A
Q −Out
d
M
a A ∧ d Me A d
M
a A ∧ d Me A
Q − In
d
Q
a A
C(C(φ))
CC Elimination
φ
Table 11.3: Interaction Rules
Here f denotes a new constant that does not occur previously in the proof, while d
has no such restriction.
11.1.1 Inferential Rule Structure
We specify the rules for the introduction and discharging of assumptions as follows:
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Elimination rules
The various forms of Expository Syllogism are as follows:
For Exposition+:⟨⟨Γ1,A i B⟩, ⟨Γ2,C, ⟩⟨Λ,C⟩⟩
Where Λ = Γ1 ∪ (Γ2 − Γ3) where Γ3 consists of some formula d a A ∧ d a B ∈ Γ2 such
that d does not occur in Λ or C.
For the modal cases:⟨⟨Γ,A ∇i B⟩, ⟨Γ2,C, ⟩⟨Λ,C⟩⟩
Where Λ = Γ ∪ (Γ2 − Γ3) where Γ3 consists of some formula d Ma A ∧ d ∆a B ∈ Γ2 such
that d does not occur in Λ or C
For the cases of Exposition− we have:
For Exposition−:⟨⟨Γ1,A o B⟩, ⟨Γ2,C, ⟩, ⟨Γ4,A i A⟩, ⟨Λ′,C⟩⟩
Where Λ′ = Γ1 ∪ (Γ2 − Γ3) ∪ Γ4 where Γ3 consists of some d a A ∧ d a B ∈ Γ2 such that
d does not occur in Λ or C.
For the Modal Cases:
⟨⟨Γ1,A ∇o B⟩, ⟨Γ2,C, ⟩, ⟨Γ4,A Mi A⟩, ⟨Λ′,C⟩⟩
Where Λ′ = Γ1 ∪ (Γ2 −Γ3)∪Γ4 where Γ3 consists of some d Ma A∧ d ∆e B ∈ Γ2 such that
d does not occur in Λ or C.
For the various forms of DDO :⟨⟨Γ1,AaB⟩, ⟨Γ2, d a A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d a B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A La B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d La B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Ma B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d Ma B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Qa B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d Qa B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Q¯a B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d Q¯a B⟩⟩
For the various DDN rules:⟨⟨Γ1,A e B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d a A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d e B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A e B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d a B⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d e A⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Le B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d Le B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Le B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma B⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d Le A⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Me B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d Me B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Me B⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma B⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d Me A⟩⟩
For the two Q¯-Out rules we have:
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⟨⟨Γ1, d Q¯a A⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Ma A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d La A⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, d Q¯a A⟩, ⟨Γ2, d Me A⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, d Le A⟩⟩
For ∧ Elimination we have:⟨⟨Γ1, φ ∧ ψ⟩, ⟨Γ1, φ⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, φ ∧ ψ⟩, ⟨Γ1, ψ⟩⟩
For Ex Falso Quodlibet we have:⟨⟨Γ1, φ⟩, ⟨Γ2,C(φ)⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, ψ⟩⟩
Introduction rules
For our introduction rules we have the following:
For the various forms of Expository syllogism+ we have:⟨⟨Γ1, d a A ∧ d a B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A i B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, d Ma A ∧ d La B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Li B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, d Ma A ∧ d Ma B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Mi B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, d Ma A ∧ d Qa B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Qi B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, d Ma A ∧ d Q¯a B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Q¯i B⟩⟩
For the various forms of Expository Syllogism− we have:⟨⟨Γ1, d a A ∧ d e B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A o B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, d Ma A ∧ d Le B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Lo B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, d Ma A ∧ d Me B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Mo B⟩⟩
For the various a-introduction rules we have:⟨⟨Γ1,A i A⟩, ⟨Γ2, faB⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ3,A a A⟩⟩
Where Γ3 = Γ2 ∖ faA and we require that f does not occur in Γ3.⟨⟨Γ1,A Mi A⟩, ⟨Γ2, f ∇a B⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ3,A ∇a A⟩⟩
Where Γ3 = Γ2 ∖ {f Ma A} and we require that f does not occur in Γ3.
For the various e-introduction rules we have:⟨⟨Γ1, f e B⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∖ {f a A},A e B⟩⟩
Where f does not occur in Γ1 ∖ {f a A}.⟨⟨Γ1, f ∇e B⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∖ {f Ma A},A ∆e B⟩⟩
Where f does not occur in Γ1 ∖ {f a A}.
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For Empty Exposition we have in the assertoric case:⟨⟨Γ, feA⟩, ⟨Γ,AoB⟩⟩
Where we require that f does not occur in Γ.
In the modal case:⟨⟨Γ, f Le A⟩, ⟨Γ,A ∇o B⟩⟩
Where we require that f does not occur in Γ.
For ∧ Introduction we have:⟨⟨Γ1, φ⟩, ⟨Γ2, ψ⟩, ⟨Γ1 ∪ Γ2, φ ∧ ψ⟩⟩
The rules for Necessity Introduction are:
⟨⟨Γ1, daA⟩, ⟨Γ1, d La A⟩⟨⟨Γ1, deA⟩, ⟨Γ1, d Le A⟩
Where Γ1 is a set of modalised singular formulae of possibility or necessity. A formula
is said to be modalised if and only if it is not of the form A
∇× B or d ∇× B where ∇ is any
one of L,M ,Q, or Q¯ and × is any of a, e, i, or o in the case of categorical propositions
and × is either a or e in the case of singular propositions.
Interaction Rules
The inference rules for the interaction rules are defined as follows:
Modal SubalternationL⟨⟨Γ1,A L× B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A M× B⟩⟩
Modal SubalternationQ⟨⟨Γ1,A Qa B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Ma B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Qe B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Ma B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Qi B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Mi B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Qo B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Ma B⟩⟩
As in the case of ∇ the use of a/e and i/o should be preserved vertically. I.e. From
A
Q
a B one may conclude A
M
a B, and similarly from A
Q
e B one may conclude A
M
e B.
For clarity we have included all four instances of the rules.
Subalternation+ ⟨⟨Γ1,A a B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A i B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A La B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Li B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Ma B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Mi B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Qa B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Qi B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Qe B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Qo B⟩⟩
As in the case of a/e L/M in the rule should be read vertically. All forms of the rule
are written here.
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Subalternation−⟨⟨Γ1,A e B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A o B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Le B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Lo B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Me B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Mo B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Q¯a B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Q¯i B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Q¯e B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Q¯e B⟩⟩
As in the case of a/e, L/M in the rule should be read vertically. All forms of the rule
are written here.
Q-Sing Equivalence:⟨⟨Γ1, d Qa A⟩, ⟨Γ1, d Qe A⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1, d Qe A⟩, ⟨Γ1, d Qa A⟩⟩
Q¯-Sing Equivalence:⟨⟨Γ1, d Q¯a A⟩, ⟨Γ1, d Q¯e A⟩⟩
⟨⟨Γ1, d Q¯e A⟩, ⟨Γ1, d Q¯a A⟩⟩
Q a-e Equivalence:⟨⟨Γ1,A Qa B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Qe B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Qe B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Qa B⟩⟩
Q i-o Equivalence:⟨⟨Γ1,A Qi B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Qo B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Qo B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Qi B⟩⟩
Q a-e Equivalence:⟨⟨Γ1,A Q¯a B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Q¯e B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Q¯e B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Q¯a B⟩⟩
Q¯ i-o Equivalence:⟨⟨Γ1,A Q¯i B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Q¯o B⟩⟩⟨⟨Γ1,A Q¯o B⟩, ⟨Γ1,A Q¯i B⟩⟩
Q −Out⟨⟨Γ1, d Qa A⟩, ⟨Γ1, d Ma A ∧ d Me A⟩⟩
Q − In
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⟨⟨Γ1, d Ma A ∧ d Me A⟩, ⟨Γ1, d Qa A⟩⟩
CC Elimination:⟨⟨Γ1,C(C(φ))⟩, ⟨Γ, φ⟩, ⟩
11.2 Soundness
In this section, we show that if Γ ⊢ φ then Γ ⊧ φ. As is normally the case with soundness
proofs, the proof is by induction on the length of the derivation. Before specifying how
the soundness proof will proceed, we will often make use of the following (simple) lemma.
Given two assignments c ∶ SING→D and c′ ∶ SING→D, we write c′ ∽k c if and only
if c′ differs from c in assignment of elements of SING at most with respect to k.
Given a (Buridan Modal) Model M, define M′ to be the same model as M except
that c is replaced with c′.
Observation 1:
For all formulae φ, models M and w ∈W if c ∽k c′ and k does not occur in φ then M,w ⊧ φ
if and only if M′,w ⊧ φ.
The proof of this observation is immediate from the definitions of c
∽
k c′ and M′.
We now turn to the proof of soundness. We claim:
If Γ ⊢ φ then Γ ⊧ φ
Recall that Γ ⊧ φ if and only if for all M and w ∈W if M,w ⊧ Γ then M,w ⊧ φ.
To that end, take an arbitrary model M and w ∈W . The proof is by induction on the
length of derivation.
Length =1
If Γ ⊢ φ and the derivation is of length 1, then this can only happen if φ ∈ Γ, as our
system has no axioms. In that case we need to show that Γ ⊧ φ, given φ ∈ Γ. This is
immediate from the definition of ⊧.
Length n
As our induction hypothesis assumes that we have, given Γ ⊢ φ, that Γ ⊧ φ for all
derivations of length < n. We claim that this also holds for derivations of length n. To
that end, it suffices to show that all of our inference rules preserve validity. We will
break this into subsections and start with the interchange rules:
11.2.1 Interchange Rules
Modal SubalternationL
We claim that the rule:
A
L× B
Modal SubalternationL
A
M× B
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is sound with respect to our semantics.
We have four cases to consider, namely when x is a, x is e, x is o, and x is o.
For x is a:
As the length of the proof that Γ ⊢ A La B is < n it follows by our inductive hypothesis
it follows that Γ ⊧ A La B. Take an arbitrary model M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ.
Then M,w ⊧ A La B. This holds if and only if M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B). By
Lemma 1.1. we have L(w,B) ⊆ M(w,B) and so M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and M(w,A) ⊆M(w,B).
Hence M,w ⊧ A Ma B as claimed.
For x is e:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Le B. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Le B. This holds if and only if
M(w,A)∩M(w,B) = ∅. By Lemma 1.1. we have L(w,B) ⊆ M(w,B) and so M(w,A)∩
L(w,B) = ∅. Hence M,w ⊧ A Me B as claimed.
For x is i:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Li B. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Li B. This holds if and only if
M(w,A)∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅. By Lemma 1.1. we have L(w,B) ⊆ M(w,B) and so M(w,A)∩
M(w,B) ≠ ∅. Hence M,w ⊧ A Mi B as claimed.
For x is o:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Lo B. Take an arbitrary model M and
world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Lo B. This holds if and only if M(w,A) = ∅
or M(w,A) ⊈ M(w,B). By Lemma 1.1. we have L(w,B) ⊆ M(w,B) and so either
M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B). Hence M,w ⊧ A Mo B as claimed.
Modal SubalternationQ We claim that the rules:
A
Q
a/e B
Modal SubalternationQ
A
M
a B
and
A
Q
i/o B
Modal SubalternationQ
A
M
i B
are sound with respect to our semantics. We would normally have four cases to
consider but since
Q
a and
Q
e are semantically equivalent and
Q
i and
Q
o are semantically
equivalent, we have only two cases to consider.
For the cases of a and e:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Qa B. Take an arbitrary model M and
world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Qa B. Then M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and M(w,A) ⊆
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(M(w,B)∩M(w,¬B)). It follows by basic set theory that M(w,A) ⊆ (M(w,B). Hence
M,w ⊧ A Ma B.
For the cases of i and o:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Qi B. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Qi B. Then M(w,A) ∩ (M(w,B) ∩
M(w,¬B)) ≠ ∅. It follows by basic set theory that M(w,A) ∩ (M(w,B) ≠ ∅. Hence
M,w ⊧ A Mi B.
Subalternation+ We claim that the rule:
A a B
Subalternation+
A i B
is sound with respect to our semantics. By our inductive hypothesis it follows that
Γ ⊧ A a B. Take an arbitrary model M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then
M,w ⊧ A a B. Hence 1) V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B) and 2) V (w,A) ≠ ∅. Since V (w,A) there
is some d such that d ∈ V (w,A). by 1) d ∈ V (w,B) also and so V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) ≠ ∅.
Hence M,w ⊧ A i B.
Subalternation− We claim that the rule:
A e B
A o B
is sound with respect to our semantics. By our inductive hypothesis it follows that
Γ ⊧ A e B. Take an arbitrary model M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then
M,w ⊧ AeB. Hence V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) = ∅. It follows by basic set theory that either
V (w,A) = ∅ or V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B). To see this, observe that we have three cases to
consider. If V (w,A) = ∅, then the left disjunct holds. If V (w,A) ≠ ∅ and V (w,B) = ∅
then the right disjunct holds. Likewise, if V (w,A) ≠ ∅ and V (w,B) ≠ ∅ then by our
assumption V (w,A) and V (w,B) are disjoint and so the right disjunct holds.
Subalternation+ We claim that the rule:
A
∇
a B
A
∇
i B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
We have four cases to consider, namely the cases where ∇ is L, M , Q, and Q¯ respec-
tively.
In the case of L:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A La B. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A La B. Hence 1) M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and
2) M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B). From 1) it follows that there is some d such that d ∈M(w,A).
From this and 2) it follows that there is some d such that d ∈M(w,A) and d ∈ L(w,B).
Hence M(w,A) ∩L(w,B) ≠ ∅ and so M,w ⊧ A Li B as claimed.
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In the case of M :
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Ma B. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Ma B. Hence 1) M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and 2)
M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,B). From 1) it follows that there is some d such that d ∈ M(w,A).
From this and 2) it follows that there is some d such that d ∈M(w,A) and d ∈M(w,B).
Hence M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ≠ ∅ and so M,w ⊧ A Mi B as claimed.
In the case of Q:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Qa B. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Qa B. Hence 1) M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and 2)
M(w,A) ⊆ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)). From 1) it follows that there is some d such that
d ∈ M(w,A). From this and 2) it follows that there is some d such that d ∈ M(w,A)
and d ∈M(w,B) and d ∈M(w,¬B). Hence M(w,A)∩M(w,B)∩M(w,¬B) ≠ ∅ and so
M,w ⊧ A Qi B as claimed.
In the case of Q¯:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Q¯a B. Take an arbitrary model
M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Q¯a B. Hence 1) M(w,A) ∩
M(w,B) ∩ M(w,¬B) = ∅ We claim that either M(w,A) = ∅ or that M(w,A) ⊈(M(w,B) ∩ M(w,¬B)). Assume not. Then 2) M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and 3) M(w,A) ⊆(M(w,B)∩M(w,¬B)). From 2) it follows that there is some d such that d ∈M(w,A).
From this and 3) it follows that some d such that d ∈ M(w,A), d ∈ M(w,B), and
d ∈ M(w,¬B). But this contradicts 1). Hence either M(w,A) = ∅ or that M(w,A) ⊈(M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) as claimed. It then follows that M,w ⊧ A Q¯i B.
Subalternation− We claim that the rule:
A
∇
e A
A
∇
o B
is sound with respect to our semantics. We prove the cases for L and M directly. It
should be observed that the cases of Q and Q¯ are nearly identical to the cases proven in
subalternation+, only requiring the additional observations that M,w ⊧ A Q/Q¯a B if and
only if M,w ⊧ A Q/Q¯e B and that M,w ⊧ A Q/Q¯i B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Q/Q¯o B.
In the case of L:
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Le B. Take an arbitrary model M and
world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Le B. Hence M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) = ∅.
We claim that either M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈ M(w,B). Assume not. Then 1)
M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and 2) M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,B). From 1) it follows that there is some d
such that d ∈ M(w,A). This, together with 2) entails that there is some d such that
d ∈ M(w,A) and d ∈ M(w,B). But this contradicts M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) = ∅. Hence
either M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈M(w,B) and so M,w ⊧ A Lo B as claimed.
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In the case of M :
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ A Me B. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ A Me B. Hence M(w,A) ∩ L(w,B) = ∅.
We claim that either M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B). Assume not. Then 1)
M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and 2) M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B). From 1) it follows that there is some d
such that d ∈ M(w,A). This, together with 2) entails that there is some d such that
d ∈M(w,A) and d ∈ L(w,B). But this contradicts M(w,A)∩L(w,B) = ∅. Hence either
M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B) and so M,w ⊧ A Mo B as claimed.
Q sing Equivalence We claim that the rule:
d
Q
a A
d
Q¯
e A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
In both directions, the soundness follows immediately from the semantic definitions.
I.e. we have M,w ⊧ d Qa A if and only if M,w ⊧ d Q¯e A.
Q¯ sing Equivalence We claim that the rule:
d
Q¯
a A
d
Q
e A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
In both directions, the soundness follows immediately from the semantic definitions.
I.e. we have M,w ⊧ d Qe A if and only if M,w ⊧ d Q¯a A.
Q a-e Equivalence We claim that the rule:
A
Q
a B
A
Q
e B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
In both directions, the soundness follows immediately from the semantic definitions.
I.e. we have M,w ⊧ A Qa B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Qe B.
Q i-o Equivalence We claim that the rule:
A
Q
i B
A
Q
o B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
In both directions, the soundness follows immediately from the semantic definitions.
That is, we have M,w ⊧ A Qi B if and only if M,w ⊧ A Qo B.
Q-Out We claim that the rule:
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d
Q
a A
d
M
a A ∧ d Me A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Qa A. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Qa A. This holds if and only if 1)
c(d) ∈M(w,A) and 2) c(d) ∈M(w,¬A). 1) holds if and only if M,w ⊧ d Ma A.
2) holds if and only if c(d) ∉ L(w,A) if and only if M,w ⊧ d Me A. The first bicondi-
tional holds by basic logic, the second because of the semantic definition of
L
e.
Then clearly, we have M,w ⊧ d Ma A ∧ d Me A.
Q-In We claim that the rule:
d
M
a A ∧ d Me A
d
Q
a A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
This follows from the previous proof, as each step was a biconditional.
CC Elimination We claim that the rule:
C(C(φ))
φ
is sound with respect to our semantics. Recall that two formulae are said to be contra-
dictory, if for all models, M and all w ∈W M,w ⊧ φ if and only if M,w ⊭ ψ. We denote
ψ by C(φ).
Observe that, for all formulae φ we have M,w ⊧ φ if and only if M,w ⊭ C(φ) if and
only if M,w ⊭ C(C(φ)). Both biconditionals follow from the definition of contradictory,
and soundness of the rule is an easy corollary of this observation.
11.2.2 Introduction Rules
Expository Syllogism + We claim that the rule:
d a A ∧ d a B
A i B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ daA ∧ daB. Take an arbitrary model
M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ daA∧daB. Hence c(d) ∈ V (w,A) and
c(d) ∈ V (w,B). Hence there is some d such that d ∈ V (w,A)∩V (w,B). So M,w ⊧ AiB.
Expository Syllogism − We claim that the rule:
d a A ∧ d e B
A o B
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is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ daA ∧ deB. Take an arbitrary model
M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ daA ∧ deB. Hence c(d) ∈ V (w,A)
and c(d) ∉ V (w,B). It then follows by basic logic that V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B). Hence either
V (w,A) = ∅ or V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B). So M,w ⊧ AoB.
Expository Syllogism L+ We claim that the rule:
d
M
a A ∧ d La B
A
L
i B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Ma A∧d La B. Take an arbitrary model
M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Ma A∧ d La B. Hence c(d) ∈M(w,A)
and c(d) ∈ L(w,B). Hence there is some d such that d ∈ M(w,A) ∩ L(w,B). So
M,w ⊧ A Li B.
Expository Syllogism L− We claim that the rule:
d
M
a A ∧ d Le B
A
L
o B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Ma A∧d Le B. Take an arbitrary model
M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Ma A∧ d Le B. Hence c(d) ∈M(w,A)
and c(d) ∉ M(w,B). It then follows by basic logic that M(w,A) ⊈ M(w,B). Hence
either M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈M(w,B). So M,w ⊧ A Lo B.
Expository Syllogism M+ We claim that the rule:
d
M
a A ∧ d Ma B
A
M
i B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Ma A∧d Ma B. Take an arbitrary model
M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Ma A∧d Ma B. Hence c(d) ∈M(w,A)
and c(d) ∈ M(w,B). Hence there is some d such that d ∈ M(w,A) ∩M(w,B). So
M,w ⊧ A Mi B.
Expository Syllogism M− We claim that the rule:
d
M
a A ∧ d Me B
A
M
o B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
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By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Ma A∧d Me B. Take an arbitrary model
M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Ma A∧d Me B. Hence c(d) ∈M(w,A)
and c(d) ∉ L(w,B). It then follows by basic logic that M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B). Hence either
M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B). So M,w ⊧ A Mo B.
Expository Syllogism Q We claim that the rule:
d
M
a A ∧ d Qa B
A
Q
i B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Ma A ∧ d Qa B. Take an arbitrary
model M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Ma A ∧ d Qa B. Hence
c(d) ∈ M(w,A) and c(d) ∈ M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B). Hence there is some d such that
d ∈M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B). So M,w ⊧ A Qi B.
Expository Syllogism Q¯ We claim that the rule:
d
M
a A ∧ d Q¯a B
A
Q¯
i B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Ma A∧d Q¯a B. Take an arbitrary model
M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Ma A ∧ d Q¯a B. Hence M,w ⊧ d Ma A
and M,w ⊧ d Q¯a B and so c(d) ∈M(w,A) and c(d) ∈ L(w,B) ∪L(w,¬B).
Assume that M(w,A) ⊆ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)). As c(d) ∈M(w,A), it follows that
c(d) ∈M(w,B) and c(d) ∈M(w,¬B).
Hence 1) ∃x such that wRx and d ∈ V (x,B) and 2) ∃y such that wRy and d ∈ V (y,¬B).
However, we already have c(d) ∈ L(w,B) ∪ L(w,¬B) hence either c(d) ∈ L(w,B) or
c(d) ∈ L(w,¬B). If the first disjunct holds, then we have:∀x if wRx then c(d) ∈ V (w,B)
which contradicts 2). However, if the second disjunct holds, a similar contradiction
follows from 1). Hence M(w,A) ⊈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)). Hence either M(w,A) = ∅
or M(w,A) ⊈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)). So M,w ⊧ A Q¯i B.
a-introduction We claim that the rule:
A i A
[faA]
faB
AaB
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
faA) is sound with respect to our semantics.
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In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since their
proofs are shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ A i A
2) ∆ ⊧ faB
We need to show that Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f a A}) ⊧ A a B. To that end, take an arbitrary model
M and world w ∈W and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ∪ (∆∖{f a A}). Then M,w ⊧ A i A and
so V (w,A) ≠ ∅.
We need to show that V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B). Take an arbitrary s ∈ D and assume that
s ∈ V (w,A).
Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧∆∖{faA} and M′,w ⊧ Γ since f does not occur in ∆∖{faA
nor in Γ.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ faA since c′(f) ∈ V (w,A). Hence M′,w ⊧ ∆ and so by 2) it
follows that M′,w ⊧ f a B, whence s = c′(f) ∈ V (w,B) As s was arbitrary, it follows
that V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B). Hence M′,w ⊧ A a B. But f does not occur in A a B and
c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ A a B.
e-introduction We claim that the rule:[faA]
feB
AeB
is sound with respect to our semantics.
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
faA).
In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the
proof is shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ feB
We need to show that Γ ∖ {f a A} ⊧ AeB. To that end, take an arbitrary model M,
w ∈ W and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ ∖ {f a A}. We need to show that M,w ⊧ AeB, i.e.
V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) = ∅.
To that end, assume that s ∈ V (w,A). Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c
at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction we have c′ ∼f c. Since f does not occur in
Γ ∖ {f a A}, we have M′,w ⊧ Γ ∖ {d a A}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ faA since c′(f) ∈ V (w,A). Hence M′,w ⊧ Γ. Hence M′,w ⊧ feB
that is to say, s = f ∉ V (w,B). As s was arbitrary, it follows that V (w,A)∩V (w,B) = ∅
Hence M′,w ⊧ AeB. But f does not occur in AeB and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation
1 that M,w ⊧ AeB.
a∇-introduction We claim that the rule:
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A
M
i A
[f Ma A]
f
∇
a B
A
∇
a B
is sound with respect to our semantics. The proof in each case is analogous to the
assertoric case. We prove the case for L.
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
f
M
a A).
In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since their
proofs are shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ A Mi A
2) ∆ ⊧ f La B
We need to show that Γ∪ (∆∖ {f Ma A}) ⊧ A La B. To that end, take an arbitrary model
M and world w ∈W and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A}). Then M,w ⊧ A Mi A
and so M(w,A) ≠ ∅.
We need to show that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B). Take an arbitrary s ∈ D and assume that
s ∈M(w,A).
Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧ ∆ ∖ {f Ma A} and M′,w ⊧ Γ since f does not occur in
∆ ∖ {f Ma A} nor in Γ.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f Ma A since c′(f) ∈ M(w,A). Hence M′,w ⊧ ∆ and so by 2) it
follows that M′,w ⊧ f La B, whence s = c′(f) ∈ L(w,B) As s was arbitrary, it follows
that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B). But f does not occur in A La B and c∼f c′, so it follows by
Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ A La B.
e∆-introduction We claim that the rule:
[f Ma A]
f
∇
e B
A
∆
e B
is sound with respect to our semantics. The proof in each case is analogous to the
assertoric case. We prove the case for
L
e. i.e we show
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[f Ma A]
f
L
e B
A
L
e B
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
faA).
In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the
proof is shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ f Le B
We need to show that Γ∖ {f Ma A} ⊧ A Le B. To that end, take an arbitrary model M,
w ∈W and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ ∖ {f Ma A}. We need to show that M,w ⊧ A Le B, i.e.
M(w,A) ∩M(w,B) = ∅.
To that end, assume that s ∈ M(w,A). Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c
at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction we have c′ ∼f c. Since f does not occur in
Γ ∖ {f Ma A}, we have M′,w ⊧ Γ ∖ {d Ma A}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f Ma A since c′(f) ∈M(w,A). Hence M′,w ⊧ Γ. Hence M′,w ⊧ f Le
B that is to say, s = f ∉M(w,B). As s was arbitrary, it follows thatM(w,A)∩M(w,B) =∅ Hence M′,w ⊧ AeB. But f does not occur in A Le B and c∼f c′, so it follows by
Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ A Le B.
Empty Exposition We claim that the rule:
feA
A o B
(where f does not occur in any open assumption) is sound with respect to our semantics.
In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the
proof is shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ feA
We want to show that from this we can infer that V (w,A) = ∅ and then use that
to conclude A o B. To that end, take an arbitrary model M, w ∈ W and assume that
M,w ⊧ Γ. We need to show that Γ ⊧ AoB.
Assume that V (w,A) ≠ ∅. Then there is some t ∈ D such that t ∈ V (w,A). Call this
element s. Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. It
then follows that c′(f) ∈ V (w,A). However, by construction we have c′ ∼f c. Since f does
not occur in Γ we have M′,w ⊧ Γ and so M′,w ⊧ feA. Hence s = f ∉ V (w,A). This
contradicts our assumption that s ∈ V (w,A). Hence V (w,A) = ∅. It then follows by
259
11 Appendix Four: Soundness
basic logic that V (w,A) = ∅ or V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B). Hence M′,w ⊧ AoB. Since f does
not occur in AoB and c′ ∼f c, it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ AoB.
Empty Exposition We claim that the rule:
f
L
e A
A
∇
o B
is sound with respect to our semantics. The proof in each case is analogous to the
assertoric case. We prove the case for L. The general proof strategy is the same as
before.
To that end, take an arbitrary model M, w ∈W and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ. We need
to show that Γ ⊧ A Lo B.
Then assume that M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and see that there is some t ∈D such that t ∈M(w,A).
Call this element s. Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s.
It then follows that c′(f) ∈ M(w,A). However, by construction we have c′ ∼f c. Since f
does not occur in Γ we have M′,w ⊧ Γ and so M,w ⊧ f Le A. Hence s = f ∉ M(w,A).
This contradicts our assumption that s ∈M(w,A). Hence M(w,A) = ∅. It then follows
by basic logic that M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈M(w,B). Hence M′,w ⊧ A Lo B. Since f
does not occur in A
L
o B and c′ ∼f c, it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ A Lo B.
Q¯-In We claim that the rule:
d
L
a A
d
Q¯
a A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d La A. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d La A. Hence c(d) ∈ L(w,A). By basic
set theory it follows that c(d) ∈ L(w,A) ∪L(w,¬A). Hence M,w ⊧ d Q¯a A.
Q¯-In We claim that the rule:
d
L
e A
d
Q¯
a A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Le A. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Le A. So, M,w ⊧ d Le A. Hence
c(d) ∉M(w,A). So c(d) ∈ L(w,¬A) By basic set theory it follows that c(d) ∈ L(w,A) ∪
L(w,¬A). Hence M,w ⊧ d Q¯a A.∧ Introduction We claim that the rule:
φ ψ
φ ∧ ψ
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is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ φ and ∆ ⊧ M,w ⊧ ψ. So, take an
arbitrary model M and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ φ
and M,w ⊧ ψ. By the semantic definition of ∧ it follows that M,w ⊧ φ ∧ ψ. Hence
Γ ∪∆ ⊧ φ ∧ ψ.
Necessity Introduction We claim that the rule:
faA
f
L
a B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
The proof of this claim can be found in Chapter Five 135.
Necessity Introduction We claim that the rule:
feA
f
L
e A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
The proof of this claim can be found in Chapter Five 135.
Reflexivity We claim that the rule:
d a A
d
M
a A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d a A. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d a A. Hence c(d) ∈ V (w,A). Since R is
reflexive, it follows that wRw. Hence c(d) ∈M(w,A) and so M,w ⊧ d Ma A.
Reflexivity We claim that the rule:
d
L
e A
d e A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ d Le A. Take an arbitrary model M
and world w such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ d Le A. Hence c(d) ∉M(w,A). Since R
is reflexive, it follows that wRw. Hence c(d) ∉ V (w,A) and so M,w ⊧ d e A.
C-Introduction We claim that the rule:[φ]
ψ ∧C(ψ)
C(φ)
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is sound with respect to our semantics.
First, observe that for all M and for all w ∈W , we have M,w ⊭ φ ∧C(φ), as we have
shown on page 240 above.
From our inductive hypothesis it follows that Γ ⊧ ψ ∧ C(ψ). We will show that
Γ ∖ {φ} ⊧ (Cφ).
Take an arbitrary model, M and w ∈ W and assume M,w ⊧ Γ ∖ {φ}. Assume for a
contradiction that, M,w ⊧ φ. Then M,w ⊧ Γ and so M,w ⊧ ψ ∧ C(ψ). But this is
impossible, as was shown previously. Hence M,w ⊭ φ. It then follows by the definition
of C that M,w ⊧ C(φ)
11.2.3 Elimination Rules
Exposition + We claim that the rule:
AiB
[faA ∧ faB]
C
C
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
faA ∧ faB) is sound with respect to our semantics.
To that end, take an arbitrary model M and w ∈ W . In order to show this rule is
sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the proofs are shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ A i B,
2) ∆ ⊧ C
We need to show that Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f a A ∧ f a B}) ⊧ C.
To that end, assume that M,w ⊧ Γ, and M,w ⊧∆ ∖ {f a A ∧ f a B}.
By 1) we know that ∃t ∈ D such that t ∈ V (w,A) and t ∈ V (w,B). Call one such
object s.
Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction we
have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧∆∖{f a A∧f a B}, since f does not occur in ∆∖{f a A∧f a B}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f a A since c′(f) ∈ VM′(w,A) and M′,w ⊧ f a B since c′(f) ∈
VM′(w,B).
So M′,w ⊧∆, and so M′,w ⊧ C by 2).
But f does not occur in C and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ C.
Hence Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f a A ∧ f a B}) ⊧ C. This proves the soundness of the rule.
Exposition − We claim that the rule:
AoB
[faA ∧ feB]
C AiA
C
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
faA ∧ feB) is sound with respect to our semantics.
In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the
proofs are shorter):
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1) Ξ ⊧ AiA,
2) Γ ⊧ AoB, and
3) ∆ ⊧ C
From 1) Ξ ⊧ AiA and 2) Γ ⊧ AoB, it follows that (for all M and w ∈W ) if M,w ⊧ Γ∪Ξ
then V (w,A) ≠ ∅ and either V (w,A) = ∅ or V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B). This then entails that
V (w,A) ⊈ V (w,B) and so
4) ∃t ∈D such that t ∈ V (w,A) and t ∉ V (w,B).
We need to show that Γ ∪Ξ ∪ (∆ ∖ {faA ∧ feB}) ⊧ C.
To that end, take an arbitrary model M and world w, and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ,
M,w ⊧ Ξ, and M,w ⊧∆ ∖ {faA ∧ feB}.
By 4) we know that ∃t ∈ D such that t ∈ V (w,A) and t ∉ V (w,B). Call one such
object s.
Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧∆∖{faA∧feB}, since f does not occur in ∆∖{faA∧feB}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ faA since c′(f) ∈ VM′(w,A) and M′,w ⊧ feB since c′(f) ∉
VM′(w,B).
So M′,w ⊧∆, and so M′,w ⊧ C by 3).
But f does not occur in C and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ C.
Hence Γ ∪Ξ ∪ (∆ ∖ {faA ∧ feB}) ⊧ C. This proves the soundness of the rule.
Exposition L+ We claim that the rule:
A
L
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f La B]
C
C
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
f
M
a A ∧ f La B) is sound with respect to our semantics.
To that end, take an arbitrary model, M and w ∈W . Then note that by the inductive
hypothesis (since the proofs are shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ A Li B,
2) ∆ ⊧ C
We need to show that Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f La B}) ⊧ C.
To that end, assume that M,w ⊧ Γ, and M,w ⊧∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f La B}.
By 1) we know that ∃t ∈ D such that t ∈ M(w,A) and t ∈ L(w,B). Call one such
object s.
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Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧ ∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f La B}, since f does not occur in ∆ ∖ {f Ma
A ∧ f La B}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f Ma A since c′(f) ∈ M(w,A) and M′,w ⊧ f La B since c′(f) ∈
L(w,B).
So M′,w ⊧∆, and so M′,w ⊧ C by 2).
But f does not occur in C and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ C.
Hence Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f La B}) ⊧ C. This proves the soundness of the rule.
Exposition L− We claim that the rule:
A
L
o B
[f Ma A ∧ f Le B]
C A
M
i A
C
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
faA ∧ feB) is sound with respect to our semantics.
In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the
proofs are shorter):
1) Ξ ⊧ A Mi A,
2) Γ ⊧ A Lo B, and
3) ∆ ⊧ C
From 1) Ξ ⊧ A Mi A and 2) Γ ⊧ A Lo B, it follows that (for all M and w ∈W ) if M,w ⊧ Γ∪Ξ
then M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and either M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈ M(w,B). This then entails
that M(w,A) ⊈M(w,B) and so
4) ∃t ∈D such that t ∈M(w,A) and t ∉M(w,B).
We need to show that Γ ∪Ξ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Le B}) ⊧ C.
To that end, take an arbitrary model M and world w, and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ,
M,w ⊧ Ξ, and M,w ⊧∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Le B}.
By 4) we know that ∃t ∈ D such that t ∈ M(w,A) and t ∉ M(w,B). Call one such
object s.
Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧ ∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Le B}, since f does not occur in ∆ ∖ {f Ma
A ∧ f Le B}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f Ma A since c′(f) ∈ M(w,A) and M′,w ⊧ f Le B since c′(f) ∉
M(w,B).
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So M′,w ⊧∆, and so M′,w ⊧ C by 3).
But f does not occur in C and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ C.
Hence Γ ∪Ξ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Le B}) ⊧ C. This proves the soundness of the rule.
Exposition M+ We claim that the rule:
A
M
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Ma B]
C
C
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
f
M
a A ∧ f Ma B) is sound with respect to our semantics. To that end, take an arbitrary
model M and world w ∈W and note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the proofs
are shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ A Mi B,
2) ∆ ⊧ C
We need to show that Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Ma B}) ⊧ C.
To that end, assume that M,w ⊧ Γ, and M,w ⊧∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Ma B}.
By 1) we know that ∃t ∈ D such that t ∈ M(w,A) and t ∈ M(w,B). Call one such
object s.
Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧ ∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Ma B}, since f does not occur in ∆ ∖ {f Ma
A ∧ f Ma B}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f Ma A since c′(f) ∈ M(w,A) and M′,w ⊧ f Ma B since c′(f) ∈
M(w,B).
So M′,w ⊧∆, and so M′,w ⊧ C by 2).
But f does not occur in C and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ C.
Hence Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Ma B}) ⊧ C. This proves the soundness of the rule.
Exposition M− We claim that the rule:
A
M
o B
[f Ma A ∧ f Me B]
C A
M
i A
C
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
f
M
a A ∧ f Me B) is sound with respect to our semantics.
In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the
proofs are shorter):
1) Ξ ⊧ A Mi A,
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2) Γ ⊧ A Mo B, and
3) ∆ ⊧ C
From 1) Ξ ⊧ A Mi A and 2) Γ ⊧ A Lo B, it follows that (for all M and w ∈W ) if M,w ⊧ Γ∪Ξ
then M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and either M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B). This then entails
that M(w,A) ⊈ L(w,B) and so
4) ∃t ∈D such that t ∈M(w,A) and t ∉ L(w,B).
We need to show that Γ ∪Ξ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Me B}) ⊧ C.
To that end, take an arbitrary model M and world w, and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ,
M,w ⊧ Ξ, and M,w ⊧∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Me B}.
By 4) we know that ∃t ∈ D such that t ∈ M(w,A) and t ∉ L(w,B). Call one such
object s.
Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧ ∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Me B}, since f does not occur in ∆ ∖ {f Ma
A ∧ f Me B}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f Ma A since c′(f) ∈ M(w,A) and M′,w ⊧ f Me B since c′(f) ∉
L(w,B).
So M′,w ⊧∆, and so M′,w ⊧ C by 3).
But f does not occur in C and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ C.
Hence Γ ∪Ξ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Me B}) ⊧ C. This proves the soundness of the rule.
Exposition Q We claim that the rule:
A
Q
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Qa B]
C
C
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
f
M
a A ∧ f Qa B) is sound with respect to our semantics.
To that end, take an arbitrary model, M and w ∈ W and note that by the inductive
hypothesis (since the proofs are shorter):
1) Γ ⊧ A Qi B,
2) ∆ ⊧ C
We need to show that Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Qa B}) ⊧ C.
To that end, assume that M,w ⊧ Γ, and M,w ⊧∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Qa B}.
By 1) we know that ∃t ∈ D such that t ∈ M(w,A), t ∈ M(w,B), and t ∈ M(w,¬B)
(i.e. t ∈ Q(w,B)). Call one such object s.
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Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧ ∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Qa B}, since f does not occur in ∆ ∖ {f Ma
A ∧ f Qa B}.
Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f Ma A since c′(f) ∈ M(w,A) and M′,w ⊧ f Qa B since c′(f) ∈
M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B).
So M′,w ⊧∆, and so M′,w ⊧ C by 2).
But f does not occur in C and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ C.
Hence Γ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Qa B}) ⊧ C. This proves the soundness of the rule.
Exposition Q¯ We claim that the rule:
A
Q¯
i B
[f Ma A ∧ f Qa B]
C A
M
i A
C
(where f does not occur in any open assumption other than the discharged assumption
f
M
a A ∧ f Q¯a B) is sound with respect to our semantics.
In order to show this rule is sound, note that by the inductive hypothesis (since the
proofs are shorter):
1) Ξ ⊧ A Mi A,
2) Γ ⊧ A Q¯i B, and
3) ∆ ⊧ C
From 1) Ξ ⊧ A Mi A and 2) Γ ⊧ A Qi B, it follows that (for all M and w ∈W ) if M,w ⊧ Γ∪Ξ
then M(w,A) ≠ ∅ and either M(w,A) = ∅ or M(w,A) ⊈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)). This
then entails that M(w,A) ⊈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) and so
4) ∃t ∈D such that t ∈M(w,A) and t ∈ L(w,B) ∪L(w,¬B) i.e. t ∉ Q(w,B).
We need to show that Γ ∪Ξ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Q¯a B}) ⊧ C.
To that end, take an arbitrary model M and world w, and assume that M,w ⊧ Γ,
M,w ⊧ Ξ, and M,w ⊧∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Q¯a B}.
By 4) we know that ∃t ∈ D such that t ∈ M(w,A) and t ∉ Q(w,B). Call one such
object s.
Let c′ be an assignment that differs from c at most in that c′(f) = s. By construction
we have c′ ∼f c. Then M′,w ⊧ ∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Q¯a B}, since f does not occur in ∆ ∖ {f Ma
A ∧ f Q¯a B}.
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Moreover, M′,w ⊧ f Ma A since c′(f) ∈ M(w,A) and M′,w ⊧ f Q¯a B since c′(f) ∈
L(w,B) ∪L(w,¬B).
So M′,w ⊧∆, and so M′,w ⊧ C by 3).
But f does not occur in C and c∼f c′, so it follows by Observation 1 that M,w ⊧ C.
Hence Γ ∪Ξ ∪ (∆ ∖ {f Ma A ∧ f Q¯a B}) ⊧ C. This proves the soundness of the rule.
DDO :
We claim that the rule:
A a B d a A
d a B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A a B and ∆ ⊧ d a A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A a B and
M,w ⊧ d a A. It then follows that V (w,A) ⊆ V (w,B) and c(d) ∈ V (w,A). Hence
c(d) ∈ V (w,B) and so M,w ⊧ d a B. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d a B.
DDN We claim that the rule:
A e B d a A
d e B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A e B and ∆ ⊧ d a A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A e B and
M,w ⊧ d a A. It then follows that V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) = ∅ and c(d) ∈ V (w,A). Hence
c(d) ∉ V (w,B) and so M,w ⊧ d e B. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d e B.
DDN We claim that the rule:
A e B d a B
d e A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A e B and ∆ ⊧ d a B. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A e B and
M,w ⊧ d a B. It then follows that V (w,A) ∩ V (w,B) = ∅ and c(d) ∈ V (w,B). Hence
c(d) ∉ V (w,A) and so M,w ⊧ d e A. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d e A.
DDO We claim that the rule:
A
L
a B d
M
a A
d
L
a B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A La B and ∆ ⊧ d Ma A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A La B and
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M,w ⊧ d Ma A. It then follows that M(w,A) ⊆ L(w,B) and c(d) ∈ M(w,A). Hence
c(d) ∈ L(w,B) and so M,w ⊧ d La B. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d La B.
DDN We claim that the rule:
A
L
e B d
M
a A
d
L
e B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A Le B and ∆ ⊧ d Ma A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A Le B and
M,w ⊧ d Ma A. It then follows that M(w,A)∩M(w,B) = ∅ and c(d) ∈M(w,A). Hence
c(d) ∉M(w,B) and so M,w ⊧ d Le B. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d Le B.
DDN We claim that the rule:
A
L
e B d
M
a B
d
L
e A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A Le B and ∆ ⊧ d Ma B. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A Le B and
M,w ⊧ d Ma B. It then follows that M(w,A)∩M(w,B) = ∅ and c(d) ∈M(w,B). Hence
c(d) ∉M(w,A) and so M,w ⊧ d Le A. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d Le A.
DDO We claim that the rule:
A
M
a B d
M
a A
d
M
a B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A Ma B and ∆ ⊧ d Ma A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A Ma B and
M,w ⊧ d Ma A. It then follows that M(w,A) ⊆ M(w,B) and c(d) ∈ M(w,A). Hence
c(d) ∈M(w,B) and so M,w ⊧ d Ma B. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d Ma B.
DDN We claim that the rule:
A
M
e B d
M
a A
d
M
e B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A Me B and ∆ ⊧ d Ma A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A Me B and
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M,w ⊧ d Ma A. It then follows that M(w,A) ∩ L(w,B) = ∅ and c(d) ∈M(w,A). Hence
c(d) ∉ L(w,B) and so M,w ⊧ d Me B. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d Me B.
DDN We claim that the rule:
A
M
e B d
L
a B
d
L
e A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A Me B and ∆ ⊧ d La B. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A Me B and
M,w ⊧ d La B. It then follows that M(w,A) ∩ L(w,B) = ∅ and c(d) ∈ L(w,B). Hence
c(d) ∉M(w,A) and so M,w ⊧ d Le A. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d Le A.
DDO We claim that the rule:
A
Q
a B d
M
a A
d
Q
a B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A Qa B and ∆ ⊧ d Ma A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧∆. Then M,w ⊧ A Qa B and M,w ⊧
d
M
a A. It then follows that M(w,A) ⊆ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) and c(d) ∈ M(w,A).
Hence c(d) ∈ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) and so M,w ⊧ d Qa B. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d Qa B.
DDO We claim that the rule:
A
Q¯
a B d
M
a A
d
Q¯
a B
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ A Q¯a B and ∆ ⊧ d Ma A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ A Qa B and
M,w ⊧ d Ma A. It then follows that M(w,A) ∩ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) = ∅ and c(d) ∈
M(w,A). Hence c(d) ∉ (M(w,B) ∩M(w,¬B)) and so c(d) ∈ (L(w,B) ∪ L(w,¬B)).
M,w ⊧ d Q¯a B. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d Q¯a B.
Q¯-Out We claim that the rule:
d
Q¯
a A d
M
a A
d
L
a A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
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By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ d Q¯a A and ∆ ⊧ d Ma A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ d Q¯a A and
M,w ⊧ d Ma A. Then it follows that c(d) ∈ L(w,A) ∪ L(w,¬A) and c(d) ∈ M(w,A).
From c(d) ∈ M(w,A) it follows that c(d) ∉ L(w,¬A). Hence c(d) ∈ L(w,A) and so
M,w ⊧ d La A. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d La A.
Q¯-Out We claim that the rule:
d
Q¯
a A d
M
e A
d
L
e A
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ d Q¯a A and ∆ ⊧ d Me A. Take an arbitrary
model M, and w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ and M,w ⊧ ∆. Then M,w ⊧ d Q¯a A and
M,w ⊧ d Me A. Then it follows that c(d) ∈ L(w,A) ∪ L(w,¬A) and c(d) ∉ L(w,A).
Hence c(d) ∈ L(w,¬A) and so c(d) ∉M(w,A). So M,w ⊧ d Le A. Hence Γ ∪∆ ⊧ d Le A.∧ Elimination We claim that the rule:
φ ∧ ψ
φ
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ φ ∧ ψ. Take an arbitrary model M, and
w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ φ ∧ ψ. Hence M,w ⊧ φ and M,w ⊧ ψ. So
M,w ⊧ φ and Γ ⊧ φ.∧ Elimination We claim that the rule:
φ ∧ ψ
ψ
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ φ ∧ ψ. Take an arbitrary model M, and
w ∈ W such that M,w ⊧ Γ. Then M,w ⊧ φ ∧ ψ. Hence M,w ⊧ φ and M,w ⊧ ψ. So
M,w ⊧ ψ and Γ ⊧ ψ.
Ex Falso Quodlibet We claim that the rule:
φ C(φ)
ψ
is sound with respect to our semantics.
By our inductive hypothesis we have Γ ⊧ φ and ∆ ⊧ C(φ). We claim that Γ∪∆ ⊧ ψ for
any formula ψ. To see this, take an arbitrary model M, and w ∈W such that M,w ⊧ Γ
and M,w ⊧∆. Then M,w ⊧ φ and M,w ⊧ C(φ). But this is impossible, as φ and C(φ)
are contradictory. So the antecedent is false, and it follows that Γ ∪∆ ⊧ ψ regardless of
choice of ψ.
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I waited patiently for the LORD; 
    He inclined to me and heard my cry. 
Psalm 40, English Standard Version 
